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In the course o f a research journey that spans years, there are times when a student, by 
pure chance, stumbles over diamonds. Gems cut out of the sheer brilliance of the intellect, 
which glow, sparkle and affect the course of one’s expedition. For each and every chapter of 
this thesis, I was lucky to find diamonds whose spark enlightened the path ahead. Two of 
those I shall mention. Nathaniel Berman’s remarkable article on ‘Sovereignty in Abeyance’ 
(published in 1988/89) was crucial in formulating the thesis of the second chapter. Another 
key text, authored by VerdroQ/Simma/Geiger in 1980, inspired my attempt to apply the 
‘divorce’ between sovereign title and effective control to the case of Kosovo. I found the 
article after six months o f agony over how to approach with what is known, among EUI 
researchers, as the 'June Paperi.
Just as pieces of academic research, one also discovers people; conversations can be as 
inspiring as gazing into the heart o f a jewel. I have incurred many debts in writing this thesis 
and most o f all, I am grateful to my supervisor at the EUI, Pierre-Marie Dupuy, for providing 
direction and perspective and for steering me away from many pitfalls. He has done so with 
ça senseof humour that managed to keep my enthusiasm in check. I hold him accountable 
fofconvincing me to expand my Master's thesis into a dissertation. I would like to extend 
special thanks to the Institute for Legal Studies of Madison Law School, and in particular 
Heinz Klug, for support during an extremely productive semester as visiting scholar at the 
University of Wisconsin.
As Grandin observed in the preface to his study of Mayan cultural and national identity in 
Guatemala, acknowledgements perform an essential Marxist task: they situate the 
production of individual work in a long chain of influence and encouragement.1 In this vein, I 
am most indebted to Elisabeth and Re/n/io/d.jiny-parents, and my sister Barbara who shone 
from afar, and were ever so close, particularly in the first year of my work in Florence, which, 
for many reasons, was miserable, sinister, and just sad. I would also like to express my 
appreciation and sense of profound gratitude to ¿/saGopa/aJCnsûflan, of the EUI, for the 
light shed, the conversations shared, the sacrifices made, which were màny.
In Kosovo, I thank many collègues and friends both within and outside the international 
mission for their encouragement, inspiration and the valuable documentary material. Among 
them were Carsten Weber and Franklin de Vrieze of the OSCE Mission, Dardan Gashi, now 
with the Kosovo Ministry of Local Governance, Izabella Karlowicz and Tim Cooper at UNMIK 
and Judith Safar at the European Union Pillar’s Legal Department. Without the rigorous 
guidance of OSCE Ambassadors Daan Everts and Pascal Fiesci and their respective Chefs 
the Cabinet, Andrew Joscelyne and Mark Etherington, I would not have received the pro­
fessional insights that enabled me to probe deeper into the tensions underlying an inter­
national institution-building mandate.
Within Kosovo’s closer periphery, I am indebted to Eric Manton and Ewald Orf at the respec­
tive OSCE Mission Headquarters in Skopje and Belgrade, Gerald Knaus of the European
1 1ntroduction to The Blood o f Guatemala. A History o f Race and Nation (Duke UP, 2000).
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Stability Initiative, Michael Weiner of the Austrian Development Agency in Sarajevo, Fried- 
helm Frischenschlager and Catherine Clarke.
I would like to extend my sense of appreciation to Christoph Schreuer of the University of 
Vienna, Verena Ringler of the Foreign Policy Magazine at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace in Washington, David del Vecchio of UNFPA in New York, Morag 
Goodwin and Richard Giesen of the Universities of Maastricht and Gießen respectively, and 
Michael Kamitschnig o f the European Commission, for reading, commenting and improving 
on earlier drafts of the thesis.
I like to thank loana Tudor for the love, enthusiasm and unfaltering support during the five 
mad months prior to the completion of the thesis. This work would also have taken a 
different path had it not been fo r the precious advice and enduring friendship of both Marcus 
Brand o f the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw and Wolfgang 
Sporrer, now with the OSCE Mission in Albania.
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The growing number of international organisations involved in ‘state-building’ and the scope 
of authority they exercise raises a number of important questions under international law -  
as to the status of UN-administered territories, the nature o f UN authority, its legal basis in 
the UN Charter, and its limitations, for example. By looking at the ways through which 
international authority carries out internationalisation projects, the thesis aims to explain how 
legal instruments were designed in order to respond to a spatio-temporal need of the 
international community. It adopts a broad topological style which interrogates where and 
how to ‘locate’ the background assumptions guiding the idea of international fiduciary 
administration, in legal and philosophical space.
By supplying complementary theoretical frameworks to account for instances of suspended 
sovereignty, the thesis presents a synoptic vision of the notion of internationalisation of 
territory and the extent to which multilateral institution-building missions share features with, 
and can be distinguished from, projects undertaken under the Mandate- and Trusteeship 
systems. It utilises institutions o f both private law (agency, trusteeship, servitude) and public 
law (wardship, the status o f organs) to analyse the dual nature of international 
administrations. Firstly, an international administration represents a non-state territorial entity 
on the international plane as agent ex lege. Second, the thesis investigates the organic 
framework through which an ancillary organ of the UN dispenses temporary political 
authority in order to carry out the functions, and meet the needs, of the international 
community. The constructive approach to international legal personality solidifies the argu­
ment that a non-state territorial entity administered by the international community may base 
its claim towards partial personality on a legal argument.
The doctorate follows a trajectory that outlines the phenomenon of 'dual functionality' 
throughout colonialism, trusteeship administration, military occupation and territorial ad­
ministration on the basis of an international mandate. The notion of the fiduciary bond under­
pin all examples which illustrate that the more 'international’ the mandate of a territorial ad­
ministration, the more pronounced its assumption of agency and pursuit of the ‘territorial’ 
interest. Both frames are applied to the UN Council for Namibia and to the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The tensions resulting from the simulta­
neous performance, by the same actor, of the functions of territorial agent and international 
organ accompany the investigation into the status o f Kosovo in public international law. 
Moreover, the thesis examines certain inherent shortcomings to an ‘open-ended’ institution- 
building operation where the future status of the entity in statu nascendi remains undecided. 
Focusing on the internal political and legal order o f an internationalised territory, the thesis 
notes that the rule of an international administration is subject to an ‘anomalous’ legitimacy 
cycle. The fundamental indeterminacy of law, gaps in statutory instruments and in human 
rights protection further expose the frailty of transitional administrations.
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Introduction
The United Nations is, for good reasons, reluctant to assume responsibility 
for maintaining law and order, nor can it impose 
a new political structure or new state institutions. ' 2
W hat we are involved in is nothing else 
than building up the whole state from scratch.’ 3
‘United Nations Imperium; The Legal Status of Territories Subject to the Administration of 
International Organisations’ is the result of three years of research at the European Urfrersity 
Institute in Florence, including one semester which I spent at Madison Law School. The idea 
behind the work presented here and submitted for review in August 2005 was conceived in 
Prishtina, Kosovo, in the winter of 2001. My daily professional exposure led \^d me to apply 
for a grant at the EUI, emerging out of an urge to reflect more profoundly upon some of the 
legal implications of ‘political trusteeship’, and particularly on the assumption of temporary 
imperium over territory by the United Nations. In the hectic environment of the Office of the 
Chef de Cabinet in the OSCE Mission, I came to realise that a background theory for 
institution-building had to be found somewhere out there. Only a strong theoretical 
grounding, I believed, could provide a recipe for good practice, whether in Kosovo or in 
Afghanistan.
In fact, there is nothing like a ’grand theory, nor do institution-building models wait on 
shelves, ready to be picked up on demand. Rather, as Selo correctly observes in her thesis 
on international institution-building in Bosnia, such models are "crafted through trial and error 
process, sculptured by a long succession of moves, deadlocks, and breakthroughs”.4 
However, back in that long winter o f 2001 in Prishtina, I decided to analyse aspects of the 
evolution of international law and the ways in which it has devised various models of 
international administration. Ensuing conversations with friends and colleagues (which would 
prove most inspiring for applying to the EUI) gravitated around some of the concepts that 
appear and re-appear throughout this thesis: title to territory, self-determination, sovereignty, 
internationalism, rule of law, fiduciary obligation, ownership, legitimacy, sacred trust, legal 
personality, and so forth. All these key terms turned out to appear in the writing o f scholars 
who pronounced, eight decades ago, on the ‘experimentalism’ with which the League of 
Nations had pursued its respective internationalisation projects. From this historical 
perspective, the idea of a re-appearance of trusteeships in the context of countering threats 
to international peace and security provided encouragement to probe deeper into the 
backround assumptions underlying the concept of ‘internationalisation’.
Every research design involves trade-offs, and this thesis is no exception. The LL.M. 
proposal I sent to the EUI dealt with human rights protection in a ‘stateless state’ and my
2 Boutros-Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary- 
General on the Occasion o f the Fiftieth Anniversary o f the United Nations, UN Doc. A/50/60- 
S/1995/1 (3 January 1995), §14.
3 Kosovo-based OSCE official, cited in Patrick Smyth, ‘In Kosovo Everything From Teachers to Power 
Workers Must Be Provided’, Irish Times (9 November 1999), at 14.
4 Senada Selo Sabic, State-Building Under Foreign Supervision: Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996-2003 
(Ph.D. thesis, on file with the EUI, 2003), at 121.
1  n i l
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thinking (in the wake of the Strasbourg Court's decision in the Bankovid case and drawing 
from its reasoning in the Loizidou dictum) that the ECHR could possibly be applied extra- 
territorially, thus vesting the population under international tutelage with an additional 
protective instrument Looking at the thesis as it now stands -  or, more accurately, as it 
lingers in its final stages -  disappointingly little analysis is offered on the issue of human 
rights protection in Kosovo. The work also falls short o f my initial expectations of closely 
examining the sphere of international responsibility o f international organisations for wrongful 
acts -  an issue currently under consideration by the International Law Commission -  which I 
meant to apply to the UN as it assumes more and more functions in administering territory. 
The reason for these shortcomings is I felt that the necessity to address the -  usually 
overlooked -  conceptual problems underpinning the temporary internationalisation of 
territory overrides my quest to answer these specific questions of public international and 
European human rights law.
Thus I began my work where all lawyers are meant to start: at the question of legal basis. My 
initial intention to examine the conceptual assumptions underlying the internationalisation of 
territory (specifically those concerning international agency) in a brief and succinct manner 
gradually ceded to a fascination with the phenomenon of the dual functions an international 
trustee is mandated to pursue and the ways in which international law reaches the subjects 
of its concern ‘directly’, without the intermediation of sovereignty. Predictably, the more 
intensive my investigation into general issues of fiduciary administration grew, the less I 
concerned myself with the ‘concrete’ legal problems o f human rights protection and 
responsibility. Now, as I re-read the initial research proposal which I found loitering in the 
depths of my laptop, I was briefly under the impression that I had chanced upon another 
person’s outline. This is of course not the case. Yet, as most students discover who are 
engaged in a writing project o f this magnitude, I came to realise that research opens a 
surprising number of doors behind which lurk beasts and problems of diverse colour and 
Gestalt whose appeal is bound to hold one’s intellect hostage for months.
A thematical preface introduces the reader to the discursive fields in which the issues under 
consideration undergo current academic treatment. I shall mention two related discourses in 
the following section. One concerns the ways in which generic tools and models for 
reconstructing societies can be assembled and applied across the board. The other relates 
to the exercise of new competencies by the international community and the use of 
terminology to describe some of its excesses.
(i) International Administrations and the Discourse of Empire
Since the mid-1990s, the United Nations and other multilateral bodies have increasingly 
asserted authority for the administration of war-tom territories. The far-reaching engagement 
of the UN in the process of state and institution-building was the result of an increased 
multilateral and civilian effort to create democratic institutions and market economies as a 
basis for sustainable peace in societies exiting conflict As such, these efforts were facilita­
ted by a changed architecture o f security in the post-Cold W ar era5 and the complementary
5 C f„ generally, Richard Haass, Intervention. The Use o f American Military Force in the Post-Cold 
War World (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1999), 16; Karin von Hippel, Democracy by 
Force. US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World (New York: CUP, 2000), at 10; and
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redefinition of the notion of 'threat to the peace’ in Article 39 of the UN Charter, resulting in 
an extension of the Security Council's (SC) enforcement powers to internal armed conflicts 
and grave humanitarian crises.* 6 The authorisation of peace-building operations, character­
ised by a crescending use of powers under Chapter VII o f the UN Charter and at the same 
time by an increasing willingness to apply diverse enforcement measures under Article 41, 
has grown both quantitatively and qualitatively.7 This development occurred as chronic 
political instability, or even the outright implosion of states, posed a challenge to the inter­
national legal order.
The growing number of international organisations involved in ‘state-building’ and the scope 
of authority they exercise raises a number of important questions under international law -  
as to the status of UN-administered territories, the nature o f UN authority, its legal basis in 
the UN Charter, and its limitations, for example. Among scholars, these new approaches to 
conflict management have ignited a debate over the fundamental purposes of such practice 
and the extent to which policy-making towards those end can be improved. In this discourse, 
it has become commonplace to observe that in the life-cycle of an international territorial 
administration, there will come a time when the domestic political system has developed to 
the point where local politicians become critical and suspicious of the continued exercise of 
the international organ's discharge of public authority. Their ensuing calls for an end to 
foreign dominance generates vastly different responses. They may be addressed by a 
continuous devolution of power (as in East Timor under international tutelage), or they may 
be answered with a renewed assertion of international power (as exemplified in Bosnia in its 
tenth year under close international supervision).
A cursory review of relevant literature indicates that the ‘rule by decree’ approach to 
international institution-building has lost much of its appeal. Critics have compared the IC's 
reassertion o f authority in Bosnia to the British Raj in early nineteenth-century India, likening 
the international High Representative to an “uncomfortable caricature of a Utilitarian des­
pot".8'There, the ongoing imposition of legislation is seen to deprive local political institutions 
of any responsibility and reduces elected assemblies to toothless bodies rubberstamping 
legislation not of their own making., Referring to its transitional administration of East Timor, 
Chopra analogised the competences o f the Special Representative of the UN Secretary- 
General to those of “a pre-constitutional monarch in a sovereign kingdom"9 where models of 
good governance are developed through the discharge of ‘benevolent despotism’. Likewise, 
Justice Goldstone concluded that an overbroad international authority in Kosovo would be ‘a
James Dobbins et al., The UN’s Role in Nation-Building. From the Congo to Iraq (RAND 
Corporation, 2005).
6 For a general discussion cf. Dan Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development o f Collective 
Security. The Delegation by the Security Council o f Chapter VII Powers (Oxford: OUP, 1999).
7 For enforcement measures cf, David Schweigman, The Authority o f the Security Council under 
Chapter VII o f the UN Charter. Legal Limits and the Role o f the International Court o f Justice (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law, 2001), at 51.
8 For a ‘neo-Burkean’ critique of the interventionist paradigm interpreted as imperialist concept in 
disguise, see Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, ‘Travails of the .European Raj: Lessons from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’, 14:3 Journal o f Democracy 60-74 (2003), 66-67. Cf. also European Stability 
Initiative, Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Part 2: International Power 
in Bosnia (March 2000).
9 Jarat Chopra, The UN's Kingdom of East Timor1, 42:3 Survival 27-36 (2000), at 27-28.
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mistake o f the colonial mentality".10 From this vantage point, the internationally supervised 
political reconstruction of Kosovo and Bosnia appears evocative of the ‘White Man’s Burden’ 
that proved a powerful justification of nineteenth century empires.11
Recent criticism s of the international administration of territory follow a thread of thought that 
can be traced back to Edmund Burke's eloquent formulation of the fiduciary duties of a 
colonial power, and the notions o f accountability the latter must be subject to.12 Following 
Burke, present writing on the topic is mostly concerned with elaborating the argument that 
progress towards developing democratic structures is, through a process of local mimicry, 
bound to remain slow and incomplete if the means employed towards that end resemble 
authoritarian administration.13 Chesterman phrases what he believes to be the central policy 
dilemma facing international administrations in the following way: “how does one help a 
population prepare for democratic governance and the rule of law by imposing a form of 
benevolent autocracy?"14
‘Participatory’ models that include both in-built provisions for establishing a partnership with 
local institutions and constitutional structures tying international authority into the long-term 
interest o f the governed population are frequently invoked as potentially more successful in 
the medium term and more sustainable in the long run.15 Recent treatments o f this subject 
matter emphasise the importance o f good governance, accountability and legitimacy in the 
context o f the international community’s transitional administration of territory. In what 
appears to be an onslaught representing the prevalent peace-building orthodoxy, Ignatieff 
critiques what he terms the ‘neocolonialist' aspects of international territorial administration
10 Goldstone quoted by Jacob S. Kreilkamp, ‘U.N. Postconflict Reconstruction’, 35 NYUJILP 619-670 
(2003), at 668.
11 For BiH, cf. David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 
at 64. Accordingly, Europe is regularly charged with ‘postcotonial imperialism’ in its neighbourhood. 
Cf., e.g., Ian Johnstone, UN Peacebuilding: Consent, Coercion and the Crisis o f State Failure. From 
Territorial Sovereignty Human Security 186 (Canadian Council o f International Law, 2000), at 196. A 
similarly stereotypical image of peace-building is painted by Roland Paris, ‘International Peace­
building and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice", 28 Review o f international Studies 637-656 (2002).
12 Cf. Edmund Burke’s celebrated speech in the House of Commons in support of Charles Fox’s 
motion to abolish the East India Company’s dominion in India (1 December 1783), ‘The Writing and 
Speeches of Edmund Burke’, in India: Madras and Bengal (vol. V ed. by P.J. Marshall, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981), at 385. See also Mark Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of 
Backward Territory in International Law (London: Longmans, 1926), at 330.
13 Cf. Richard Caplan, A New Trusteeship? The International Administration o f War-Tom Territories 
(Adelphi Paper 341, Oxford: OUP, 2002), at 54-55. To give another representative quote, Kreilkamp 
believes that the legacy of colonialism “suggests that total coercive control over distant regions, 
wielded by unaccountable individuals, is a poor recipe for 'building' sustainable, independent 
political structures’  (‘Reconstruction’, supra note 10, at 668).
14 Simon Chesterman, You, the People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State- 
Building (Oxford: OUP 2004), at 127. Cf. also the Report by the Council of Europe Political Affairs 
Committee, Strengthening o f Democratic Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Doc. 10196, 4 
June 2004), §35. The report is an example of the excessive tone with which the CoE launches its 
diatribes against the High Representative. Referring to the HR’s continuing authority to dismiss 
public officials that he finds in breach of the Dayton Agreements, the Rapporteur believes that “such 
powers run counter to the basic principles of democracy and are reminiscent o f a totalitarian 
regime’  (§39, emphasis supplied).
15 Cf., generally, Ian Smillie (ed.), Patronage or Partnership: Local Capacity Building in Humanitarian 
Crises (Westport, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 2001); Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: 
The Learning Curve (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); 
UNDP, Development Dimensions o f Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building (study prepared by B. 
Wood, New York: UNDP, 2001). '
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and the tendency of international agents to ‘perennialise’ their stronghold over key 
competencies:
The United Nations once oversaw discrete development projects. Now it takes over political 
and administrative infrastructure of entire nations and rebuilds them from scratch... (T]here is 
an imperial premise at work here: Wealthy strangers are taking upon themselves the right to 
rule over those too poor, too conflict-ridden, to rule themselves. If it is...imperialism, is it 
benign? Only if it succeeds: if [the territory] leams to rule itself, then these well-paid agents of 
the international conscience do themselves out of a job. But no one knows if it will succeed. 
And the omens are not auspicious.16
These associations -  ‘benign imperialism’, ‘autocracy’ reminiscent of a ‘totalitarian regime’, 
'sovereign kingdom', 'dictatorship of virtue’ -  and the authorities that rule them -  ‘benevolent 
despof, ‘pre-constitutional monarch’, ‘neo-colonial administration’17 -  have considerable 
appeal. They are easily comprehensible. Under closer scrutiny they do, however, harbour 
distinct and mutually exclusive identities. The fiduciary exercise of administrative powers with 
the authorisation of the UN Security Council differs significantly from imperial or colonial rule 
where tasks were carried out in the interest of the metropolitan power. Detached from the 
context of decolonisation, references to the alleged resurrection of the UN’s Trusteeship 
system will also not suffice to capture the most important features of the phenomenon of 
internationalisation. As Bain observes, it is impossible to confirm the ‘reality’ of a resurrected 
practice of trusteeship on account of the extraordinary executive and legislative powers 
exhibited in cases that are in fact constitutionally different The attempt to “trade on the 
paternal discourse of empire, which embraced trusteeship in a righteous mission of 
civilisation ordained by divine providence, is, in this particular context misleading”.18 One of 
the underlying themes of this dissertation will be that such metaphorical extensions are 
indeed ill-suited to capture the elusive phenomenon of international territorial administration 
and the peculiar ways in which it temporarily configures public life.
In a second, related discourse, it has become en vogue to proceed from Bosnia via Kosovo 
to East Tim or (and extend the trajectory to Afghanistan and Iraq). The framework of 
international authority set up by the Dayton Peace Agreement for BiH is regularly juxtaposed 
with that o f UN Security Council Resolutions 1244 and 1272(1999), mandating UNMIK and 
the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor respectively. Contrasting scopes of 
authority, operational aims, bureaucratic organisation, and endeavouring to cross-evaluate 
performance and measure the pace o f devolution of competencies have become stalwart 
features of comparative studies o f international institution-building.
Yet, finding reliable ways to gauge these items and analysing how they cluster at the level of 
whole polities usually proves d ifficu lt19 Comparing evidence of a policy’s impact in one
16 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor. Ethnic War and Modem Conscience (New York: Henry Holt, 
1997), at 79-80.
17 All previous characterisations mentioned here appear in the literature quoted above, except 
‘dictatorship of virtue' (in: Robert M. Hayden, ‘Why Political Union Cannot be Imposed by Foreign 
Powers. Bosnia: The Contradictions o f “Democracy" Without Consent’ , 7:2 EECR (1998)).
18 William Bain, Between Anarchy and Society. Trusteeship and the Obligations o f Power (Oxford: 
OUP, 2003), at 148 and 149.
19 As Schmrtter aptly remarked in what amounts to a substantial self-critique of his quality-of- 
democracy research, “one type of organisation for which there exists data -  whether it is trade
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institution-building context with policies that are pursued under different local conditions is a 
tricky occupation indeed. The overwhelming number of items that would have to be correla­
ted suggests that comparative studies can only explain the impact o f a segment of 
institution-building policies. Notwithstanding such methodological difficulties, proponents of 
comparative studies in international institution and peace building are eager to move rapidly 
from the realm of theory and disputation to the task of ‘getting on with reality’. Those who 
'model’ international administration have allowed themselves in a number of instances to 
over-promise and to arouse expectations that w ill not be fulfilled in the immediate future. 
Operating in a world over-eager for prompt results, they frame sweeping recommendations 
concerning ‘ingredients’ for successful peace-building by suggesting standardised socio­
economic 'tool-kits’ -  or even 'standard operating procedures’ -  that should aid the develop­
ment o f liberal democracy in internationalised territories.20 In short, the elaboration of a 
normative framework for multilateral intervention -  very much aimed at conceiving modules 
for a 'Government out of the Box’ -  has undoubtedly become an academic growth discipline 
in which its exponents make passionate assessments o f the impact o f ‘models’ o f inter­
national territorial governance.21
Passion is, however, a distortive lens that makes it hard to perceive the precise shape of 
things. By looking solely at ‘output’ variables, studies of international missions tend to ignore 
crucial aspects and dispositive issues that would contribute to a macro-performance 
analysis. As Feldman recently remarked, the assumption that successful institutions can be 
built on the basis of a menu of options in which the nation-builder chooses a “parliamentary 
system from column A, judicial review from column B, and a type of federalism from column 
C" is highly problematic.22 While broad organisational templates may be transferable, a 
state-building project is sensitive to the nature o f the recipient and the local body politic.
(ii) Methodological Frames and Structure of the T hesis
The task I have set myself in writing this thesis is decidedly more modest. Its objective 
consists in interrogating the idiosyncratic character of trusteeship and the multifarious ways 
in which it became subjected to legal appropriation by international society in the twentieth 
century. In other words, this thesis is an exercise in exploring the legal background 
assumptions and frames that inform theories o f international institution-building under 
temporary trustee administration. Its underlying objective is to  rescue public international law
unions or bowling societies -  can be quite unrepresentative o f collective actions that are occurring 
elsewhere in society* ('The Ambiguous Virtues o f Democracy’ , 15:4 Journal o f Democracy 47 
(2004), at 50). However, for a useful analysis comparing such administrations’ activities within 
sector-specific competencies, see Richard Caplan, International Governance o f War-Tom Terri­
tories. Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford: OUP, 2005), at 45 et seq.
20 For an example of such scattered analysis see Outi Korhonen and Jutta Gras, International 
Governance in Post-Conflict Situations (Helsinki: Forum Juris, 2001), at 145 et seq. For further 
examples o f sweeping generalisations on the legitimacy of models of ‘proxy governance’ see, e.g., 
Fen O. Hampson, ‘Can Peacebuilding Work?’, 30 Cornell fLJ 701 (1997), at 707 et seq.
21 Cf. the report of the high-level workshop organised by the Crisis Management Initiative, State- 
Building and Strengthening o f Civilian Administration in Post-Conflict Societies and Failed States 
(Helsinki, September 2004), at 22 et seq. Regarding further suggestions to the UN to put together 
model legislation in ‘framework packages’ for an emergency legal system see also the 
recommendations in Honoring Human Rights under International Mandates: Lessons from Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and East 77mor(Washington, DC: Aspen Institute, 2003), at 19.
22 Noah Feldman, What We Owe Iraq. War and the Ethics o f Nation Building (Princeton/Oxford: 
Princeton UP, 2004), at 143, note 23.
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from its abduction by pragmatic management This seems particularly appropriate as the 
international system is rapidly developing, and experimenting with, new forms of political 
authority which enable it to effectively respond and directly participate in the governance of 
such territories with a view to restructuring their domestic constitutional order.23 A discussion 
of the spatial response of the international community, namely its imposition of a temporary 
international 'trusteeship', will form the outer margins o f the thesis. However, the legal 
frameworks discussed cannot be analysed in vacuo. They are naturally related to, and have 
their basis in, the realm of Vorstellungen of how international society should be designed. In 
short, these conceptions are predicated upon two assumptions. The method of 'internatio­
nalisation' is informed by a substantive belief in the universality and rationality of international 
authority. As a corollary, internationalisation projects appear to be based on a paradigm that 
has its intellectual roots in what has been labelled liberal internationalism.24
Being concerned with internationalisation of territory, this thesis is hence about a concept 
and its normative underpinnings. It is primarily a legal analysis, yet also a historical study to 
the extent that the League’s Mandate system, through the evolution of fiduciary bonds as 
means of international governance, has structured the legal instruments available to inter­
national society today. The discussion by no means reflects upon the multiplicity of specific 
historic situations in which internationalisation was utilised, but merely intends to enable us 
to determine the typological locus of a historical and legal phenomenon. We thus aim to first 
approximate and then delineate some particular traits o f an Idealtyp of territorial internatio­
nalisation.
There are several different methods available to academic lawyers in order to carry out their 
pursuits. By looking at the ways through which international authority carries out internatio­
nalisation projects, this thesis aims to explain how legal instruments were designed in order 
to respond to a spatio-temporal need of the international community. I have adopted a broad 
topological style which interrogates where and how to ‘locate’ the background assumptions 
guiding the idea of international fiduciary administration, in legal and philosophical space. At 
the outset it is appropriate to caution the reader that the analysis presented here is, so to 
speak, 'undisciplined' in that it transgresses the academic boundaries between traditional 
international law, sociological jurisprudence and legal history. Accordingly, it strays in and 
out of the two academic territories o f international law and the social sciences.
At least three 'archetypical' forms o f propositions in classical international law method will be 
utilised: The empirical form ('this is the practice o f states’); the deductive or analytical form 
(‘given a rule of logical consistency, rule B follows deductively from rule A'); and the 
teleological form (‘this proposition leads to the most desirable result’).2S Clearly, the trans­
lation of 'is' statements to 'ought1 propositions makes the arguments vulnerable to the dual 
positivist charges of collapsing the separation between law and sociology and embracing a 
non-scientific operation that seeks to create a syntactical construct out of norms without
23 Marcus Cox, The Making o f a Bosnian State: international Law and the Authority o f the 
international Community (Ph.D. on file with the University of Cambridge, 2001), at 2.
24 Cf. Nathaniel Berman, ‘Legalizing Jerusalem or, Of Law, Fantasy, and Faith', 45 Catholic University 
Law Review 823-835 (1995-96), at 826, as well as Roland Paris, 'Peacebuilding and the Limits of 
Liberal Internationalism', 22:2 International Security 54-89 (1997), at 55.
25 This categorisation draws on Philip Allott’s ‘Language, Method and the Nature o f International Law*, 
45 BYIL 79-135 (1971), at 80.
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regard to their value content26 The solution I have adopted here is that whenever the thesis 
switches into ‘policy mode’ and prescription, hence linking values and preferences (which 
are not as such part o f the analytical method) with actual events, I explicitly refer to the 
assumptions and sources from which it derives such ‘ought patterns’. Especially in the pre­
sentation of 'interests’, both held by the international community and by a non-state territorial 
entity, I have been careful to clarify my observational standpoint and not to let public inter­
national law evaporate from the analysis.
In order to identify the relevant topoi and the units of research, I will briefly introduce the 
frameworks utilised to approach the status of a non-state territorial entity under temporary 
international administration. The overall structure of the thesis is straightforward. In the first 
two chapters, I survey twentieth-century activity in the area of internationalisation and 
analyse the methods leading to it, from an in rem perspective on the one hand, and a law-of- 
obligation one on the other. There, my aim is to investigate to what extent the sovereignty 
frame structures available approaches to the internationalisation of territory. Chapters III and 
IV are concerned with the status of a non-state territorial entity under international tutelage 
and the dual functions of the UN-organ administering it. The first four chapters will, in various 
ways, tackle the issue of how such an entity relates to the international legal plane and, vice 
versa, how the international legal structure reaches the subjects of its concern directly. I 
contend that the practice of submitting territories to international administration both 
challenges and consolidates the international legal Grundnorm of sovereign equality. No 
doubt, temporary international governance of post-conflict territories defies traditional notions 
of accountability that flow from the identification o f the ‘sovereign’. Yet, on the other hand, 
such a practice consolidates traditional notions of sovereign equality by underlining the 
anomalous and temporary nature of an international administration that works towards the 
telos of resuscitating representation of a territory -  and title to it -  through its stated vision of 
enhancing local capacity to an extent that such a dependent territory be reintegrated into its 
pre-conflict structure (Eastern Slavonia) or stand by itself (East Timor).
The thesis follows a ‘cartographical’ style in which selection of the object o f research 
appears to oscillate between a structural and phenomenological view. This broad approach 
is necessary in order to map the ‘grids’ and coordinates within which the concept o f inter­
nationalisation can be situated. I have therefore adopted a number of distinct methods. 
Discussing instances in state practice where dominium and imperium were ‘divorced’ from 
each other, the thesis begins by analysing how the internationalisation of territory can be 
appreciated from an in rem point of view. The forms utilised in Chapter I will thus be both 
analytical and empirical. Chapter II consists in an inquiry into the nature o f an inter­
nationalised territory in the twentieth century and seeks to answer some of the conceptual 
questions arising from the uneasy relationship between the title to territory -  legal 
sovereignty -  and indigenous claims to self-determination in moments of international 
societal expansion. As we will see, jurists encountered analytical obstacles when attempting 
to ‘categorise’ fiduciary administrations in accordance with the in rem perspective. This static 
view, advocated inter alia by Quincy Wright with regard to the Mandate system,27 has of 
course been frequently criticised not only for positing law as a normative repository indepen-
26 The classical statement is presented in the preface to Kelsen’s, Die Reine Rechtsiehre: Einleitung 
in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik (15t ed. 1934, Sciencia Veriag Aalen, 1994).
27 Mandates under the League o f Nations (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1930).
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dent of ethics and sociology,28 but also for overlooking the auto-regulatory function o f inter­
national law and its capacity to recreate itself through the occurrence of compliance on the 
part of the states which deem themselves subject to its normative range. The second 
chapter’s discussion of the change in normative spheres heralded by the League’s Mandate 
system therefore applies a methodology that emphasises the policy implications o f juris­
prudential developments.
In an article criticising post-conflict governance of territories by the international community 
for failing to implement minimum standards of accountability, Korhonen observes that as 
such deep interventions become increasingly frequent, the more difficult it would be to "leave 
the spectator hanging on indeterminate positions towards sovereignty and the identity of 
power".29 One of the aims of the second chapter is to turn the argument on its head by 
demonstrating that the concept o f fiduciary administration has, from its inception in the wake 
of the ‘displacement* of sovereignty, instituted a system o f reciprocal rights and duties in 
which international law finds its new ‘essential basis’ in times of transition. Such fluid 
arrangements of reciprocal international obligations, developed within the framework of the 
Mandate and Trusteeship systems, have, of course, influenced the Security Council’s 
current self-authorised practice o f territorial administration in anomalous situations. Ad­
ministration in trust, as a new institution in McNair's analysis, has created new international 
legal instruments which do without sovereignty as the basis for legal representation of 
territory and the people within it  ‘Law1 will be presented in Chapter II as an instrument with 
which international society gradually responded to the changing needs of territories that 
came to be administered under the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’. By using this second 
contextual frame, devised by what is commonly referred to as the New Haven School,30 I 
intend to telescope a process commencing at Versailles and its reconfiguration o f political 
authority at the periphery, via the process of decolonisation and the dismantling o f imperial 
units, to a period after the Cold War in which the ties between the notion of legitimate state­
hood and the protection of individual human rights emerged strengthened and consolidated. 
The second chapter is hence designed as a corollary to positivist jurisprudence, which holds 
that ‘existing’ rules emanate solely from entities deemed equally ‘sovereign’.31 By applying 
two competing forms and methods, the first two chapters aim at drawing dialectical counter­
images of the notion of ‘suspension’ o f sovereignty.
The third chapter builds on the second -  not merely in terms o f continuing substantive focus 
on developments precipitated by the creation of the UN Council for Namibia. Seeking to 
'construct' lim ited legal personality o f territories temporarily administered by the international 
community, my argument utilises a sim ilar method, i.e. the teleological form which advocates 
that in the achievement of 'community values', international institutions be given the authority
28 See, for instance, Hans J. Morgenthau, 'Positivism, Functionalism and International Law1, 34 
American Journal o f International Law  260-284 (1940), at 261 -2.
29 Outi Korhonen, ‘Post’ as Justification: International Law and Democracy Building after Iraq’, 4:7 
German U  709-723 (2003), at 723.
30 The principal delineation of the 'New Haven School* approach is presented in Harold D. Lasswell 
and Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy 
(New Haven: New Haven Press, 1992). For the contextual, problem-oriented and multi-method 
approach o f such ‘configurative’ jurisprudence cf. also McDougal e t a/., Theories about International 
Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence’, 8 Virginia J IL 188-299 (1967-1968).
31 For the classic statement of states as ‘units’ of international law see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of 
Law  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), at 191.
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to make decisions in support of those values, even if the rules of positivism do not fully 
support the same result.32 By crystallising legal concepts in jurisprudential technique, the 
teleological form frames legal propositions as growing out of a social context. Namibia’s 
decolonisation project is accordingly presented in prescriptive terms which resemble the 
methodology employed by what has come to be known as Transnational Legal Process. 
According to this school of thought which opposes autonomous theories of law, policy 
makers should be striving to take account of the changes in normative spheres generated 
within the transnational socio-political context -  in the instance discussed here, by granting 
UN-administered entities access to the international legal plane. My aim in the third chapter 
is to re-cast the question of the status of non-state territorial entities as a problem o f nascent 
legal personality which, as I suggest, is constructed at the intersection o f international need 
and municipal desert. In Chapter IV l w ill follow Transnational Legal Process and incorporate 
values and ‘interests’ into the analysis which are held beyond those of the state system and 
implicitly challenge the positivist doctrine of sources in the achievement of those values. I 
argue, firstly, that an international administering agent is situated at the exact interface 
between domestic and international politics and law, and, secondly, that his roles are split 
into agent and organic functions.
The interrelation between conceptions of trust and legal sovereignty provides the thematic 
continuity underlying the diversity and detail of the final two chapters. Turning ‘inwards’ into 
the politics of an internationalised territory in Chapter V, I introduce the peculiar 
problématique of an open-ended institution-building mandate and apply the theoretical 
observations made in the preceding analysis. In order to indicate spheres in which those 
conclusions are of policy significance, I have, where appropriate, included a memo to the 
Kosovo Prime Minister and an imaginary case study. Accounting for the inherent limitations 
to comparative studies of international institution-building, Chapter VI then attempts to reach 
beyond what appears to be an across-the-board criticism  of international administrations, 
and point at systemic constraints that might indeed lim it the success of UN territorial 
governance. •
The distinct forms and styles utilised in the final chapter consciously mirror those applied in 
the first two chapters. Chapter VI begins by conceptualising how claims to the ‘legitimate’ 
exercise o f power are framed under conditions o f internationalisation. It uses a Weberian 
approach to explore how the pursuit of divergent ‘interests’ o f local and international actors -  
which I maintain is inherent in an ‘open-ended’ institution-building mandate o f fiduciary 
nature -  impacts on the legitimacy o f international political authority. By focusing on the 
particularities o f the normative space within an internationalised territory, the final chapter’s 
second section applies the analytical method of positivism to arrive at conclusions about the 
lex lata and its problematic relation to what ju rists refer to as the ‘legality’ o f a certain 
normative order.
The 'coordinates' of a thus constructed mental map can obviously not be located on a simple 
temporal axis. I have avoided the language of ‘generations’ of peacekeeping, as well as the 
‘old/new’ dichotomy that is frequently employed in academic writing with a view to providing a *107
32 Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘New International Legal Process’, in The Methods o f International Law 79-
107 (ed. by S.R. Ratner and A.-M. Slaughter, Washington, D.C.:36 ASIL Studies in Transnational 
Legal Policy, 2004), at 79.
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linear narrative of the conceptual evolution of the internationalisation of territory and the 
increasingly assertive role of the UN's institutional structure. Whereas the extent of the 
administrative prerogatives held by multilateral bodies in internationalised territories appears 
unprecedented, it is one of my objectives to de-mystify the alleged novelty of the legal 
instruments used, in order to supply a somewhat sober analysis of how to integrate such a 
practice in an evolving system of international law. As Wilde has pointed out in a recent 
essay, there is an inherent flaw in positioning the UN’s undertakings in Kosovo and East 
Timor as the latest pinnacles o f a progressive increase o f complex intervention, in the 
culmination of a historical process.33 We must, however, also avoid drawing an exceptiona- 
list portrait that places international territorial administrations beyond historical experience 
and applicable legal frameworks. This thesis endeavours, if anything, to point out novelties 
and exceptionalism when appropriate, while indicating continuity and precedence when 
apposite. The result of such topological approach is hence not the production of one single 
mental map, but o f layers of a palimpsest through which the conceptual contours of inter­
nationalised territories become discernible.
Two final, technical notes are in order. Sometimes history is unkind to researchers. When I 
left the Balkans after four years of work for the OSCE, I was convinced that I would be able 
to include the resolution of Kosovo’s status in the thesis. This was not the case. An inquiry 
into the evolving role of UNMIK remains a ’moving target*. As new developments occurred, I 
incorporated them in the thesis but naturally, I am not in a position to predict the outcome of 
the final status discussions which are now set for 2006.1 therefore regret that some o f the 
conclusions hover between the prescriptive and the speculative. Secondly, I have drawn a 
number of conclusions from working papers and policy documents that have not been, or will 
not ever be published. In advanced bureaucratic organisations, the exchange of ‘non­
papers’, ‘memos’ and ‘draft notes’ drawn up by informal working groups and circulated 
among advisers and other mandarins is a complex social ritual by which access to 
information is bestowed, limited, and denied. This is also the case in the world of UN field 
missions and their ancillary components. Where I believed that such internal papers actually 
influenced official policy, I have quoted from their substance. In.the bibliography, the reader 
will see whether the quoted documentary material is drawn from an open source or whether 
it remains on file with the author.
33 Cf. Ralph Wilde, ‘Representing International Territorial Administration: A Critique of Some 
Approaches’, 15:1 EJIL 71 (2004), 80 ef seq. The ‘Brahimi Report* placed the two ‘deep’ post-Cold 
War administration missions -  Kosovo and East Timor -  in a class of their own as responding to 
‘extreme’ situations (Report o f the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305, 
S2000/809, reprinted in 39 ILM 1432 (2000), see esp. §§19 and 77). Michael Matheson refers to 
“the novel...undertakings in Kosovo and East Timor" (‘United Nations Governance of Postconflict 
Societies’, 95:1 AJIL 76-85 (2001), at 83). For Hansjorg Strohmeyer, the “scope of the challenges 
and responsibilities deriving from [UNMIK’s and UNTAETs] mandates was unprecedented in United 
Nations peacekeeping operations” ('Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: the United 
Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor*, 95:1 AJIL 46-63 (2001), at 46).
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Chapter I
T he Creation of Internationalised  T erritories
Referring to processes and methods of transferring effective control over territory, this first 
chapter will mainly focus on territories under international administration as experimental 
models o f ‘restricted sovereignty*. One of its major thrusts consists in arguing that the 
demands of political reality have forced sovereign states for centuries to consent to 
agreements by which they relinquished a portion of their sovereignty -  of the suprema 
potestas -  in favour of another sovereign entity.34 Likewise, as Crawford pointed out, the 
establishment of autonomous entities under a form of international protection, supervision or 
guarantees has been a “persistent form of organisation o f territories disputed between 
States on strategic or ethnic or other grounds”.35 We will pursue these two arguments by 
interrogating an analogy, drawn by Grotius, Pufendorf and Seiden, between the Roman 
private law concept of dominium and sovereignty over territory. While the analogy allows us 
to grasp the key conception of the institution of ‘legal sovereignty', it also permits us to 
examine the various practices which were instrumental in devising exceptions to the 
application o f dominium over territory. We w ill hence begin by adopting an in rem 
perspective in order to capture international legal solutions that were applied to situations in 
which title to territory had been divorced from imperium, or what German constitutional 
doctrine refers to as Gebietshoheit.
The dry re-application of Roman law concepts is, in our submission, a necessary means to 
disentangle the contested idea of sovereignty from cognate notions of 'supreme w ill' and 
'absolute command’ that have marred the term’s transformation since Bodin and Hobbes. 
Having established the analogy between Roman private law instruments and the notion of 
territorial sovereignty, we turn to the methodology through which ‘regimes’ of restricted 
sovereignty have been created, and eventually to the establishment of entities temporarily 
administered by the United Nations. We provide a first normative frame within which the 
transfer of imperium, from a sovereign power to a protecting entity with the former retaining 
the sovereign claim as a bare title, can be located. This in rem perspective w ill be later 
utilised to capture some aspects of the phenomenon of an international administration which 
is caught between honouring the 'suspended' title of the sovereign and the fiduciary 
obligations it is mandated to pursue with respect to the territory in which it exercises 
temporary imperium.
We begin by addressing two interrelated issues that have been debated in recent literature: 
(i), the transfer of effective control, through ‘horizontal’ means (treaty), by a state to another 
entity that leaves the old sovereign with a nudum jus  he can still dispose of, as developed by 
doctrine and jurisprudence, and as practiced by states; (ii), we focus on the capacity of the 
United Nations to administer territory, and to ‘vertically impose’ a transfer of effective control, 
based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The mandate and extent of the authority of UN 
Missions in internationalised territories such as Kosovo and their status in international law, 
will then be interpreted as the synthesis between the horizontal tradition of transferring 
effective control and the application o f vertical instruments in public international law.
34 Cf. Patrick Daillier and Alain Pellet, Droit International Public (6th ed., Paris 1999), at §313.
35 James Crawford, The Creation o f States in International Law (Oxford: OUP, 1979), at 160.
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1.1 Horizontal T ransfer of Effective Control and the Bare T itle to 
T erritory
This section aims to bring into sharper focus the concept of residual sovereignty through the 
prism o f the horizontal dynamics that governed the transfer of effective control, as distinct 
from title to territory, and applies it to the model of international territorial administration.36 
The concept of ‘suspended’ sovereignty is not at all new to legal and political discourse in 
international relations.37 It is increasingly employed when .investigating the properties of 
territories under international administration which were conceived on the basis of a distinct 
multilateral settlement.38 An analysis of instances involving a disjunction o f notions of 
sovereignty and territorial control includes a reappraisal of the relationship between 
imperium and dominium; their duality adds a conceptual mediation to the definition of 
sovereignty.39 40
1.1.1  D o c t r in e  and  J u r is p r u d e n c e
The acceptance of territorial sovereignty as a ‘rule of recognition’ at the settlement of 
W estphalia meant that mutually exclusive areas were carved out for the exercise of supreme 
authority with the sovereigns recognising only this form of political organisation as legitimate. 
The adoption of Roman private law concepts represented a “convenient way of squaring 
their claims to supremacy with the mutual recognition of equality”.10 Dominium in this sense 
represented the “ultimate legal title beyond and above which there was no other"41 and 
involved both an obligation on the part of others to abstain from all interference, and the right 
of its holder to act on the territory, a faculty o f absolute disposition. ‘Titular sovereignty’ in 
international law has thus been used to describe the right of ownership which a state may 
have over any particular portion o f territory,42 with the territorial sovereign exercising effective 
control sim ilar to an owner of an object. Similar to continental legal conceptions, sovereignty 
would also be conceptualised as an analogon to dominium in common law systems. As 
O’Connell explains, the common law theory of title “still has its roots in feudal law with the
36 Parts o f this section appeared in my ‘UN Imperium: Horizontal and Vertical Transfer of Effective 
Control and the Concept o f Residual Sovereignty in ‘Internationalised’ Territories’, 7 Austrian RIEL 
3-52 (2002).
37 A rough typology of state practice regarding non-sovereign entities with limited (or restricted) 
international personality is provided by Méir Ydit, Internationalised Territories. From the Free City of 
Cracow' to the Free City o f Berlin'. A Study in the Historical Development o f a Modem Notion in 
International Law and International Relations (1815 -  i960) (Leiden: A.W. Sythoff, 1961), at 19-20. 
See also J.H.W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. II (Leiden, 1969), Chapter 
VI, and vol. Ill (1970), Chapter IV.
38 Cf., e.g., Alexandras Yannis, The  Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in International Law\ 13:5 
EJIL 1037-1052 (2002), at 1043 etseq.
39 For a brief account of the ‘Viennese school’s’ contribution to an understanding of the object theory 
o f the state cf. Erik Suy, ‘Réflexions sur la distinction entre la souveraineté et la compétence 
territoriale’, in Internationale Festschrift für Alfred Verdroß (Munich/Salzburg: Wilhelm Fink, 1971), 
at 493 e t seq.
40 Friedrich Kratochwil, 'Sovereignty as Dominium. Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?’, in 
Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention (ed. by G. M. Lyons and M. 
Mastanduno, Baltimore: JHU Press, 1995), 21-42, at 25.
41 W.W. Buckland, Textbook o f Roman Law (3rd ed. by Stein, 1963), at 188.
42 Elihu Lauterpacht, 'The International Personality of the United Nations. Capacity to Administer 
Territory’, 5 ICLQ 409-413 (1956), at 410. Similar: Malcolm N. Shaw, ‘Territory in International Law*, 
13 NŸIL 61 (1982), at 74.
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Crown having the ultimate reversion and proprietary rights being explained in terms of 
vassalage. Accordingly, sovereignty and property are indistinguishable conceptions to the 
Anglo-American lawyer."43
Whereas late medieval doctrine had sought to derive imperium from dominium according to 
the principle o f territorial sovereignty, the 'subject theory' rejected such derivation and only 
acknowledged a connection: the imperium was not necessarily territorial.44 Yet prevailing 
scholarly opinion continued to view jurisdiction as an essentially territorial concept and 
referred to the concept of imperium as general state jurisdiction derived from Roman 
constitutional law while employing the Roman law of ownership and its conception of 
dominium as to refer to rights over things, in particular territory or land.45 The possession of 
title conceived along the lines of Roman property rights hence implied the right of title holder 
to exercise supreme authority as long as he remained within his territorially limited domain. 
The boundaries of the right to territorial control were no longer determined by 'right use’ but 
became dependent on the mutual acceptance that acts of the sovereign in his public 
capacity were valid prima facie and not reviewable by others. The entitlement to exclusive 
possession “could no longer be lost by reason of the objectionable exercise of proprietary 
rights, except those based on the institutionally explicit procedures providing for the 
acquisition or loss o f title".46
The exercise o f imperium, on the other hand, involved the assertion or exercise o f legal 
authority or competence, actual or purported, over persons who owed some form of 
allegiance to that authority or who had been brought under this authority’s control. It has also 
been suggested that the term ‘jurisdiction’ generally entailed some form of structured 
relationship normally existing over time.47 Building on the foundations of ‘object theory’, the 
‘competence theory1 rejected one of its key assumptions: it comprehended territory not as a 
geographical conception but as “the sphere of validity of a juridical order based in space".48 
Its followers comprehended the state as ruling within territory, not over it, and the ‘people’ as
43 International Law  (vol. I, London: Stevens&Sons, 1970 11965]), at 403-404. For a review of the 
analogy between the conception of the individual with an ’automatic’ (natural) right of property and 
the state with sovereignty over its territory through its simple existence as state, see Anthony Carty, 
The Decay o f International Law? A Reappraisal o f the Limits o f Legal Imagination In International 
Affairs (Manchaster: Manchester UP, 1986), at 44-46 and 55-60.
44 Compare, for instance, Carl Friedrich von Gerber’s interpretation of territory as the ‘body’ of the 
state ‘person’, in Grundzöge des deutschen Staatsrechts (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1880), at 67.
45 Cf. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (4th ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), at 
108-9; Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law: Collected Papers (ed. by E. Lauterpacht, Cambridge: 
CUP, 1970). 367-70; Verzijl, International Law, supra note 37, vol. Ill, Chapter 1, at 9; Alfred 
Verdroß, Völkerrecht (5th ed., Vienna: Springer Vertag, 1964), at 267, and Donati who, in the 
tradition of Roman ownership law, argued “che il diritto dello Stato sul territorio costituisce un diritto 
di dominio in senso stretto’  (8 Rivista di diritto intemazionale (1914), at 471). For the reception of 
Roman property regimes into modem jus  gentium cf. also Joshua Castellio and Steve Allen, Title to 
Territory in International Law. A Temporal Analysis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), at 42-55.
46 Kratochwil, ‘Dominium’, supra note 40, at 26.
47 This position was recently reinforced by the Bankovió case in which the European Court o f Human 
Rights (ECHR) concluded that extraterritorial jurisdiction can only be recognized in cases where a 
state effectively controls the relevant territory and its inhabitants, exercising at least some of the 
public powers normally exercised by that government (Bankovió and Others v. Belgium and 16 
Other Contracting States, [2001], ECtHR, No. 52207/99, 12 December 2001 (Decision (Admissi­
bility)), at §§59-73). The Decision will be briefly discussed in Chapter VI.2.3, infra note 884.
48 Josef L. Kunz, “The Vienna School” and International Law\ 2 NYU Law Quarterly 370-421 (1934),
at 392.
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the personal sphere of validity o f a juridical order.49
Neither the Permanent Court (PCIJ) nor the International Court o f Justice (ICJ) have 
followed the propositions of the competence theory, namely, to let the law of territory vanish 
into the law of jurisdiction.50 Instead, they continued to interpret the notion of sovereignty 
over a certain part of the globe as dominium in analogy to Roman private law. They thereby 
followed a conception of legal sovereignty that implied that imperium and dominium are 
connected, precisely because both population and territory are elements of the state, each 
element being dependent on the other.51 As Portugal's judge ad hoc stated in the Right o f  
Passage case, "[sjovereignty over territory implies the capacity to exercise public authority in 
that territory. It implies the right and the obligation to maintain public order there, if necessary 
manu militari” 52 A government exercises its sovereign title, thus connecting the population 
with the respective territory.
Although the Court acknowledged that imperium is usually found in the same hands as 
dominium, or legal sovereignty, it continued to disconnect the two concepts. This doctrinal 
disconnection has been adopted from Roman commentators who recognised that the scope 
of territorial jurisdiction could be altered by consent while leaving the title over territory 
untouched. Ulpian’s separation between proprietas and possessio53 appears to reverberate 
through the PCIJ judgment in the S.S. Lotus case: “All that can be required of a state is that 
it should not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction. Without 
these limits its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty".54 The disjunction between 
sovereign claims and effective control has to some extent been dealt with in a case in which 
the Security Council requested an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ on the legal consequences 
o f South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia.55 There, the ICJ reaffirmed the distinction 
between physical control over a territory and the notion of sovereignty or legitimacy of title:
The fact that South Africa no longer has any title to administer the Territory does not release it
4 Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law  Sources and Analogies o f International Law  (New York: 
Longmans, 1927), at 93. On the essential identity between jurisdiction, control and sovereignty, see 
also his ‘Sovereignty over Submarine Areas', 27 BYIL 376-433 (1950), at 389: “For exclusive 
jurisdiction and control is sovereignty. This is so necessarily, seeing that State territory is the space 
within which the State exercises its supreme authority” .
50 Cf. Carty, Decay, supra note 43, at 46.
51 Building on the the Memel Territory case and the Treatment o f Polish Nationals opinion (infra, note 
406), the PCIJ assumed there could not be more than one sovereign in respect of given territory. In 
separating competing state powers, “the actual exercise of sovereign rights“ would be the yardstick 
to measure the strength of the respective claims to “territorial sovereignty’  (Legal Status o f Eastern 
Greenland case (Denmark v. Norway, PCIJ (Ser. A/B), No. 53 (1933), at 46)).
52 Judge Fernandes, diss. op. in the Right of Passage over Indian Temtory case (Portugal v. India), 
ICJ Reports [1960] 6, at 124.
^  Cf. J.A.C. Thomas, Textbook o f Roman Law (1976), at 138. Cf, also W.W. Buckland and Arnold 
McNair, Roman Law and Common Law. A Comparison in Outline (2nd ed. by F.H. Lawson, 1965), at 
62.
54 France v. Turkey, PCIJ (Ser. A), No. 10 (1927), at 19. Kelsen also implicitly subscribed to the 
distinction. Though referring to the functional competencies o f state organs, he maintained that 
“[u]nder international Law, only the state within the boundaries of which a territory lies is entitled to 
dispose o f this territory, which means that...only organs of the national legal order have the power 
to enter into legal transactions referring to the territory" (Principles o f International Law  (New York: 
Rinehart&Co, 1952), at 217).
55 S/RES/284, 29 July 1970. UN Doc. S/INF/25, reproduced in 9 /LA# 1090 (1970), at 4, §1.
•25 •
from its obligations and responsibilities under international law towards other States in respect 
of the exercise of its powers in relation to this Territory. Physical control of a territory, and not 
sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the basis of State liability for acts affecting other States.56
The nexus between legal title and the exercise of effective control, as well as the rights and 
obligations flowing from that exercise, was also the subject of a fierce legal debate that 
surrounded the East Timor case.57 Although the Monetary Gold principle58 was found to 
operate as a jurisdictional barrier to Portugal’s claim that it atone, in its capacity as 
administrative power, had the capacity to enter into a treaty on behalf of East Timor, the 
Court nevertheless emphasised the continued legitimate authority of Portugal to administer 
the territory, despite the full and effective territorial control exercised by Indonesia following 
its unlawful military occupation in December 1975. The case raises very interesting 
questions, not so much regarding the divorce between sovereign title and effective control 
(since Portugal did not have any sovereign rights, save in its capacity as custodian of the 
rights of East Timorese people), but concerning the disjunction of a claim to jurisdiction and 
effective control, two terms that are often interchangeably used. Effectively, Australia 
submitted that Portugal lacked the capacity to implement any treaty it may have signed 
relating to East Timor. Absent this capacity, Australia argued, Portugal would also lack the 
ability to enter into any meaningful treaty regarding the territory, or to complain that a treaty 
has been entered into by another state having effective control. Portugal, on the other hand, 
replied that although it has physically left the territory and no longer controls it, it was 
nonetheless the administering power, charged with the responsibility arising from Chapter XI 
of the UN Charter.
A thorough analysis of the issue, unfortunately not undertaken by the Court, would entail an 
enquiry into the question whether an administrative power's loss of imperium deprives it of 
the status and functions of an administrative authority and whether “the protective and 
reporting structure, so carefully fashioned by the United Nations Charter, can be thus 
brushed aside."59 For the purposes of this chapter, it will prove to be useful to maintain such 
clear distinction between title to territory and effective control -  a striking characteristic of 
Roman law - , and to correlate the two concepts that can, in some cases, undergo shifts in 
opposite directions.60 While the transposition of Roman law concepts into international 
normative space has been criticised, in particular to the extent that it represented territory as 
something extraneous to the state itself, it nevertheless supplies a set of coherent and useful 
methodological tools with which disjunction phenomena may be contemplated.
56 Legal Consequences for States o f the Continued Presence o f South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 
[1971] 16, at §118. For an extensive discussion of the Opinion see Chapter 11.2.1 (i).
57 Portugal v. Australia, ICJ Reports [1995] 90, at 99.
58 In its judgment concerning Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, the Court declined to rule 
on the lawfulness of the conduct o f a third state in the absence of this state’s consent (Italy v. 
France, United Kingdom and USA, ICJ Reports [1954] 19, at 32). For a discussion cf. C. 
Antonopoulos, ‘Effectiveness v. the Rule of Law Following the East Timor Case’, 27 NYU  75-111 
(1996), at 82 ef seq. and Peter Hilpold, 'Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Vblker vor dem IGH-der 
Osttimor-FaH’, 53 0Z6RV263-291 (1998), at 275-278.
59 Diss, op. Judge Weeramantry in the East Timor case, supra note 57, part B(ii).
60 Cf. Bernard Gilson, The Conceptual System o f Sovereign Equality (Leuven: Peeters, 1984), at 164.
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1.1.2 The Dynamics of State Practice
The conception that territory might be essentia) to the exercise of state power, yet without 
constituting one of its elements according to the object theory, has been reinforced by state 
practice. This becomes particularly salient when reviewing cases in which the aggregate o f 
public competencies respective to the territory and its inhabitants was transferred while the 
bare title  to territory was retained. From the homogenous nature o f the actors involved in 
such transfer, i.e. states, the dynamics shifted to include, with the creation of the League o f 
Nation and later the United Nations -  multilateral bodies operating alongside single actors 
that would similarly engage in the horizontal transfer of effective control, using the same 
instruments.
A state, the grantor, can clearly cede sovereignty over a certain land, on a horizontal basis, 
and, to that extent, dispose o f its title, without territorial control necessarily falling into the 
hands of the grantee.61 As a corollary, territorial control -  understood as positive jurisdiction 
over people -  can be transferred to the exclusive benefit of another entity, without the latter 
acquiring sovereign title. Though the extent of powers delegated to the 'protecting entity’ has 
varied over the course of the 20th century, formal sovereignty remained unaffected, albeit 
reduced and shrunken to a nudum jus. In other words, a “scintilla of sovereignty -  a 
reversionary sovereignty"62 -  subsisted. The following discussion demonstrates that this 
reduced claim to sovereign title cannot be regarded as a legal fiction.63 The nudum jus may 
acquire normative content with the re-transfer o f effective control and complete jurisdiction 
from the protecting entity. The concrete entitlement, in its reduced form, remains tangible 
because the sovereign can still dispose of the territory effectively controlled by another 
administrative entity in a legal transaction with another state. The following cases illustrate 
this proposition.
(i) T he Leases of the Panama Canal and Guantánamo Bay (Both 1903)
Examples in which administration and effective control are divorced from sovereign title can 
be found in certain m inor territorial rights such as leases or servitudes in which titular 
sovereignty has been resuscitated after the termination of the lease.64 Amongst the most
61 Alfred Verdroß, Bruno Simma, and Rudolf Geiger (Territoriale Souveränität und Gebietshoheit’, 31 
ÖZöRV 223-245 (1980), at 226) discuss the cases of Austria ceding sovereignty over Lombardy 
(Treaty of Zurich, 10 November 1859) and Venice (Treaty o f Vienna, 24 August 1866) to France 
without the latter assuming effective control which, instead, was acquired by Sardinia.
62 Lester H. Woolsey, 'The Sovereignty of the Panama Canal Zone’, 20 AJIL 117-124 (1926), at 121. 
The concept of reversion should be distinguished from that of residual sovereignty, the principal 
point o f difference consisting in the fact that reversion involves a change of sovereignty, whilst in the 
case o f residual sovereignty, the territorial sovereign has not lost status as such (Brownlie, 
Principles, 4m ed., supra note 45, at 112-3). We thus prefer to use the term 'residual', rather than 
‘reversionary’, sovereignty. Cf. also examples of titular, residual and distributed sovereignty in 
O’Connell, Internationa! Law, supra note 43, at 325-327.
63 As advocated by Julie Ringelheim, The Legal Status o f Kosovo, in Kosovo 1999-2000: The In­
tractable Peace (EUI Working Group Report, 2000), section 2.2., as well as in her ‘International 
Reactions to the Kosovo Crisis’, 32 Revue beige de droit international 475 (1999-2), at 540. See the 
discussion in Chapter V.1.1 (ii), infra p. 155.
64 See, generally, Christian Rumpf, Territory, Lease', in 4 EPIL (ed. by Rudolf Bernhardt, Amsterdam: 
Elsevier, 2000), 842-844. In 1898, China leased four territories to the German Empire to Russia, 
France, and to England, explicitly without transferring territorial sovereignty. Cf. Rudolf 
Kirchschläger, ’Pacht’, in Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts (vol. II, ed. by H.-J. Schlochauer, 1961), at 
707-8. By the treaty o f Peace o f Portsmouth (1905), Russia, in tum, sub-ceded the lease of Port
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eminent65 is the Hay/Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 18 November 1903 between the USA and the 
Republic of Panama. In Article III o f the Treaty, Panama granted to the US
all the rights, powers and authority regarding the zone ... which the United States would 
possess and exercise i f  it were the sovereign o f the territory ... to the entire exclusion o f the 
exercise by the Republic of Panama o f any such sovereign rights, powers, o r authority.66
The treaty thus preserved a titular sovereignty over the Canal Zone that was automatically 
resuscitated when the initial 1903 Treaty was terminated by a new Panama Canal Treaty of 
1977.67 As a corollary, the US had acquired temporary jurisdiction that amounted to physical 
control over territory, but certainly not to sovereign powers.68 Distinguishing not only between 
territorial sovereignty and territorial supremacy (Gebietshoheit) but also between the right to 
exercise territorial control, derived from territorial sovereignty, and its actual exercise (which 
can be legitimate or illegitimate), Verdroß suggested that the US exercised its, rather than 
Panama’s, territorial control over the canal: The United States
herrschen in dieser Zone allerdings auf einem fremden Gebiete, sie üben aber dort einzig und 
alleine ihre durch ihre eigenstaatliche Rechtsordnung geregelte Gebietshoheit aus, wodurch 
natürlich die Gebietshoheit des territorialen Souveräns beschränkt wird. Hingegen bleibt die 
territoriale Souveränität Panamas über dieses Gebiet »  trotz der dort begründeten Gebiets­
hoheit eines fremden Staates -  weiter bestehen... Er kann [das Gebiet] derelinquirieren, an 
einen anderen Staat zedieren oder mit anderen Gebieten zu einem neuen Staate 
verschmelzen, ohne die Zustimmung der VSt zu bedürfen.69
The Agreement of 16/23 February 1903 in which the United States and Cuba agreed to 
'cede in lease’ lands in Cuba for thè purpose of coalmining and thè establishment o f naval
Arthur and Talienwan to Japan (Undley, Acquisition, supra note 12, at 239). Similarly, Japan, based 
on the Peace Treaty of 8 September 1951, ceded the right to exercise full legislative, judicial, and 
administrative control over Okinawa to the U.S., whereas residual sovereignty resided with Japan. 
In 1951 the US Secretary o f State Dulles referred to the "residual sovereignty of Japan over the 
islands* that enabled her to place them under the trusteeship of the United Nations, *with the United 
States as the administering authority" (quoted by Brownlie, Principles, 4th ed., supra note 45, at 
112). For exceptional restrictions to the territorial supremacy of a state cf. Oppenheim, International 
Law, vol.1 (8th edition ed. by Lauterpacht, London: Longmans, 1955), at 188-197 and 535-543, as 
well as Ferenc A. Väli, Servitudes in International Law. A Study of Rights in Foreign Territories (2nd 
ed., London: Stevens, 1958), at 277.
65 The status of the New Territories and Hong Kong was of special nature and will not be discussed 
under here. See, however, Yash Ghai, Hong Kong’s New Constitutional O rder- The Resumption of 
Chinese Sovereignty and the Basic Law  (Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 1997).
66 Quoted by Woolsey, ‘Panama Canal', supra note 62, at 118-119 (my italics).
67 AJIL 72 (1978), at 516. This superseded the treaties of 1901, 1903, 1936 and 1955 governing the 
Canal. See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), 367 at note 203, and 
Verdroß et al., 'Gebietshoheit', supra note 61, at 232.
68 US Secretary of State Vance, addressing the House Committee on International Relations, said: "In 
1903, we acquired certain rights, similar to those exercised by a sovereign, but nonetheless rights, 
not sovereignty" (quoted by Verdroß et al., ‘Gebietshoheit’, supra note 61, at 234). For case law 
(both the US Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the Panama Canal Zone) cf. O’Connell, 
International Law, vol. I, supra note 43, at 326-327.
69 Verdroß, Völkerrecht, 5th ed., supra note 45, at 268. In the successive Panama Canal Treaty of 
1977, Panama was demonstratively referred to as "territorial sovereign" that "grants to the [USA] the 
rights to manage, operate and maintain the Panama Canal..." (Article I and III o f the Panama Canal 
Treaty). For Panama’s residual sovereignty cf. also Brownlie, Principles, 4th ed., supra note 45, at 
111- 112.
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bases provides another illustration of an intention to shift the right to exercise territorial 
jurisdiction while preserving the locus of titular sovereignty. Article III of the Agreement 
provided that
[wjhile on the one hand the United States recognizes the continuance o f the ultimate 
sovereignty of the Republic o f Cuba over the above described areas o f land and water, on the 
other hand the Republic o f Cuba consents that during the period of the occupation...the United 
States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control over and within said areas.70
(ti) Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878) and the Saar Territory (1920)
In the aftermath of the Congress o f Berlin in 1878, the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
were occupied and administered by Austria and Hungary,71 with the Sublime Porte retaining 
legal title to the exercise o f effective control. In that case, the Sublime Porte entered into a 
valid treaty relationship with Austria, affording to the latter certain extensive functions, both 
internally and externally. In a declaration made at the Conference at which the Treaty was 
adopted, the representatives o f Austria-Hungary expressly accepted that the rights o f 
sovereignty of the Sublime Porte over the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina would not be 
affected by the fact of occupation.72
The concept o f suspended sovereignty has similarly been invoked when far-reaching 
authority in the management o f a territory’s domestic affairs had been conferred upon 
different protecting entities -  multilateral agencies -  using identical legal instruments and 
procedures as those concerning single entity recipients. Particularly in the inter-war era, 
nationalist passion aligned itself with the newly autonomous international law to create a 
sophisticated system of minority regimes under the auspices of the League of Nations.73 The 
administration of the Saar Territory between 1920 and 1935 is such an example. Based on 
the Versailles Treaty,74 an International Governing Commission representing the League o f 
Nations was entrusted with the exercise of executive and legislative powers, without being
0 Quoted by Joseph Lazar, ‘International Legal Status of Guantanamo Bay’, 62 AJIL 730-740 (1968), 
at 733. The Agreement of February 1903 was implemented by the ‘Lease to the United States by 
Cuba o f Land and Water for Naval and Coaling Stations in Guantanamo and Bahia Honda’ 
Agreement (Washington, 2 July 1903). See also Lazar, “ Cession in Lease’  o f the Guantänamo Bay 
Naval Station and Cuba’s “Ultimate Sovereignty” , 63 AJIL 116-118 (1969). Whether sovereignty o r 
territorial jurisdiction would form the basis of an inquiry into habeas jurisdiction and the status o f 
detainees held at Guantanamo Naval Base has recently attracted increased attention. Cf., i.e., the 
discussion in United States Court for Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Gherebi v. Bush and Rumsfeld, 43 ILM  
381 (2004), at 389 ef seq.
71 Art. XXV of the Treaty o f Berfin, 13 July 1878. Cf, VerzijI, International Law, vol. Ill, supra note 37, 
at 408; Verdroß et a!., ’Gebietshoheit’, supra note 61, at 227. Contrary to the occupation and 
administration of Cyprus by England based on the Treaty of June 1878 between the Sublime Porte 
and England, the transfer o f effective control over Bosnia-Herzegovina to the ‘protecting state’ 
Austria-Hungary was not limited in time.
72 See Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The Annexation o f Bosnia 1908-1909 (1937), quoted in C.A. 
Whomersley, ‘The International Legal Status of Gdansk, Klaipeda and the Former East Prussia’, 42 
ICLQ 919-927 (1993), at 925.
73 Cf. Chapter 11.1.2, infra p. 59.
74 Treaty of Peace between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Germany of 28 June 
1919 (Treaty of Versailles), 225 Consolidated TS (1919), at 189, Part III, Section IV, Annex, Art. 16. 
See generally on the subject Frank M. Russel, The International Government o f the Saar (Berkeley, 
Cal.: University of California Press, 1926). A useful synopsis is provided by Fritz Münch, ‘Saar 
Territory’, in 4  EPIL 271-273 (2000).
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bound by local legislative bodies. The powers that would later be acquired by the UNMIK 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) under Resolution 1244 and 
UNMIK Regulation 1999/175 are reminiscent of the authority given to the Saar Commission. 
The Treaty o f Versailles granted the Commission “all the powers of government [hitherto 
belonging to Germany], including the appointment and dismissal of officials, and the creation 
of such administrative and representative bodies as it may deem necessary.“76 Following the 
suspension o f German authority pending the referendum on the status of the Territory of the 
Saar Basin’,77 all governmental powers were ceded to the League under the Treaty of 
Versailles. The Saar Commission occasionally consulted with Saarland leaders and 
frequently reported to the Council o f the League on its activities.
It may be suggested that the Saarland was not so much internationalised as, in fact, 
governed by France, through the League of Nations regime and in co-operation with it. The 
Commission, however, exercised effective control over the territory. This temporary 
trusteeship o f the League was exercised while Germany remained the titular sovereign over 
the territory. As Corbett wrote, Germany retained, at the minimum, the *nuda proprietas of 
sovereignty, as she retains the nuda proprietas of all her domanial property, except the 
mines, in the Saar".78 The approach chosen in the Saarland case involved a separation of 
formal title (Germany), material interest (accorded in large part to France) and governing 
power (vested in the Commission)79 -  an international legal solution involving the temporal 
desegregation of public authority which would be re-applied in the case of Kosovo in 1999.
(in) Contrasting the N u d u m  J u s  with State Servitudes
Even if these residual territorial rights hardly appear operative, the legal framework, however 
remote its contingencies, is not meaningless. As we will see later when discussing the legal 
status of internationalised territories whose ‘final status’ in public international law has been 
deliberately left open, improbable contingencies may become realities, and full sovereignty 
may revert back to the holder of the nudum jus, Before.looking at the current scenario of 
Kosovo, however, the next section places the residual title to territory within another explana­
tory framework analogised from the Roman law of ownership -  state servitudes.80 In the
75 Cf. Chapter V .1 .1 , infra, p. 150.
76 Treaty of Peace, supra, Art. 19.
77 The mandate of the League ended in 1935 when the population of the Saar Territory voted in a 
plebiscite on 13 January 1935 in favour of immediate reunification with Germany.
78 Percy E. Corbett, ‘What is the League of Nations?’, 5 BYiL (1924), at 127. Similarly, Ydit claimed 
that “what really remained for Germany was only the nudum jus  to the territory itself“ 
(Internationalised Territories, supra note 37, at 45). Hurst Hannum remarks that “German courts 
considered the Saar to be part of the Reich for various purposes. Saar residents also retained 
German nationality. However, the Saar was a wholly autonomous regime..., and all governmental 
ties with Germany were severed during this time’  (Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: 
The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), at 
391).
79 Adapted from Nathaniel Berman's “But the Alternative Is Despair“ ’: European Nationalism and the 
Modernist Renewal of International Law*. 106 Harvard LR 1792-1903 (1992-1993), at 1879.
80 Cautiousness in establishing analogies between the private law systems and state servitudes is 
certainly appropriate. For Lauterpacht, no attempt to apply conceptions taken from private laws to 
inter-state relations “has caused more confusion or has brought the recourse to analogy into more 
disrepute than the efforts made to introduce the conception of servitudes into international public 
law“ (Private Law Sources, supra note 49, at 119). Whether the concept of servitude has a place in 
international law is still contested. According to Ragazzi, no generally accepted definition of the
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context of the Saarland administration, it has been argued that the exercise of German 
authority was temporarily limited to a period of 15 years for the benefit of the League o f 
Nations which exercised effective control through its agent, the Saar Commission.81 
Accordingly, ‘internationalisation’ o f a territory has been understood as
die vertragliche Verpflichtung eines Staates, auf die Verwaltung eines Gebietsteils, der weiter­
hin unter seiner Souveränität bleibt, zugunsten gewisser regelmäßiger Verkehrsinteressen 
anderer Staaten oder aller Staaten zu verzichten.82
This conceptual reinterpretation o f an international territorial administration along the lines o f 
rights exercised in foreign territory corresponding to a non-faciendo or in patiendo on the 
part o f the burdened state holds particular appeal since it allows us to distinguish it from the 
League o f Nations regime governing the administration of Mandate territories in which the 
sovereignty of colonies and territories have “ceased to be under the sovereignty of the 
States which formerly governed them".83 Also, in the discussion before the Council of the 
League in the matter of the Polish rights upon the Westerplatte, these rights were styled by 
the President of the Danzig Senate as “servitude”.84
As we will see later when discussing the status o f Kosovo in international law, the institution 
of state servitude could assist in further defining the legal properties of an international 
territorial administrations and the international legal framework within which it is required to 
discharge its functions. One could liken Kosovo's status in international law to a general 
servitude exercised by the United Nations on behalf and in favour of a limited legal subject o f 
international law85 which cannot exercise it itself. As Daillier and Peilet point out, the powers 
which accompany the creation o f a servitude could by analogy be said to attach to other 
types of institutions, or, in their terminology, to ‘integrated organisations'.86
concept and scope of state servitudes has emerged (The Concept o f international Obligations Erga 
Omnes (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997), at 21-22, with annotated bibliography).
81 Art. 49 o f the Treaty of Versailles determined that “Germany renounces in favour of the League in 
the capacity of trustee the government of the territory defined above. At the end of fifteen years..., 
the inhabitants of the said territory shall be called to indicate the sovereignty under which they 
desire to be placed”. Julius Hatschek interpreted this provision convincingly, arguing that .Der 
Völkerbund als Rechtssubjekt ad hoc erhält eine Staatsservitut, d.h. er schränkt die deutsche 
Staatshoheit für die Dauer von 15 Jahren dahin ein, daß er die Regierung übernimmt“ (Völkerrecht 
ais System rechtlich bedeutsamer Staatsakte (Leipzig/Eriangen, 1923), at 161). Cf. also Väli, 
Servitudes, supra note 64, at 281, including annotated literature. Sceptical as to the creation of a 
state servitude in the case of the Saar. Lauterpacht, Private Law  Sources, supra note 49, at 124.
82 Raimund Beck, Die Intemationalisiervng von Territorien (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1962), at 71.
83 League o f Nations Covenant, Art. 22 §1 (my italics). See Chapter 11.1.2 (ii), infra p. 56. For a 
discussion o f some the Versailles Treaty’s provisions establishing rights with a ‘real’ character see 
Arnold McNair, 'So-Called State Servitudes’, 6 BV/L 111-127 (1925).
84 Quoted by Väli, Servitudes, supra note 64, at 61, note 5. The appreciation o f the similarity between 
processes of internationalisation and international servitudes however precedes the creation 
League of Nations. See David J. Bederman, The Souls of International Organizations: Legal 
Personality and the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel', 36 Virginia JIL 275-377 (1995-1996), at 319 et 
seq. (concluding the 1865 Convention Concerning the Administration and Upholding of the 
Lighthouse at Cape spartel delegated the operation o f the lighthouse to an international 
competence, not the Maroccoan territory upon which the lighthouse was situated).
85 For the argument that seeks to construct limited international legal personality for internationalised 
territories, see Chapter NI.2, infra, p. 105.
86 Daillier/Pellet, Droit International Public, supra note 34, no. 315.
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A sub-category of personal servitudes is that of public servitudes, which are burdens upon a 
piece of land for the benefit of the general public, a group of individuals or their representa­
tive bod/.87 Hence, even if there was no contractual basis for the transfer of the title to 
exercise effective control, the general servitude in favour o f a limited subject of international 
law -  a territory under UN administration -  could have been vertically imposed by the UN 
Security Council (SC) on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter. In applying ordre public 
considerations in municipal law, according to which the right of passage can be imposed on 
the owner o f a land (or the right of the public to navigate a river, the bed of which belongs to 
a private person), the internationalisation of territory by the SC’s reliance on Chapter VII 
could be viewed as the imposition of a temporary servitude juris gentium necessariae. The 
non-faciendo of the burdened state (Serbia and Montenegro) would then correspond to the 
right of the UN to temporarily exercise imperium on the territory. International servitudes, in 
this re-conceptionalisation, can be understood as temporal limitations upon the sovereign 
exercise of authority of one entity, rather than 'real entitlements’ held by the administering 
organ, and are conceived as operating independently from territorial sovereignty.88
While the merits of such a systematic transposition of private/public law figures shall not be 
discussed here in detail, the conceptual reinterpretation of an international territorial adminis­
tration holds appeal in that it might enable us to draw analogies between the legal properties 
accompanying the establishment o f a state servitude. The careful application o f the 
analogon of servitude could assist us in our argument that the imposition of an ‘objective 
legal regime' created obligations with erga omnes character which can only be fulfilled or 
breached vis-à-vis all states.
1.1.4 Mixed Methodology: Chapter VII and the Incorporation of a Horizontal 
Agreement
The case of Eastern Slavonia is illustrative of the ‘vertical shift’ of effective control to an 
international organ that was actually preceded by a horizontal agreement between the 
warring parties. Its discussion is relevant for the contextualisation of the newly developed 
methods of international crisis management through which horizontal agreements are 
incorporated (or 'confirmed') by the SC's reliance on Chapter VIL
(i) Eastern Slavonia (1995)
On the margins of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA),89 the Presidents of Croatia and
87 Ragazzi, Erga Omnes, supra note 80, at 21.
88 This approach is inspired by Véli’s chapter on international servitudes as distinguished from 
territorial sovereignty (Servitudes, supra note 64, at 49 et seq.). Cf., however, the highly relevant 
comments o f McNair who argued that international law’s cautious reluctance to draw on the civil law 
of servitudes may be justified by the difference between dominium and imperium: “States are very 
sensitive -  hypersensitive -  on the question of sovereignty, and the very word 'servitude' has an 
ugly sound in the ear of a sovereign state’s legal adviser or representative” ('State Servitudes', 
supra note 83, at 121-122).
89 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina -  Croatia -  Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Paris, 14 December 1995, reproduced in 
35 ILM 75 (1996). The case of post-conflict Bosnia can neither be placed in the context of second- 
generation peacekeeping, nor in the context of internationalisation developed here. The multi­
layered system of international supervision established by the DPA resembles an indirect model of 
international administration. In his exercise of executive authority, .the High Representative is 
authorised by Security Council which assumed the position of the ultimate guarantor of the peace
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Serbia hammered out an arrangement that became known as the Basic Agreement, 
eventually signed between the government of Croatia and local Croat Serb authorities in 
November 1995.90 The signatories called on the SC to establish a transitional administration 
to “govern the Region during the transitional period in the interest of all persons resident in o r 
returning to the Region".91 They also requested the Council to authorise an international 
force to maintain international peace and security. W ith the adoption of Resolution 1025 
(1995), the SC invited the Secretary-General (SG) to draw up a report and make re­
commendations as to how the Basic Agreement might be implemented 92 On 15 January 
1996, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the SC decided to establish fo r an initial 12 
month period a UN peace-keeping operation for the region -  the United Nations Transitional 
Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). The SC 
further requested the SG to appoint, in consultation with the parties, a Transitional Adminis­
trator to have overall authority over the military and civilian components of UNTAES, and to  
exercise the authority given to the Transitional Administration in the Basic Agreement.93
In what was later viewed as an extension of ‘complex peacekeeping’, the Security Council 
invoked Chapter VII o f the Charter for the first time in order to establish a direct and 
comprehensive UN civil and military presence.94 In accordance with the Basic Agreement 
and the relevant vertical instrument, the Transitional Administrator had the responsibility to  
effectively govern the UNTAES region, while gradually helping to reintegrate it into Croatia's 
legal system.95 Following the successful holding of elections by UNTAES in 1997, the UN 
Transitional Administration developed an exit strategy which was described by the UN SG in 
the following terms:
In the first phase, the Transitional Administrator would devolve to Croatia executive 
responsibility for the major part o f civil administration of the region while maintaining his 
authority and ability to intervene and overrule decisions should the situation deteriorate and
process. The case of BiH does also not represent a ‘pure’ case of an actual divorce between 
imperium and dominium. Further references to BiH under international administration will be made 
later (Chapter Vl.2.3 (ii), infra p. 230), albeit without explicit reference to the legal construction upon 
which 'joint administration’ of the territory (i.e., by national and international authorities) is based.
90 Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (Erdut 
Agreement), Government of the Republic of Croatia -  local Croatian Serb authorities (Erdut, 12 
November 1995), UN Doc. S/1995/951, Annex reproduced in 35 ILM 184 (1996). Cf. also Richard 
Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 238-239.
91 Erdut Agreement, supra, at 185.
92 See the Report o f the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 981 (1995), 982 
(1995) and 983 (1995), S/1995/987, §29, and his report pursuant to S/RES/1025 (1995), 
S/1995/1028, §6.
93 S/RES/1037,15 January 1996
94 For an account of Chinese resistance to the adoption of the mission's mandate under Chapter VII 
see Derek Boothby, The  Political Challenges of Administering Eastern Slavonia’, 10:1 Global 
Governance 37-51 (2004), at 45.
95 Giovanni Cellamare, ‘Note sull’amministrazione transitoria delle Nazioni Unite in Slavonia Orientale 
(UNTAES)’, in Divenire socials ed adeguamento del diritto: studi in onore di Francesco Capotorti 
(1999), at 83-97. The re-integration of Eastern Slavonia into Croatia’s political and economic 
structures was carried out through a number of Joint Implementing Committees (JICs). See Jelena 
Smolenar, ‘ International Administration and Socio-Economic Policy: UNTAES and the Regulation o f 
Housing and Property Issues’, Paper delivered at the SGIR 5th Pan-European Conference (The 
Hague, September 2004), at 8. Only the Transitional Administrator was in a position to make 
binding arrangements with the governments of Croatia, Serbia, or with local Serb authorities. Cf. 
Derek Boothby, The UNTAES Experience. Weapons Buy-Back in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and 
Western Sirmium (Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 1998), at 13.
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the achievements of UNTAES be threatened. The pace of devolution would be commensurate 
with Croatia’s demonstrated ability to reassure the Serb population and successfully complete 
peaceful integration. In the second phase, and subject to satisfactory Croatian performance, 
remaining executive functions would be devolved, with Croatia assuming responsibility for the 
continued demilitarisation of the region and the gradual reintegration of the transitional Police 
Force into the Croatian police force.96
Throughout its mandate the UNTAES force pursued a policy of negotiating public 
agreements with the Government o f Croatia on the post-UNTAES implementation of its 
commitments and guarantees,97 partly in order to assure and prepare the local population for 
the full transfer of authority. However, the characterisation o f the legal basis for the exercise 
of powers proved controversial when determining whether it was Croatia or the SC who had 
the capacity to terminate UNTAES' activities.98 When the original UNTAES mandate was 
extended by SC Resolution 1120 (despite strong objections of Croatia which argued that its 
powers of government should immediately resume), the Security Council’s express 
reference to Chapter VII became significant It precluded Croatia's arguments that those 
powers were conferred to it by Croatia on an ad hoc basis. In this light, the Basic Agreement 
represented nothing more than a request to the SC to exercise its Chapter VII powers and 
not, as Croatia would have wanted, a conferral of revocable powers.99 The UNTAES 
mandate had been established by the SC's genuine reference to Chapter VII. It further 
manifested its authority when it decided to terminate UNTAES based on its evaluation that 
its mandate had been fulfilled.100
It is hard to overstate the importance of the Security Council’s reference to Chapter VII. This 
new practice of utilising it as the genuine legal basis for the creation of an international 
administration represents a significant departure from the previous horizontal practice 
through which the SC had earlier accepted the explicit conferral of powers. A specific case in 
question was the 1991 Paris Peace Accords regarding Cambodia.101 Since the SC Resolu­
96 Report o f the Secretary-General on the Situation in Croatia (23 June 1997), S/1997/487, §48. The 
gradual empowerment of local institution and a commensurate devolution of international powers 
conditioned on the performance of local actors was endorsed in S/RES/1120, 14 July 1997, and 
would later provide the guiding principle of transferring international powers to the locally elected 
institutions o f Kosovo.
97 Cf. the brief account of the negotiations surrounding the signing of the Affidavit of Employment 
Rights, through which all public employees in the region would retain their employment status by 
Jacques-Paul Klein, The United Nations and Administration of Territory; The United Nations 
Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES)’, 97 AStL Proceedings 205-209 (2003), 
at 208.
98 See Dan Sarooshi, Some Preliminary Remarks on the Conferral by States o f Powers on 
International Organizations (Jean Monnet WP 4/03, NYU School o f Law, 2003), at 17.
99 Cf. ibid., at 18. The Chapter VII basis was thus important since UN peacekeeping forces 
traditionally have no inherent capability to restore a situation in which consent for their activities 
wavers or evaporates. Cf. John MacKinlay, ‘Military Responses to Complex Emergencies’ , in
• Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), The United Nations and Civil Wars (London; Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1995), at 54. With regard to the authorisation of IFOR through reliance on Chapter VII -  not 
necessary but politically expedient -  this is also the conclusion o f Oliver Dörr, ‘Die Vereinbarungen 
von Dayton/Ohio. Eine völkerrechtliche Einführung’, 35 AdV 129-180 (1997), at 156-57.
100 S/RES/1145, 19 December 1997. See also the statement of the President of the SC on behalf of 
the Council: S/PRST/1998/3,13 February 1998.
101 For three extensive accounts of the UNTAC mission see Steven R. Ratner, The New UN 
Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands o f Conflict after the Cold War (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1995), at 157 ef seq.; Michael W. Doyle and Nishkala Suntharalingam, T he  UN in 
Cambodia: Lessons for Complex Peacekeeping’, 1 International Peacekeeping 117-143 (1994);
tion which established the United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC)102 
did not explicitly refer to Chapter VII of the Charter, the horizontal agreement between the 
parties provided the limits according to which the international mandate could be exercised. 
Hence UNTAC was required to comply with certain directions of the Supreme National 
Council that was defined as the “unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, 
throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity o f Cambodia are 
enshrined".103 UNTAC was therefore constrained to exercise its power within the context o f 
the terms and conditions set out in the particular conferral.104
The trends of internationalisation, starting with the Saar Territory administration via the 
horizontal agreement and ad hoc conferral of governmental powers to UNTAC, to the 
administration of Eastern Slavonia based on a Chapter VII mandate illustrate the dynamic 
shift from horizontal to vertical instruments effectuating the transfer o f imperium. They are 
also useful precedents when analysing the scope, principles and procedures through which 
an international presence assumed effective control in Kosovo, discussed in Chapter V.
1.2 U n it e d  Na t io n s  T e r r it o r ia l  A d m in is t r a t io n  a n d  t h e  V e r t ic a l  
Im p o s it io n  o f  I m p e r iu m
Starting with the examples of Jerusalem and Trieste, this section will give a broad overview 
of the struggle over the correct legal basis of temporary UN territorial administration. It 
proceeds by discussing four more cases, in pairs: W est Irian/Namibia illustrate the UN’s 
increasing capacity to assume temporary administrative powers; Kosovo and East Timor 
exemplify the ‘new* legal basis grounded in Chapter VII o f the UN Charter.
1.2.1 The Struggle for a Legal Basis: From Article 24 to Chapter V II
The issue whether the League, and its successor, the UN, were authorised to assume 
administering powers outside the context of the Trusteeship System (that has always 
followed a formal trusteeship agreement between itself and a government responsible for 
administering a territory, based on Article 77 of the Charter) has been the subject of legal 
controversy. In particular, Kelsen favoured a restrictive interpretation of UN powers, claiming 
that “the Organization is not authorised by the Charter to exercise sovereignty over a 
territory, which does not have the legal status of a trust territory."105 In the decade after 
WWII, one can, however, point at two examples o f instances of recognition by UN members
Dobbins et al., UN’s Role, supra note 5, at 69-91.
102 S/RES/745,28 February 1992.
103 Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Paris, 23 October 
1991, Art. 3 and 5, 31 ILM 183 (1991). According to Matheson, UNTAC’s “authority was limited by 
the requirement that UNTAC follow any ‘advice’ approved by a consensus of the factions 
represented in the Supreme National Council, to the extent that it did not conflict with the 
Agreement" {‘Governance’, supra note 33, at 77).
104
105
For an in-depth legal analysis o f the distribution of competencies between UNTAC and the SNC 
see Frank E. Hufnagel, UN-Friedensoperationen der zweiten Generation. Vom Puffer zur neuen 
Treuhand (Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1996), at 107-138.
Hans Kelsen, The Law o f the United Nations. A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems 
(London: Stevens&Sons, 1950), at 651.
mnmHpfja
*35 ■
{hat the United Nations possessed the capacity to administer or supervise the administration 
of territories other than trustee territories.
(i) Jerusalem and Trieste (Both 1947}
By a series o f Resolutions in 1947 and 1948,106 the GA determined that the city of Jerusalem 
should be placed under a special international regime under effective UN control. Article 1 of 
the draft Statute establishing the regime explicitly constituted Jerusalem as a "corpus 
separatum under the administration of the United Nations".107 As expressly stated, the city 
was not to be a trust territory, and Chapters XII and XIII of the UN Charter were not 
applicable.108 Yet the Governor of the city, who was entrusted “on behalf of the United 
Nations", was to be appointed by, and responsible to, the Trusteeship Council.109 Moreover, 
the Governor was given power to conduct the external affairs of the city and to conclude 
treaties on its behalf.110 Safeguarded by the Security Council, the framework put in place 
was, as Berman aptly remarked, a masterpiece of international legal imagination, 
“embodying the entire range of international legal solutions for the problem of nationa­
lism".111 It provided for the internationalisation of the city under the Trusteeship Council, 
subject to plebiscitary review after ten years. In its call for two states it supplied an oppor­
tunity for self-determination and provided guarantees for each of the minorities in the two 
new states. Finally, it envisaged the supranational integration of the city in the form of a Joint 
Economic Board, with multiethnic participation under UN auspices.112
The second example which illustrates the novel solutions suggested in the context of 
internationalisation is that of Trieste. The annexes to the Treaty of Peace with Italy conferred 
upon the SC certain limited governmental functions over the proposed Free Territory of 
Trieste.113 Although the Statute never entered into force, it still provides some evidence of 
the recognition by the signatories of the Treaty of the capacity of the UN to supervise the 
administration o f a territory. The Permanent Statute, if adopted, would have provided that
[t]he integrity and independence of the Free Territory shall be assured by the [UN SCJ. This 
responsibility implies that the Council shall: (a) ensure the observance of the present Statute 
and in particular the protection of the basic human rights of the inhabitants, (b) ensure the
106 A/RES/181 (A+B) (II), 29 November 1947, UN Doc. A/64, at 131 (1947); Cf. also A/RES/303 (IV), 9 
December 1949.
107 Statute for the City of Jerusalem, Article 1. UN TCOR, 6th session, 4 April 1950, UN Doc. T/592,
108 Cf. Kelsen, United Nations, 1950, supra note 105, at 687 (with citations).
109 Cf. Statute, supra note 107, Article 12 and 13.
110 Ibid., Art. 37(5 and 6).
111 Berman, ‘Jerusalem’, supra note 24, at 825.
112 For a discussion of the ‘degree’ of Jerusalem’s envisioned internationalisation cf. Bèck, 
Intemationalisierung, supra note 82, at 49-52. The discussions in the Trusteeship Council (and the 
eventual collapse of the internationalisation project) are summarised by Nicolas Vei'copoulos, 
Traité des territories dépendants, vol II (Athens, 1971), §§1192-1195.
113 Treaty of Peace with Italy, Paris, 10 February 1947; 49 UNTS 126, 187. Annex VI supplied the 
Permanent Statute (pending a decision of the SC on its coming into force). Trieste’s envisioned 
internationalisation is discussed by Beck in Intemationalisierung, supra note 82, at 41-47; Verzijl, 
International Law, vol. II, supra note 37, at 504-5; and A. Gervais, ‘Le statut de Trieste’, 51 RGDIP 
134 (1947). The powers were never actually assumed because of inability to reach agreement in 
the SC on the details of the administration.
>36 •
maintenance o f public order and security in the Free Territory.114
When the SC discussed the approval of the Permanent Statute in 1947, some members o f 
the Council were of the opinion that it was not empowered to act as supreme governing body 
of a territory with the ultimate authority over its people, because such functions would have 
no direct connection to maintaining peace and security.115 They maintained that the  
Council's responsibility could only be exercised through the specific powers granted for tha t 
purpose in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII which, in their opinion, did not confer upon the  
Council sufficient authority to exercise the functions stipulated in the Permanente Statute.116 
In response to these objections, other representatives pointed either to the Council's im plicit 
powers or to the spirit of the Charter. The French representative, for instance, deprecated 
that “world opinion would certainly not understand it, if the Security Council were to give the  
impression of evading a responsibility so closely related to the maintenance o f international 
peace and security, as it is precisely [its] main task and responsibility".117 Arguing on sim ilar 
teleological basis, the Polish delegate stated that “it would be entirely within the general sp irit 
of the Charter...if it were decided to form a Free Territory under a quasi-international 
administration."118
A consensus emerged, according to which the necessary authority to adm inister a territory 
could be found in Article 24. On the question o f the Permanent Statute for Trieste, Secretary- 
General Lie argued that the words, “primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter­
national peace and security", coupled with the phrase “acts on their behalf, constituted a 
sufficiently wide legal basis for assuming (temporary} governmental authority, since the UN 
members had thereby conferred “powers commensurate with its responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace and security" upon the Council, limited only by the fundamental 
principles and purposes of the Charter.119
(ii) Western Irian (1962) and Namibia (1967)
The exercise of administering territories, as well as the emerging practice to establish UN 
forces, would find a potent functional justification in what was termed the doctrine o f 'implied
114 Peace Treaty with Italy, supra note 113, Article 2.
115 See the statements of the Representatives of Syria and Australia, Repertoire o f the Practice o f the  
Security Council, 1946-1951,482-3 (Syria) and 484 (Australia).
116 This referred particularly to Article 19 of the Statute which recognised the competence of the SC to 
prevent legislation from coming into force. Due to those irreconcilable positions, the territorial 
conflict had to await a horizontal solution which was only arrived at in 1975. For the Osimo 
Accords between Italy and Yugoslavia, see Eckart Klein, Statusverträge im Völkerrecht. 
Rechtsfragen territorialer Sondenegime (Beriin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer Verlag: 1980), at 
39-40.
117 SCOR (II), 89th meeting 16 (1947).
113■ UNSC Repertoire, supra note 115, at 483. Cf. also the discussion of the Trieste case and its 
significance for the development of the residuary power of the Security Council by Oscar 
Schächter, 'The Development of International Law through the Legal Opinion of the United 
Nations Secretariat', 25 BYIL 91-132 (1948), at 96-101. Seyersted noted correctly that the failure 
of the UN to exercise territorial jurisdiction in Jerusalem and Trieste was not a prima facie 
indication of the absence of its legal capacity but due to the external reason that most of the 
territory was under the control o f states (‘United Nations Forces: Some Legal Problems’, 37 BYIL 
351-475 (1961), at 453).
119 UNSC Repertoire, supra note 115, at 483. With the adoption of Resolution 16 of 10 January 1947 
and the 'Permanent Statute’, the Security Council followed the opinion of the SG.
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powers’.120 A decade after the two unsuccessful attempts to establish its authority over 
Jerusalem and Trieste, the United Nations accepted full responsibility for governing the 
territory of W est Irian (West New Guinea), based on an Agreement between Indonesia and 
the Netherlands,121 which provided that the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority 
(UNTEA) would “have full authority under the direction o f the Secretary General to 
administer the territory".122 When UNTEA eventually assumed actual responsibility for the 
territory, and effectuated a transition of governmental power from one authority to another, 
the Charter basis for doing so remained uncertain. The approach followed in the case of 
Trieste had, in a sense, been sounder, as it clearly spelled out the components o f a policy 
that were supposed to lead the internationalisation of the territory: First, an international 
regime for the territory was deemed necessary, second, the UN was the most appropriate 
agency for assuming the supervision of such regime; and third, that this rôle could be 
justified under Article 24 of the Charter, which vests the Security Council with the primary 
responsibility fo r maintaining peace and security.
The United Nations' assumption of governmental authority over a territory became the 
subject of debate with the establishment of the UN Council for Namibia in 1967.123 In 1966, 
the GA had adopted Resolution 2145 (XXI), by which it terminated the mandate o f South 
Africa over Namibia and placed the territory under the direct responsibility of the United 
Nations. In the following year, the G A created the United Nations Council for Namibia, 
initially comprising eleven member States.124 A conspicuously high number o f states, 
however, abstained from voting for the relevant Resolution.125 They were clearly concerned 
that the GA would not have the competence to confer such extensive legislative powers 
upon a thus created UN Council. Though it did not explicitly address the legal basis for the 
establishment o f the Council, the ICJ couched its language very much in the line of 
reasoning developed in the Trieste determination, when it observed that “Article 24 of the 
Charter vests in the Security Council the necessary authority to take actions such as that
120 For a comparison of the three different views expressed by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on 
Reparation fo r Injuries Suffered in the Service o f the United Nations (ICJ Reports [1949] 174, 
especially at 174 and 182) on the question of implied powers see Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law 
and Procedures of the International Court of Justice: International Organizations and Tribunals’, 
29 BYIL 1-62 (1952), at 5-6. On the issue of inherent powers of the UN to establish and command 
forces, see Seyersted, 'United Nations Forces’, supra note 118, at 460 et seq.
121 Essentially containing the US-proposed 'Bunker plan' that suggested a transfer of Dutch authority 
to a temporary executive authority under the supervision of the UN SG. Cf. Agreement Concerning 
West New Guinea (West lrian)/West Papua, Indonesia -  Netherlands, 15 August 1962, UN Doc. 
A/5170, Annex C, 1-21,437 UNTS 274.
122 A/RES/1752 (XVII), 21 September 1962. On 1 May 1963 the administration o f the territory was 
transferred by the UNTEA to Indonesia while the formers preparatory task and responsibility in the 
future 'act o f self-determination’ -  as stipulated in the August 15 Agreement -  was minimised. For 
two highly critical accounts o f the UN’s administration of West Papua, especially its failure to resist 
to Indonesian political calculus, see the two studies by John Saltford, The United Nations and the 
Indonesian Takeover o f West Papua, 1962-1969. The Anatomy o f Betrayal (London: Routlege 
Curzon, 2003), and Paul W . van der Veur, ‘The United Nations in West Irian: A Critique’, 18:1 
International Organization 53-73 (1964).
123 The case o f Namibia is dealt with in greater depth in Chapters H.2.3 and IV.3 of this thesis.
124 A/RES/2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, UN Doc. A/6657/Supp. 1 (1967).
125 Resolution 2248 was adopted by 85 votes to 2 with 30 abstentions. On the attitude of governments 
towards Resolution 2248 see the Report by the Secretary-General, Compliance o f Member States 
with the United Nations Resolutions and Decisions Relating to Namibia, Taking into Account the 
Advisory Opinion o f the International Court o f Justice o f 21 June 1971, 12 March 1975, UN Doc. 
A/AC. 131/37.
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taken in the present case".126
In short, the authority of the UN Security Council to alter or abrogate territorial rights against 
the wish of the sovereign, or its capacity to convey title to territorial disposition, was fiercely 
contested. It was argued that the creation of the Council for Namibia, and via this precedent, 
the creation o f an international territorial administration, could be based on an analogous 
application o f Article 81, despite the lack of a trusteeship agreement within the sense of 
Article 79 of the Charter.127 In his dissenting opinion in the 1971 Legal Consequences case, 
Judge Fitzmaurice stated that, on the other hand, “[t]he Security Council might, after making 
the necessary determinations under A rt 39..., order the occupation of a country or piece of 
a territory to restore peace or security, but it could not thereby, or as part o f that operation, 
abrogate or alter territorial rights".128 Even more cautious was the oral statement o f the 
representative o f the UN Secretary-General at the prior pleadings who suggested that “a 
situation, dispute, threat or breach of the piece is hardly conceivable in which the Security 
Council would be in a position to call upon a sovereign State to withdraw its administration 
from a part o f its territory".129 Thirty years later, however, scholarly opinion seems to lean 
towards a contingent and case by case justification that would enable the SC to direct a 
permanent change in some aspects o f status, boundaries, political structure, or legal system 
of a territory within a state, if the Council should determine that doing so is necessary to 
restore and maintain international peace and security.130
1.2.2 Imposing the Divorce: Chapter VII and the Appropriation of Effective 
Control by the United Nations
The preceding discussion emphasised that for a ‘protecting entity' to exercise effective 
control in accordance with international law, the ceding state must have authorised the 
transfer of effective control through an international agreement131 by which it manifests its
126 ICJ Advisory Opinion, 1971, supra note 56, at 52. Discussing whether Article 24 furnishes the 
necessary authority for the administration by the UN, Halderman suggested that “ in the absence 
of any reasonable specific authority for such action in the Charter, and of any apparent intent on 
the part of the framers to include such authority, it is believed to be the best solution o f the 
resulting problem to regard the Council action...as the first step in a potential process of Charter 
modification...through practice and acquiescence of the members’  (‘United Nations Territorial 
Administration and the Development of the Charter’, 95 Duke LJ 95-108 (1964), at 99).
127 Klein, Statusverträge, supra note 116, at 303: “Territorial zuständig sind...die Vereinten Nationen, 
...die in analoger Anwendung von Art. 81 SVN zur Administration befugt sind. In Ausübung dieser 
Befugnis hat die Generalversammlung den ’Council for Namibia* errichtet.“ Cf. also Lawrence 
Herman, The Legal Status of Namibia and of the United Nations Council for Namibia’ , 13 
Canadian YIL 306-322 (1975), at 319-322.
128Namibia opinion, supra note 56, at 294.
129 Oral Statement by Mr. Vickers, Representative of the UN SG, in the context of the ICJ Pleadings in 
the 1971 Legal Consequences case. See ICJ Pleadings, Vol. II, at 486.
130 Matheson, ’Governance’, supra note 33, at 85. He takes this extensive interpretation from a 
reading of Art. 41 which recites a list of possible measures that may be employed to give effect to 
its decisions. He argues that the list, clearly being exemplary and non-exhaustive, would not limit 
the Council in deciding on different steps or instruments. For references to authors disagreeing 
with such a wide interpretation o f SC competencies see Chapter V.3.1, infra note 734.
131 The term Verwaltungszession (administrative cession), frequently used in German legal literature 
(cf. Verdroß et. al., ’Gebietshoheit’, supra note 61, at 241 and Verzijl, International Law, supra 
note 37, vol. Ml, at 408), appears inadequate to approach the phenomenon in question. Cession, 
one of the modes through which territory can be acquired in international law, involves the 
peaceful transfer o f territory from one sovereign to another. The basis of cession lies in the
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intention to create, change, or define legal relationships. Absent such agreement, the 
assumption of effective control by a 'protecting entity*, must have another legal basis in 
international law. Even without the consent of a state, the SC might be empowered to order 
a transfer of effective control over territory to a 'protecting entity* based on Chapter VII o f the 
UN Charter. The unease with which jurists viewed the emerging dynamics that would later 
lead to the advent of plenary systems of international administration vertically imposed by the 
SC was best summarised by Judge Weeramantry in the 1995 East Timor case when, in his 
dissenting opinion, he pronounced his scepticism that a UN organ could ever take over the 
responsibilities of the administering power
It is true indeed that the General Assembly and the Security Council, in all their plenitude of 
power, preside over the great task of decolonisation and protection of dependent peoples. Yet, 
with all respect, they are no substitutes for the particular attention to the needs of each 
territory, which the Charter clearly intends to achieve. Protection from Internal exploitation and 
external harm, day-to-day administration, development of human rights, promotion of 
economic interests and well-being, recovery of wrongful loss, fostering of self-government, 
representation in world forums, including this Court -  all these require particular attention from 
a Power specifically charged with responsibility in that regard. [...I]n the absence o f an 
administering power, there would be a total neglect o f that function and hence an impairment 
of United Nations supervision.132
In the context of trusteeship administration, those considerations were certainly adequate. 
However, beyond the confines of Chapter XII of the Charter, Weeramantrys unease proved 
obsolete even at the time of his writing, given that (i) the Trusteeship Council (Jerusalem), 
and (ii) the Security Council (Trieste) had been found competent to assume functions of 
direct multilateral administration, and (iii) the General Assembly (Namibia), and (iv) the 
Secretary-General (West Irian) had actually assumed those functions in the subsequent 
decades. The cases of Kosovo and East Timor, put under international administration only 
four years after the ICJ’s East Timor dictum illustrate the SG’s newly manifested authority, 
delegated to him by the Security Council, to administer territory through his subsidiary organ. 
Those cases also represent the latest instances in which the SC chose to divorce sovereign 
title and imperium over territory.
(i) Kosovo and East T imor (Both 1999)
The problems surrounding the imposed divorce between sovereign claims and effective 
control have crystallised in two UN Security Council resolutions adopted in 1999. On 10 June 
1999, the SC adopted Resolution 1244, authorising the Secretary-General to establish “an 
interim administration...under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy 
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia".133 Only a few months later, on 25 October 1999, 
the SC decided to establish an interim administration endowed with "overall responsibility for 
the administration of East Timor”, including "all legislative and executive authority” and the 
administration of justice.134 Both UNMIK and UNTAET, as these administrations were sub­
sequently named, were created on the basis of Chapter VII o f the UN Charter, and in both
intention of the relevant parties to transfer sovereignty. In the cases discussed, only effective 
control -  and not the sovereign dominium -  has been transferred.
132 tCJ Reports [1995], supra note 57, at 181.
133 §10 of S/RES/1244,10 June 1999.
134 §1 of S/RES/1272, 25 October 1999.
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cases an international territorial administration assumed exclusive administrative authority 
over territories placed under their effective control and supervision.
The deployment of UNMIK arguably broke with a traditional requirement that UN peace­
keeping operations would have the consent of the host state.135 Formally, the UN did follow 
its tradition of seeking the host government’s consent before deploying a UN peacekeeping 
mission into a post-conflict setting.136 The end of NATO’s air campaign was, however, 
conditional on the approval of the Kumanovo agreement137 by the FRY, which recorded the 
latter's consent that KFOR would deploy with the authority to take all necessary action to 
establish and maintain a secure environment
Doubts have recently been expressed as to the legal validity of the Kumanovo Agreement 
endorsed by the Security Council in its Resolution 1244.138 Indeed, the transfer o f effective 
control from the FRY to an international territorial administration in 1999 occurred in circum­
stances that would not qualify as a voluntary agreement. According to a general principle 
codified in the common Article 52 o f the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and 
the 1986 Convention on the Law o f Treaties between States and international Organizations, 
a treaty (of which FRY’s acceptance of a phased withdrawal o f its military is an example) “is 
void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use o f force". Although coercion was 
indeed an objective element affecting the validity of the agreement, the view that the 
invalidity o f the horizontal agreement should extend to the vertical instrument (i.e. Resolution 
1244) is certainly misguided. The Kumanovo Agreement, sim ilar to the horizontal agreement 
signed in 1995 at Erdut in which Croatia and local Croat Serb authorities agreed to establish 
a transitional Administration,139 was superseded by the SC’s reliance on Chapter VII. The 
question whether the Kumanovo Agreement ought to be considered null and void ab initio, or 
whether it produced some legal effects by the coerced party’s subsequent acquiescence,140 
is therefore moot. As Tomuschat notes, it is clear that
135 This principle was first stated by SG Hammarskjöld in his 1956 report to the General Assembly on 
the first major UN peacekeeping operation, UNEF (established by the GA in the Middle East from 
1956 to 1967, and operating under a Status o f Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the host state 
establishing the rights and privileges o f the UN forces). It served to differentiate peacekeeping 
from the employment of UN personnel in conflict situations under a Chapter VII mandate. Cf. 
Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (OUP, 2000), at 152 and 183; Ratner, New 
UN Peacekeeping, supra note 101, at 51; and Erik Suy, ‘Peacekeeping Operations’, in Manuel sur 
les organisations intemationales (Hague Academy o f International Law, ed. by. R.-J. Dupuy, The 
Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1988), at 387-90. On UNEF in particular see Mona Ghali, ‘United Nations 
Emergency Force I: 1956-1967’, in The Evolution o f UN Peacekeeping. Case Studies and 
Comparative Analysis (ed. by W.J. Durch, New York: St. Martin’s Press), 104-130.
136 The Kosovo peace plan, negotiated between the Finnish President, the Special Envoy of the 
Russian President, and the Yugoslav President was subsequently ratified by the Serbian 
parliament and annexed to S/RES/1244. The Decision by the Serbian National Assembly of 3 
June 1999 is reprinted in Philip and David Auerswald, The Kosovo Conflict. A Diplomatic History 
Through Documents (Cambridge/The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2000), at 1079).
Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between the International Security Force (‘KFOR’) and the 
Governments of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia, Kumanovo (FYRoM), 9 June 1999, UN Doc. 
S/199/682, 38 ILM 1217 (1999). The agreement was signed by Lt. General Jackson, on behalf of 
NATO, and by Col. General Marjanovic o f the Yugoslav Army as well as Lt. General Stevanovic of 
the Ministry o f Internal Affairs, on behalf o f the Governments of the FRY and Serbia.
138 Enrico Milano, ‘Security Council Action in the Balkans: Reviewing the Legality of Kosovo’s 
Territorial Status’ , 14:5 EJIL 999-1022 (2003).
139 On the Erdut Agreement and the deployment of UNTAES, see supra note 90.
140 Cf. Milano, ‘Action’, supra note 138, at 1018.
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such expression of consent does not alter the intrinsic nature of a resolution of the Security 
Council... Notwithstanding such a consensual pre-stage of the decision-making process, 
resolutions of the [SC] remain unilateral acts, which are not dependent upon the continuation 
in time o f the consent given... The legal position is not changed...by the conclusion...of the 
[Kumanovo Agreement}. As its name indicates, this agreement regulates details of the deploy­
ment o f KFOR troops. It does not constitute an independent legal basis for that deployment.141
What is valid for the deployment of military forces must also be true for the UN-mandated 
deployment o f a civilian force. UNMIK was not set up under the terms of the Kumanovo 
Agreement. Its authority is hence not -  as sometimes argued in literature -  based on a 
‘double footing’, a Chapter VII resolution on the one hand, and the consent of the host state, 
on the other.142 The normative quality of Resolution 1244, it is submitted, lies in its vertical 
imposition o f the transfer o f effective control, and not in its endorsement of such a transfer 
through a horizontal agreement. Chapter VII of the UN Charter was employed as the legal 
basis for the establishment o f an international territorial administration that also (temporarily) 
suspended the FRY’s jurisdiction. This was perceived as a necessary measure to restore 
international peace in the region within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter.
It follows from the Charter that the adoption of enforcement measures by the Security 
Council, including the appropriation of imperium over territory and its transfer to one of its 
organs,143 is not limited by the principle of non-interference since Article 2(7) expressly 
states that the principle of domestic jurisdiction shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures adopted under Chapter VII. In the absence of a treaty (analogous to 
the Trusteeship Agreement with the territorial state contained in A rt 77 of the Charter), the
141 Christian Tomuschat, 'Yugoslavia’s Damaged Sovereignty over the Province of Kosovo’, in State, 
Sovereignty, and International Governance 323-347 (ed. by Gerard Kreijen et al., Oxford: OUP, 
2002), at 339. Frowein employs a similar line of argument: „man wird [die Zustimmung der 
Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien zur Einsetzung der zivilen Verwaltung für das Kosovo] vor allem als 
praktisch bedeutsam ansehen müssen; dagegen nicht annehmen können, daß diese rechtlich 
notwendig ist. Wenn die Zuständigkeit des Sicherheitsrates nach Kapitel VII auf der Grundlage 
einer Friedensgefährdung oder Friedensstörung, wie sie nach Art. 39 umschrieben ist, vorliegt, 
kann der Sicherheitsrat in einer derartigen Lage eine Territorial Verwaltung einsetzen, wenn das 
die einzige Möglichkeit ist, um friedliche Verhältnisse zu gewährleisten" (‘NotstandsVerwaltung von 
Gebieten durch die Vereinten Nationen’, in Völkerrecht und deutsches Recht, Festschrift für 
Walter Rudolf43-54 (ed. by H.-W. Arndt et al., München: Ch. Beck, 2001), at 44).
142 As argued, e.g., by Leopold von Carlowitz, ’UNMIK Lawmaking between Effective Peace Support 
and Internal Self-determination’, 41 Archiv des Völkerrechts 336-393 (2003), at 343. See also 
Niels van Willigen, ‘International Administration: Legal but Illegitimate?’, Paper delivered at the 
SGIR 5th Pan-European Conference (The Hague, September 2004), at 7. For an entirely mistaken 
approach to the incidence of UN plenary administrations cf. Epaminontas E. Triantafilou, ‘Matter of 
Law, Question of Policy: Kosovo’s Current and Future Status under International Law*, 5 Chicago 
JIL 355 (2004).
143 The wording of Art. 41 of the UN Charter grants the Council wide discretion as to the range of 
measures necessary for the maintenance of international peace. The list of measures expressly 
referred to is not exhaustive. It is a testimony to the ever-increasing importance of the SC that, in 
the 1990s, international territorial administrations were established as subsidiary organs under the 
authority of the SC and not of the GA: UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 
1992-3), UNMIK and UNTEAT as well as UNMIBH (UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina which 
exercised administrative functions in relation to, and was in charge of the restructuring of, the UN 
International Police Task Force) were (and in case of UNMIK, are still) administered by the SG 
pursuant to Art. 98. While the SG performs functions entrusted to him by the SC, the delegation of 
the establishment of subsidiary organs to the SG does not remove these organs from the ambit of 
the SC (Art. 29). Cf. Andreas Paulus ‘Article 29’, in The Charter o f the United Nations. A Commen­
tary (Vol. I, 2nd ed. by B. Simma, Munich, 2002), at 553. The nature of a UN administration mission 
as subsidiary organ of the SG will be clarified in Chapter IV.1.2, infra p. 126.
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Security Council can authorise, and thus create a title for, the temporary transfer of imperium 
to an international territorial administration without the invitation of the target state in 
situations that it determines to be a threat to international peace in accordance with Articles 
41 and 42 respectively.144
The history of UN intervention in East Timor in 1999 exemplifies the dynamic shift between 
horizontal and vertical tendencies that was to propel the UN into assuming the wholesale 
administration of the territory later that year. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1246, 
establishing the United Nations Administration Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to organise 
a popular consultation, based on a tripartite agreement with Indonesia and Portugal 
regarding the modalities o f its conduct145 Violence escalated in the wake of the vote, and 
Indonesia expressed its readiness to accept an offer of assistance. The SC, acting under 
Chapter VII, established the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) which took over 
all security functions from Indonesia and was authorised to use all necessary means to fu lfil 
its mandate. In a tripartite meeting with the UN SG, Indonesia and Portugal affirmed their 
agreement that governing authority should be transferred to the United Nations.146 A fter the 
result of the popular consultation was recognised by the Indonesian People’s Consultative 
Assembly, the SC adopted Resolution 1272 (1999), establishing the Transitional Administra­
tion (UNTAET) to take overall responsibility for the administration of the territory;147 powers 
that went fa r beyond the initial agreement of 6 May 1999. In what could be termed a complex 
peace-keeping mandate,148 UNTAET was given multiple assignments beyond ‘traditional 
duties’, including political, electoral, and informational components.149
44 For Ruffert, direct territorial administration complies with Chapter VII through the application of the 
implied-powers doctrine developed by the ICJ (The Administration of Kosovo and East Timor’, 
50:3 iCLQ 613-631 (2001), at 620.
145 S/RES/1246 (1999), 11 June 1999, based on the Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the 
Popular Consultation o f East Timor through a Direct Ballot, 5 May 1999. The 5 May Agreement 
consisted, as Lissauer correctly notes, of three parts: the first, an agreement between the two 
governments witnessed by the UN SG (providing for a conclusion of the dispute over the status o f 
the territory), and the second and third parts which are tripartite agreements between the two 
governments and the SG (on the modalities of the popular consultation under the auspices of the 
UN and the security arrangements thereto). Cf. Gyorgy B. Lissauer, Government by the Internatio­
nal Community: Establishing United Nations Administered Temtories. The Case o f Kosovo and 
East Timor (M.Phil. thesis on file with Oxford University, 2002), at 30. Resolution 1246 based the 
justifycation for the creation o f UNAMET both on the Agreement and on earlier GA pronounce­
ments affirming East Timor’s right o f self-determination as a non-self-goveming territory (compare 
the references in S/RES/1264 to A/RES/1514 (XV) and 2625 (XXV) via S/RES/1236).
146 Report o f the Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor (4 October 1999), UN Doc. S/1999/ 
1024 (1999), §25.
147 S/RES/1272,25 October 1999.
148 S/RES/1264, 15 September 1999. Whether the reference to Chapter VII was legally necessary or 
not remains contested. Indonesia had in principle expressed its readiness to accept an internatio­
nal peacekeeping force in the 5 May Agreement. In itself, this would have eliminated the barrier of 
domestic jurisdiction established by Art. 2(7) of the UN Charter. Invoking Chapter VII, had, 
however, the practical advantage that the Security Council could vest the multinational force with a 
robust mandate that included the use of ‘all necessary measures’, including the use of force. In 
addition, as Rothert observes, “had the Security Council not acted under the authority of Chapter 
VII, INTERFET would have been subject to Indonesia’s withdrawal of consent" (‘U.N. Intervention 
in East Timor*, 39 Columbia JTL 257-282 (2000-1). at 274).
149 For a concise study o f UNTAETs performance in all sectors of its mandate see Conflict Security 
and Development Group, A Review o f Peace Operations: A Case For Change? East Timor (Kings 
College, 10 March 2003).
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Arguably, the creation of the international territorial administration in East Timor revolutio­
nised the extent to which a UN organ could be vested with effective control and step into the 
administrative vacuum. UNTAET has not met with restraints of (suspended) sovereignty 
claims comparable to those of UNMIK as the United Nations had never recognised 
Indonesia’s exercise of administrative power as legal.150 In an exchange of notes constituting 
an Agreement with Australia, UNTAET had assumed all rights and obligations previously 
exercised by Indonesia under the Timor Gap Treaty “until the date of independence o f East 
Timor”.151 Some authors therefore claim that UNTAET, along with the assumption of 
effective control, had acquired temporary sovereignty over the territory. Chopra, for instance, 
notes that “it is the first time sovereignty has passed to the UN independently o f any 
competing authority".152 In a similar vein, Zimmermann and Stahn suggest that UNTAET was 
a unique operation for it was the first time that the UN exercised what they call “fu ll and 
exclusive sovereignty over a territory".153 Due to the lack of animus possidendi on the part of 
the UN, this suggestion is untenable, at least when applying the positivist object theory. It 
may be suggested, however, that UNTAET has replaced Portugal as an administrative 
power without sovereign rights, save in its capacity as custodian of the rights to self- 
determination of the East Timorese people, and thus temporarily assuming title, alongside 
impenum, on behalf of the people that were to constitute themselves as a polity in due
154course.
By way of summarising our discussion of state practice, the following table compares 
selected cases in which territories were treated as external objects of states in accordance 
with the doctrine of disjunction, as outlined above. These cases are distinguished according 
to the recipient of the transfer of effective control, with single state entities on the le ft and 
multilateral agencies on the right side.
150 Jarat Chopra, introductory Note to UNTAET Regulation 13,39 ILM 936-938 (2000), at 937.
151 Cf. 9 Australian Treaty Series (2000). For a discussion of UNTAETs role with regard to re­
negotiating the East Timor Gap Treaty on behalf of East Timor, see Chapter V.2.1 (i), infra p.166
152 Chopra, ‘Kingdom’, supra note 9, at 29. He repeats his (misguided) assertion that ‘Resolution 1272 
was the instrument for bestowing sovereignty over East Timor to the UN' in ‘Building State Failure 
in East Timor’, 33:5 Development & Change 979-1000 (2002), at 984.
153 Andreas Zimmermann and Carsten Stahn, ‘Yugoslav Territory, United Nations Trusteeship or 
Sovereign State? Reflections on the Current and Future Legal Status of Kosovo’, 70 Nordic JIL 
423-460 (2001), at 434.
154 It may be significant in this respect that several commentators suggest that the residual 
sovereignty over territories placed under Mandate rested with the League of Nations. This view will 
be discussed in the next chapter.
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00 Table: Disjunction Between Sovereign Title and Effective Control in State 
Practice; Selected Examples Since 1878
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(‘internationalised territory') by horizontal and 










Turkey ceded effective control 
over Bosnia-Herzegovina to 
Austria (Treaty of Berlin, 13 
July 1878) which occupied and 
administered the territory with 






Germany renounced the government of the Saar Territory by 
the LN (Peace Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919). Between 
1920 and 1935, Germany's territorial sovereignty was reduced 












Also at Versailles, Danzig was severed from Germany and 
constituted as a 'Free City’ under the protection of the LN (17 
November 1920) and a High Commissioner appointed by it.
Turkey ceded effective control 
over Cyprus to Great Britain 
(Treaty of Alliance, June 







Following a confrontation between Peru and Colombia over 
the control of the port of Leticia, the parties agreed to transfer 
effective control over the territory to the LN (Geneva 

















In 1898, China leased 4 terri­
tories to the German Empire 
(Bay of Kiauchau, 6 March 
1898), to Russia (Port Arthur, 
7 March 1898), to France 
(Kwang-chou-wan), and to 
Britain (Weihaiwei, 1 July 













By A/RES/181 (A+B) (29 November 1947), the GA. endorsed 
the proposal of UNSCOP that envisaged Jerusalem be 
placed under an international regime, constituting it as 'a 
corpus separatum’. The Trusteeship Council, to which the 
Governor would be accountable, was designed to discharge 
the responsibilities of the UN in this regard. The plan was 













Following the Peace Treaty with Italy (10 February 1947), the 
'Free Territory of Trieste' was envisaged as an independent 
state entity based on a 'Permanent Statute’ under the direct 
control of the SC and administered by a Governor to prevent it 






















Cuba transferred the exercise 
of jurisdiction and control over 
Guantanamo to the United 
States (Lease Agreement of 2 
July 1903) while the U.S. 
recognised the continuance of 
the suspended, yet 'ultimate 
sovereignty* over the naval 









A compromise reached between the Netherlands and 
Indonesia (Agreement of 15 August 1962) stated that UNTEA 
would take over full territorial control of West Irian (West New 
Guinea), to be followed by a hand over of authority to 
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By A/RES/2145 (XXI) of 1966, the GA terminated South 
Africa’s mandate over South West Africa (Namibia), thus 
placing it under the direct responsibility of the UN Council for 
Namibia. South Africa responded by declaring its intention not 





















Panama ceded its right to 
exercise control over the 
Canal Zone to the United 
States (Treaty of Hay-Varilla, 
18 November 1903) with 








After the Basic Agreement was concluded between Croatia 
and local Croatian Serb authorities (12 November 1995), the 
SC set up UNTAES through S/RES/1037 (1996) to govern the 
region of Eastern Slavonia in a transition period (1995-98) 





























Japan ceded the right to 
exercise legislative, judicial 
and administrative control over 
Okinawa to the United States 
[Peace Treaty between US 
and Japan, 8 September 
1951) whereas residual 





S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) vested UNMIK with plenary 
authority over Kosovo while suspending yet in principle 



















er Indonesia and Portugal agreed to transfer authority over East 
Timor to the UN (5 May 1999). S/RES/1246 established 
UNAMET to conduct the popular consultation. The question of 
titular sovereignty remains contested. The mandate of 























Résumé: T owards an i n  r e m  Characterisation of Internationalised T erritories
This chapter employed a doctrine commonly referred to as object theory that traditionally 
conceived imperium as physical controt over people and objects in a defined territory. By 
focusing on methodological questions, it was generally concerned with the ‘unbundling’ of 
sovereign rights and its implications for the question of exclusive dominium in a territorial 
order. We applied this in rem frame to analyse phenomena of residual sovereignty in 
international law. Indeed, we sought to integrate the methods utilised to restrict the panoply 
of sovereign rights and to divorce imperium from dominium into an evolving framework for 
the creation of an international territorial administration.
Our main objective was to emphasise that the technique of administering a territory under 
the auspices of an international authority and the concomitant curtailment of sovereign rights 
over territory is not a novel instrument of international diplomacy. The concept of 
internationalisation, whereby territories are put under international tutelage in order to create 
independent polities to balance the conflicting interests of competing states, had been a 
familiar notion over the past two centuries. Accordingly, states have chosen (through the 
medium of treaties) to agree to specific obligations barring the exercise of certain rights, 
while accepting the transfer of effective control to another subject of international law.155 In 
some of the cases discussed, this claim was ‘ceded’ on a consensual basis by a horizontal 
agreement, through which a state or an international organisation acquired the right to 
exercise effective governmental control on the sovereign territory of the grantee. In more 
recent cases, the Security Council has appropriated effective control and transferred it to a 
UN subsidiary organ. We have, in any case, demonstrated that, although the residual 
sovereignty of the transferring state may be reduced to a nudum jus -  a situation in which 
the sovereign emperor was indeed left without clothes -  the titular claim to the exercise of 
power could very well be resuscitated by amending the transfer treaty or after its expiration. 
The retained bare title is, however, not a mere legal fiction. It may be resuscitated, as our 
analysis in Chapter V  will demonstrate.
We further concluded that internationalised territories (as opposed to other types of 
territories with restricted sovereignty which were created by a bilateral agreement or settle­
ment) rest on distinct multilateral instruments imposing obligations that may suspend the 
exercise of sovereign rights indefinitely. Those propositions, open-ended as they are, 
support the view that the United Nations may vertically suspend the right of exercise of 
sovereign powers and assume tasks of temporary government if, and to the extent that, 
such decisions serve the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
Adopting an in rem perspective supplied an initial lens through which we are capable of 
observing permutations of, and limitations to, dominium in the context of internationalised 
territories. Phenomena of international imperium over territory are, however, more intricate to 
analyse than the straightforward analogies to Roman private law would suggest. 
Notwithstanding its heuristic fruitfulness, the application of concepts of dominium to 
instances of internationalisation cannot fully capture the key transformations in the intematio-
155 Allan James, The Concept of Sovereignty Revisited’, in Kosovo and the Challenge of 
Humanitarian Intervention. Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship 
(ed. by A. Schnabel and R. Thakur, Tokyo: UNU Press, 2000), at 337.
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nal legal system that occurred with the Versailles Peace Settlement The subsequent 
chapter thus supplies a second normative frame, namely one that locates political authority 
within a temporary fiduciary bond. Through the application o f a framework of obligations, 
rather than one of in rem title, we may explain the emergence of a substantially different 
mode of imperium that the Mandate system heralded.
The next Chapter argues that the elevation of trust to an instrument o f international 
government changed the international legal system to an extent that displaced both the 
property/Iegal sovereignty analogy in its institutionalised form along with the dominium/  
imperium dichotomy. One of the features that clearly distinguished the transfer o f public 
authority to a Mandatory under the League system was the obligation of the latter to 
administer the territory in a ‘benevolent’ fashion, i.e., in the interest of the people governed, 
without proprietary interests. One of the conclusions of the following chapter will thus be that 
such 'benign administration’ distinguishes internationalised territories (in which the United 
Nations possess imperium) from cases in which states agreed to transfer effective control 
under a protecting scheme, or under a demilitarisation or neutralisation agreement.156
156 Cf. Rudolf Geiger, Die völkerrechtliche Beschränkung der Vertragsschlußfähigkeit von Staaten 
(Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1979), at 141-2.
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C hapter  II
F iduciary Administration: Mandates, T rust, 
and the T ransitory Sovereignty Vacuum
‘[J]f the essential basis o f these mles, that is to say, territorial sovereignty, is lacking, 
either because the state is not yet fully formed or because it is 
undergoing transformation or dissolution, the situation is obscure and 
uncertain from a legal point o f view and will not become clear 
until the period o f development is completed and a definite new situation, 
which is normal in respect to tenitorial sovereignty, has been established. ' 15?
Introduction: T he Challenge to Patrimonial Conceptions of Sovereignty
The Mandate system and the extent to which the notion of trust was operationalised for the 
governance of peripheral territories provides the framework -  understood as a German 
Rahmenerzählung in which one story is told within a story -  for this chapter which traces the 
curious events that led to the internationalisation of the territory once known as South-West 
Africa. It seeks to embed the narrative of Namibia’s international administration in a ‘fiduciary 
frame' that spanned the Mandate- and Trusteeship systems.
The analysis o f the Mandate system, its transition to the UN Trusteeship system is a 
particularly rewarding task. The fascination stems from insights gained in appreciating the 
extent to which the normative repository o f international law was accessed and while doing 
so, further developed and expanded, to enable a more effective response to anomalous 
situations. We will frame the developments by reference to the static-positivist conceptual 
framework (as applied in the preceding chapter), while pointing to the modemist 
assumptions underlying the departure of the sovereign at the periphery of the international 
system. It is the dichotomy, both its static and dynamic aspects, o f international law, that 
thus informs this chapter's discussion of the fiduciary administration of dependent territories. 
We suggest that the powers and capacities; assumed by the League and later the United 
Nations to supervise the performance of the Mandatory and Trustee under the two related 
régimes, profoundly structured the international legal system to an extent that it would, at a 
later stage, generate the disposition, on the part of the international community, to endow the 
UN and other regional organisations with wide-ranging powers of territorial administration.
We will set the stage with a thorough re-appreciation of the two assumptions on which 
positivist jurisprudence has founded its theoretical system. Firstly, we discuss its étatist 
monism that considers the sovereign state as the basic site for the creation of international 
law. In this conception, only the state provided a clear, identifiable reality upon which a truly 
scientific analysis o f international law could be grounded. The positivist insistence on 
sovereignty as the founding concept of the international system will naturally lead to a careful 
scrutiny of which entities could be regarded as ‘sovereign1. A set o f assumptions that broadly 
conceived of all land territory of the world as under the sovereignty of a certain state had 
undoubtedly the clear advantage of providing coherence and a uniform standard for 
interpreting treaties relating to territory. The static objective involved distinguishing proper *
157 Report o f the International Committee ofJunsts entmsted by the Council o f the League o f Nations 
with the task of giving an advisory opinion upon the legal aspects o f the Aaiand Islands question, 
LNOJ Spec. Supp. 3 (1920), at 6.
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sovereigns from other entities that appeared to possess attributes of sovereignty, such as 
pirates and nomads. Secondly, international legal positivism has sought to transpose legal 
concepts from the municipal to the international level in order to strengthen the coherence of 
law which virtually contains, and through a mere process of logical deduction will actually 
produce, all rules necessary for resolving all possible cases. The Roman law of mandatum 
and the common law instrument of trusteeship have thus been utilised as a framework for 
categorising an apparently new legal phenomenon that entered the international stage with 
the Paris Peace Conference. Our first -  formalist -  task will thus consist in tracing the advent 
of a new system o f governance back to its fundamental conception as horizontal agree­
ments bearing a strong resemblance to private law instruments.
The impact o f the global legal transition in 1919, however, challenged the positivist 
foundation of sovereign obligation. Later in this chapter we demonstrate that the use of 
traditional legal instruments -  conceived in the context of private law and applied on the 
international stage -  led to the emergence o f a set of new administrative techniques and a 
system of interlocking obligations. These gravitated around the concept of trust, which 
gradually superseded patrimonial notions of sovereignty to form a new temporary ‘essential 
basis' in international law. Sovereignty, the basic element of the ‘grammar of politics’/ 58 was 
temporary replaced by the syntax of tru s t Grounded in principles o f equity and morality and 
devoted to the furtherance of social goals, trust represented a new linkage between the 
occurrence in which sovereignty reposed in abeyance and the opportunities for emergent 
forms of legal creativity.
Our approach in this chapter w ill be to argue that the notions of fiduciary administration and 
trust came to fill the void left by the displacement of the sovereign at the periphery of the 
international system. The perennial dispute (briefly reviewed below) as to where sovereignty 
over ‘C’-Mandates lay, between the mandatory Powers, the Principal Allies and Associated 
Powers, the League of Nations, or the inhabitants of the mandate territory, illustrates the 
deep rupture that had occurred with the development o f the system of government by 
commission. W ith Verzijl we conclude that traditional categories o f international law were 
“much too rigid to also cover the recent new formations...and tha t accordingly the time is 
more than ripe for a thorough revision of the traditional classification apparatus”.158 59
♦
As will be apparent later when discussing the General Assembly's termination in 1966 of the 
Mandate of South Africa over what is now called Namibia, the normative syntax of 
international law had been re-read by international jurists who adapted it to give effect to a 
more functional interpretation of the social purpose and objectives underlying the needs of 
international society. This development, which we w ill describe as a ‘triumph of the 
ideologists’, is important as it offers a preview of what has been called 'suspension of 
sovereignty1 by an international authority -  a capacity that was eventually adopted into the 
normative repertoire of the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII. By the end of the 
twentieth century, international law would equip such authority w ith the power to ‘pierce the 
veil’ of the state system and its sovereign shield, guarded so jealously by international law, to 
reach the underlying sociological facts -  something that Morgenthau might have forecast in
158 The expression is adopted from Harold Laski, A Grammar o f Politics (London: Allen&Unwin, 1978).
159 Verzijl, International Law, supra note 37, vol. II, at 519.
»49 ■
his fundamental critique of legal positivism delivered in 1940, when he suggested that “the 
intelligibility of any legal system depends on the recognition of such a set of fundamental 
ethical principles which constitute the ethical substance of the legal system, and shed their 
illuminating light upon each particular rule of law.”160
Adopting the merits of a Rahmenerzählung means that the units within the individual case 
studies will be reassembled and repositioned to take on a different meaning at the level of 
the thesis as a whole. The inquiry into the normative framework that governed the 
establishment of the Mandate- and Trusteeship systems is therefore only a mere beginning 
for deriving further insights into, firstly, the position, in public international law, of non-state 
territorial entities temporarily governed by an international organisation, and, secondly, into 
the very legal nature of such an international administration. We argue that the solutions 
found in the case of the UN Council for Namibia were certainly novel and supported by a 
political will to undermine South Africa’s residual standing in international relations. Yet these 
novel solutions raised further questions as to the representation of peoples caught at the 
crossroads between collective self-identification, foreign occupation, international tutelage 
and nominal independence. As we proceed, we will reposition these questions and adopt a 
more normative perspective in Chapter III and IV that builds on the occurrence of the 
phenomenon of the 'dual functions’ of an international administration which acts both as 
territorial administrator and as representative of the organised community of states.
2.1 M a n d a t e s  a n d  th e  D is p l a c e m e n t  o f  t h e  S o v e r e ig n
‘Legal erudition will decide as to what extent it can apply 
to this institution the older juridical notions. *161
WWI occasioned the triumph and decline o f liberal nationalism as a new basis for internatio­
nal law. At its ideological apex, nationalism’s claim to replace state power with national 
identity as the fundamental principle of European public order was regarded as particularly 
strong. The collapse of the imperial states under nationalist pressures had, however, not yet 
revealed a transparent new order based on 'nations’; on the contrary, the old order led to a 
murky situation marked by a tangle of national identities. At the centre of the European state 
system, a newly established international authority was charged with restructuring the nation 
state according to new, far-reaching principles that boldly defined the concept of population 
without reference to existing sovereign legal systems.162 At its periphery, the ideological 
substratum that came to govern the exercise of international responsibility was that of trust -  
an essentially moral obligation, as President Wilson stated in 1918 when he suggested that 
“peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if
160 Morgenthau, Positivism, supra note 28, at 268.
161 ‘Hymans Report’, The Obligations o f the League o f Nations Under the Terms of Article 22 o f the 
Covenant (Mandates), adopted by the LON Council in its 8th Session (1 LNOJ 8, Title VII, o f 5 
August 1920, 334-341), at 339.
162 See, e.g., the Advisory Opinion Question Concerning the Acquisition o f Polish Nationality, PCIJ 
(Ser. B), No. 7 (1923), at 14-15. The Opinion is discussed by Berman in his remarkable ‘Despair*. 
supra note 79, at 1834-1842.
they were chattels and pawns in a gam e. 163
This essentially new model of governance related to the powerful policy objective that Wilson 
had outlined in his programme for peace before a joint session of Congress in January 1917. 
In what would come to be known as the 'Fourteen Points' and ‘Four Principles’, he proposed 
an impartial adjustment of colonial claims according to the principle that in matters pertaining 
to sovereignty, “the interests of the populations concerned musts have equal weight with the 
equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined".163 64 As the former 
colonies lacked the capacity to assume the role of independent states in the short- and 
medium run, only international controlled governance remained to fill the vacuum in local 
government. General Smuts, whose major influence in the creation of the Mandate system is 
generally recognised, prepared the League for a strong role equivalent to that of sovereign 
site. In a pamphlet published in 1918, he suggested, concerning the territories of the 
defeated powers, that
[t]he League of Nations should be considered as the reversionary in the most general sense 
and as clothed with the right o f ultimate disposal in accordance with certain fundamental 
principles. Reversion to the League should be substituted for any policy of national annexa­
tion... The degree of authority, control, or administration exercised by the mandatory state shall 
in each case be laid down by the League in a special act or charter, which shall reserve to it 
complete power of ultimate control and supervision, as well as the right of appeal to it from the 
territory or people affected against any gross breach of the mandate by the mandatory state.165
The idea that certain territories should be internationally administered had, o f course, not 
been new. A system to protect dependent peoples from the machinations and rapacity of 
outsiders had already been proposed at the 1884 Congress of Berlin for the administration of 
the Congo.166 Wilson's euphoric endorsement of various claims to self-determination was, 
however, not accompanied by sufficient confidence in the capacity of the newly founded 
League to directly bear the burden o f administering post-colonial territories that had been 
earmarked fo r national self-determination.167 Smuts’ views, however, represented a radically
163 Wilson quoted by Ramendra N. Chowdhuri, International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems: A 
Comparative Study (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1955), at 45.
164 Woodrow Wilson, 'An Address to a Joint Session of Congress, January 8,1918’, in The Papers o f 
Woodrow Wilson, vol. 45 (ed. by A.S. Link, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1984), at 534-39.
165 Jan C. Smuts, The League o f Nations. A Practical Suggestion (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1918), at 19 (italics supplied).
166 The Berlin ‘General Act' of 26 February 1885 which provided for the neutralisation of the Congo 
basin, has been called the “first international treaty for the protection of native rights" in a 
dependent territory (cf. Chowdhuri, Mandates, supra note 163, at 20-21 and Wright, Mandates, 
supra note 27, 18-20). For a brief discussion o f the 'Congo Free State’ and the absence of an 
international machinery for ensuring the implementation of the Berlin Act see Francis B. Sayre, 
Experiments in International Administration (New York/London: Harper & Brothers, 1919), at 79-89 
and Bain, Anarchy, supra note 18’ at 68-74.
167 Wilson seemed to have been eventually weaned away from the idea of giving the League ultimate 
title to the territories after consultations with French and British leaders in early 1919. For a 
general discussion of the Allied dispositions toward the Mandate system and in particular on 
General Smuts' role in structuring the debate on fiduciary administration prior to the adoption of 
the Covenant in April 1919 see Pittman B. Potter, 'Origin of the System of Mandates under the 
League of Nations’, 16:4 APSR 563-83 (1922). On Wilson’s concept of self-determination see, 
inter alia, Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the 
United Nations (Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1982), at 1-7. For an examination of Wilson’s understanding of 
national self-determination against the considerations of security, economics and diplomacy see
■
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utopian departure from previous suggestions of ‘benevolent administration’. It linked the 
notion of trust to a system of international governance operating on a global basis and 
anchored it in a machinery of accountability: "Europe is being liquidated, and the League of 
Nations must be the heir to this great estate."160 In this political context, the Mandate system 
proved to be an intermediate device between competing claims for outright annexation of the 
territories renounced by the Central Powers on the one hand, and for plenary administration
169by an international body on the other.
2.1.1 The Translation of Political Context into Legal Response
The Mandate system created the link between the agenda of state building and the granting 
of a continuously growing share in the territory’s administration under the banner of self- 
determination, with a policy of gradual detachment that differentiated various levels of 
development. In the following sections, we suggest that the League instituted the Mandate 
system as a parenthesis within which trust substituted patrimonial notions of sovereignty 
over those territories whose populations were not yet prepared for the 'strenuous conditions 
of the modem world’.
(0 Trust and the Transposition of Municipal Legal Instruments
In their characterisation of trust, the drafters of Article 22 of the League's Covenant echoed 
the Spanish legal scholars and theologians of the sixteenth century, especially Bartolomé de 
Las Casas and Franciscus de Vitoria,168 970 as well as Edmund Burke and his great 
parliamentary campaign in which he formulated the limitations of state power at the peri­
phery o f the empire, the fiduciary duties of a colonial power and the notion o f accountability 
which the latter must be subject to.171
The notion of trust in which the legal instruments establishing the Mandates were grounded, 
derives its meaning precisely from the mission it is supposed to fulfil. In the English common 
law system, this mission invariably consists in ensuring that the res be matched to its aim by 
operation of the law. As Brieriy pointed out, the underlying doctrine of trust was necessarily 
in conflict with the proprietary notion o f title to a thing. The rights of a trustee are contingent 
upon his obligations; “they are tools given to him for the fulfilment of his duties, and such 
duties are determined by the appropriation to which the res has been devoted".172 Trust, in
Allen Lynch, ‘Woodrow Wilson and the Principle of "National Self-Determination’’: A 
Reconsideration’, 28 Review of International Studies 419 (2000).
168 Smuts quoted by David H. Miller, ‘The Origin of the Mandate System’, 6 Foreign Affairs 277-289 
(January 1928), at 281.
169 As the Director of the Mandates Section of the LON told the Mandates Commission at its first 
meeting, “[tjhe Mandatory system formed a kind of compromise between the position of the 
advocates o f annexation, and the proposition put forward by those who wished to entrust the 
colonial territories to an.international administration" (quoted by Quincy Wright, 'Sovereignty of the 
Mandates’, 17 AJIL 691-703 (1923), at 691).
170 Cf. James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law. Francisco de Vitoria and his Law  
of Nations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934); J.H. Parry, The Spanish Theory o f Empire in the 
Sixteenth Century (Cambridge: CUP, 1940); and C. Castariôn, ‘Les problèmes coloniaux et les 
classiques espagnols du droit des gens', 86 RCADI (1954-11), at 557.
171 Cf., e.g., his speech in the House of Commons on Fox’s India Bill of 1783, supra note 12.
172 ‘Trust and Mandates’, 10 BYIL 217-219 (1929)., at 218. See also Wright, 'Sovereignty', supra note 
169, at .695 and Buckland/McNair, Roman Law, supra note 53, at 307. ef seq. For the fidei- 
commissum as the precursor to the common law trust cf., e.g., David Johnston, The Roman Law
1
*52 •
Briefly’s understanding, thus involves a segregation of assets from the patrimonium of 
individuals, and a devotion of such assets to a certain function. In what seemed to be an 
extension of de Vitoria’s extraordinarily potent metaphor of wardship over infants, McNair 
compared the Mandate system with the English common law trust, according to which power 
can be transferred to a trustee for the benefit of a “minor or a lunatic" who cannot manage 
her own affairs while supervisory authority is vested in a court.173 174To McNair, the abeyance 
of sovereignty was analogous to the common law institution of trust, “whereby the property 
(and sometimes the persons) of those who are not sui juris...can be entrusted to some 
responsible person as a trustee or tuteuror curateur”m
Among the principles central to such institution is that the trustee “is not in the position of the 
normal complete owner“ but he must still “carry out...the mission confided to him for the 
benefit of some other person”. The trustee "is precluded from administering the property for 
his own personal benefit".175 On the contrary, the Mandate was an institution to be notionally 
contrasted with ownership, since it did not share any of the three elements of the latter, 
usus, fructus, and abusus. The right to exercise effective control held by the Mandatory 
power, or the Trustee, found its sole justification in his duty to perform the trust in a certain 
fashion, and to achieve the work assigned to him. This seemed to have been the approach 
taken by McNair who opined that in the absence of sovereignty, the focus shifts to the “rights 
and duties o f the Mandatory" as defined in “international agreements creating the system 
and the rules of law they attract”.176
Transposed to the international normative space, fiduciary administration meant to bind the 
Mandatory in a two-fold system of obligations. On the one hand, the state vested with public 
authority in the mandated territories exercised its powers by commission from another entity, 
the League of Nations. Hence, Mandatories had to report to the Permanent Mandates 
Commission (PMC), the monitoring organ established to “receive and examine the annual 
reports of the Mandatories, and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the 
observance of the mandates".177 Administering the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ vested in him, 
the Mandatory, by accepting a mandate, assumed an obligation of binding legal character
o f Trust (Oxford: OUP, 1988). See also Avisheh Avini, The Origin of the Modem English Trust 
Revisited’, 70 Tulane LR 1139 (1995-1996) and Thomas B. Lehman, Trust: A Common-Law 
Institution in a Civilian Context’, 8 Tuiane European and Civil Law Forum  53 (2003).
173
Judge McNair, Advisory Opinion on the international Status of South-West Africa, ICJ Reports 
[1950] 128, at 150.
174 Ibid., at 149 (emphasis added). International law’s image of the child-like native was, of course, 
later rejected by the decolonisation movement which opened the door to a more participatory 
structure of the trust. This powerful metaphor will, however, reappear and be critically reflected 
upon throughout the thesis
175 Ibid., at 149. Similar: Emst G. Mohr, Die Frage der Souveränität in den Mandatsgebieten (Leipzig: 
Universitätsverlag R. Noske, 1928), at 19-20.
176 McNair, supra note 173, at 150.
177 Article 22(9) of the Covenant. For the scope and powers of the PMC cf. Duncan H. Hall, Mandates, 
Dependencies and Trusteeships (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd. for the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1948), at 177-212. The Mandate system arguably failed to provide any formal 
mechanism by which the ‘natives’ could correspond meaningfully with, and be represented, before 
the PMC. The Commission was also unable to check abuses of the system by the Mandatory 
powers themselves. See Antony Anghie, ‘Colonialism and the Birth o f International Institutions: 
Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System o f the League of Nations’, 34 NYUJILP 513-633
' (2002), at 604-605.
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towards the international community.178 As a corollary of that trust "securities for its perfor­
mance were instituted in the form of legal accountability for its discharge and fulfilment".179 
On the other hand, the Mandatory was conceived as acting for the benefit of a third entity, 
namely the territory and people concerned. In this context, Makowski drew a sharp 
distinction between the legal bond linking the Mandatory and the mandated territory and the 
relationship between the Mandatory and the native population.180 According to him, the 
former bond would be a ‘real’ relationship in which the Mandatory is the only ayant-droit, 
whereas the second would be a ‘personal’ one, the content of which was determined by the 
League, showing affinity with the legal relationship flowing from the Minority Treaties.181 This 
two-fold system of obligation, instituted for the first time through Article 22 of the League 
Covenant, can be seen as at the source of what some authors have termed the ‘dual
1fi2functionality’ o f international territorial administrations.
In any case, the Mandate framework classified Mandate territories according to their ‘degree 
of advancement’ and attached differing legal identities to them. The limited international 
personality of ‘A’-Mandate -  those entities formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire -  was 
recognised in Article 22(3) o f the Covenant183 These territories clearly fell within the 
category of not yet fully sovereign subjects of international law, vested as such with territorial 
supremacy over the area included within their borders. On the international plane, France 
and Great Britain, the powers mandated to administer the three entities in the Middle East, 
acted on behalf of the mandated territory in its capacity as a separate legal entity in a 
manner that was compared to a relationship of a suzerain state with regard to his vassal.184 
Analysing the Mandates for Syria and Lebanon as approved by the Council and the treaty 
between Great Britain and Iraq, Corbett found that the position of the Mandatory was closely 
analogous to that o f a state exercising a protectorate, contemplated, as they were, on a 
temporary basis.185 As Berman plainly asserts, "if the general Mandate system was a half­
way house between colonisation and self-determination, the ‘A’ Mandates... constituted a 
halfway house between the Mandate system itself and self-determination".186 The situation 
was different with regard to Mandate ‘B’ territories, established under Article 22(5) over 
peoples, particularly in Central Africa, whose actual stage o f development was still too
178 Cf. the first ‘Hymans Report’ which specified that the Mandatory Powers musts be invested with 
the necessary powers "by means of a legal instrument which will legally bind them" (supra note 
161, at 335).
779ICJ Reports 1950, supra note 173, at 29.
180 M. Makowski, ‘La doctrine juridique des mandats B et C’, 40 RGDIP (1933), at 374 ef seq.
101 Roche established a similar bi-fold obligation of the Trustee towards, first, the population whose 
development he is to further, and second, towards the territory whose integrity is to be protected 
(‘La souveraineté dans les territoire sous tutelle1, 58 RGDIP 399-437 (1954), at 416 et seq.).
102 See Chapter IV.2.1, infra p. 130.
103 Palestine/Transjordan, Syria/Lebanon, and Iraq (Mesopotamia) had, in the terms of Art. 22(4), 
reached a stage o f development where their existence as independent nations could be provisio­
nally recognised "subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory 
until such time as they (were) able to stand alone". For a discussion of the peculiar position of Iraq 
cf. Arnold McNair, ’Mandates’, 3:2 Cambridge L J 149-160 (1925), at 153-154, note 4.
184 Verzijl, International Law, supra note 37, at 546.
105 Corbett, ‘League’, supra note 78, at 130. For a comparison of the Mandatory's public international 
function to a protectorate cf. Georges A.J. Scelle, Manuel de droit international public (Paris: 
Domat-Montchrestien, 1948), at 223. For the (limited) legal personality of Mandate territories see 
Chapter 111.2.1, infra p. 109
100 Nathaniel Berman, ‘Between “Alliance" and "Localization": Nationalism and the New Oscillatio- 
nisrn’, 26 NYUJILP 449-491 (1993-1994), at 478.
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’backward’ to allow them ‘to stand by themselves’, and ‘C’ Mandates, such as South-West 
Africa and certain South-Pacific islands, which pursuant to Article 22(6) could for some other 
reason be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of their 
territory. Regarding these two latter categories, it has been found impossible to determine 
who held the title to territorial sovereignty.
2.1.2 The Mandate System as a Network of Interlocking Obligations
Having briefly described the Mandate framework as it was established in the post-war 
political context, we further expounded upon it by analysing the municipal origin of the legal 
tools that international lawyers used to build this framework. The aim of the following section 
is to demonstrate that a ‘snapshot o f sovereignty’, taken through a positivist lens, fails to 
account for the temporary shift of paradigm contained in the parenthesis of anomalous 
situations, namely an obligations-based framework of fiduciary authority. Verzijl has captured 
the essence of the difficulties which positivists faced when trying to determine the seat of 
territorial sovereignty: “With regard to the legal situation in which different manifestations of 
public power over one and the same territory are apportioned among different authorities, 
the whole quest for the ‘the’ territorial sovereignty loses much of its usual meaning, or 
becomes senseless.”187 The following section is specifically concerned with demonstrating 
that a static analysis of the interlocking legal instruments establishing the Mandate system 
and its attempts to facilitate a categorisation of anomalous situations cannot fully capture the 
temporary shift in the essential basis o f international law at which Verzijl hinted.
(i) Formal Categorisation op Legal Instruments Utilised
The Mandate system can be disaggregated into four discrete legal instruments:
• First, the traditional horizontal agreements among victorious powers which carved 
up the remnants of two empires and preliminarily assigned them to the Mandatory 
powers.
• Second, the renunciation o f title and effective control by the old sovereign, to the 
Principal Allied and Associated Powers -  Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and 
the United States (hereinafter PAA Powers).
• Third, by setting up the League of Nations, the PAA Powers ceded the right to 
supervise the exercise of effective control to the multilateral body.
• The Mandate which in itself represented a tripartite treaty binding all parties to a 
single policy objective, the administration of territory under the concept of the 
’sacred trust of civilisation’.
The first set o f instruments allocated territories as ‘mandates’ to states which had already 
occupied them.188 The next legal step in this chronology was the highly significant renuncia­
187 J.H.W. Verzijl, ’International Court of Justice: South West Africa and Northern Cameroons Cases 
(Preliminary Objections)’, 9 Nederlands TIR 1-33 (1964), at 15. The difficulties of transposing 
private law conceptions into the realm of international mandates were synthesised by Lauterpacht 
in his Private Law Sources, supra note 49,191-202.
188 Individual ‘C’ Mandates for the former German colonies were allocated to the Mandatories by the 
PAAP Supreme Council on 7 May 1919 which would have presumably not have had any legal
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tion o f territorial sovereignty and effective control by the Central Powers, to the grantees, the 
P M  Powers.189 International law appears to have undergone a deep rupture at this point 
Through the vehicle of horizontal agreements between the victorious and the Central 
Powers, the latter’s sovereign rights, as jura in rem, or real rights in a proprietary sense, had 
been renounced in favour of a party from whose hands they seemed to have disappeared. 
With regard to ‘C’ Mandates, the search for the sovereign ceases here and the notion of 
territorial title is not to appear again.
The next legally significant instrument to be considered is the creation of the League, and 
the cession of the P M  Powers’ right to supervise the exercise of effective control (under­
stood as the power to confirm a Mandatory who would exercise effective control on its 
behalf) over the territories to the League. This cession is implicitly contained in Article 22 of 
the Covenant. According to the Vice-President of the Permanent Mandates Commission, 
sovereignty over Germany's overseas possessions has passed to the P M  Powers, while 
“the right of supervision appertaining to these Powers as grantors of the mandates has 
automatically passed to the League o f Nations.“190
Finally, we need to consider the Mandate instrument itself, which was limited in time and 
concluded between a plurality of persons, constituting a complex web of interlocking obliga­
tions. In brief, the relevant Allied Power authorised the Mandatory to exercise effective 
control with the consent of the League Council, the Mandant. The authorisation itself was 
comprised of a 'chain of title '191 -  three separate agreements, categorised by the ICJ in the 
1962 South West Africa (Preliminary Objections) case:192 Firstly, it incorporated an agree­
ment of the definite acceptance of the Mandate by the Mandatory in accordance with Art. 
22(2) of the Covenant (‘willing to accept them’) through which the aggregate of public com­
petencies respective to the territory and its inhabitants -  the totality of state competencies in-
effect at least until the Treaty of Versailles came into force on 10 January 1920, since nemo dat 
quod non habet See Geoffrey Marston, 'Termination of Trusteeship’, 18 iCLQ 1-40 (1969), at 35. 
The Turkish territories were allocated at San Remo on 25 April 1920. By this latter date the United 
States had withdrawn from official participation in the Supreme Council. The concrete terms of the 
C-Mandates were later defined by the League Council on 17 December 1920.
189 By Article 119 of the Treaty o f Versailles, 1919, Germany renounced ‘all rights and titles’ over its 
overseas possessions. By Article 16 of the Treaty o f Lausanne, of 24 July 1923, Turkey 
renounced 'all rights and title whatsoever* over its overseas possessions. The issue of whether or 
not the P M  Powers thereby acquired territorial sovereignty, either individually or collectively, has 
been the subject of a fierce debate (see infra). Even before the Versailles Treaty was signed, 
there had been a vigorous dispute among the victorious P M  Powers, particularly between those 
who favoured outright annexation and those such as President Wilson who favoured the Mandate- 
based administration. The Mandate provisions were eventually written into the draft Covenant 
which was published on 14 February 1919 and came into force on 10 January 1920, the same day 
the treaty of Versailles did. The ‘C’ Mandates, however, were only confirmed by the League 
Council on 17 December 1920. It has been argued that there was no period in time during which 
the P M  Powers could have held the territories a titre de souverain. See Marston, ‘Termination’, 
supra note 188, at 35.
190 PMC, LN Doc. A19 (Annexes) Vol. VI (1923), at 222 (quoted by Corbett, 'League’, supra note 78, 
at 133).
191 ICJ Reports 1950, supra note 173, at 393.
192 In this case, the question arose whether the Mandate was indeed a treaty or convention in force 
within the meaning of Article 37 of the Statute. The judgement stated that ‘ [t]he Mandate, in fact 
and in law, is an international agreement having the character of a treaty or convention" (Ethiopia 
v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa, ICJ Reports [1962] 319, at 330). Judges Spender and 
Fitzmaurice (at 490) argued that it was a “delegation promulgated by a resolution of the Council of 
the League*.
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herent to the concept of territorial sovereignty -  was transferred. Secondly, it confirmed the 
commitment of the PAA Powers to propose the terms of the Mandate to the League Council. 
Thirdly, it contained a confirmation agreement by the Council that the terms of the Mandate 
proposed to it had been accepted and agreed to by the Mandatory and the Council. The 
Mandate agreement was thus conditional upon the consent of the League’s Council (repre­
senting the League and its Members) which implied that effective control was to be exerci­
sed on its behalf, with the latter retaining the capacity to loosely supervise performance of 
this trust.
The tripartite nature of this international treaty instituted a novel international regime to which 
the League itself, represented by its Council, became party. Its tripartite nature was further 
strengthened by the provision that the Mandatory had no right to annex, cede, or otherwise 
dispose o f the mandated territory without the consent of the Council. Within the proposed 
framework, it meant that, while the right to exercise effective control was to be transferred to 
the Mandatory, the right to supervise its conduct remained with the League. By defining the 
method through which the mandate-tuteile was to be exercised, the tripartite agreements 
functioned as the implementing instrument of Article 22 of the Covenant.
W e can preliminarily conclude that a formal categorisation of the legal technique of 
transferring effective control over ‘C*-Mandates involved the application of four interlocking 
instruments that, although lacking a synallagma, created ‘objective’ obligations which would 
maintain their binding character even in case of a fundamental breach by one party: “[t]he 
obligation of each party was altogether independent of performance by any of the others”.193 
W hile the right to exercise effective control remained with the Allies, titular sovereignty 
seemed to have been suspended to give way to a more fluid arrangement, a system of 
institutional restraint structured by reciprocal international obligations and accountability. In 
short, the Mandate System represented an international regulatory regime which viewed the 
authority o f international law over people and territory as a substitute for sovereignty.194
(ll) S U P R E M A  P O T E S TA S  WITHIN THE MANDATE SYSTEM?
As we discuss the instruments through which supreme governmental power was transferred 
from the Central powers to the Mandatories, it is clearly unsurprising that the sovereignty 
issue continued to puzzle inter-war jurists. As traditional doctrine had limited its efforts to 
“schematically transplanting time-honoured common and Roman law principles of interpreta­
tion to the international field",195 jurists began to scrutinise the novel Mandate instrument
193 Gerald Fitzmaurice, YILC (1958-11), at 44. Cf. also Christopher Kienle, ’Der völkerrechtliche Status 
Südwestafrikas/Nam¡bias’, 63 Fnedenswarte 68-92 (1980), at 79 et seq. Similarly, Trusteeship 
agreements possessed a dispositive (conveyancing) as well as a contractual character and 
constituted a qua si-statutory basis for the Trusteeship system. See Clive Parry, 'The Legal Nature 
of Trusteeship Agreements’, 27 BYIL 164-185 (1950), at 185, as well as the discussion o f ‘disposi­
tive’ treaties infra, p. 65
194 D. Campbell Lee was one of there first commentators who advanced the concept of suspended 
sovereignty in case of the Mandate system: “I suggest that the sovereignty of a Mandated area is 
in suspense pending the creation of a new State, pending the time, when the people is able to 
stand alone... Full sovereignty will come in due time to the territory, but only when its people 
assume the dignity of an independent State” (The Mandate for Mesopotamia and the Principle of 
Trusteeship in English Law*, Lecture delivered under the Cecil Rhodes Benefaction at University 
College (London University, 23 May 1921), quoted by Mohr, Souveränität, supra note 175, at 49).
195 Morgenthau, ‘Positivism’, supra note 28, at 281.
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from the perspective of potential holders of the title to territory. Possible candidates included 
the League o f Nations, the Allies, the Mandatory powers, and the mandated territory itself, 
which was characterised as possessing ‘latent sovereignty’ that would constitute itself upon 
the termination of the mandate.196
The PAA Powers (either collectively as condominium, or individually) appeared to be a 
promising firs t candidate. The central powers lost their titles to their overseas territories as 
result o f the peace settlements. Moreover, they allocated the territories to be placed under 
the Mandate to the Mandatory powers. The capacity to designate the Mandatory power can 
be interpreted as part of the notion of sovereignty that has always included the power to 
dispose of territory, and to cede effective control over territory to a third entity. A discussion 
of the title to territory according to patrimonial notions of ownership under Roman private law 
would, however, point to the absence of animus on the part of the Allies to actually assume 
sovereignty over the territories.197 198W hile the justa causa for the transfer of possession 
obviously lay in the various renunciation treaties, and corpus possessionis (physical 
possession or, in the analogous figure of international law, the external criterion of effective 
control) was arguably maintained by the Mandatory on behalf of the PAA Powers, the latter 
clearly lacked the intention to act as sovereign'9*
The only point o f unanimous agreement in what was once a highly controversial legal debate 
was that the title would not reside with the Mandatory powers. Although Article 22 o f the 
Covenant provided that territories o f the ’C’ Mandate category “could best be administered 
under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory", the clear view o f the 
organs of the League -  the Permanent Mandates Commission and the Council -  was that
196 Antony Anghie, '"The Heart of My Home:" Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and the Nauru 
Case’, 34:2 Harvard ILJ 445-506 (1993), at 466. No attempt is made here to cite the extensive 
literature on this subject. For three illuminating reviews of several theories of sovereignty over 
mandated territories, see Mohr, Souveränität, supra note 175; Wright, Mandates, supra note 27, at 
319-338; Francis B. Sayre, 'Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship System’, 
42 AJIL 263-298 (1948), at 268-72.
197 The figure of animus was re-employed by the PCIJ in the Legal Status of East Greenland case in 
which it pointed out that sovereignty required ‘ intention and will to act as a sovereign and some 
exercise of such authority" (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, PCIJ (Ser. A/B), No. 53 (1933), at 
46). As Koskenniemi notes, the Court’s express distinction between the aspects of animus/corpus 
possessionis in this case was aimed the reconciliation of the two concepts. On the one hand, the 
State’s own self-interpretation (animus) had to be effective and materialise on the territory 
concerned. On the other had to exist an external criterion (corpus,) to control such self- 
interpretation (From Apology to Utopia. The Structure o f International Legal Argument (Helsinki: 
Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Co., 1989), at 249).
198 Cf. J. Stoyanovsky, La théorie générale des mandats internationaux (Paris: Les Presses 
Universitaires, 1925), at 69. This question re-appeared with the advent of the Trusteeship system 
and the agreements made under it. The majority of Trusteeship agreements stipulated that 
territories should be administered as an ‘integral part’ of the administering state. Oppenheim 
quotes the French and Belgian delegates to the UN GA who stated that it was the intention of their 
governments that the words 'as integral part’ were necessary as a matter of administrative 
convenience. The British delegate stated that the retention of this phrase in the Trusteeship 
agreement for Togoland and the British Cameroons ‘did not involve administration as an integral 
part of the United Kingdom itself and did not imply British sovereignty in these areas’ (GA Doc. 
A/258, 12 December 1946, quoted in Oppenheim, International Law, vol. I, 8th ed., supra note 64, 
at 238 note 2). In an explanatory comment on the draft Trusteeship agreement for the former Ja­
panese mandated areas in which the phrase ‘integral part' appeared, the US declared that this did 
not “imply sovereignty over the territory" (Sayre, 'Legal Problems’, supra note 196, at 271, note 
22).
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sovereignty did not reside with the Mandatory powers.199 Mandatories could not have 
obtained the title  from the PAA Powers since they themselves lacked it and nemo plus iuris 
(ad alium) transferre potest, quam ipse habet This position has also been subscribed to, in 
the strongest language possible, by the ICJ when it established that “[t]he terms of this 
Mandate, as well as the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant and the principles embodied 
therein, show that the creation of this new international institution did not involve any cession 
o f territory or transfer of sovereignty” to the Mandatory.200
Was, after all, the League vested with the sovereign title to any o f the mandated territories? 
Those supporting this view201 relied on the clause in the preamble of the respective mandate 
agreements which referred to its exercise by the Mandatory power ‘on behalf of the League’. 
Yet not only would the justa causa have lacked in this regard, even the animus to possess 
territory would have been very difficult to establish. Although the League had the task of 
supervising the performance of the trust, it was certainly not meant to exercise aspects o f 
sovereignty over the mandated territories, if we understand sovereignty in a static analogy o f 
Roman private law that includes the right of the possessor to dispose of the territory. Similar 
difficulties have been encountered positing “the people" of the mandated territory as holders 
of ultimate political authority. While such understanding might be more plausibly applied to 
the ‘A ’ mandates, defined by Article 22 as having “reached a stage of development where 
their existence as independent nations may be provisionally recognised subject to the 
rendering o f administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are 
able to stand by themselves”, it was inapplicable to the ‘B’ and ‘C  mandates.202
(ni) The A pplication of a ‘Matrix of Modernism’
In hindsight, the idea of suspending sovereignty in the case o f the Mandate system served 
as the legal rationalisation o f political realities. As Brownlie aptly demonstrates, the Mandate 
system did not emerge solely as a result of a legal appreciation o f the local population’s 
capacity for self-rule, but rested on the power of disposition o f the principal powers, the 
leading victor states of WWI, over the colonial territories of the defeated powers.203 A power
199 Cf. Chowdhuri, Mandates, supra note 163, at 90-91 as well as Wright, Mandates, supra note 27, at 
446-47 and the League documents there cited.
200 ICJ Reports 1950, supra note 173, at 132. By way o f qualification, it should be noted that the 
question o f locating suprema potestas entailed a range of concrete legal problems. In the notable 
case Rex v. Jacobus Christian ([1924], 12 Ann. Dig.), the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
o f South Africa had to decide whether the offence of high treason could be committed with respect 
to a Mandatory Power or whether there could be no crimen majestatis where the authority 
concerned had no majestas. The judgement concluded that the limitations upon the exercise of 
authority o f the Mandatory are not inconsistent with the possession, by the Mandatory, of majestas 
within its territory on which a charge o f high treason can be founded. Cf. the discussion of the 
case in E.L. Matthews, "International Status of Mandatory of League of Nations. High Treason 
Against Mandatory Authority", 6 Journal o f Comparative Legislation and IL 245-50 (1924).
201 See authorities cited in Oppenheim, International Law, vol. I, 8th ed., supra note 198, 222 note 5.
202 Sayre, "Legal Problems’, supra note 196, at 270. That sovereignty in the Mandate system rested 
with the ‘people’ under tutelage was the conclusion of, inter alia, Paul Pic (’Le régime du mandat 
d'après le traité de Versailles’, 30 RGDIP 321 (1923), at 334) and Albrecht Mendelssohn- 
Bartholdy, who noted that “[d]ie Idee des Mandates ist es, daß nicht der Mandatar Souverän ist, 
sondern das Volk des Mandatsgebietes" (’Die Afrikanischen Mandate’, Mitteilungen der 
Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 70 (1925), at 74).
203 Brownlie, Principles, 4th ed., supra note 45, at 172. Wright was equally realistic when he wrote that 
the system was not a “product of disinterested juristic thought nor of detached scientific
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of disposition, one might add, that sought to be restrained by notions of trust in an 
asymmetrical relationship posited in modem opposition to territorial conquest and 
annexation. As Bain observes, members of European state society internationalised the idea 
of trusteeship by establishing international legal obligations that explicitly repudiated relations 
based on domination and exploitation.204 There appeared to be common agreement among 
the PAA Powers that the division o f territories taken from Germany and Turkey would 
contradict what had been concluded regarding the iniquity o f conquest, while an attempt to 
permanently divide the spoils would have provided too great an opportunity for conflict 
among the Allies themselves.
The ambivalent relationship between title and obligations that emerged after WWI can, 
however, not be solved through mere political contextualisation. As Kennedy has 
demonstrated with great insight, the Versailles settlement represented a “move from war to 
peace as the capture of an unruly politics by law".205 The challenge at the Paris Peace Con­
ference consisted in the reconciliation o f novel visions about a people’s self-determination 
with the static framework of international law, propelled by an enduring sense of legalism 
which had survived the shock of WWI. Those inter-war jurists who tried to capture the 
phenomenon of suspended sovereignty through the prism of a ‘titre souverain' had not yet 
fully appreciated the change of paradigm that occurred with the operationalisation of trust in 
the framework o f the Mandate system. The question of exactly where sovereignty over 
mandate territories lay must have appeared sterile and static to jurists such as Brieriy who 
ridiculed the idle attempts undertaken by Continental lawyers to force the mandate into the 
“individualistic concept of sovereignty, as it is to force the trust into a scheme based only on 
private property".206
The attempts to account for the developments of the interwar period produced on the other 
hand more nuanced and sophisticated versions of sovereignty doctrine.207 Constraints o f the 
stable legal order grounded in sovereignty were rejected in favour of international legal 
‘matrix of modernism' -  the experimental exploration of legal'techniques enshrined in the 
post-war settlement which provided, as a starting point, for plebiscites to determine the fate 
of disputed border areas and, further, the provision o f special regimes designed to protect 
ethnic groups too small or dispersed to be eligible for such plebiscites.208 These novel tools 
were adopted under the rubric of ‘self-determination’ and embodied a heightened belief in 
the power of disposition, appropriated by the international community, to define the verifiable 
bearers (‘peoples’) o f a right and the concomitant duties owed by other parties (states).
investigation but was a compromise invented by the Versailles statesmen to meet an immediate 
political dilemma“ (Mandates, supra note 27, at 3).
204 Bain, Anarchy, supra note 18, at 53.
205 David Kennedy, The Move to Institutions’, 8 Cardozo LR 841-988 (1987), at 841.
206 Brieriy, 'Trust and Mandates’, supra note 172, at 219.
207 Of. Anghie, ‘Birth’, supra note 177, at 535-544. For the characteristics of the ‘high modernist 
cultural renewal' and its force of experimentation in the sphere of jurisprudence see also Nathaniel 
Berman, ‘Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction’, 4 Yale Journal o f Law and 
Humanities 351-380 (1992), at 362 etseq.
208 For the post-war plebiscites cf. Anthony Whelan, ‘Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles 
Settlement’, 43 ICLQ 99-115 (1994), at 101 etseq. Answering the criticism that 'self-determina­
tion* was extended only to vanquished territories, he argues convincingly that such ‘right’ was, in 
the context of the Versailles settlement, understood rather as a maxim, or criterion, which guided 
the exercise of discretionary power without dictating its outcome (at 108-109).
■60 *
These instruments aimed at nothing less but the concrétisation of an underlying communal 
‘se lf in a moment of 'carence de souveraineté’. Such legal experimentation reached its most 
radically modern force with the creation of various new legal techniques, in theory and 
doctrine, culminating in the governance of territory by local, yet international institutions. 
Each inter-war experiment in legislative creativity, which we have briefly discussed in the 
preceding chapter, contributed to an international legal version of complex modernist 
innovation: direct international government in the Saar; a novel independent entity in Danzig; 
the supranational integration in Upper Silesia.209 Innovative ideas similarly guided the plans 
to ‘internationalise’ Fiume/Rijeka under the League’s ‘souveraineté absolue210
Interwar jurists had successfully addressed the problem o f sovereignty by dislodging its 
foundational significance for international law. Yet, as we w ill see in the course of the next 
section, the question of locating the sovereign site remained- unanswered. It would re-visit 
the United Nations in subsequent intervals, beginning in 1949, when the old idea of flying a 
League of Nations flag side by side with the national flag o f the administrating power on the 
mandated territory was revived in the context of the establishment of the new Trusteeship 
system.211 Beyond the merely symbolic, the issue garnered renewed significance as 
international lawyers struggled with the doctrinal minefield laid by the termination of South 
Africa's mandate for the administration of South-West Africa, and the subsequent issues 
surrounding the capacity of the United Nations to assume supreme authority after such 
termination. Indeed, the new essential basis stemming from transitionally interlocking 
obligations proved to be a mere interval in the operation of the positivist paradigm, as a new 
sovereign, embodied by the ‘peoples’ and their legitimate claims to self-determination, was 
fated to return.
209 The excitement with new models of international governance is palpable in Sayre’s Experiments, 
supra note 166. His account, written in the wake of the Paris Peace Conference, draws lessons 
from the failures of international organs with limited territorial competencies such as the Cape 
Spartel Lighthouse (1865) and the Suez Canal Commission (1888). For two comprehensive 
studies on inter-war experimentalism with international administration see Beck, Intemationaih 
sierung, supra note 82, as well as Ydit, Internationalised Territories, supra note 37. Cf. also 
Whomersley, ‘Gdansk’, supra note 72, at 919 etseq.; Münch, ‘Saar1, supra note 74, at 271, and 
Hannum, Autonomy, supra note 78, at, 389 ef seq.
210 British -  American -  French Memorandum of 9 December 1919, quoted by Beck, Intemationaih 
sierung, supra note 82, at 28.
211 After a lengthy discussion, the Forth Assembly adopted A/RES/325 (IV) on 15 November 1949 
which requested the Trusteeship Council to recommend to the Administrating Authorities that the 
flag of the UN be flown over all Trust Territories side by side with the local flag as a visibly symbol 
o f the ideals and aspirations proclaimed by the Charter. For background to the flag issue cf. 
George Thullen, Problems o f the Trusteeship System. A Study o f Political Behaviour in the United 
Nations (PhD Thesis no. 159, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, Geneva, 
1964), at 91-94.
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2.2 ‘Le Rot e s t  Mort, Vive Le  Rot!’: T he T r u s t e s h ip  Sys tem  a n d  t h e  
R e t u r n  o f  th e  S o v e r e ig n
The choice bequeathed by the interwar period 
is not between 'experiment and tradition ', 
but between different kinds of 'experiments. *212
The Mandate system, although limited in its territorial application, gave practical expression 
to the concept of international concern for dependent peoples through which “all members of 
the organisation are jointly and severally responsible for the fulfilment of the sacred trus t"213 
The regime regulating the fiduciary administration of territory was, of course, a consequence 
of an appreciation of the manifestly unequal balance of power between the parties 
concerned. The reconfiguration of rights and responsibilities o f a state power exercised over 
dependent peoples represented the recognition of a relationship in which one party operates 
with formal authority over another, less powerful party.214 In the absence of local capacity to 
govern and represent territory, trust temporarily operationalised an asymmetrical relationship 
that would work parallel to, and beyond, the sovereign equality of states. Under the 
modernist prism, such recognition was, as Berman points out, facilitated by the convergence 
of two streams of contemporary thought the infra-state level, nationalism, was viewed as 
being in an alliance with the supra-state level, the modernist faith in cutting-edge 
internationalism and its array of novel legal techniques -  allies against the power o f the 
state, the cornerstone of late 19th century positivism.215
As a consequence of a successful challenge that nationalism had mounted against nine­
teenth-century static positivist doctrine, the League affirmed that the well-being of subject 
peoples constituted a legitimate subject of international scrutiny. The principle o f 
nationalities, implemented in the European centre, came to occupy the role of a zodiac 
sign216 of the period that also marked the departure of the sovereign at its periphery and the 
creation of a mechanism to ensure the faithful performance of trusteeship obligations. 
Framing the debate in terms of rights and duties of the Mandatory, rather than in patrimonial 
notions of ownership, McNair famously stated in his separate opinion in the 1950 South- 
West Africa case that
212 Berman, 'Alliance, supra note 186, at 456.
213 Judge Bustamante, ICJ Reports 1962 (First Phase), supra note 192, at 355.
214 Michael Reisman, 'Reflections on State Responsibility for Violations of Explicit Protectorate, 
Mandate, and Trusteeship Obligations’, 10 Michigan JiL 231-240 (1989), at 232. See also Robert 
Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, international Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1990), at 71-74.
215 Berman, 'Alliance', supra note 186, at 458. As an example o f this asymmetric alliance, he 
discusses the minority protection scheme established to protect central European national groups 
which were not granted external seff-determ¡nation by the Paris Treaties, designed, in the words of 
the PCIJ, to promote the flourishing of the 'national essence’ of those groups (Minority Schools in 
Albania, PCIJ (Ser. A/B), No. 64 (1935), at 17), hence (a) heightening international authority (b) at 
the expense of sovereigns on the basis of (c) an alliance with the 'essence' of nationalist culture, 
while (d) excluding minorities themselves from international fora due to their potentially 
distabilising influence.
216 Robert Redslob, Le principe des nationalités (Paris, 1931), at 36, quoted by Berman, ‘Despair1, 
supra note 79, at 1824. For Redslob’s contribution to the modernist renewal of international law 
and legal reasoning see also Berinan, 'Modernism', supra note 207, at 363-365.
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[t]he doctrine of sovereignty has no application in this new system. Sovereignty over a 
mandated Territory is in abeyance; if and when the inhabitants of the Territory obtain recogni­
tion as an independent State...sovereignty will revive and rest in the new State. What matters 
...is not where sovereignty lies, but what are the rights and duties of the Mandatory in regard 
to the area of territory being administered by it.217
In the inter-war framework, the concept of fiduciary administration was deemed the best 
means to mediate between nationalism and the ascertainment of indigenous claims to self- 
determination on the one hand, and the intentions by the great powers to engage in outright 
annexation of the relevant territories on the other. While claims to self-determination would 
soon challenge sovereignty’s claim to representation by introducing a further criterion of 
legitimacy -  the ‘people’ -  which would play the role traditionally occupied by reason in 
naturalistic jurisprudence,218 219the Mandate system assumed the role of mediating between 
these two criteria. Rather than positioning itself on one side or another in the sovereignty/ 
self-determination dilemma, the concept of trust wove a textured discourse between them. In 
short, the Mandate system was designed as a cobweb of obligations to keep pending 
sovereignty questions at bay. The displacement of the foundational role o f sovereignty by 
the recognition of nationalism shifted the ultimate competence over issues of collective and 
individual identity to an international authority. On the other hand, the Mandate system intro­
duced the experimental model of provisional administration that was supposed to be solely 
grounded in the notion o f the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ bestowed upon the Mandatory 
power. Thus, it presented a fluid arrangement that not only displaced the notion of 
sovereignty as title to territory, but also temporarily acquiesced claims brought forward by the 
‘people’.
2.2.1 Self-Determination and the Reversion to the Sovereignty Narrative
The notion o f administration-in-trust did not only undermine the fundamental principle of 
territorial sovereignty. It also represented a new 'essential basis’ upon which rights and res­
ponsibilities in an asymmetrical relationship between the metropolitan power and peripheral 
dependent people could be temporarily grounded. As such, this transitional basis o f inter­
national law contained an enduring promise to which the international community became a 
party; trust itself contained foundational ideas. As Anghie demonstrated, both Mandate and 
Trusteeship systems were framed as civilising missions posited to traverse the chasm 
between different cultural worlds. It was through these administrative instruments that inter­
national law first promised to “fulfil its task of incorporating all territories into international 
society on equal terms as part of one, universal system"220 and hence to manage the 
problem of cultural difference between the ‘civilised’ and 'uncivilised' that was so vehemently
217 McNair, ICJ Reports 1950, supra note 173, at 150.
218 Nathaniel Berman, 'Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law*, 7:1 
Wisconsin ILJ 51-104 (1988-1989), at 58. For naturalism’s attempt to locate the binding force of 
international norms in sources outside sovereignty cf. David Kennedy, 'International Law and the 
Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion’, 65 Nordic JIL 385-420 (1996), at 397-398.
219 Cf. Moritz Bileski, ’Die Entwicklung der Mandatsgebiete zur Unabhängigkeit’, 13 ÖZöR 8-67 
(1933), at 51. Bileski anticipated what would later become the argumentative armoury of the 
decolonization movement. Analysing the apparent conflict between national aspirations and the 
institution o f the Mandate, he argued that the Mandate did not only serve as a vehicle to the 
development of institutions o f self-government but represented a powerful obstacle to the reali­
sation o f those national aspirations.
220 ‘Heart’, supra note 196, at 448.
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221proposed by positivist jurists.
As a corollary of the paradigmatic 'mission civilisatrice', the enduring promise entailed that, 
following the termination of the fiduciary administration exercised by the international 
community embodied in the League (and later the United Nations), sovereignty would be 
reconstructed along the lines of, and vested in, ‘the peoples’, an actor newly constituted by 
the UN Charter. The principle of self-determination, and its subsequent formulation as 
collective ‘right1, concretised the second promise as a continuing entitlement to exercise 
freedom from outside interference.21 22 This more permanent promise of fiduciary administra­
tion operated under the assumption that sovereignty existed in a sort of linear continuum, 
and every 'dependent people' could be placed at some point along this ladder of civilisation 
based on its approximation to the ideal of a European nation-state.223
On the other hand, the foundational promise represented a radical departure from earlier 
conceptions of sovereignty exercised in the framework of colonialism: sovereignty in the 
non-European world had hitherto meant the complete negation o f independence, authority, 
and authenticity o f a subjugated people, and had been sustained by elaborate mechanisms 
of oppression and management. Through fiduciary administration, or so the promise went, 
Europe would depart from the practice of subordination and alienation of the periphery and 
replicate its own conception of sovereignty that gravitated around the notion of empower­
ment and authority. The machinery of international accountability operated to safe-guard the 
just treatment of the population and vested them with an inchoate title to be free from 
outside interference erga omnes.224 This political process would later be legally crystallised 
in “all people’s” right to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development*.225
221 For a discussion of positivist jurisprudence and its approach towards colonialism see Antony 
Anghie, 'Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International 
Law’, 40:1 Han/ard ILR 1-80 (1999), at 25 etseq.
222 Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), at 
55. This point will be expanded upon in Chapter III.1.1, infra p.95.
223 For an interpretation of the matrix of 'standards’ as not so much as springing from conceptions of 
superiority than from the need for reciprocity in the dealings between European and non- 
European powers see Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of ’Civilization’ in International Society 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). The idea that sovereignty could be ‘graded’ was implicit in the 
classification of mandates. As Bileski noted: .Der wiederholte Gebrauch des Wortes 
‘Entwicklungsstufen’ in...Artikel 22 scheint im Zusammenhang mit der Einteilung der Mandate in 
Klassen, bei denen die Befugnisse des Mandatars immer schwächer werden, die Annahme 
nahezulegen, daß das Ziel der vollen staatlichen Selbständigkeit erreicht werden soll, indem die 
verschiedenen Mandatsgebiete von ihren verschiedenen Standorten aus die Stufenleiter des Man­
datssystems von unten nach oben zur vollen Selbständigkeit hin durchlaufen“ (’Mandatsgebiete1, 
supra note 219, at 16).
224 Oral statement by the representative of the Netherlands, ICJ Pleadings 1971, Vol. II, at 129.
225 Article 1(1) of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.
>64 '
(i) ‘S ilent Alchemy’: Namibia and the T riumph of the T eleologists
‘It is inconceivable that the interests of the people o f a territory 
placed under the sacred trust of civilization..., 
over which the General Assembly exercised a supervisory role for 21 years 
and which has ultimately been brought under a direct responsibility o f the United Nations.
should be delivered into a juridical vacuum. ’ 226
Conceived as a temporary arrangement, fiduciary administration and international law began 
to operate in support of one overall telos: the development of institutions of self-government 
and the creation of local capacity that would, in principle, be prepared to take over responsi­
bilities from the Mandatory. As Wilson put it at the Paris Peace Conference: “[t]he fundamen­
tal idea would be that the world was acting as trustee through a mandatory and would be in 
charge o f the whole administration until the day when the true wishes of the inhabitants 
would be ascertained."227 28
The first ICJ opinion relating to South-West Africa serves to illustrate the extent to which the 
transitional paradigm -  in which reciprocal obligations served to displace sovereignty at the 
periphery and mediate between claims and counter-claims to representation -  had been 
relied upon. The Court affirmed unanimously that South Africa had no competence to modify 
the international status o f a Mandate territory and that the competence to determine this 
status rested with South Africa acting with the consent o f the United Nations. The Court 
further held that the Union continued to be bound by the international obligations laid down 
both in Article 22 of the Covenant and in the Mandate for South-West Africa, as well as by 
the obligation to transmit petitions from the inhabitants of that territory. Upon consideration, 
the ICJ’s opinion confirmed the inadequacy of positivist doctrine regarding suspended 
sovereignty which proved unable to comprehensively address the transformations that were 
reflected by the temporary departure o f the sovereign at the periphery of the international 
system.
Suggestions that the obligations of the Mandate had terminated with the dissolution of the 
League were rejected by the Court. To the contrary, it held that the provisions of the 
Mandate created an international status for the territory, independent of the question 
whether one of the parties to the original instrument (i.e., the League) still existed. A transi­
tional instrument had, it seemed, acquired a legal existence o f its own. Rooted in a transitory 
regime of rights and obligations, it transcended the limits that contract law set in the event 
that one party to an arrangement disappeared as a legal entity. In a separate opinion to the 
ICJ’s 1971 pronouncement, Judge Dillard made it crystal clear that a contextual, functional 
interpretation of a legal regime would have to take precedence over a textual reading:
[W henever a long-term engagement, of whatever nature, is so interrupted, emphasis in 
attempting a reasonable interpretation and construction of its meaning and the obligations it 
imposes shifts from a textual analysis to one which stresses the object and purpose of the
226 UN Interoffice Memorandum of Erik Suy, Legal Counsel, to Bernardo Zuleta, Under-General 
Secretary, 20 April 1982, UN Doc. 23A/NO 82, quoted by Andreas Junius, Der United Nations 
Council fo r Namibia (Europäische Hochschulschriften, Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1989), at 73.
227 Quoted by the representative o f Pakistan, ICJ Pleadings 1971, Vol. II, at 136.
228 ICJ Reports 1950, supra note 173, at 132.
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engagement in light of the total context in which the engagement was located.229
The new 'essential basis' in which rights and obligations grounded themselves was that of 
trust, which supplied a special principle of legal succession. Operating independently o f the 
intentions of the parties, it automatically effected the substitution of the United Nations’ 
supervisory role for that of the League. This ‘functional’ approach to objective international 
regimes must be contrasted to the neo-positivist view that was at that time shared by Judge 
Fitzmaurice as well as Kelsen:
The trusteeship system did not automatically replace the mandate system, and the UN did not 
succeed to rights of the League of Nations as to the former mandated territories. There is no 
legal continuity in the relation of these two systems. The one ceased to exist long before the 
other came into existence.230
The Court did not follow such a static approach. It opined that the permanent nature of the 
rights created by the Mandate had established an ‘objective international régime’ -  Judge 
McNair would later call it a dispositive (or constitutive) instrument with erga omnes effects.231 
In the post-colonial narrative, and particularly after the celebrated dictum of the ICJ in the 
Barcelona Traction case,232 obligations flowing from the creation of such regimes belong to 
the class of international legal obligations which are neither synallagmatic nor reciprocal in 
kind, but arise in favour of all members of the international community.233 234
As Berman submits, this emerging international law has its own principles that come into 
play during the *carence de souveraineté'.23* The supply of novel norms of legal succession 
to contractual relationships represented one of them. Not only had the sovereign been dis­
located, the entity that had been party to, and supervised the performance of, the Mandate 
agreement (the League) had disappeared. Yet the set of obligations flowing from the initial 
arrangement, its telos, continued to bind the Mandatory South Africa. The Mandate system, 
devised as fiduciary administrative machinery under a transitional paradigm, had become 
the means through which international law had found its 'essential basis'. And this essential
229 ICJ Reports 1971, supra note 56, at 157.
230 Kelsen, United Nations, 1950, supra note 105, at 596-597.
231 Erga omnes obligations arise, according to McNair, as permanent rights are created by, or in 
pursuance of, a treaty as well as through the semi-legislative authority of states particularly 
interested in the settlement or arrangement made. See Arnold McNair, The Law of Treaties 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), at 255.
232 Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain, 
Second Phase), ICJ Reports [1970] 3, at 32: \..[A ]n  essential distinction should be drawn 
between the obligation of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those 
arising vis-à-vis another State... By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In 
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection; they are obligations erga omnes." Regarding the special status of self-determination as 
peremptory norm cf. also Judge Ammoun, sep. op., ibid., at 304. For a discussion of the case cf. 
Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldem, ‘Der Barcelona-Traction-Fall’, 22 OZôR 255 (1971).
233 Klein defines such 'status treaties' as treaties which create a territorial order which is relevant for 
third parties because of their intended realisation of an international public interest (intendierte 
Gemeinwohlverwirklichung). See his seminal Statusvertrage, supra note 116, at 22-23. For erga 
omnes obligations in general see the penetrating study of Ragazzi, Erga Omnes, supra note 80, at 
37 et seq. as well as Claudia Annacker, The Legal Régime of Erga Omnes Obligations in 
International Law1, 46 OZôRV 131 (1993-1994)
234 Berman, ‘Despair1, supra note 79, at 1867.
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basis had a functional core. On the basis of this new functional essence, South Africa’s obli­
gations to report and account in respect of its administration of South-West Africa survived 
the dissolution o f the League, as well as the relevant supervisory powers, now vested in its 
successor organisation, without the consent of the Mandatory power. The utilisation o f the 
concept of an ‘objective legal régime’ in the 1950 Opinion was premised on the principle o f 
effectiveness and its application to the original treaties constituting the Mandate system: the 
Court recognised that the removal of international supervision would effectively put an end to 
the whole concept of 'sacred trusf .235 Consequently, in order to give effect to the original 
obligations assumed under the Mandate, the ICJ was compelled to read into the original 
documents a principle of succession in international association. This development has been 
termed the “triumph of the teleologists"236 as certain objects and purposes were given effect 
by a rigorous functional approach to creating an objective intemationalregime
Discussing the same 1950 Opinion that held that the United Nations must be substituted for 
the League as the supervisory organ, Judge Lauterpacht remarked, almost detachedly, that 
it “did no more than give effect to the main purpose of the legal instruments before it. That is 
the true function of ¡nterpretation."237The case showed that even such a fundamental change 
of circumstance as the disappearance of the League was not in itself a sufficient ground to 
declare an international arrangement to have lapsed if the change does not affect the raison 
d'être and the ‘original object’ of that arrangement.238 It is indeed remarkable that lacunae in 
the regulatory framework of a global administrative system were filled by increasingly 
constructive solutions that were only compatible with the basic premise of the administrative 
instrument itself (the Mandate's promises of self-determination and non-annexation of 
territories), but certainly not with a traditional application of general international law that had 
so far governed the novatio of a contractual relationship. In sharp contrast to these views 
were those o f Judge Fitzmaurice in 1971, who, in dissent, opposed effective methods of 
treaty interpretation. He preferred a restrictive interpretation in favour of state sovereignty 
and denounced such constructive filling o f lacunae as “some sort o f silent alchemy”.239
In this dynamic narrative, the Treaty o f Versailles and the subsequent establishment of the 
League marked the beginning of the formation of instruments, based on municipal law and 
transposed to the international plane, through which the sovereign was substituted by a 
notion of administration-in-trust, while the right to self-determination was held in check by 
overlapping and reciprocal duties which were themselves supervised by the League. Or as 
Lauterpacht put it,
[The administrating authorities] cannot cede or otherwise alter the status of trust territories
235 Cf. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development o f International Law by the International Court (London: 
Stevens, 1958), at 278-9.
236 Cf. John Dugard, 'Namibia (South West Africa): The Court’s Opinion, South Africa’s Response, 
and the Prospects for the Future’, 11 Columbia JTL 14-49 (1972), at 20. See also his The Opinion 
on South W est Africa (“Namibia”): The Teleologists' Triumph’, 88 South African LJ 463 (1971).
237 Advisory Opinion on Admissibility o f Hearings o f Petitioners by the Committee on South West 
Africa, ICJ Reports [1956], at 56.
238 Athanassios Vamvoukos, Termination o f Treaties in International Law. The Doctrine of Rebus Sic 
Stantibus and Desuetude (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), at 165.
239 ICJ Reports 1971, supra note 56, at 239. Cf. also the dissenting opinions of Judges Fitzmaurice 
and Spender in ICJ Reports 1962, supra note 192, at 495, stating that “we do not accept the view 
that a treaty can be partyless*.
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except with the approval of the United Nations in which the residuary sovereignty must be 
considered to be vested... The relation of trust o f ‘tutelage’ or ‘fide/ commissum’ implies 
fundamentally a relation of service and delegation wholly incompatible with any exclusiveness 
of rights of sovereignty on the part of the State concerned.240
As discussed later in this chapter, the Court applied a similar functional interpretation when it 
confirmed that South Africa’s Mandate had been terminated. The Court seemed to agree 
that given the fiduciary essence of the Mandate and the political and social norms under­
pinning it, it would be indefensible to construct a system that intentionally precluded a 
judgment of violation or revocation notwithstanding the gravest breaches of responsibility by 
the Mandatory. Before turning to the issue of termination, we conclude, in any case, that 
creative legal solutions were devised in the sphere o f international authority to respond 
“more directly to the service of the lives, current needs of our present-day society".241 24Such 
novel modes of experimentation were undoubtedly propelled by a re-definition of popular 
sovereignty and the underlying concept of the 'self.
2.2.2 C lo s e r  S u p e r v is io n  a n d  O b l ig a t io n s  u n d e r  th e  T r u s t e e s h ip  S y s te m
‘Self-determination’ in a post-mandate understanding sought to strike a synthesis between 
two initially diametrically opposed concepts: the first sought to dislodge sovereignty under a 
fluid fiduciary arrangement in order to liberate the peoples under Mandate from the 
‘strenuous conditions of the modem world’, and its antithesis, the restoration o f sovereignty, 
operationalised through the transfer of governmental power to a new sovereign that would 
be repatriated from legal exile: an empowered ‘peoples’. As Evans put it in 1932, the logic 
internal to the Mandate system required that the “new state will receive its hitherto ‘divided’ 
sovereignty from the hands of the Council of the League of Nations, and such sovereignty
242will thereupon take ‘normal shape’” .
The next section demonstrates the extent to which the ICJ took it upon itself to act as final 
arbiter between two essential claims: one, brought forward by the Mandatory who, having 
disavowed its promise of promoting the ‘sacred trust, intended to prolong its territorial 
control; and a second claim by a different, injured (and putative) entity, the ‘peoples’ of 
South-West Africa that looked to the international community for assistance in their progress 
towards the goals for which the ‘sacred trust’ was instituted, and more concretely, towards 
the fulfilment of the permanent promise of popular sovereignty. Commenting on the 1950 
ICJ Opinion on the international Status o f South West Africa, Lauterpacht captured the 
intrinsic tension between the notions of trust and sovereignty that would haunt the ICJ for the 
next two decades:
The opinion is significant as it separates from formal sovereignty the otherwise complete 
authority of the Mandatory. The result -  in accordance with what is the essence of the system
240 Oppenheim, International Law, vo!.1 (7th ed., supra note 64), at 214-216. For the functions and the 
internal structure of the fideicommissum see generally Johnston, Roman Law, supra note 172, at 
18 etseq.
241 Manley 0. Hudson, The Prospect of International Law in the Twentieth Century’, 10 Cornell LQ 
419-459 (1924-1925), at 435.
242 Luther H. Evans. ‘The General Principles Governing the Termination o f a Mandate’, 26 AJIL 735- 
758 (1932). at 747. For the types of inquiry this generated see Corbett, ‘League’, supra note 78 
and Geoffrey Butler. ‘Sovereignty and the League of Nations’, 1 BYIL 35-44 (1920-21).
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of mandates and trusteeship -  is to stress the functional divisibility of sovereignty and, thus, 
the absence from it, notwithstanding doctrinal logic, of any rigid element of absoluteness.243
(i) Normative Framework of the T rusteeship Mechanism
The institutional development of the United Nations is remarkable in its heightened authority 
and the confidence with which it pursued the decolonisation project. It constituted a renewed 
voice of an international order in which sovereignty was not pronounced primarily in favour of 
the state, but would rather be embroidered into an international organised structure that 
attempted to reconstruct sovereignty along the lines of self-determination once a fiduciary 
administration had fulfilled its functions. The innovations of the League were carried over to 
the United Nations system in the forms of an operational Trusteeship arrangement on one 
side, and an automatic non-self-governing arrangement on the other.244 A sharp distinction 
was drawn at San Francisco between Chapter XI (Articles 73 and 74) of the Charter, 
applicable to all non-self-goveming peoples (in which sovereignty and jurisdiction remained 
vested in the administrating states), and Chapters XII and XIII, applicable exclusively to 
Trust territories. It was only with regard to the latter that supervision lay with the UN.
On the other hand, the provisions o f Chapters XII and XIII went considerably beyond the 
Mandate system of the League. As its historical successor, the Trusteeship system was not 
lim ited to specific territories formerly belonging to the enemy. Rather, it was open to any 
territory placed under it by means o f a Trusteeship agreement and hence fell outside of the 
fixed classification system set up by the League.245 Yet the Trusteeship system assumed a 
very similar role by viewing the territories placed under it as a matter of concern for the 
United Nations as a whole, and their good administration as an obligation falling to the 
organisation. The essentially utopian idea that watched over the cradle o f the League’s 
creation, namely that international well-being would enter into the calculus of state action as 
the regime aspired to affect the psychology of sovereignty, was resuscitated and reinforced 
with a renewed focus on pursuing goals through cooperative agreements. Irrespective of 
where sovereignty may have rested, it placed the former mandated territories under a 
trusteeship that was to be eventually terminated under the Charter by the grant of self- 
government or independence. From a political point of view, the provisions of Articles 73 to 
91 o f the UN Charter may have emerged out of the need to find a suitable compromise to a 
series of conflicting interests. As one commentator laconically suggested, the provisions 
artificially reconciled clashing aspirations with the result that
PJiberal humanitarianism received its satisfaction in the Declaration Regarding Non-Self- 
Goveming Territories but conservative humanitarianism was made content by the limited appli­
cation of the Trusteeship System proper. Military opponents o f international rule were recon­
ciled through the strategic trust provisions but those who saw in trusteeship a means of inter­
nationalizing future trouble spots received satisfaction through the possibility of the submission 
of any colonial area to the system. Economic liberals could take comfort in the open door pro­
visions and economic protectionists in the corresponding escape clauses. Colonial nationalism
243 Lauterpacht, Development, supra note 235, at 323.
244 Cf., for instance, Donald S. Leeper, Trusteeship Compared with Mandate’, 49 Michigan LR 1199- 
1210(1951).
245 James N. Murray, The United Nations Trusteeship System (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1957), at 43-44.
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was temporary appeased but Colonial Empires seemed also to remain intact.246
Such complex synthesis aside, the important point remains that an international institution 
was given the task of recreating sovereignty out of the 'backward peoples’ and territories 
brought under its fiduciary regime. Alternatively, the Trusteeship system anticipated that 
territories held in trust could also opt for their eventual reintegration into the jurisdiction of the 
former administrating power as associated and dependent states.247 'Self-government', 
within the meaning of Article 76(b) of the Charter, could, of course, take the form of indepen­
dence; or local autonomy within a larger association; or even the form of assimilation to a 
sovereign state provided that the inhabitants of the territory in question had attained a 
sufficient degree o f political autonomy and reached a stage of political development enabling 
them to make a free and considered choice.248
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system were set out in Article 76 of the Charter. 
Article 79 specified that the terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the 
system should be agreed upon by the ‘states directly concerned’ and be approved by the 
United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Articles 85 and 83 (for strategic areas). 
As such, the agreements were contracts between two legal personalities, the General 
Assembly and the administering authority.249 They contained provisions (i) to promote de­
velopment of political institutions; (n) to assure the inhabitants a progressive share in the 
administration; (iii) and to take all other appropriate measures with a view to the political 
development of the inhabitants in accordance with Article 76(b).250 As established in the form 
of treaties between the UN and the several administering authorities, the Trusteeship 
agreements were legal acts implementing Article 76 of the Charter. They possessed a 
contractual yet also ‘objective’ character and constituted a quasi-statutory basis for the 
trusteeship system conceived as a principal-agent relationship251 according to which the UN 
would supervise the administrative authority as it recreated sovereignty by establishing the 
underlying structure -  the political, social, and economic substance -  of a state.
(it) Institutional Framework
However, the question of who would be a party to the trusteeship agreement, and therefore 
derive both rights and obligations from it, proved contentious. Initially, the view prevailed that
246 Ernst B. Haas, The Attempt to Terminate Colonialism: Acceptance of the U.N. Trusteeship 
System1, 7:1 International Organization 1-21 (1953), at 20.
247 For th case of the West Indies cf., e.g., Margaret Broderick, Associated Statehood -  A New Form 
of Decolonisation, 17 ICLQ 368-403 (1968), at 371 etseq.
248 The option of effectively foregoing a claim for self-determination was clearly spelled out by the GA 
which dedared in 1970 that “the free association or integration with an independent State or the 
emergence into any other political status freely determined by the people* would also constitute 
modes of implementing the right of self-determination (Declaration on Principles o f International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, A/RES/2625 (XXV), 24 
October 1970, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970)). The ambiguity with which an international regulatory 
authority pursued its mediation project by limiting the implications for sovereignty and claims to 
self-determination is most visible in cases of recent establishments of international territorial 
administrations, and particularly in those instances, such as Kosovo, where the question of 'final 
status’ was left unresolved. See Chapter V.1.2, infra p.160.
249 O’Connell, International Law, vol. 1, supra note 62, at 337. r
250 For a discussion of the objectives of Article 78 see Bruno Simma, The Charter o f the United 
Nations. A Commentary (Vol.II, 2nd ed., Munich, 2002), at 1106-1111.
251 Parry, ‘Trusteeship Agreements’, supra note 193, at 176.
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a trusteeship agreement would be an inter-state treaty concluded under the auspices of the 
UN. As Parry wrote in 1950, “it is not possible to maintain with any confidence that the 
United Nations is, in the Charter, envisaged as a party to the Trusteeship agreements. If that 
had been intended, it could scarcely have been stated more obscurely”.252 The high-priest of 
textuality, S ir Fitzmaurice, also appears to have taken a contrary view in his separate opinion 
in the Northern Cameroons case in which he stated that
the Trust Agreement was concluded by being embodied in a resolution of the United Nations 
Assembly, and it has been common ground throughout the present case that the sole entities 
formally parties to it were the Administering Authority on the one hand, and the United Nations 
represented by the General Assembly on the other.253
The GA was thus charged with exercising concurrent jurisdiction with the Trusteeship 
Council regarding the supervision of the administration of the trust territories.254 These 
contrasting opinions reveal the extent to which the original thesis, according to which the 
Trusteeship system consisted of an inter-state treaty while the process of bringing a territory 
under it involved two separate stages -  that of a horizontal agreement between states and of 
subsequent approval by the appropriate UN organ -  had been departed from. In the South- 
West Africa opinion, these two stages collapsed into one where the United Nations would 
step in as a contracting party. Although it would not stand on an equal footing with the 
prospective administrative power concerning the negotiation of the agreement, the UN would 
still assume supervisory functions not dissimilar to a principal-agent relationship. The funda­
mental importance of the Trusteeship system in the scheme o f the Charter was expressed 
by the fact that the ultimate responsibility for its operation lay with the GA, and, with regard to 
strategic areas, with the SC. These bodies approved the Trusteeship agreements and any 
modification required their consent. Scholars seemed to agree that from the perspective of 
material content, the Trusteeship System represented a considerable advance over the 
Mandate System with respect to international supervision and accountability.255
Chapter XIII o f the UN Charter, dealing with the composition, powers, and voting procedures 
of the Trusteeship Council, provided a more elaborate procedure and granted more exten­
sive powers of supervision than was the case with the Permanent Mandates Commission 
(PMC) under the League system. The outcome of the drafting process was initially greeted 
by analysts who concluded that, in a comparison of the two administrative modalities, the 
novel Trusteeship system would represent the nadir of accountability in the performance of
252 Id., at 166.
253 Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroons v. United Kingdom), Preliminary 
Objections, ICJ Reports [1963] 15, at 113.
264 The (now defunct) Articles 87 and 88 stipulated that the administering authority was to report 
annually to the GA concerning the territory it was entrusted to administer. With regard to strategic 
areas, the functions of the UN were exercised by the SC (Art. 83). For the functions of the General 
Assembly/Security Council and the Trusteeship Council towards trustee territories, see 
Vei'copoulos, Traité, supra note 112, at §§833-851 (GA), §§852-855 (SC) and §§856-916 (TC).
255 M un-ay, Trusteeship System, supra note 245, at 45. Lauterpacht concluded that the essential 
novelty of the Mandates and Trusteeship Systems “lay in the machinery of international 
supervision intended to secure the effectiveness of the System’ (Development; supra note 235, at 
279). According to Chowdhuri, “[p]erhaps the predominant element, which pervades the entire 
administration of the Trust Territory, is the principle of international accountability whereby the 
Trustee Power exercises its authority in accordance with the decisions of the international 
community" (Mandates, supra note 163, at 146).
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the ‘sacred trust’. The former Director of the Mandate Department of the League commen­
ted, perhaps idealistically: "W hat is certain today is that in the intentions of the drafters o f the 
Charter, persuasion and the discreet political pressure of emulation, which were the main 
motive agents of the Mandates System, are to be supplemented and even, if need be, 
replaced by coercive and direct intervention."256
The peremptory language of Article 73 UN Charter represented a clear departure from the 
framework in which the Mandate System had operated. As Reisman noted, the administra­
tion of non-self-goveming territories “automatically imposed on the superordinated party 
specific obligations for the welfare of the inhabitants of the territory".257 258Yet both the Mandate 
and the Trusteeship Systems were devised in such a way as not to subordinate the Man­
datory or the administering authority to the dictates of a supervisory body. Illustrating his 
views by reference to the trusteeship provision, which he regarded as relevant to that of 
Mandates, Judge Lauterpacht concluded in 1955 that
[t]he Trusteeship Agreements do not provide for a legal obligation of the Administering 
Authority to comply with the decisions of the organs of the United Nations in the matter of 
trusteeship. Thus there is no legal obligation, on the part of the Administering Authority to give 
effect to a recommendation of the General Assembly to adopt or depart from a particular 
course of legislation or any particular administrative measure... The Administering Authority, 
not the General Assembly, bears the direct responsibility for the welfare of the population of 
the Trust Territory ... In fact States administering Trust Territories have often asserted their 
right not to accept recommendations of the General Assembly or of the Trusteeship Council... 
That right has never been seriously challenged. There are numerous examples of express
258refusal on the part of an Administrating Authority to comply with a recommendation.
More than a decade later, the dictum in the South West Africa cases was equally sceptical 
on the issue whether a principal-agent relationship between the Administering Authority and 
the supervisory organ had been concluded. Pertaining to the ‘conduct* provision of the 
Mandates; the Court observed that “it was never the intention that the Council should be able 
to impose its views on the various Mandatories -  the system adopted was one which 
rendered this impossible".259 From this formal interpretation o f the League arrangement, it 
appeared to be a long way to the authoritative statement of the Court another five years later 
in which it held that accountability of the Mandatory had always been understood as the flip- 
side of the peoples' entitlement to good governance:
The acceptance of a Mandate...connoted the assumption of obligations not only of a moral but 
also of a binding legal character; and, as a corollary of the trust, ‘securities for pts] perfor­
mance’ were instituted [§7 o f Article 22 of the Covenant] in the form of legal accountability for
256 William Rappard, The Mandates and the International Trusteeship Systems’, 61 PSQ 408-19 
(1946), at 416.
257 Reismann, ‘State Responsibility’, supra note 214, at 236 (italised in the original).
258 Advisory Opinion on Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning 
the Territory o f South-West Africa, ICJ Reports [1955] 67, at 116.
259 South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase (Judgment), 
ICJ Reports [1966] 6. at 46.
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its discharge and fulfilment... Thus the reply to the essential question, quis custodiet ipsos 
custodes?, was given in terms of the mandatory’s accountability to international organs.260
At the centre o f its reasoning was the assertion, made by the Court in 1962, that judicial 
protection by the PCI J of the ‘sacred* trust in each Mandate was an essential feature o f the 
system itself while the administrative supervision by the League was a ‘normal security’ to 
ensure the full performance of the ‘sacred trust’ by the Mandatory.261 Inspired by the function 
of the Mandate system to promote the exercise of the right to self-determination of peoples, 
the organised community o f states did not only limit the powers o f the Mandatory but also 
made these limitations amenable to judicial review and protection by the PCIJ.262 It 
eventually also subordinated its own powers to attainment o f this objective. This develop­
ment represented the second leap of what can be termed an embryonic version o f insti­
tutionalised accountability from the initial starting point in 1919 that sought to schematically 
transplant, into the domain of international law, institutions initially devised by Roman and 
common law under which the tuteur was responsible for the performance of the trust vested 
in him.
The UN Charter provided its own contingent regime for securing compliance by the Adm inis­
tering Authority with their respective obligations regarding the objectives of the system. In 
contrast to the PMC, the Trusteeship Council was purposely designed as a political organ, 
constituted as one of the principal organs of the new world body. It would function as the 
right arm of the plenary representative organ, the GA, which in turn would operate under a 
two-thirds majority rule and not under the unanimity requirement as the League Council did. 
All o f the functions of the UN regarding Trusteeship Arrangements (for all areas not 
designated as strategic territories) -  the supervision of administration and the policing o f the 
obligations owed both to the people o f a territory and to the UN itself -  were vested 
exclusively in the GA.263
Under its authority, the Trusteeship Council was to (i) consider reports by the administrating 
authority; (ii) in consultation with the latter, accept and examine petitions from the inhabitants 
of trust territories; (iii) arrange for periodic visits to trust territories at times agreed upon with 
the administrating authority,264(iv) formulate questionnaires on the political, economic, social, 
and educational progress of the inhabitants, that were to be used as templates for the 
annual reports submitted to the GA by the administering authority; and (v) take any other 
action in conformity with the Trusteeship agreements.265 Within their general ambit, these 
legal obligations were to be fulfilled by the administrating power and by the Trusteeship 
Council; they were both narrower and more comprehensive than those stipulated by the 
mandate agreements concluded under Article 22 of the League Covenant.
260 ICJ Reports 1971, supra note 56, at 29-30.
261 ICJ Reports 1962, supra note 192, at 336.
262 Cf. sep. op. Sir Spender in the Northern Cameroons case, supra note 253, at 71 et seq.
263 Article 87 o f the UN Charter.
264 Visiting Missions were one of the Trusteeship system's principal innovations, as compared to the 
machinery set up under Art. 22 of the Covenant. Cf. Veïcopoulos, Traité, supra note 112, at 
§§1006 -1025. For some of the procedural difficulties that arose in connection with their 
composition see Thullen, Problems, supra note 211, at 70-75.
265 For a general discussion of the mechanics of the Trusteeship Council and its rules of procedure, 
see Murray, Trusteeship System, supra note 245,128 et seq.
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The second objective of the trusteeship system, enshrined in Article 76(b) of the Charter -  
setting territories under fiduciary administration on a clear path towards self-government or 
independence -  incorporates the central tenet of the Mandate system, while going beyond 
i t 266 Article 22 of the Covenant had confined the Mandate’s objective to the “well-being and 
development” of the inhabitants under it. The framers of the Charter boldly added “pro­
gressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to 
the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed 
wishes of the peoples concerned", thus making the first, more permanent promise to 
transfer values whose local implementation is measurable by development indicators, from 
the European core to the periphery.267 In all, the framework resembled a system through 
which the performance of both moral and legal obligations was continuously supervised. As 
Chowdhuri convincingly stated, a direct comparison between the Mandate- and the Trustee­
ship system showed that the emphasis has shifted from the mere prohibition of abuses 
under the former to the more positive aspect of constructive development in political, 
economic, social, and educational spheres.268 In the exercise of its functions, however, the 
Trusteeship Council only had force of persuasion and public opinion to ensure compliance 
with its recommendations.
Two important issues shall be highlighted here to summarise the ideas presented so far and 
to lay the groundwork of the substantive discussion in the next section. The first issue relates 
to the capacity to terminate an agreement that benefits a third party, namely the inhabitants 
of a territory held in trust One could argue that the ultimate test of the proximity o f a 
supervisory relationship between a UN principal organ and an administrating power lies in 
determining who would eventually have the power to terminate the Mandate or trusteeship 
agreement Incidentally, the question of the removal of an administrating power was a much- 
debated point under the Mandate system, particularly in connection with the withdrawal o f 
Japan from the League and its violation o f the military clauses of the mandate.269 This issue 
also preoccupied the Security Council in 1947 when it debated its competence to deprive an 
■enemy state of its Mandate prior to a peace settlement.270- Curiously enough, none of the 
draft proposals submitted at San Francisco had referred to any provision for termination or 
substitution of Trusteeship. Until the resolution of the South-West Africa dispute discussed 
below, it was held that only the administering power was in a position to determine the nature 
and character of a fiduciary bond which it was willing to propose to the UN and undertake to 
administer. The question whether the right to revocation and transfer rested with the 
mandant under the Roman law of mandatum had not yet been answered. Expressed in 
modem terms, the question concerned the issue whether the international status o f a 
territory could be changed unilaterally, based on the United Nation's finding of a material
266 As discussed above, the preparation for self-government or independence had only been 
specifically envisaged for ‘A'-Mandates.
267 Sayre noted that while each of the ten trusteeship agreements specified in some details the means 
for promoting political advancement, none specifically amplified the words ‘self-government’ or 
‘independence’ (‘Legal Problems’, supra note 196,280, at footnote 41).
268 Chowdhuri, Mandates, supra note 163, at 11. For example, all administrating authorities had 
accepted, in the trusteeship agreement, to receive visiting missions. Cf. Henry G. Schemners and 
Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity (Boston/Leiden: M. Nijhoff, 
2003), at §1415 (with references).
269 Wright, Mandates, supra note 27, at 520-21.
270 SCOR (II), 113th meeting, 26 February 1947, at 413.
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breach of contract by a 'rogue' administrating power, and, if yes, by which UN organ.271
The second issue, closely related to the question of power to terminate a fiduciary bond and 
to undertake what necessarily amounts to a territorial disposition, concerned the general 
capacity of the United Nations to administer territory, either within the framework of the 
Mandate or the Trusteeship system, or outside of it. As demonstrated earlier, the tendency 
to vest the UN or one of its subsidiary organs with increasing responsibilities of territorial 
administration began with the Resolution on the Future Government o f Palestine adopted by 
the GA in 1947, delegating the responsibility for administering the City of Jerusalem as 
'corpus separatum ’ to  the Trusteeship Council.272 We recall that a two-thirds majority of the 
members of the UN had thus established that a principal organ could be called upon to 
perform tasks outside the Trusteeship system. To an extent hereto unheard of, this tendency 
brought out the willingness o f UN member states to activate the ‘latent capacities’ of the UN 
regarding an immediate political problem.
This willingness would crystallise again, twenty years later, with the creation of the Council 
for Namibia, upon which the UN General Assembly bestowed legal title to administer the 
territory after revoking South A frica’s mandate. As we w ill see in the subsequent section, the 
process of internationalisation o f a territory through which an entity was to be directly 
administered by a subsidiary organ of the UN necessitated the granting of a sui generis legal 
personality to the territory on whose behalf the international organisation acted, hence 
further widening the gap between the application of the rules of classical international law 
and the novel legal responses that fiduciary administration had introduced.
In order to wind up the discussion on Mandates and Trusteeships, the following table 
supplies a taxonomy o f territories under these respective fiduciary administrations.
271 Marston, ‘Termination’, supra note 188, at 14-28.
272 UN Doc. A/516, 25 November 1947.
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(iv ) Ta b le : M a n d a t e s  a n d  T r u s t e e s h ip  T e r r it o r ie s











Palestine and Transjordan (GB) * M-terms approved 














Cameroons, Br. (UK) • T-agreement approved by UN 
Dec. 1946 • North section joined to Nigeria (June 
1961), south section to Cameroons (Oct. 1961)
Syria and Lebanon (FR) * M-temns approved by LN 
July 1922 * Mandate unilaterally terminated without 
bilateral treaty ■ UN admission 1946
Cameroons, Fr. (FR) • T-agreement approved by UN 
Dec. 1946 • UN admission Sept. 1960 (A/RES/1476 
(XV))
Mesopotamia (Iraq, GB) • M-terms embodied in 
Treaty of Alliance’ btw. GB and Iraq (signed October 
1922), approved by LN Council in Sept. 1924 • 
Termination of the Mandate by the LN Council • LN 
admission in Oct. 1932
Ruanda-Urundi (B) • T-agreement approved by UN 
Dec. 1946 * UN admission as Rwanda and Burundi 







Cameroons (5/6* FR: remainder GB) • M-terms 
approved by LN July 1922
Tanganyika (UK) • T-agreement approved by UN Dec. 
1946 * UN admission as Tanzania Dec. 1961 • 
A/RES/1667 (XVI)
Togoland (2/3rt FR; remainder GB) • M-terms 
approved by LN July 1922
Togoland, Br. (UK) • T-agreement approved by UN 
Dec. 1946 • joined with Gold Coast to form Ghana, 
admitted to UN March 1957 * A/RES/1118 (XI)
East Africa (Tanganyika, GB; Rwanda and Urundi, B) 
• M-temns approved by LN July 1922
Togoland, Fr. (FR) - T-agreement approved by UN 








South-West Africa (SA) • M-terms approved by the 
LN Dec. 1920 * Mandate terminated Oct. 1966 
(A/RES/2145 (XXI) • UN admission as Namibia
New Guinea (AUS) • T-agreement approved by UN 
Dec. 1946 • UN admission as Papua New Guinea Oct. 
1975 • A/RES/3368 (XXX)
Samoa (NZ) • M-terms approved by the LN Dec. 1920 Nauru (AUS) • T-agreement approved by UN Nov. 
1947 • UN admission 1968
Nauru (GB, AUS, NZ) • M-terms approved by the LN 
Dec. 1920
Somalia (I) * T-agreement approved by UN Dec. 1950 
(limited to 10 years) * UN admission SepL 1960 • 
A/RES/1478 (XV)
German New Guinea (and German islands in the 
pacific south of the Equator other than Samoa and 
Nauru, AUS) • M-terms approved by the LN Dec. 1920
Western Samoa (NZ) * T-agreement approved by UN 
Dec. 1946 • UN admisson Dec. 1976 • A/RES/31/104 
(XXXI)
Yap (and other German islands in the Pacific north of 








Pacific Islands (Marianas, Caroline, Marshall Islands, 
US) • T-agreement approved by the SC April 1947 • 
Admitted to UN as Federated States of Micronesia 
Sept. 1991 (A/RS/46/2 and 46/3), Marshall Islands 














Germany renounced the government of the Saar 
Territory by the LN (Peace Treaty of Versailles, 28 
June 1919). Between 1920 and 1935, Germany’s 
















By A/RES/181 (A+B) (29 November 1947), the GA 
endorsed the proposal of UNSCOP that envisaged 
Jerusalem being placed under an international 
regime, constituting it as a ‘corpus separatum’. The 
Trusteeship Council, to which the Governor would be 
accountable, was designed to discharge the responsi­
bilities of the UN in this regard. The plan was rejected 
and never entered into force.
Danzig was severed from Germany and constituted 
as ’Free City1 under the protection of the LN (17 
November 1920) and a High Commissioner appointed 
by it
Following the Peace Treaty with Italy (10 February 
1947), the ‘Free Territory of Trieste’ was envisaged 
as an independent state entity based on a 'Permanent 
Statute’ under the direct control of the SC and 
administered by a Governor to prevent it from being 
annexed by Italy or YU.
Upper-Silesia By A/RES/2145 (XXI) of 1966, the GA terminated 
South Africa's mandate over South West Africa 
(Namibia), thus placing it under the direct 
responsibility of the UN Council for Namibia. South 
Africa responded by declaring its intention not to 
withdraw from the territory.
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2.2.3 South-West Africa Revisited
'It is .. .difficult to see what the world organisation would do with the territory i f  it had it. ’ 273
The establishment of the UN Council of Namibia, ineffective and contentious as it was, 
represents the apparent drawing together of the two threads so far laid throughout the 
present chapter. Firstly, South-West Africa had been the site vacated of sovereign title in 
which obligations and rights were reconfigured according to the notion of trust in which 
international law found its transitional ‘essential basis'. Secondly, notwithstanding the 
transitionality of the arrangement, we are able to detect a peculiar permanent essence, the 
promise of self-determination, in the continued operation of trust. The case is a good starting 
point for our examination of how an imposed divorce between title to territory and effective 
control -  expounded upon in Chapter I -  led to a paradoxical situation in which a territory 
under international authority was admitted to a number of specialised UN agencies. It might 
also hold the key to several interrelated problems that we will tackle in the third chapter, 
particularly regarding the status of internationalised territories and their partial legal 
personality. An inquiry into the long and tortuous role o f the UN in the dispute over South- 
W est Africa also furthers the more radical propositions, advanced in Chapter IV, that deal 
with the dual nature of international administrations.
In order to comprehend the issues at hand, we shall review, in summary fashion, the back­
ground to the Namibia dispute that concerned the UN for more than four decades. The 
significance of the various acts performed by relevant governments at the introduction o f the 
Mandate system, of which this thesis has previously spoken, culminated in the adoption of 
GA.Resolution 2145 (XXI) terminating South Africa’s mandate over the territory.
(r) Background
As Germany was divested o f all her colonial possessions following the end of W W I,274 
German South West Africa passed to South Africa through the Mandate for the 
Administration o f German South West Africa conferred upon His Britannic Majesty for, and 
on behalf of, the Government of the Union of South Africa, confirmed and defined by the 
League’s Council.275 This gave the Mandatory full powers of administration and legislation 
over the territory but reserved the right to define more explicit powers to the League Council. 
As discussed, 'advanced nations’ were under this system bestowed with a Mandate to 
govern former colonies whose inhabitants were not considered to be able to govern 
themselves, in accordance with the principle that “the well-being and development of such 
peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation”.276
273 George F. Kennan, 'Hazardous Courses in South Africa, 49 Foreign Affairs 218-236 (1970-1971), 
at 227.
274 League of Nations Covenant Articles 119-127. For a general discussion see Solomon Slonim, 
South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute (Baltimore: JHU 
Press, 1973), at 22 etseq.
275 Cf. Isaak I. Dore, 'Self-Determination of Namibia and the United Nations: Paradigm of a Paradox', 
27:1 Harvard IL J 159-191 (1986), atftn. 11.
276 League of Nations Covenant Art. 22, §1.
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By accepting the Class ’C’ mandate over South-West Africa from the League,277 South 
Africa became the legitimate government of the territory, while it had to accept the 
responsibilities and obligations inherent in the Mandate system. The transfer of legal title to 
administer and legislate for the territory thus created fiduciary obligations, particularly 
regarding the promotion of the 'material well being and the social progress of the inhabitants 
of the territory’.278 By prohibiting the annexation of Mandate territories,279 requiring periodic 
reports to the League 280 and emphasising the concept of 'sacred trust*, the Mandate system 
established the supervisory role of the League.281
Much of the legal controversy over South-West Africa after WWII can be traced back to the 
ambiguities surrounding the transition from the League (which supervised South Africa’s 
administration o f the territory until 1940) to the United Nations. Although the supervision by 
the League had effectively ended with the dissolution of the body, the establishment of the 
UN Trusteeship Council and the transition of mandates from the former to the latter became 
a fundamental source of contention -  particularly with regard to South-West Africa. When 
the UN GA attempted to seek a commitment from South Africa to some system of inter­
national accountability for the administration of the territory, its demands were met with solid 
non-compliance. In effect, South Africa claimed it was absolved from any further obligation 
of international accountability concerning South-West Africa.282 Moreover, the Union 
announced its intention to annex the territory and later, after the nationalist government 
came into power in Pretoria in 1948, contended that the mandate had lapsed upon 
dissolution of the League. The Trusteeship Council, reporting in 1948 on the (sparse) data 
submitted by the South African government, commented that
[t]he indigenous inhabitants have no franchise, no eligibility to office and no representation...in 
the administration of the territory... P]here is an expenditure of little more than ten percent of 
the budget on the indigenous inhabitants, who comprise approximately 90 percent of the entire
population.283
Indeed, the Mandate system, itself a novel arrangement in the international order, had 
spawned a unique legal situation.284 South Africa’s recalcitrance would tax the United 
Nations machinery to its utmost in the coming decades as resolutions and adjudications
277 As previously stated, the Mandates were to be designated as *A', ‘B’ or ‘C’ depending on the “state 
of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions 
and other similar circumstances" (id., §3). ‘C’ mandates were regarded as “best administered 
under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory" because of such factors as 
sparse population, small size, remoteness of territory from the ‘centres of civilisation" or their geo­
graphical contiguity to the territory of the mandatory (id., §6).
278 Mandate for South West Africa, Art. 2. The text of the Mandate is reprinted in Terms o f League o f 
Nation Mandates, UN Doc. A/70, No. 10 (1046).
279ICJ Reports 1950, supra note 173, at 131-2.
280 This obligation was specified in Art. 6 of the South West Africa mandate, supra note 278.
281 See Anonymous Note, 'The United Nations, Self-Determination and the Namibia Opinion’, 82 Yale 
U  533-558 (1973), at 535-8.
282 Cf. Slonim, South West Africa, supra note 274, at 101.
283 GAOR (III), A/lNF/28+Add.2, Supplement 4, at 42 (1948)
284 For accounts of the diplomatic history with regard to Namibia’s struggle for independence see 
Maurice Kamto, 'L’accession de la Namibie ¿ I’independence’, 94:3 RGDIP 577 (1990) and 
Ronald Dreyer, The United Nations and Namibia: An Overview (1946-1990)’, 5 International 
Geneva Yearbook 26 (1991).
would fail to wrench the territory from the Mandatory’s grasp. Faced with these irreconcilable 
positions, the GA requested the ICJ in 1950 to render an Advisory Opinion on the territory’s 
legal status. The ICJ ruled that the Mandate had survived the demise of the League and 
South Africa's responsibilities continued to include the duty to submit annual reports on the 
administration of the mandate, and the duty to transmit petitions from the territory’s people to 
the Trusteeship Council.285 Furthermore, all supervisory functions previously exercised by 
the League were to be seized by the United Nations. Like the League process, the UN 
regime assigned ultimate responsibility for such territories to the international community, 
while temporarily delegating that responsibility to a supervisory state.286 It advised the GA 
that not only did the territory remain under the mandate of South Africa (including the 
international obligations set out in Art. 22 of the Covenant), its international status could only 
be modified by the South African government with the consent of the UN.287
The supervisory functions regarding the fulfilment of trustee obligations, reconfigured as they 
had been, appear to have survived the termination of the original Mandate agreement. As 
discussed above, the Mandate was seen to have created an international regime that 
continued to produce legal obligations as long as the raison d ’être and the original object of 
the legal instrument remained to be attained.288 By emphasising the character of the 
Mandate as an 'objective international régime’ (and hence engaging in what Fitzmaurice had 
called “some sort of silent alchemy")289, the Court demonstrated that fulfilment o f the 
obligations flowing from the instrument neither depended on the continued legal existence of 
the League nor of its supervisory organ. It thus created a de facto succession between the 
League and the UN in so far as South Africa’s obligation to submit to international 
supervision of the Mandate was concerned. As one writer remarked, this regime “was 
essentially o f judicial origin" and in conferring supervisory powers on the GA, the Court 
fulfilled “an essentially creative, and not just interpretative role in its capacity as the principal 
jud icia l organ o f the United Nations."290
International opinion firmly crystallised against South Africa after Ethiopia and Liberia had 
brought unsuccessful proceedings before the ICJ in 1962291 and generated a consensus that 
South Africa's governance of Namibia violated its obligations as a Mandatory, as well as
285 ICJ Reports 1950, supra note 173, at 133 and 136-37. The GA had invited South Africa to propose 
a trusteeship agreement for South West Africa in A/RES/141 (II), 1 November 1947, UN Doc. 
A/519 (1947), at 47, and the Union complied with one of its obligations as mandatory power when 
it submitted a report of its administration (UN GAOR (I), 1104th Plenary Meeting, at 573, UN Doc. 
A/422 (1947)) before declining to accept the trusteeship path.
286 Compare UN Charter Articles 75 and 81 with LN Covenant Art. 22 (2).
287 ICJ Reports 1950, supra note 173, at 143-44. See Anonymous Note, ‘Namibia Opinion’, supra 
note 281, at 546.
288 See Eckart Klein, 'International Régimes’ in 2 EPIL 1354-1359 (1995), at 1355 ef seq. as well as 
Marston, ‘Termination’, supra note 188, at 31.
269 Supra, note 239.
290 Slonim, South West Africa, supra note 274, at 122.
291 South West Africa cases, ICJ Reports 1962, supra note 192. Cf. the authoritative analyses o f the 
proceedings by Elisabeth S. Landis, ‘The South West Africa Cases: Remand to the United 
Nations', 52 Cornell LQ 627-71 (1967) and John F. Crawford. ‘South West Africa: Mandate 
Termination in Historical Perspective’, 6 Columbia JTL 91-137 (1967), at 133 et seq. Although the 
ICJ decided it could hear the merits of the dispute, it subsequently held that Ethiopia and Liberia 
lacked the necessary standing to raise the issue since the right to supervise the mandate 
belonged to the League, not to its members (ICJ Reports 1966, supra note 259, at 28-29).
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breaching customary international law on self-determination. The UN's activism, that had so 
far gravitated around Namibia’s demands for decolonisation and self-determination, led to 
the legally pivotal termination of the Mandate of South-West Africa in 1966.292 In pertinent 
parts, the Assembly declared that “South Africa has failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of 
the administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the moral and material well-being 
and security of the indigenous inhabitants...and has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate”. 
Further, it decided that South Africa has no other right to administer the Territory and that 
henceforth South W est Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations".293
(ti) Legal Basis for Terminating the Mandate
To the extent that Resolution 2145 (XXI) was adopted by the GA as the supervisory authority 
and as a party to the contractual relationship with South Africa arising from the Mandate, the 
resolution proved to be infra vires and constitutionally valid, particularly after its endorsement 
by the Security Council in a number of Resolutions.294 The question of non-compliance with 
GA resolutions had first been submitted to the SC in 1969. In its Resolution 264, the Council 
recognised that the GA terminated the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia and assumed 
direct responsibility for the Territory until its independence and considered that "the 
continued presence of South Africa in Namibia is illegal and contrary to the principles of the 
Charter and the previous decisions of the United Nations".295
A few months later, the Security Council condemned South Africa “for its refusal to comply 
with Resolution 264 (1969) and for its persistent defiance of the authority of the United 
Nations".296 Further, the SC declared that “the defiant attitude of the Government of South 
Africa towards the Council’s decisions undermines the authority of the United Nations".297 
Finally, it noted the continued flagrant refusal of the Government of South Africa to comply 
with its decisions and called upon all states to take various measures with respect to South 
Africa and Namibia.298 South Africa, which did not accept the termination of the mandate, 
responded in October 1969 by declaring its intention not to withdraw from the territory, 
effectively freezing the diametrically opposed positions of the Union on the one side and the
292 See, generally, John Dugard, T he  Revocation of the Mandate for South West Africa’, 62 AJIL 78- 
97 (1968). For a discussion of the political background to A/RES/2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 
(UN Doc. A/6316 (1966) see Laurent Lucchini, ‘La Namibie: une construction des Nations Unies', 
15 AFDI355-374 (1969) at 356 et seq.
293 A/RES/2145 (XXI), Art. 3 and 4. Article 6 o f the Resolution established a fourteen-member Ad Hoc 
Committee for South-West Africa to recommend practical means by which the territory should be 
administered. The ICJ held in 1971 that, through S/RES/284 (supra note 53), the UN had formally 
terminated SA’s mandate over Namibia and had resumed formal control over the territory.
294 The proposition that the GA and the SC could terminate the Mandate even if the GA, acting alone, 
could not have done so, was advanced in the written statement by the United States in the Legal 
Consequences case (ICJ Pleadings 1971, Vol. I, 877) and in the ora! statement of the repre­
sentative of the Secretary General (ibid., at 53: ‘Whatever legal questions one may have had con­
cerning the right of the General Assembly to act alone, or the right o f the Security Council to act 
alone...it cannot be denied that the combined action of both principal organs with respect to 
Namibia is effective beyond any constitutional or legal challenge").
295 S/RES/264 (XXIV), 1465th meeting 1 (1969).
296 S/RES/269 (XXIV), 1497th meeting 2 (1969).
297 S/RES/276 (XXV), 1529th meeting 1 (1970), §3.
298 S/RES/283 (XXV), 29 July 1970, reproduced in 9 ILM 1087 (1970), §4 of the Preamble.
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General Assembly and the Security Council on the other299 Despite the defiant attitude 
South Africa displayed, from the viewpoint of international law, and in the absence o f any 
intervening sovereign jurisdiction between the General Assembly and the people and 
territory of Namibia, no legitimate governmental authority existed other than the GA.
Interestingly, few of the written statements in the 1971 proceedings, or the debates 
preceding the adoption of the resolutions, advanced any argument that the SC in fact acted 
under Chapter VII.300 Instead, the UN Secretariat continued to apply its wide interpretation of 
Article 24 of the Charter, as it had done twenty years before in the case of the Permanent 
Statute for Trieste. There, the Secretary-General had stated that the term “primary respon­
sibility for the maintenance of international peace and security", coupled with the phrase 
“acts on their behalf, constituted a sufficiently wide legal basis for assuming (temporary) 
governmental authority, since the UN members had thereby conferred “powers 
commensurate with its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security” upon the 
Council, limited only by the fundamental principles and purposes of the Charter.301 In the 
case of Namibia, the restoration of a territory illegally occupied by a rogue administrator into 
an ‘internationalised territory’ falling under the direct responsibility o f the UN was to be 
achieved also on the basis of Article 24. As the representative of the SG argued during the 
pleadings that led to the 1971ICJ Advisory Opinion, the SC
was acting in the exercise of its powers as defined in Article 24.... [This is] evident from the 
nature of the violation committed by South Africa of her international obligation, and of the 
measures which the Council found it necessary to take. Moreover, the intention to create an 
obligation for States to comply with these measures is evidenced by the fact that, without such 
powers, their effect may be largely nugatory.302
The logic in the argument that seeks to derive the legal basis for Security Council action 
from “the nature of the violation" that could conceivably only be determined after the capacity 
of the organ to deal with such ‘violation’ had been established, is, of course, circular. 
Nevertheless, it appeared to have impressed the ICJ, which had almost ten years before 
adopted a similar teleological approach to the question of UN’s legal capacities when it 
opined that “when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was 
appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated Purposes of the United Nations, the
299 See Report o f the Secretary-General on the Implementation ofS/RES/269, UN Doc. S/9463/Add. 1 
(1969).
300 The representative of the US said he was able to support the draft resolution “because it wisely 
does not commit the Council to the narrow path of mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the 
Charter'. The UK representative added that "it is well that an original intention to include language 
of Chapter VII o f the Charter has been abandoned. I have already made it clear that my 
Government is not and will not be prepared to agree to commitments under Chapter VII of the 
• Charter in this regard" (UN Doc. S/PV.1465, pp. 7 and 41 respectively). Only Pakistan suggested 
that the relevant resolutions would in fact fall under Chapter VII, somewhat unconvincingly 
contending that South Africa’s persistent refusal to withdraw from Namibia would constitute a 
threat to peace in terms of Art. 39 (ICJ Pleadings 1971, Vol. I, at 357). For an account of the 
considerable confusion in the minds of UN delegations as to the legal basis upon which the 
Security Council resolutions were passed see John Dugard, The South West A/rica/Namibia 
Dispute. Documents and Scholarly Writings on the Controversy Between South Africa and the 
United Nations (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1973), at 506-516.
301 Cf. supra note 119.




presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization.’303
Under closer scrutiny, it is not surprising that the Security Council affirmed the validity of GA 
Resolution 2145, terminating the title to administer territory without reliance on Chapter VII. 
As demonstrated earlier, the relationship between the administering authority and the 
supervisory body had always been one o f a multilateral contractual nature. Malperformance, 
or material breach, of the trust by the former would, as a general principle, vest the latter 
with the competence to terminate the contractual bond without having to determine a threat 
to international peace and security.304 This was the argument of the SG’s representative who 
relied heavily on the applicability of the maxim non adimpleti contractus-305 It was precisely 
the absence of any intervening sovereign jurisdiction, or competing territorial title, and the 
mere existence o f contractual obligations, that enabled the United Nations to invoke Article 
24 in support of a theory of a reserve of powers against the will of a non-consenting member 
state qua administrating power. The exercise of power involved did not amount to an in­
vasion of national sovereignty precisely because the territory was already vested with inter­
national status.306 Article 24(2) states that the specific powers granted to the SC are laid 
down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII and it appears that the ICJ agreed that the Council 
would not only possess those powers but may exercise such other powers that are 
necessary for it to discharge its responsibilities,307 one of which had been to declare South 
Africa’s presence illegal and to restore the more permanent promise of future self- 
determination.
In what was arguably the most revolutionary feature of the Opinion, the Court found that the 
Security Council Resolution 276 was legally binding upon states despite the fact that it was 
not adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. The reasoning of the Court went as follows:
(1), the SC acted in the exercise o f its primary responsibilities, the maintenance of 
international peace and security, when it adopted Resolution 276.
303 Advisory Opinion concerning Certain Expenses o f the United Nations, ICJ Reports [1962] 151, at 
168.
304 On the issue of the revocation/termi nation of the Mandate on the basis of Article 24 of the Charter 
compare ICJ Reports 1971, supra note 56, at 47, with the separate opinion of Judge de Castro, 
id., at 216. Contra, sep. op, of Judge Fitzmaurice, id., at 266-268. For a general discussion of the 
Opinion’s implications, see Arthur W. Rovine, *The World Court Opinion on Namibia’, 11 Columbia 
JTL 203-239 (1972), at 226 ef seq.: Oliver J. Lissitzyn, ‘International Law and the Advisory 
Opinion on Namibia', 11 Columbia JTL 50-73 (1972), at 65 ef seq.; John F. Murphy, ‘Whither Now 
Namibia?’, 6 Cornell ILJ 1-43 (1972), at 28 et seq.; Preston Brown, ‘The 1971 I.C.J. Advisory 
Opinion on South West Africa (Namibia)’, 5 Vandeibijlt JTL 213-242 (1971-1972), at 219 etseq.; 
and Herman, ‘Namibia’, supra note 127, at 315-319.
305 See the Oral statement by the representative of the UN SG, ICJ Pleadings 1971, Voi. II, at 54: “A 
party which does not fulfil the obligations incumbent upon it and arising from the relationship, 
cannot be recognised as retaining the rights which it claims to derive from the relationship",
306 Sep. op. Judge Dillard, ICJ Reports 1971, supra note 56, at 163.
307 Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro and Anne P. Simons, Charter o f the United Nations. 
Commentary and Documents (3rd ed., New York, 1969), at 204. In its Legal Consequences 
opinion, the Court held that ‘ reference in paragraph 2 of this Article [24] to specific powers of the 
Security Council under certain chapters of the Charter does not preclude the existence of general 
powers to discharge the responsibilities conferred in paragraph 1’  (ICJ Reports 1971, at 52). 
Kelsen would not have agreed with this interpretation for he submitted that ‘ it is impossible to 
interpret Article 24 to mean that it confers upon the Council powers not conferred upon it in other 
articles of the Charter’  (United Nations, 1950, supra note 105, at 284).
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(2) , the legal basis of the resolution was Article 24{1), which
(3) does not restrict the SC to the specific powers mentioned in Article 24(2) but
(4) confers implied ‘general powers’ upon the Council to discharge its primary 
responsibility which are
(5) limited only by the fundamental principles and purposes o f the Charter.308
According to the Court, it was clear from the wording of the Resolution and the circum­
stances in which it was adopted that it was intended to be binding upon member states 
under Article 25:
When the Security Council adopts a decision under Article 25 in accordance with the Charter, 
it is for Member States to comply with that decision, including those members of the Security 
Council which voted against it and those Members of the United Nations who are not members 
of the Council. To hold otherwise would be to deprive this principal organ of its essential 
functions and powers under the Charter.309
In its final pronouncement on the issue, the ICJ
(1) advised the Security Council that South Africa's continued presence in Namibia 
would be illegal, hence confirming the demise o f South African authority over the 
mandate,
(2) stated South Africa’s obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia to 
end the occupation,
(3) found the territory to be under UN jurisdiction,
(4) affirmed the right of Namibians to self-determination and freedom from apartheid 
which it held to be a massive violation o f the human rights o f its citizens.310
The Court’s stance in this context came closer to an authoritative justification for a legislative 
role for the SC than had yet been propounded by an organ of the UN.311 As Higgins 
observed, the Court, in what was undoubtedly one of its most important constitutional 
pronouncements, “appears to be saying that [the GA] can pass resolutions which are legally 
operative, even if it is necessary to ask for the assistance o f the Security Council in making
308 ICJ Reports 1971, supra note 56, at 51-53. This example o f an application of the teleological 
method of interpretation was opposed by five judges. Perhaps overzealously, Judge Gros 
described it as a modification of the principles o f the Charter which would convert the SC into a 
world government (id., at 340-1). Judge Fitzmaurice insisted that “only when the Council is acting 
under Chapter VII, will its resolutions be binding on member States. In other cases their effect will 
be recommendatory and hortatory only* (id., at 293).
309 ICJ Reports 1971, at 54. Note also the views o f Higgins who examined whether Article 25 was 
intended to apply to decisions taken under Chapter VII after a determination had been made that 
a threat to the peace existed under Article 39. She supports the conclusion that the S/RES/276 
was binding under Article 25, having been validly passed under Article 24 (The Advisory Opinion 
on Namibia: Which U.N. Resolutions are Binding under Article 25 of the Charter?’, 21 ICLQ 270- 
286 (1972), at 286).
310 On this issue cf. Henry J. Richardson, ‘Self-Determination, International Law and the South African 
Bantustan Policy’, 17 Columbia JTL 185 (1978), at 190-93. For a concise overview of the system 
o f discriminatory policies see, e.g., Jost Delbrück, ‘Apartheid’, in United Nations: Law, Policies and 
Practice (ed. by Rüdiger Wolfrum, 1995), at 27-38.
311 Rovine, ’Opinion’, supra note 304, at 229.
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them legally effective”2' 2 While the ICJ did not discuss Resolution 2248 ($-V) or the status 
of the UN Council for Namibia and provided no guidance on the issue of UN governance o f 
the territory,312 13 it had, however, in effect come full circle. The judicial solution of 1950, of 
instituting a sui generis system of international accountability had proven ineffective, as 
vividly demonstrated by the introduction of apartheid into the territory. In its 1971 pro­
nouncement, the ICJ viewed international law as a function of the regulative ideas operating 
in a certain political and social environment, thereby reinforcing a pattern of judicial-political 
cooperation that had marked the early years of the Namibia dispute. Its criteria for the 
discharge of international justice were desert (entitlement) and need (being subjected to 
apartheid policy), and it interpreted rules of general international law through this functional 
prism.
(hi) T he United Nations Council for Namibia
After terminating the Mandate in 1966, the GA attempted to confront the problem of 
implementing the judgment of the ICJ. It established an eleven-member United Nations 
Council for South-West Africa,314 later renamed the UN Council for Namibia (UNCfN).315 As 
the executive arm of the Council, the Office of the UN Commissioner for Namibia was 
responsible for implementing the Council's decisions and engaged in research and 
information, education, training and welfare programmes316 as well as the administration of 
the UN Fund for Namibia.317 Interestingly, the Council’s functions were complemented by the 
nomination of a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) who was 
charged to “assist in achieving the aim of self-determination and independence and to study 
all questions relevant thereto".318 His functions were framed independently from those of the 
Council so to allow a separation between administrative tasks and diplomatic negotiation
312 The Development o f International Law through the Political Organs o f the United Nations (Oxford: 
OUP, 1963), at 270.
313 See Lissitzyn, ‘Advisory Opinion’, supra note 304, at 71. Rovine argued that the Court preferred to 
evade Soviet bloc political opposition to UN administration and the legal problems involved in 
assessing the effect of decisions made by the UNCfN or by any absent dejure  UN administration 
(‘Opinion, supra note 304, at 234).
314 A/RES/2248 (S-V). UN Doc. A/6657/Supp.1 (1967). The Council’s membership was successively 
increased to 18 On 1972), to 25 (in 1974), and to 31 (in 1978). See Nico J. Schrijver, The UN 
Council for Namibia vs. Urenco, UCN and the State of the Netherlands’, 1 LUL 25-47 (1988), at 
34.
315 A/RES/2372 (XXII), 12 June 1968, UN Doc. A/6716/Add.1 (1968), reproduced in 7 ILM 890 (1968). 
The General Assembly optimistically set June 1968 as the date by which Namibia should be inde­
pendent.
3,6 A/RES/2248, supra note 314, §3. A good overview of the UNCfN wide range of activities is 
provided by Junius, UN Council, supra note 226, at 132 ef seq. as well as by Roberto Barsotti, ‘In 
tema di amministrazione diretta di territori non autonomi da parte dell’ONU: II caso della Namibia’, 
16 Comunicazioni e Studi 53 (1980), at 63 et seq.
317 The Fund was based on the consideration that the UN incurred an obligation to assist Namibians 
in their struggle to gain independence, and to that end, to provide them with comprehensive 
assistance. See Eckart Klein, ‘Namibia’ in 3 EPIL (ed. by Bernhardt, 1997), at 489. Through 
A/RES/3112 (XXVIII), 12 December 1973, the UN Council for Namibia was appointed trustee of 
the UN Fund for Namibia (UN Doc. A/9030 (1973).
318 S/RES/319 (XXVII), 1 August 1972, §5 in accordance with which the SRSG was appointed on 24 
September 1972. See the Report o f the Secretary-General on the Implementation o f SCR 319 
(1972), 15 November 1972, UN Doc. S/10832, Annex II, in D.J. Djonovich, United Nations 
Resolutions, Vol. IX, 1972-1975 (New York 1990), 125. The ‘Commissioner for Namibia' was 
appointed by the UN GA. His functions and those of the Special Representative were later merged 
within the framework o f the settlement proposal approved by S/RES/431 (1978). Cf. Schrijver, 
‘Urenco’, supra note 314, at 33.
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with a view to exploring possible avenues to break the deadlock.
The establishment o f the Council o f Namibia was a late result of the operationalisation of the 
two principles on which the Mandate system was initially founded: the permanent right of self 
determination o f peoples and, second, the principle of non-annexation of the territories. To 
that effect, the Council was charged with the task of administering the territory until 
independence and the complementary legislative authority to “promulgate such laws, 
decrees and administrative regulation as are necessary for the administration of the Territory 
until a legislative assembly is established following elections conducted on the basis of 
universal adult suffrage”.319 The GA Resolution also directed the SC to “take all appropriate 
measures to enable the [UNCfN] to discharge the functions and responsibilities entrusted to 
it by the General Assembly".320 The novelty of the legal form chosen to operationalise those 
two principles in the case of Namibia can hardly be overstated:
Per la prima volta, I’ONU ha espresso la precisa volontà di amministrare un Territorio non 
autonomo in contrapposizione allo Stato amministratore, e per la prima volta l’Organizzazione 
dispone di strumenti giuridici idonei a consentirle l’esplicazione di poteri effettivamente anti- 
gonistici rispetto a quelli statali.321
As Goy convincingly argued with reference to South Africa’s illegal occupation and the 
Council's activities, Namibia had been subject to a ‘double dependency’ under two 
competing authorities: one exercising effective control within the territory, the other 
exercising control of 'external power1.322 32As a result, the Council was, from its inception, 
faced with the problem that it had to operate as a kind of government in exile. Reflecting 
upon its tenure, one of its more successful activities consisted in its quest to represent the 
territory on the international plane, hence seeking membership in various UN specialised 
agencies. Following a request to the SG to assist the Council to secure representation "on 
behalf o f the Namibian people" at discussions relating to major conferences and 
organisations324 the GA requested all UN specialised agencies and organisations “to grant 
full membership to the United Nations Council for Namibia so that it may participate in that 
capacity as the legal Administrative Authority for Namibia in the work of these agencies, 
organisations and conferences.”325 In a subsequent resolution, the GA declared that 
membership of the UNCfN in the specialised agencies and other organisations and bodies 
within the UN system “is an indispensable element in the fulfilment o f the responsibilities of
319 A/RES/2248 (S-V), supra note 314, pt. I!(b).
320 Ibid., pt. IV, §5.
321 Barsotti, ‘Amministrazione diretta’, supra note 316, at 132 (emphasis in the original).
322 Raymond Goy, ‘L’independence de la Namibie’, 37 AFDI387-405 (1991), 387-89.
323 See UN Council for Namibia, Excerpts from Report to General Assembly, 28 October 1971, §V(b) 
(Proposal for future action by the Council), UN Doc. A/8424, reproduced in 1 1 1LM (1972), 80. The 
Council also sought to be substituted for South Africa as a party to multilateral treaties, planned to 
draft interim taws and suggested to register, and levy taxes on, all persons and corporations doing 
business in Namibia. It was even prepared to establish a judicial body to review 'quasi-judicial 
decisions’ of administrative officials and tribunals in the territory.
324 Recommendations from the Report o f the UN Council for Namibia, UN Doc. A/9024, §27, 
reproduced in 13 ILM452 (1974).
325 A/RES/32/9E, 4 November 1977, UN Doc A/32/45 (1978). This resolution was preceded by a 
similarly worded resolution A/RES/31/149, 20 December 1976, requesting agencies “to consider 
favorably granting a waiver of the assessment of Namibia while it is represented by the United 
Nations Council for Namibia".
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the international community towards the people of Namibia".326
The hurdles on the way to representation of a non-state territorial entity on the international 
plane by the subsidiary organ of the GA, were however easy to detect: membership in such 
bodies is regularly accorded to ‘States’327, ‘countries’328 or ‘nations’.329 It seems evident from 
the international character of its functions and responsibilities that the UN Council operated 
on the international plane but it certainly did not possess the positive attributes of a ‘state’, 
‘country’ or ‘nation’. Could Namibia, because of its international status, be treated as an 
entity sui generis for purposes of admission to full membership o f international organisa­
tions?330 The ideas developed in the context of the ICJ's 1971 Advisory Opinion appeared to 
have been taken a step further in what can be termed a radically functionalist interpretation 
of membership criteria in international organisations. While the issue of permanent popula­
tion and defined territory did not present stumbling blocks to accession, the territory certainly 
had no government that exercised effective control over it.331 However, inter-state fora have 
not always adhered to the principle o f effective government when deciding on the 
representation o f members.332 Namibia, so the argument went, possessed an agent o f 
necessity that was authorised by the GA to assume certain governmental functions and the 
capacity to enter into relations with other states. Even though the Council lacked the admini­
326 A/RES/S-9/13, 3 May 1978, §24. A decade later, the GA would reiterate its request to all 
specialised agencies to grant full membership to Namibia, represented by the Council. See 
A/RES/42/14, 6 November 1987, C §10 et seq. The politically symbolic step of formally 
recognising SWAPO as the “authentic representative of the Namibian people' by A/RES/3112 
(supra note 317) will not be extensively discussed here. The acknowledgement and support of the 
GA did not confer upon SWAPO the status of the legal authority over the territory (cf. Malcolm N. 
Shaw, The International Status of National Liberation Movements’, 5:1 Liverpool L R 19-34 (1983), 
at 31 and 33). Whereas the GA formally requested that UN agencies grant the UN Council full 
membership status, the GA did not make a similar request for SWAPO. Nor did the GA establish a 
hierarchy between it and the UN Council for Namibia. Instead, A/RES/3295 (XXIX), 13 December 
1974, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974), requested that both the Council and SWAPO be allowed to 
participate in conferences where their rights and interests were involved. The Council and 
SWAPO were allowed to participate as separate entities in the proceedings of international 
organisations such as the ILO, the WHO, the FAO, and the UNESCO. See Ebere Osieke, 
‘Admission to Membership in International Organisations: The Case of Namibia', 51 BYIL 189-229 
(1980), examining the far-reaching implications for the law of international organisations in the 
light of the legal status of the UN Council for Namibia, at 196 note 1, as well as Sushma Soni, 
'Regimes for Namibia’s Independence: A Comparative Study1, 29 Columbia JTL 563-600 (1991), 
at 581-583.
327 Articles III and IV of the UN Charter; Articles III and IV of the Charter of the OAU; Article 1(2) of the 
Constitution of the ILO; Articles III, V and VI of the WHO Constitution; Article IV of the Statute of 
the Council of Europe; Article 11(2) of the UNESCO Constitution (but see also Article 11(3) which 
stipulates that ‘[tjem'tories...which are not responsible for the conduct of their international 
relations may be admitted as Associate Members..., upon application made on behalf of such 
territory...by the Member or other authority having responsibility for their international relations'); 
Article IV of the IAEA Statute; Article Xl{2) c) and d) of the IDA Articles of Agreement.
328 Cf. the Articles o f Agreement of the IMF (Article II (1 and 2)); of the IBRD (Article 11(1)); and of the 
IFC (Article IX(2) c) and d)).
329 Article 11(1) as well as Annex 1 of the FAO Constitution. For wider survey of the modafities of non- 
autonomous territories’ representation in international life see Robert Kovar, 'La participation des 
territoires non autonomes aux organisations intemationales’, 15 AFD I522-549 (1969).
330 For a general discussion see Osieke, ‘Membership’, supra note 326, at 189 et seq. and Ralph 
Zacklin, 'The Problem of Namibia in International Law1, 171 RCADf 233-340 (1981-11), at 313 et 
seq.
331 Apart, of course, from the illegal South African government. For an examination of the criteria and 
elements of statehood see James Crawford, The Criteria of Statehood in International Law1, 48 
BYIL 93-182 (1976-77) as well as his seminal Creation of States, supra note 35, at 31-76.
332 Cf. Higgins, Development o f international Law, supra note 312, at 166.
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strative structures and capacity of a state, UN organisations eventually admitted Namibia, re­
presented by the Council, into associated333 and even full membership,334 despite provisions 
under which non-independent territories could only be admitted only as Associate Members.
The legal fiction at work through which access to the international plane was secured by an 
international organ acting as a territorial government was perhaps best summarised by the 
ILO Subcommittee that was charged with evaluating the capacity of Namibia for member­
ship: "Until the present illegal occupation of Namibia is terminated, the United Nations 
Council for Namibia, established by the United Nations as the legal administering authority 
for Namibia empowered, inter alia, to represent it in international organisations, will be 
regarded as the Government o f Namibia for the purpose of the application of the Constitution 
of the Organisation."335
The legal fiction of recognising the Council in its two roles -  both as the legitimate govern­
ment of the territory and as the policy-implementing subsidiary organ of the G A -  continued 
to operate in the framework of the internal workings of UN organs until 1990.336 In addition, 
the Council was also permitted to participate in both the UN Conference on the Succession 
of States in Respect to Treaties (1977J337 and the Third UN Conference on the Law o f the 
Seas (UNCLOS III, 1973-1982) where its delegation was seated with state delegations and 
its written statements distributed by the Secretariat338 The ratification of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea by the Council339 represents a remarkable example of such 
representation that had been endorsed by the GA on a permanent basis.
Although the UN Council could not directly administer the territory, it did carry out some of
333 WHO; see Osieke, 'Membership', supra note 326, at 206-7.
334 FAO (14 November 1977) and ILO (23 June 1978). The President o f the UN Council for Namibia 
requested the admission of the territory as a member of UNESCO on 15 August 1978; UNESCO's 
Executive Board decided to recommend to the General Conference to admit Namibia (Cf.' 
UNESCO, Decisions Adopted by the Executive Board at its 10d * Session (Doc. 105 EX/ 
Decisions, Paris, 28 December 1978), item 9.3. Cf. also Osieke, 'Membership', supra note 326, at 
208 and 215 et seq. respectively as well as Zacklin, ‘Problem’, supra note 330 at 318. Full 
membership of Namibia (represented by the UNCfN) ensued in UNCTAD, UNIDO, ITU, IAEA and 
the Executive Committee of the UNHCR (Junius, UN Council, supra note 226, at 176).
335 International Labour Conference, 64th Session (1978), Provisional Record, No. 24, 19-20 (my 
italics), quoted by Ebere Osieke, Constitutional Law and Practice in the International Labour 
Organisation, (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancasten M. Nijhoff, 1985), at 24, as well as in his 'Member­
ship', supra note 326, at 214-215.
For the participation of the President of the Council for Namibia in the meetings of the Security 
Council see, e.g., SCOR (XXVII), 28 January 1972. The GA dissolved the UNCfN on 11 
September 1990 (A/RES/44/243A, UN Doc. A/44/PV.96) while it decided that the UN Fund for 
Namibia should continue to operate under the custody of the SG.
337 See Osieke, 'Membership', supra note 326, at 201 et seq.
338 Cf. ibid., at 205 as well as Schermers/Blokker, International Institutional Law, supra note 268, at 
§75. For details o f the participation of the UN Council for Namibia at the UN Water Conference 
(14-25 March 1977), World Conference for Action Against Apartheid (22 July-6 August 1977), the 
UN Conference on Desertification (29 August-9 September 1977) and the 7th Session of the UN 
Conference on the Standardisation of Geographical Names (17 August-7 September 1977), see 
Report o f the UN Council for Namibia, GAOR (XXXII), vol. 1, Suppl. No. 24 (A/32/24 (1977)), at 17 
and 20-21.
339 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 10 December 1982. The UN Council ratified the Convention as early as 
April 1983 to “protect Namibia’s rights over its extensive territorial sea and littoral, which are rich in 
marine resources" (Annual Report o f the UN Council for Namibia (1983), UN Doc. A/38/24 (1983), 
§581).
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the normal functions of an administrating authority. Through the UN Fund for Namibia, 
created in 1970 to finance its activities, the Council helped Namibian refugees, organised 
training programmes and established an emergency program of economic and technical 
assistance. In its representative and administrative functions, the Council also exercised its 
competence to issue travel and identity documents, as conceded by GA Resolution 2372 
(XXII).340 In a note verbale on 12 December 1968 addressed to the Permanent Representa­
tives of the UN Member States, the SG requested UN member states to accept as valid the 
travel and identity documents issued by the Council to Namibians abroad.341 The Council 
also opened liaison offices in various East African countries.342 Secondly, on the legislative 
plane, the adoption of the Decree No. 1 on the Natural Resources of Namibia by the UN 
Council on Namibia in September 1974 caused a novel situation in which the source of 
municipal and international normative space appeared to merge in one body.343
When the United Nations finally arrived in Namibia in 1989, the Resolution mandating 
UNTAG with the authority to supervise and control the process by which Namibia would elect 
its assembly, was already more a decade old.344 The protracted struggle for Namibia’s inde­
pendence showed however that the international system was prepared to apply novel rules 
to a unique situation in which no intervening sovereign claim stood between the collective 
entitlement to self-determination and international territorial administration.
R é s u m é : H e i g h t e n e d  International Authority ano the 'Peoples' as  a  N ew  A ctor
The first two chapters of this thesis aimed at drawing dialectical counter-images of the notion 
of ’suspension’ of sovereignty. The analysis gradually shifted from a static ownership-based 
view to one that conceives of a trustee as internally bound in the performance of trust -  
hence segregating this obligation from jura in rem -  and eventually to an appreciation of the 
revolutionary ICJ ruling of 1971 that gave effect to a functional understanding of the inherent 
properties and promises of fiduciary administration. In the wake of suspended sovereignty, 
we emphasised that th§ UN regime devised for Namibia resembled a more structured
340 “The Council shall continue with a sense of urgency its consultations on the question of issuing to 
Namibians travel documents enabling them to travel abroad" (A/RES/2372 (XXII), 12 June 1968, 
reproduced in 7 ILM  (1968), at 890).
341 UN Doc. A/AC.131/10 (1969) which also reproduces the replies of governments. Cf. also J.F. 
Engers, ‘The United Nations Travel and Identity Document for Namibians’, 65 AJIL 571-78 (1971), 
at 574 et seq. The recognition of travel documents issued by the Council was finalised in various 
exchanges of letters between the UN Commissioner for Namibia and government representatives. 
Cf. UN Council for Namibia, Agreements with African Counties for Issuing Travel and Identity 
Documents to Namibians (July 1970), reproduced in 9 ILM (1970), at 1218 et seq. See also 
Junius’ discussion of the issuance of travel documents as an instance of the dual capacity of the 
UNCfN in UN Council, supra note 226, at 194-199.
342 The establishment of these offices was authorised by the GA as a consequence of its adoption o f 
operative §7 of A/RES/2517 (XXIV), 1 December 1969, UN Doc. A/7798 (1969).
343 This specific instrument will be discussed below in Chapter IV.3.1, infra p.137, in the context of the 
functional duality o f international territorial administrations.
344 S/RES/435 (XXXII), 29 September 1978, 2087th meeting, UN Doc. S/RES/435 (1978). The position 
of UNTAG was, however, not derived from the competencies of the UN Council for Namibia (which 
would have been legally sound as it had already assumed the powers to administer the territory). 
Instead, the UN tacitly accepted the de facto effective control of South Africa. See Hufnagel, 
Friedensoperationen, supra note 104, at 60-61. For accounts of post-independence involvement 
of the UN see Roger Hearn, UN Peacekeeping in Action: The Namibian Experience (1999); 
Laurent C.W. Kaela, The Question of Namibia (London: MacMillan, 1996), and Lionel Cliffe, The 
Transition to Independence in Namibia (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 1994), at 115 ef seg.
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version of the League’s mandate system while also assigning ultimate responsibility for 
territories to the international community.
Following a temporal trajectory, we started our inquiry into the nature of non-state territorial 
entities under the control of a fiduciary administration by introducing the novel ideas under­
pinning the establishment of the Mandate System at Versailles. The political shocks that had 
reverberated through the international system following the catastrophe of WWI prompted 
not only changes in its 'operative system’ -  the creation of processes and structures -  but 
also included corresponding transitional changes in its normative sphere. As Angie 
observes, it was within the space created by the absence o f sovereignty that authorities 
could proceed to extend and refine the ‘civilising mission’ by means of a new science of 
administration.345 The institution of the Mandate, as discussed in the present chapter, did not 
confer ‘sovereignty of permanent rights’ in a patrimonial understanding, but consisted of a 
conditional grant of powers for the achievement o f a purpose -  not for the benefit of the 
grantee but for the benefit of a third party, a newly constituted actor, the ‘peoples’.
With Berman, we suggested that in such periods of turbulent transition international law 
reached beyond its basis and placed itself within a transitional paradigm in which the 
abstract dichotomy between sovereignty and self-determination appeared temporarily 
suspended and in which new sets of rules found their appropriate context. The hiatus in the 
application of general rules of international law and the introduction of novel rules -  inspired 
as they were by a fiduciary understanding of administration -  can thus be explained by the 
conversion of two entities, sub-state (the ‘peoples’) and supra-state (a global organisation) 
that lacked the intermediate level of state sovereignty to which classical rules had so far 
applied. This conversion will, in the course of the next chapter, be interpreted as the result o f 
a singular alliance between international legal modernism and nationalism.
What, exactly, had the UN representative, speaking in the context of the 1971 ICJ 
Pleadings, meant when he referred to Namibia as territory which had “for the past 50 years, 
possessed sui generis international status, not being under the sovereignty of any State, and 
having been placed under the overall authority and protection of the international community, 
represented since 1946 by the United Nations”?346 An attempt to answer this question leads 
us directly into the concept of subjectivity, and henceforth o f partial personality, in 
international law. The following two chapters thus introduce further criteria that complement 
the matrix according to which we capture the status of UN-administered non-state territorial 
entities in public international law. The firs t criterion (Chapter III) refers to the relationship of 
agency between an international administration and the people under its temporary tutelage. 
The second criterion (Chapter IV) concerns the relation between such an administration and 
its mother organisation which we term ‘organic1. This second criterion supplies a fundamen­
tal means to distinguish properly ‘internationalised’ territories from, firstly, other instances in 
which impenum is divorced from dominium (protectorates, neutralised zones and leases, as 
discussed in Chapter I) and, secondly, from  fiduciary arrangements under the Mandate- and 
Trusteeship systems where sovereign states, and not international organs, were bound by 
fiduciary obligations. The extent to which a territory is directly submitted to international law
345 Anghie, ‘Heart’, supra note 196, at 496.
346 Oral statement, ICJ Pleadings 1971, vol. II, at 35.
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will be introduced as a third criterion used to categorise the anomalies emerging from a 
divorce between sovereign title and temporary jurisdiction by an international organ. The 
notion of Vtilkerrechtsunmittelbarkeit means that a UN-administered territorial unit is, though 
not sovereign, exclusively subject, without the intervention of any other state entity, to inter­
national norms and those created by the international organ administering it  We apply this 
notion in Chapter IV as we analyse the normative content of legal pronouncements of the 
UN Council for Namibia which was formally in charge of administering the territory after 




Self -D etermination and the Legal Personality of 
Internationalised Territories
The first and second chapter of this thesis sought to account for the phenomenon of 
‘suspended sovereignty’. The first chapter supplied an in rem frame to explain the divorce 
between legal title to territory and jurisdiction over It while the previous chapter accounted for 
the suspension o f the application of general rules of international law and the introduction of 
novel rules that regulated the operation of the Mandate and Trusteeship systems. It applied 
McNair's and Berman’s conception of the transitionality of legal norms in which rules were 
grounded in a new ‘essential basis'. This chapter begins with a re-appraisal of the concept o f 
collective entitlement to realise what has earlier been described as the ‘permanent promise’ 
o f fiduciary administration -  that of internal and external self-determination. Administration by 
trust will thus be presented as a reaction to a general challenge to international law’s 
normative foundation. In more metaphorical terms, the content of this promise points to the 
eventual return of ‘the sovereign’ disguised in garments spun by the machinery of self- 
determination. Her return in the Gestalt of the ‘peoples’ -  an international actor newly 
constituted by the UN Charter -  not only ends the hiatus created by the de-sovereignising 
principle of trust. As a dynamic principle designed to end colonialism, it also had a pro­
foundly threatening impact on the configuration of nation states as such -  ill-prepared, as 
they remain, for an increasingly empowered tribalism that relies on the second, stable 
promise o f territorial sovereignty. The purpose of the following sections is to briefly examine 
those catalysts which appeared to have displaced notions of sovereignty and regulated their 
temporary substitution.
As we know, there has hardly been any progress in finding doctrinal consensus on the 
treatment, in public international law, of quasi-govemmental authority.347 This chapter offers 
key elements essential to determining the status of a non-state territorial entity in public 
international law. Building on the conclusions drawn from the discussion in the previous two 
chapters, we suggest here that with regard to territories under international tutelage, 
simplistic conceptions of the international legal system, in which a territory either was or was 
not under the complete sovereignty of a state, are disputable. In discussing whether non­
state territorial entities can acquire (derivative) international legal personality based on 
considerations of functional necessity, we will adopt a normative perspective on the concept 
o f internationalisation, and limit our research interest to an inquiry into the nature of entities 
administered by an internationally mandated organ. In order to methodologically complement 
our discussion of fiduciary administration, this chapter introduces an inseparable concept to 
capture the nature of the relationship between a non-state territorial entity and its 
administration: that of agency. What will eventually be of key interest is the question of how a 
theory of partial legal personality based on the concept of agency could provide a more 
refined normative framework within which UN-administered territories can be located.
347 For an account of arguments in favour of the (partial) legal personality of de facto regimes c l 
Michael Schoiswohl, Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognised De Facto Re­
gimes in international Law. The Case o f ‘Somaliland’: State Collapse, Secession, Non-Recogni­
tion and Human Rights, (Ph.D. on file with the University of Vienna, 2001), 174 et seq.
Introduction: International Law’s Agnosticism
Self-determination, operationalised by temporal fiduciary administration of peripheral terri­
tories, acquired a distinct significance as the concept’s penumbra of uncertainty came to be 
exploited. Indeed, as Bain argues, the passing of GA Resolution 1514 (XV)348 and its repu­
diation of any test of preparedness for independence dealt a fatal blow to the legitimacy of 
trusteeship: "The right of self-determination transformed trusteeship into nothing less than a 
crime against humanity.“349 Whereas membership in international society prior to decoloni­
sation admitted the conditional reasoning of trusteeship, post-colonial international society 
excluded considerations of a state’s ability and willingness to fu lfil the obligations of state­
hood; the “discourse of ‘fitness’ was therefore no longer intelligible in international life.”350
Issues of self-determination, Berman reminds us, arise in unusual temporal and spatial gaps 
in the international legal system. As a result o f a set of circumstances -  political, historical, 
ideological -  sovereignty is temporarily called into question and, with it, the functioning of the 
legal order as such.351 The right to self determination, formulated as a claim by a ’people’ to 
control its own destiny (albeit held in check and supervised until it met the criteria 
established by the Mandatory and Trustee powers) emerged out of two devastating wars 
when the international legal system was at its weakest. As a demand that confronted the 
positivist acceptance of sovereignty’s claim to representation, self-determination would be 
channelled through the two universal institutions that sought to reconstruct international 
society after the two world wars. These two collective systems were themselves vehicles to 
mediate between competing representation claims based on a rational-liberal vision of 
individuals united in states on the one hand, and group identity on the other.
The confrontation between normative bases o f law that contributed to the limited suspension 
of the normal operation of legal norms ultimately directs us back towards the complementari­
ty of self-determination and sovereignty. In this binary conception of international legal 
principles that portrays normativity as an interface for statist and dynamic principles, self- 
determination would, as a revolutionary concept bom out of an intrinsic belief in the value of 
overcoming mandatory tutelage, and based on the faith in the legitimacy of the international 
community’s culturally evaluative and transformative authority,352 eventually be utilised by a 
much wider class o f 'subjects’ than originally envisaged. In the hands of those vying for 
recognition, self-determination presented itself as a claim to redefine the 'se lf based on 
notions of popular sovereignty, “elevated to the obsessive and passionate preoccupation of 
rulers”.353 The revolutionary character of such an unrestrained notion of self-determination -  
in the guise of micronationalism that feeds on the tenets o f political philosophy underpinning 
the permanent promise of territorial sovereignty -  threatened to overload the self-identifying
348 infra, p. 370
349 *Bam, Anarchy, supra note 18, at 134.
350 Ibid., at 135. On the abandonment o f the criteria o f effectiveness in the decolonisation o f sub- 
Saharan Africa see particularly Gerard Kreijen, State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness 
(Leiden: M. N ijhoff, 2004), at 171 etseq.
351 Berman, ‘Abeyance’, supra note 218 at 58.3_i\<y
Nathaniel Berman, 'Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism? Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, and “Peace­
ful Change"’, 65 Nordic JIL 421-479 (1996) at 424.
Georges A.J. Scelle, ‘Obsession du territo ire', in Symbolae Verzijl (The Hague, 1958), at 361.
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capacity of the available social systems.354 Seeking to conceptualise the charismatic prin­
ciple of self-determination, international society was therefore confronted with an especially 
difficult problem.
True, emerging human rights norms provided moral resources for the de-legitimisation of 
colonialism, opened the valves for the proliferation of new sovereigns in the developing 
world, and contributed to the growth of international society since the end of the Cold War.355 
Yet not only did the nationalisation of self-determination place a "time bomb under the 
concept of empire as a legitimate political form",356 357secession would also tend to beget 
secession in a chaotic mitosis. The return of the sovereign narrative entailed a statist 
'obsession with territory’ on the part o f communities striving for independent statehood, 
against which Scelle opposed the need for a gradual trend towards integration into a 
universal federal society and the appearance of actual solidarity.358 As a direct consequence 
of the ’de-sovereignising’ operation of trust, and its underlying principle of self-determination 
in the normative sphere, the 'bodily* or proprietary conception of territory was reinforced in 
the hearts and minds of people relying on, and taking inspiration as well as determination 
from, this more permanent promesse étatique. While In extraordinary circumstances the 
complementarity o f law and sovereignty might be suspended, self-determination remained 
teleologically directed towards the reconstitution of the latter.
In turning the ideas of the West against the West,359 the application of the self-determination 
doctrine not only proved its potential to destabilise the international normative framework and 
operate in the gap of sovereignty. The doctrine also expected international legal institutions 
to determine the ‘se lf in order to locate and delimit the holder o f sovereign title, and 
secondly, to discharge functions of impartial arbitration between competing sovereigns. In 
the process, the international community’s legal competence to distinguish between 
'authentic' and 'specious' claims of self-determination was heightened as it was pushed to 
develop objective indicia to define the particular authentic units that would be entitled to 
process such an identification of the underlying ‘self. The international community has 
accorded a varying degree of political recognition to such claims, but has done so in a some­
what haphazard manner.360 The history of international arbitration between competing claims 
over territory and population, carved out in a succession of pronouncements beginning with 
the Aaland Islands dispute, via the Namibia case, the Western Sahara opinion and the East
354 Philip Allott, 'Self-Determination -  Absolute Right or Social Poetry1, in Modem Law o f Self-Determi­
nation (ed. by C. Tomuschat, M. Nijhoff, 1993), at 177. See also Ernst Gellner, Nations and 
Nationalism (Cornell University Press, 1983), at 2.
355 Christian Reus-Smit, 'Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty’, 27 Review o f 
International Studies 519 (2001), at 520.
356 Cf. James Mayall, '1789 and the Liberal Theory of International Society, 15 Review o f Internatio­
nal Studies 297-307 (1989)
357 Daniel Philpott, ‘Self-Determination in Practice’, in National Self-Detennination and Secession (ed. 
by M. Moore, OUP, 1998), at 91.
358 Scelle, ‘Obsession’, supra note 353, at 357-358.
359 Hedley Bull, ‘The Revolt Against the W est’, in The Expansion o f International Society (ed. by H. 
Bull and A. W atson, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), at 222.
360 Gerry J. Simpson, ‘The Diffusion o f Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age’, 32 
Stanford JIL 255 (1996), at 259. See also the instructive study o f ‘recognition contests’ and the 
credentials controversies by Brad R. Roth, Government Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1999), in chapters 7, 8, and 9.
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Timor dictum, gives a vivid account of the heightened role of international authority that 
attempts to determine the extent of rights of territorial entities to attain legal status. A  re­
conceptualisation of self-determination is therefore closely intertwined with the ascendance 
of international law that is called upon to mediate proprietary disputes over ownership o f the 
'se lf.361
These observations emphasise that post-colonial public international law left the dichotomy 
of territorial integrity and self-determination intentionally unresolved. Indeed, not only was the 
dichotomy left unresolved, it was also wrapped in a tautology, making the realisation o f the 
entitlement as inaccessible as possible. Since the definition of 'peoples’ was not fixed inde­
pendently of the entitlement to self-determination, a community is certifiable as ‘people’ only 
once it is ascertained to possess this entitlement.362 For Berman, this tautology represents 
the result of a rupture created by the conceptual confrontation of complementary ideas -  "the 
positive and normative elements of legal authority, the subjective and objective components 
of national identity".363 International law, therefore, appears agnostic, and rather than taking 
sides, it must be concerned with the restoration of normative harmony and regulating and 
mitigating “in a humanitarian fashion the effects of postmodern tribal secessionnism" that 
attempts to create political identity out of an ethnic affiliation.364
It is this dichotomy that will implicitly underpin the remaining discussion of the thesis. The 
following exposé investigates the normative underpinning through which international law 
addresses the 'se lf o f a particular entity, elevating it to a partial subject of international law. 
The case study on Kosovo, presented in Chapter V, illustrates on the other hand how 
international legal institutions are reluctant to properly adjudicate claims that contest the 
normative space between sovereignty and self-determination. In the same chapter, the 
thesis w ill also critically assess the new approach of 'earned sovereignty' and argues that it 
fails to mediate this ever-present dichotomy. Focusing on an ‘open-ended institution-building 
mandate, Chapter VI then demonstrates that international authority is liable to undergo a 
process of de-legitimisation as it declines to determine the ‘future status' of an internatio­
nalised territory.
361 Simpson, ‘Diffusion*, supra note 360, at 261. Cf. also Berman’s interpretation o f the ICJ’s adjudica­
tory role in weighing the two cardinal principles o f GA Resolution 1514 -  self determination and 
territorial integrity -  in the Western Sahara opinion (‘Abeyance’, supra note 218, at 99-104).
362 Cf. Roth, Government illegitimacy, supra note 360, at 201.
353 ‘Abeyance’, supra note 218, at 104.
364 Thomas M. Franck, ‘Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession’, in Peoples and Minorities 
in International Law  (ed. by C. BrSImann, R. Lefeber, and M. Zieck, 1993), at 12. For an analysis 
of the polarity o f territorial integrity and the right o f secession see David B Knight, ‘Territory and 
People or People and Territory? Thoughts on Postcolonial Self-Determination’, 6 International 
Political Science Review 258-272 (1985). The ambiguity permeating international law’s treatment 
of self-determ ination with respect to secessionist claims is also well discussed by Michael Eisner, 
‘A Procedural Model for the Resolution o f Secessionist Disputes’ , 33:2 Harvard ILJ 407-426 
(1992).
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3.1 SUBJECTIVITY AS ENTITLEMENT
The discussion presented in this chapter proceeds in three stages. The following section will 
account for the dynamic principle of self-determination, how it relates to the establishment o f 
an objective international regime such as an international administration, and how it provided 
subjectivity to the ‘peoples' concerned. This first approach is inductive in the sense that it 
seeks to infer a certain legal status from a set of abstract collective entitlements provided by 
the international legal community. In his study on Mandates, Wright concluded:
W hile ordinarily rights under international law vest only in states, it appears that the mandated 
peoples have a status, withdrawing them from the sovereignty o f any state and giving them the 
opportunity to invoke the direct protection of the League, which makes it not inappropriate to  
speak o f them as enjoying rights under international law correlative to the duties imposed by 
the mandates upon the mandatories for their benefit.365
The exposé will follow Wright and others who argued that the Mandate system not only 
undermined static notions of sovereignty, but had further consequences for the concept of 
‘personality1 in international law. Hence, the main thrust of the following section consists in 
the argument that the claim to partial legal personality in international law by non-state 
territories under fiduciary administration is, since Versailles, becoming increasingly plausible. 
Indeed, we suggest that an overwhelming trend points to ever more differentiated categories 
of legal participants being recognised as ‘subjects’ or given some other form of effective 
label or standing under international law,366 367The second section is devoted to the concept of 
agency and interrogates the function of an international agent representing those rights on 
the international plane. There, the argument will be that a territory administered by the 
United Nations can, for the period of its administration, base its aspirations towards repre­
sentation on the international plane on a legal argument Building on these two argu­
mentative stages, we conclude by striking a synthesis between international entitlement and 
international representation. We do so by outlining, in fact deriving, a functionally limited 
legal capacity o f territories under international administration from the performative practice 
of its international agent, as implicitly recognised by other persons of international law. While 
a fully fledged person of international law traditionally enjoys full legal capacity to take part in 
international life, a person with such limited capacity “ont, de par leur but limité, descompe-
m3£7fences restreintes.
3.1.1 The Dynamic Principle of Self-Determination
The first part of this discussion represents a constitutive element in our overall argument that 
seeks to construct partial legal personality from the notion of international entitlement. W e 
submit that the discourse on collective rights, as abstractly formulated as they had initially 
been with regard to the principle of self-determination, is directly relevant to the discussion of 
aspects of internal as well as external self-determination of internationalised territories.
365 Mandates, supra note 27, at 457.
366 Henry J. Richardson, ‘Constitutive Questions in the Negotiations fo r Namibian Independence’ , 78 
AJIL 76-120 (1984), at 117.
367 P. Cahier, Etudes des accords de siège entre les organisations internationales et les Etats où 
elles résident (1959), at 42.
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Ever since its formulation in 1919, the right of national self-determination has historically had 
two main zones of application: the first accorded independence to nations in Central and 
Eastern Europe which had previously been contained within dynastic empires but whose 
aspirations to statehood had been fuelled by nineteenth century romantic nationalism. In its 
second sphere of application it helped to accelerate the independence of the former colonies 
of the European empires at the periphery of the international system in the wave of ‘anti- 
imperialist struggles’ in the decades following WWII. In this period, the principle’s range had 
been tailored back to a particular historic context and applied so as to allow the inhabitants 
of form er colonies to take over pre-existing political units as independent states in accor­
dance with uti possidetis iuris.
The formulation of the principle in the international normative sphere in this second zone of 
application lacked normative content as it was offset by the continued operation o f the 
principle of sovereign equality and its specific formulation o f a correlative duty to respect 
existing states’ territorial integrity. The continuous pronouncement by the GA of the ‘legal 
standard’ of self-determination acquired, however, enormous symbolic importance as it 
concretised a new political conception, the repudiation of colonialism. Most o f the time, as 
Franck writes, this accommodation between territorial integrity/utf possidetis and self- 
determination worked reasonably well. Both notions were doctrinally synthesised and con­
structed as aspects of the same right: peoples entitled to self-determination were defined as 
inhabitants of a colony and the realisation o f their entitlement was to occur within the colonial 
boundaries, which would remain sacrosanct, unless the people within those boundaries 
freely elected to change them by integrating with another state.368
Attempting to implicitly limit its function to the context o f decolonisation, the ICJ referred to 
the “principle of self-determination as a right of peoples, and its application for the purpose 
of bringing all colonial situations to a speedy end".369 According to Resolution 1514,370 a 
substantive right would accrue to groups which had been subject to a particular historical 
form o f subjugation, hence constituting them as potential subjects of international law that 
would obtain access to the international plane to assert their claims. This doctrinal 
consensus operated as a brake to contain the spread of rights within its immediate historic 
context until the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights incorporated the 
right to self-determination in its very first article.371 In effect, the ICCPR established a perma­
nent link between self-determination as an abstract ‘principle’ that fuelled the process of 
breaking the link between overseas colony and metropolitan power, and self-determination 
as a collective human right. Self-determination henceforth encompassed a continuously 
exercisable right of 'peoples' to partake in the internal decision-making process of a political
368 Franck, ‘Postmodern Tribalism’, supra note 364, at 9.
369 W estern Sahara opinion, ICJ Reports [1975] 12, at 31 (emphasis added).
370 Declaration o f the Granting o f Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, A/RES/1514 (XV), 
14 December 1960.
371 Cf. also the (identical) Article 1 o f the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights which declares, inter alia that “[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination. By 
virtue o f that right they freely determine their political status," while state parties to the instruments 
“shall promote the realisation o f the right to self-determination and shall respect the right in 
conform ity with the provisions o f the Charter...".
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entity.372
The discursive connection between ethical un¡versalism and legitimate statehood was 
solidified by appeals to emergent human rights norms de-legitimising the institution of 
colonialism. As Reus-Smit argues, this discursive texture provided the moral foundation for 
the norm of self-determination that licensed the proliferation of new sovereigns.373 By 
building on the achievements of the two Covenants, Principle VIII o f the 1975 CSCE Helsinki 
Declaration attested to what has been termed a ‘new oscillationism'374 by primarily 
expanding the right’s internal dimension (sometimes understood as autonomy, or self- 
government) and widening its normative scope to the whole ‘people’ of every single signatory 
state.375 While a close analysis of the instalments developed in the 1960s and 1970s 
showed that no right of self-determination accrued under international law to peoples o f 
sovereign states or minority groups living in sovereign states,376 the ambiguity in the 
deployment of international entitlements is particularly obvious in the case of the saving 
clause of the 1970 Declaration on Principles Concerning Friendly Relations. It states that 
nothing in the section on self-determination shall be construed as authorising or encouraging 
the dismembering or impairing of the territorial integrity of states conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle o f self-determination and thus possessed by a "government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, 
or colour."377 378
In effect, the formulation had initially meant that a state possessing a representative 
government that grants equal access to political institutions and decision making processes 
to the entire population within its territory is presumed to satisfy the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination as regards those peoples.376 Reversing this proposition implied that 
states that do not so conduct themselves are not protected by the principle of territorial 
integrity.379 The questions whether (i) that would justify recourse to self-determination on the 
part of the peoples who are not, or who claim not to be, represented in and by their 
government, and (ii) when, under the terms of the Declaration, this right would encompass 
the right to impair the territorial integrity and political unity of the state, would continue to 
puzzle international lawyers to an extent that it has been said that “the defining issue in 
international law for the 21st century is finding compromises between the principles of self-
372 Cassese, Self-Determination, supra note 222, at 54.
373 ‘Social Construction’, supra note 355, at 520.
374 Berman, ‘Oscillationism’, supra note 186, see especially 486.
375 In general see Thomas Buergenthal (ed.). Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki 
Accord (ASIL, 1977), 203 etseq.
376 See Daiilier/Pellet, Droit International Public, supra note 34, at §342; James Crawford, ‘State 
Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession', 69 BYIL (1998), 85-117; Donald L. 
Horowitz, ‘A Right to Secede?', in Secession and Self-Determination 50 (ed. by S. Macedo and A. 
Buchanan, New York: NYU Press, 2003), a t 59 etseq.
377 A/RES/2625 (XXV). supra note 248.
378 Cf. the US proposal to be included in the 1970 Declaration, found in UN Doc. A/AC.125/L.75 (15 
September 1969). See also Robert Rosenstock, ‘The Declaration on Friendly Relations’, 65 AJIL 
713 (1971), 730 etseq .
379 Malcolm N. Shaw, ’Peoples, Tem'torialism and Boundaries’, 8 EJIL 475 (1997), at 483.
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determination and the sanctity of borders“.380
Again, we can observe the degree to which agnostic international law veers between the 
adoption o f self-determination and its political concept o f nationality as allies in the 
emancipatory struggle for freedom, and their rejection that posits its irrationality against the 
rationality of sovereignty or human rights. In his study of self-determination, Koskenniemi 
argues that the concept both buttresses the state by acknowledging that peoples have the 
right to freely determine their political status without external interference, while on the other 
hand, it challenges the formal structures of statehood. Describing these two facets o f self- 
determination as ‘Hobbesean’ and ‘Rousseauesque’, he concludes that
statehood per se embodies no particular virtue and...even as it is useful as a presumption 
about the authority of a particular territorial rule, that presumption may be overruled or its 
consequences modified in favour o f a group or unit finding itse lf excluded from those positions 
o f authority in which the substance o f the rule is determined.381
As different groups began to utilise the evolving semantics of self-determination, the 
organised international community struggled to develop prescriptions to deal with these 
growing demands while expanding the range of groups to which the principle o f self- 
determination applied.382 With equal consistency, other groups opposed the extension of the 
principle’s applicability, seeking to lim it it to situations least threatening to the status quo and 
relying on Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which reserves to the states matters essentially 
within their domestic jurisdiction. As Cassese demonstrated with great insight, the political 
will o f UN Member States, which had coalesced in the form of GA resolutions, triggered a 
development in which opinio juris  and a gradual adoption, by these states, of attitudes 
consistent with the legal standards pronounced in these resolutions as well as in treaty law 
(usus) converged to produce a customary rule on the matter.383 The emerging legal position 
was probably best summarised in 1971 by the ICJ, again in its Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 
where the Court held that “(t]he subsequent development in international law ir> regard to 
non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter..., made the principle of self- 
determination applicable to all o f them".384 This position was rendered slightly more judicially
300 Lone M. Graham, 'Self-Determination for Indigenous People After Kosovo: Translating Self- 
Determination “Into Practice’  and “Into Peace"’, 6 ILSA Journal of iCL 455 (2000), at 465.
Martti Koskenniemi, 'National Self-Determination Today: Problems o f Legal Theory and Practice', 
4 3 ICLQ 241-269 (1994), 243-44.
382 For an impressive exploration o f the im plicit and explicit restraints on secession see, inter alia, 
Viva O. Bartkus, The Dynamic o f Secession (64 Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 
CUP, 1999). For a somewhat provocative argument in favour o f a right to secessions see 
Anonymous Note, ‘The Logic of Secession’, 89:4 Yale LJ 802-824 (1980).
383 Cassese, Self-Determination, supra note 222, 69-70, 120 and 126 etseq., with relevant literature. 
The ICJ held in the East Timor case that self-determination was "one o f the essential principles o f 
contemporary international law" (ICJ Reports 1995, supra note 57, at 102). See also Christian 
Tomuschat, ’Staatsvolk ohne Staat’, in Staat und Volkenechtsordnung. Festschrift fur Karl 
Doehring (ed. by K. Hailbronner, G. Ress, and T. Stein, 1989), at 996-997. Though suggesting 
that the right “is not yet one which can be characterised as based on customary international law", 
Higgins found it academic “to argue that as Assembly resolutions are not binding nothing has 
changed, and that ‘self-determination’ remains a mere ‘principle’ and Article 2(7) is an effective 
defense against its implementation. To insist upon this interpretation is to fail to give any weight 
either to the doctrine o f bona tides or to the practice o f states as revealed by unanimous and 
consistent behaviour" (Development, supra note 312, at 101-102).
384 ICJ Reports 1971, supra note 56, a t 31.
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palpable by the ICJ’s opinion in Western Sahara that the quintessence of self-determination 
would include the “need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples* each time the 
fate of people was at issue.385
(i) Norms of Self-Determination as a Latent International Entitlement
Without intending to enter into the debate of whether the right to self-determination has 
developed into a peremptory norm of international law,386 it is at this stage difficult to 
question its status as a collective 'right' in international law.387 The view according to which 
peoples are holders of proper legal rights is not only based on a close reading of Article 1 of 
the ICCPR. It is also informed by ambitions that have guided member states when they 
sought to upgrade the position of 'peoples' to the status of participants in at least some 
international dealings, within the context of an international treaty. As Cassese explains, it 
would be contradictory to refer to a ‘right’ of peoples and then “actually to mean that what is 
granted is not a legal entitlement proper but simply an indirect benefit accruing to peoples 
because of the interplay of rights and obligations between Contracting States".388
A number of developments clearly stand out that are pivotal in analysing a non-state 
territory’s emergent subjectivity. An abstract basis had been laid with the 1970 Declaration of 
the GA concerning Friendly Relations. In it, the GA seemed to follow this initial inductive 
approach. From the existence of certain rights and obligations, the GA inferred that these 
territories possessed a status distinct from the territory of the administering State. This 
distinct status “shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Goveming Territory have 
exercised their right to self-determination".389 In the latest stage of the conceptual evolution 
of subjectivity -  according to Article 1 of the 1966 Covenants, as well as Principle V ili of the 
1976 Helsinki Decalogue -  ‘people’ became holders of international rights with 
corresponding obligations upon the contracting states vis-à-vis both 'peoples' and the 
international community which presumably share a common interest in attainment of the 
entitlement to self-determination.
For the purposes of our inquiry, we can, in any case, detect the emergence of an abstract
385 ICJ Reports 1975, at 33.
386 Cf. the notable definition provided in Art. 53 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1155 
UNTS 331, reproduced in 8 ILM, 698 (1967)). In favour o f the right to self-determination as a jus  
cogens: Hector Gros Espiell, 'Self-Determination and Jus Cogens’, in UN Law/Fundamenta! 
Rights: Two Topics in international Law (ed. by A. Cassese, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979), at 167- 
173; Cassese, Self-Determination, supra note 222, at 140; Brownlie, Principles, 3rd ed., supra note 
45, at 515; Jochen A. Frowein, 'Self-Determination as a Limit to Obligations under International 
Law', in Modem Law of Self-Determination, supra note 354, at 218-221. Contra its status as 
peremptory norm: Crawford, Creation o f States, supra note 35, a t 80-82 and Pomerance, Self- 
Determination, supra note 167, at 70-72.
387 Cf. Higgins, Development, supra note 312, 90-106. In the following paragraphs we ought to keep 
in mind, however, that these 'rights’ or ‘entitlements', be they derived from treaty sources or 
customary law, are located in a normative environment which does not assist its holders in 
effectively enforcing them. As for treaty law, the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its 
Optional Protocol do not provide a machinery for remedial measures where these rights are 
breached as these instruments do not confer on 'peoples’, or their representatives, the right to 
submit ‘communications’ on alleged violations. Neither do customary rules provide a 'right' to take 
remedial action in cases of gross breach of the right to self-determination. See Cassese, Self- 
Determination, supra note 222, at 142-145 for treaty law; at 150-155 and 197-8 for customary law.
388 Cassese, Self-Determination, supra note 222, at 143-144.
389 A/RES/2625 (XXV), supra note 248.
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set of entitlements that would not only apply to colonial 'peoples’ or 'peoples’ under foreign 
military occupation. They could also be applied to internationalised territories -  administered 
in a fiduciary fashion -  whose interests and entitlements, limited as they might be, are 
represented by an international territorial administration. A legal process that begun with the 
Mandate system and was carried over to the UN Trusteeship system has worked towards 
temporarily dislodging sovereignty at the periphery of the international system while groun­
ding itself in a new basis, that of ‘sacred trust’. Along the axis of this development, inter­
national law became more and more confronted by arguments that heightened the latent 
tensions between its three cardinal principles: sovereign equality of the metropolitan core, 
national self-determination at the periphery, and the West’s 'civilising mission’ through which 
values and beliefs would be transmitted from the metropolitan core to the periphery.390 As a 
first result, we suggest that this evolution was compounded by the gradual constitution of a 
peoples’ subjectivity through the emergence of a legal right to self-determination.
3.1.2 Other Sources of Entitlement: The Inductive Approach to Personality
Norms of self-determination vested non-self-goveming territories with an increasingly rich 
normative texture. Our focus on an entity’s entitlement is the starting point for an inductive 
approach that suggests that an entity is a legal subject to the extent that rules o f the 
international legal system refer to it.391 This section argues that we may construct legal 
personality firstly on the basis of certain rights (and duties) that were expressly conferred 
upon such an entity. Rather than attaching certain rights to the concept of legal personality, 
we suggest that the argument should proceed from entitlement to capacity.392 The reverse 
argument, namely that rights and duties can only be conferred upon an entity capable of 
bearing rights and duties, insinuates that legal capacity constitutes a prerequisite for the 
attribution of such subjectivity. This (mistaken) view, based on a fallacious transposition of 
von Gierke’s essentially municipal concept of Persönlichkeit kraft Daseins (emergence of 
natural personality through mere existence)393 to the international plane reifies the social and 
legal existence of the state. It confuses the ontological existence -  the social reality, within 
which an ‘entity’ can be located -  with the consequences that a legal order attaches (or 
chooses not to attach) to it. Personality as normative concept does not flow from factual
390 For a brilliant discussion of the interbellum’s modernist alliance between international legitimacy 
and nationalist malleability, see Berman, ‘Beyond Colonialism’, supra note 352,421-479.
391 Cf. Carty, Decay, supra note 43, at 57.
392 The inductive approach pursued here fundamentally differs from the ‘objective’ and arguably 
circular reasoning employed by the ICJ in the Reparation opinion in which it located international 
personality in the existence o f ‘objective’ characteristics fulfilled by the UN. There, the ICJ took 
recourse to the concept of international legal personality in order to derive from it the right o f 
presenting an international claim. Taking into account certain objective characteristics (such as 
the existence o f organs), the Court concluded that international personality “can only be explained 
on the basis o f the possession o f a large measure o f international personality and the capacity to 
operate on the international plane...what it does mean is that it is  a subject of international law 
and capable o f possessing international rights and duties* (ICJ Reports 1949, supra note 120, at 
179). For three thorough reviews of inductive, formal, and material approaches to international 
personality, cf. Manuel Rama-Montaldo, ‘ International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of 
International Organizations’, 44 BYIL 111-155 (1970), at 112 et seq.; A.S. Muller, International 
Organizations and their Host State (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 1995), at 69 et seq. as well as 
Christian N. Okeke, The Expansion o f New Subjects o f Contemporary International Law through 
their Treaty-Making Capacity (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1973), at 183-185.
393 Otto von Gierke, Deutsches Privatrecht I, Ailgemeiner Teil und Personenrecht (Munich/Leipzig: 
Duncker&Humblot, 1895), at 488. *
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existence.394 It is the law which is the foundation of legal personality for it determines the 
scope and nature o f personality.395 Within the positivist paradigm, a person of law is there­
fore identical with the scope of obligations and subjective rights that it bears:
Die Person als Träger” von Rechtspflichten und subjektiven Rechten ist nicht etwas von den 
Rechtspflichten und subjektiven Rechten Verschiedenes... Die physische oder juristische Per­
son, die RechtspfHchten und subjektive Rechte -  als deren Träger -  .hat“, ist diese Rechts­
pflichten und subjektiven Rechte, is t ein Komplex von Rechtspflichten und subjektiven 
Rechten, deren Einheit im Begriff der Person figürlich zum Ausdruck kommt. Die Person ist 
nur die Personifikation dieser Einheit.396
On the international plane, the legal order chooses to formally attribute rights and obligations 
to -  by definition, derivative -  subjects o f international law.397 Becoming a subject of inter­
national law is the direct attribution of rights and obligations to an entity, and hence its 
implicit recognition as a subject of that order. The positivist definition adopted here indeed 
assumes that some specific rule is required ’permitting’ an entity to be a 'subject’ of inter­
national law, and it does so as a matter of discretion.398 In an international legal order which 
recognises a right to, for instance, self-determination of a specific peoples, the latter can be 
seen as subjects of international law to precisely that degree. To the extent to which 
minorities possess rights deriving directly from international law, they are certainly ‘subjects’ 
of that legal order,399 Whether they are capable of exercising international rights and duties
334 This problematic argument is also employed by Okeke, suggesting that “the substantial element of 
personality itse lf...is  not vested in them by international law but by the facts of international life  
itself. In this sense, personality itself is not totally a legal concept as such but also a sociological 
notion from which legal consequences ensue" (New Subjects, supra note 392, at 18-19).
395 Shaw, international Law, 4m ed. 1997, supra note 67, at 137. In his General Course, Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy refers to norms o f lex specialis that confer legal 'capabilities’ upon subjects o f international 
law other then states. See his L'unité de l'ordre juridique international. Cours général de droit 
international public (2000) (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 2003), at 114.
396 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, supra note 26, at 177. For an appreciation o f ‘legal fäcts* -  facts to 
which the law attaches certain consequences (duties and rights) -  cf. also his ‘The Principle of 
Sovereign Equality o f States as a Basis fo r International Organization', 53 Yale LJ 207-220 (1943- 
1944), at 218.
397 Cf. Georg Jellinek, System der subjektiven Öffentlichen Rechte (reprint o f 2nd ed., Aalen: Scientia 
Verlag, 1964), at 28: .Persönlichkeit...gehört nicht der Welt der Dinge an, ist überhaupt kein Sein, 
sondern ist eine Relation von einem Subjekt zum anderen und zur Rechtsordnung. Sie ist stets 
vom Rechte verliehen, nicht von Natur aus gegeben.“ The protracted and somewhat tedious 
dispute as to whether 'objective facts’, or recognition itself, constitute the relevant criteria of the 
‘original’ legal personality of states shall not be entered into here.
398 This account follows Kelsen’s formulation o f the concept o f ‘personality’ as a Zurechnungssubjekt. 
As presented in his Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (1911), personification takes place 
through attribution. The concept for Kelsen is therefore purely normative and not contingent upon 
any other elements from the realm of Sein: “Allein man verschließe sich nicht der Erkenntnis, daß 
auch der Mensch erst durch die Zurechnung zur Person wird, und daß auch hier nur durch die Zu­
rechnung eine Summe von natürlichen, physikalischen, chemischen und psychischen Prozessen 
personifiziert, d.h. zu einer normativen Einheit erhoben wird" (at 83). For a rejection o f the 
positivist subject-object dichotomy cf. Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Processes. International 
Law and How We Use It (Oxford: OUP, 1994), at 49.
399 M.C. van Walt van Praag, ‘The Position o f UNPO in the International Legal Order1, in Peoples and 
Minorities in International Law (ed. by C. Brölmann, R. Lefeber, and M. Zieck, M. Nijhoff, 1993), at 
317. By ‘directly addressed' we wish to indicate a situation in which a ‘minority’ is addressed by 
norms of international taw without the necessary intermediate transformation into municipal law by 
the state. The system for the protection o f minorities set up after W W t, as part o f the Peace 
Treaties of Versailles, would not fulfil these criteria. The protection system was supervised by the 
League, yet the provisions containing the most far-reaching measures for minorities were 
constructed as obligations of the state. Sim ilarly, Article 27 of the ICCPR does not directly address
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is an entirely different question which will be tackled below.
(i) T he Free City or Danzig, the Westbank/Gaza, and Kosovo
In this formalist understanding of subjectivity, the quality of being a subject o f international 
law can be attributed to any composite entity, in vacuo, hence relating it to other subjects, as 
well as to the very legal order that identified its subjectivity and defined its characteristics.400 
In the first stage of constructing legal personality we thus follow Anzilotti and the ‘constitutive’ 
role o f international law.401 Liberation movements representing peoples oppressed by a 
colonial power, or a foreign occupier, or a racist regime have been elevated to the status of 
subjects of international law because they have been addressed as such.402 This conferral 
can also occur through the internal constitutional order of a sovereign state without relying 
on the context of self-determination.403A  limited parcel of subjectivity can be devolved to sub­
state entities for the fulfilment of a specific purpose in a way sim ilar to which the constituent 
units o f a federal state can be vested with a measure o f international legal personality.404
Consider three instances that illuminate our understanding of subjectivity in international law. 
In the first case, subjectivity was constituted by international treaty law. In the second, 
subjectivity flows from the ‘principle’ of self-determination, as recognised by treaty law. In the 
third instance, a territory was vested with an ‘entitlement’ through a UN Security Council 
Resolution.
The creation of the Free City of Danzig by international treaty law was, to the extent that it 
was vested with a particular measure o f autonomy, a subject of international law placed 
under the protection of the League of Nations.405 Its capacity to possess competencies was 
derived from the same normative source from which its subjectivity flowed. In what we 
believe to support our overall argument, the PCIJ even recognised the City’s international
m inorities. The obligations incurred by the contracting parties are obligations of states; they are 
the addressees of the international treaty and its provisions leave a margin of discretion to the 
state concerning the implementation of the respective obligation. For a flawed argumentative 
basis in the tradition o f von Gierke that tries to construct legal personality from Dasein -  in this 
case, deriving personality from the occurrence o f ethnic criteria shared by a certain community -  
see Anna Meijknecht, Towards International Personality: The Position o f Minorities and 
Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2001), 25 et seq.
400 Contra Verzijl, International Law, vol. II, supra note 37, at 4.
401 D ionisio Anzilotti, Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts (vol. I., 1929), at 119.
402 Cf. Shaw, ‘Movements’, supra note 326, particularly his discussion o f the modes through which 
national liberation movements were recognised as “authentic representatives o f the true 
aspirations o f the peoples", at 22 et seq. See also Cassese, Self-Determination, supra note 222, 
at 166-167, with literature.
403 See, for instance, Yongping Ge, Völkerrechtssubjektivität und Vertragabschlußkompetenz von 
Hongkong’, 41 Archiv des Völkerrechts 220-243 (2003) as well as Roda Mushkat, 'Hong Kong a$ 
an International Legal Person’, 6 Emory IL R 105 (1992).
404 C f., i.e., the position o f Greenland under the Greenland Home Rule Act, which defines it as a 
“distinct community within the Kingdom o f Denmark" (quoted by Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, Claims 
to Statehood in International Law  (1994), at 191). Under the Act, treaties that affect Greenland's 
interests are required to be referred to home rule authorities before they are concluded by 
Denmark.
405 Articles 100-108 of the Treaty o f Versailles. For a discussion cf. Verzijl, International Law, vol. II, 
supra note 37, at 510-545, and Malcolm M. Lewis, 'The Free City o f Danzig', 5 BYIL 89-102 
(1924), at 101 (concluding that ‘it seems impossible to deny her some intematicnal status in view 
of her relations to the League’).
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personality which it linked to the City's legal capacity to act on the international plane.406
In a second case, the subjectivity o f the West Bank and the Gaza strip derives from 
international treaty law.407 The concretisation of an initial entitlement to self-determination408 
represented the first step in a succession of related arrangements that vested an entity with 
an entitlement that was to be telescoped into a partial personality of international law.409 
While the next argumentative step in the construction of partial legal personality -  
representation -  will only be discussed further below, it is at this stage appropriate to point 
out that the 1997 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, in listing the powers and responsi­
bilities of the Palestinian Council, specified the capacity to conclude contracts while allowing 
the PLO to conduct negotiations and sign agreements with states and international organisa­
tions “for the benefit of the Council" in a number of defined spheres.410 The retention of 
residual powers by Israel, comprising all competencies not transferred to the Council,411 
limits the legal personality of the Palestinian entity in accordance with the general argumen­
tative structure presented later in this chapter.412
406 In the Advisory Opinion on the Treatment o f Polish Nationals and other Persons of Polish Origin or 
Speech in the Danzig Territory ((Ser. A/B), No. 44 (1932)), the PCIJ approached the constitution 
of the Free City in search of an entity qua holder of sovereignty. It held that in respect to Poland, 
the Danzig Constitution “is and remains the constitution of a foreign State", thus being a matter “o f 
domestic concern" to Danzig. Referring to the "ordinary rules governing relations between States’ , 
“[t]he general principles of international law apply to Danzig subject, however, to the treaty 
provisions binding upon the Free City" (at 23-25 and 31). Cf. also the earlier case concerning the 
Free City o f Danzig and the International Labour Organisation (PCIJ (Ser. B), No. 18 (1930), at 
15) and especially the reasoning of President Anzilotti in his individual opinion (at 21-22). For an 
account of the discussion as to the Free City was a 'State', cf. Ole Spiermann, International Legal 
Argument in the Permanent Court o f International Justice. The Rise o f the International Judiciary 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 332-339.
407 The legal classification o f the Declaration o f Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 
(DOP, or 'Oslo I’), Washington, 13 September 1993, 32 ILM  1527 (1993) was contested. See 
Kathryn M. McKinney, 'The Legal Effects of the lsraeli-PLD Declaration of Principles: Steps 
Toward Statehood for Palestine', 18 Seattle University LR 93-128 (1994), at 101-105 (arguing that 
Israel was bound by the provisions of the DOP through an unilateral statement, even though they 
did note rise to the level o f a treaty under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). As to the 
DO P’s quality as a public international law treaty see Karin Calvo-Goller, ‘Legal Analysis of the 
Security Arrangements between Israel and the PLO’, 28 Israel LR 236-267 (1994), at 239-241. For 
an analysis of foreign representation competences according to the DOP, the ‘Cairo Agreement’ 
and the ‘Preparatory Transfer Agreement' (both 1994) see Joel Singer, ‘Aspects o f Foreign 
Relations Under the Israeli-Palestinian Agreements on Interim Self-Government Arrangements for 
the West Bank and Gaza’, 28 Israel LR 268-296 (1994).
408 Recognised by Israel in the Egypt -  Israel, Camp David Agreements (1978): A Framework for 
Peace in the Middle East, 17 ILM 1466 (1978) and in the Framework fo r the Conclusion o f a 
Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, ibid., 1470.
409 Culminating in the Israeli -  Palestinian Interim Agreement on the W est Bank and the Gaza Strip 
(IA, o r‘Oslo II), concluded on 28 September 1995, reproduced in 36 ILM  551 (1997).
410 Id., Ch. 1, Article 9(2) as well as Article 9(5)(b), at 561.
411 Id., Ch. 1, Article 1(1), at 558, and Ch. 3, Article 17(4), at 564. For a general discussion of the 
Palestinian Authority's functional and personal jurisdiction under the IA see Omar M. Dajani, 
'Stalled between Seasons: The International Legal Status o f Palestine during the Interim Period’, 
26 Denver JIL 27 (1997-1998), at 65 et seq.
412 Of special significance is the realisation that agreements with the Palestinian Authority, particularly 
in the field of donor assistance, were arguably void since the capacity to conclude international 
agreements on behalf of the Palestinian territories was not vested in the Authority, but has been 
retained by the Israeli military government. See Stephan Sina, Der völkerrechtliche Status des 
Westjordanlandes und des Gaza-Streifens nach den Ostoer Verträgen (Berlin/London: Springer 
Verlag, 2004), at 344.
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Kosovo is the third instance presented here to illustrate the abstract entitlement o f a non­
state territorial entity in international law. In order to substantiate the argument about the 
various means through which a unit’s subjectivity can be constituted and to situate such 
entities in a normative context, the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1244(1999) 
shall be briefly examined here. The machinery devised provides for a progressive conferral 
o f broad governmental responsibilities "under which the population can enjoy substantial 
autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” and in which the establishment o f self- 
governing institution should ensure the conditions for a peaceful life.413 Through the 
instrument o f a SC Resolution, the international community has provided an international 
régime for a territory, very much in conformity with an understanding adopted from 
McNair.4'4 The concept of 'autonomy' has arguably no fixed juridical meaning in international 
law,415 with ‘substantive autonomy’ merely connoting a first stage of democratic develop­
ment. However, the notion o f ‘self-govemmenf has taken on a legal meaning which denotes 
a collective entitlement to a higher level of self-responsibility in the exercise o f public affairs, 
inside a larger political system. Self-government in international law has a specific meaning 
shaped by the UN Charter's Articles 73(b) on colonial territories and Article 76(c) on trust 
territories where it is identified as one of the aims to be promoted by the relevant adminis­
tering power. As Tomuschat points out,
self-government describes a legal status under which a human community enjoys fu ll powers 
to govern its internal matters while still being debarred from concluding its own foreign affairs 
and having to accept a foreign m ilitary presence.416
Resolution 1244 is, in our understanding, the source o f an abstract entitlement that 
constitutes a form of ‘subjectivity’. In opposition to Berman, we indeed venture to suggest 
that those non-state territorial entities discussed above actually did only exist in brute 
positivity,417 like dormant organisms, until they were ‘discovered’ by the law that chose to 
attribute certain legal consequences to their factual existence. The organised international 
community related them to other subjects and the legal order itself by means of an
413 S/RES/1244 (1999), §10. The resolution w ill be discussed in more detail In Chapter V, infra p.147. 
For the capacity of the Security Council to confer rights within the institutional framework o f the 
UN, cf. Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, The Role of the United Nations Security Council in the 
International Legal System’, in The Role of Law in International Politics. Essays in International 
Relations and International Law  269-276 (ed. by M. Byers, Oxford: OUP, 2000), at 271.
414 Cf. Chapter 11.2.1 (i), supra p.65.
415 Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Lillich, The Concept of Autonomy in International Law’, 74 AJIL 
858-889 (1980), at 885. See also Frederic L. Kirgis, The Degrees of Self-Determination in the 
United Nations Era’, 88 AJIL 304-310 (1994), at 308; Ruth Lapidoth, ‘Autonomy and Sovereignty-  
Are They Mutually Exclusive?’, in New Political Entities in Public and Private International Law. 
With Special Reference to the Palestinian Entity (ed. by Amos Shapira and Mala Tabory, Kluwer 
Law International, 1999), a t 4; Geoff Gilbert, ‘Autonomy and Minority Groups: A  Right in Inter­
national Law?*, 35 Cornell ILJ 307-353 (2002), at 307.
416 Tomuschat, ‘Damaged Sovereignty’, supra note 141, at 328 (my emphasis). His arguments gain 
even more plausiblity when we compare the ways in which international institutions have referred 
to  the inhabitants of Kosovo, starting with ’Kosovar Albanian community’ (e.g., in S/RES/1199 
(L ll), 23 September 1998 and S/RES/1203 (Lll), 24 October 1998), to  their qualification as ’people* 
in S/RES/1244 (§10 and Annex II §5). Cf. Natalino Ronzitti, ’Options for Kosovo's Final Status’, 
35:2 International Spectator 103-112 (2000), at 105. Those references acquired an additional 
spatial dimension with the designation of Kosovo as “undivided territorial unit., which, with its 
people, has unique historical, legal, cultural and linguistic attributes” (UNMIK/REG/2001/9, §§1(2) 
and 1 (1), infra note 618).
417 Cf. ‘Abeyance’, supra note 218, at 103.
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international legal instrument The inter-war legal history of Danzig, for instance, is indicative 
of a relevant legal process through which internationalised territories were ‘carved out’ by the 
international legal community and ‘given life* in the law of nations as a possible “solution to 
the problem of conflicting territorial claims and aspirations."418 As a corollary, and following 
Lauterpacht’s attempt to reconcile the declaratory and constitutive approaches to the 
formation of international persons, one would have to conclude that entities not addressed 
by such an international ‘rule of recognition’
may exist as a physical fact. But it is a physical fact which is o f no relevance for the 
commencement o f the particular international rights and duties until by recognition...it has 
been lifted into the sphere o f law, until by recognition it has become a juridical fact.419
For our purposes it suffices to conclude at this point that a territorial unit had indeed been 
‘addressed’ and abstractly entitled by Resolution 1244(1999), an instrument of international 
law which, according to the framework followed here, represented the first phase in a 
trajectory that could telescope into the constitution of a legal personality ad interim.
3.2 AGENCY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY
Referring earlier to its ‘agnostic’ character when attempting to arbitrate between the two 
competing concepts of territorial sovereignty and self-determination essentially grounded in 
a notion of popular sovereignty, this chapter has so far explained, in cursory fashion, why 
general public international law hesitates to provide a comprehensive regulative framework 
for transitory territorial entities. International law has accordingly been reluctant to widen the 
range of participants whose conduct it purports to regulate. We noted, on the other hand, 
that the crystallisation of the principle of self-determination gave rise to a new class of 
subjects, following the conferral of rights and obligations on ‘peoples’. The traditional 
approach to subjectivity regularly links the foundation for international legal personality with 
explicit recognition by states -  a static perspective which tends to reduce legal personality to 
a descriptive notion. This approach does not, in our submission, faithfully reflect the doctrinal 
evolution of international law on the matter. The construction of the legal personality of 
internationally administrated non-state territorial entities is, we suggest, predicated on a 
complex interaction between an initial entitlement of a territorial unit by international law and 
its representation on the international plane by the same organised international community 
that had initially vested the entity with those abstract rights.
In order to offer a new constructive way of conceptualising international legal personality, we 
suggested a two-pronged approach. Firstly (as argued above), subjectivity arises out of 
being a direct addressee of primary or secondary international norms that grant entitlements 
(or incur obligations) without the interference of intermediate municipal processes 
incorporating the norm. This is what civil law systems understand by the term Rechtsfähig-
418 John K. Bleimaier, 'The Legal Status of the Free City o f Danzig 1929-1939: Lessons to be Derived 
from the Experiences of a Non-State Entity in the International Community’, 2 Hague YIL 69-93 
(1989), at 70.
419 Hersh Lauterpacht, Recognition in international Law (Cambridge: CUP, 1947), at 75.
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keit. Subjectivity, under a functional lens, will ”embrasse toutes les relations possibles entre 
une individualité quelle qu’elle soit et un ordre juridique”.420 In order to draw the next con­
clusion, it is suggested to refer back to the distinction between subjects and persons in inter­
national law. To Pintor, a 'subject' is 7e destinataire de normes juridiques’ while a ‘person’ 
represents la  possibilité juridique générale d’être titulaire de n ’importe quel droit et de 
n ’importe quelle obligation appartenant à un domaine juridique donné”421 As in municipal 
law, it is necessary to differentiate between the capacity to bring about legal effects through 
the actions of a body -  in other words, to undertake legal transactions -  and the capacity to 
be the bearer of legal rights and duties, previously abstractly formulated as ‘entitlements’.422 
As distinct from subjects, international persons are then not merely addressees of norms of 
international law. They moreover possess the capacity to enter into relationship and operate 
on the international legal plane.
As the PCIJ already stated in its judgment in the Peter Pàzmàny University case, it is 
scarcely necessary to point out that the “capacity to possess civil rights does not necessarily 
imply the capacity to exercise those rights oneself”.423 One must naturally agree with the 
PCIJ as well as Verzijl that the true test of personality in a given legal order “would not seem 
to be whether an individual or composite entity derives its rights from that order, but whether 
he or it is in a position to pursue or/and enforce them within i f . 424 The second step in the 
construction of a (limited) legal personality of non-state territorial entities therefore consists 
in an enquiry into their actual Handlungsfähigkeit, denoting the capacity to activate latent 
rights and obligations on the international plane.425 How can a theory of legitimate represent- 
tation contribute, then, to the formulation of legal personality? Could we, from an agency 
perspective, suggest that the normative concept of legal personality is inherent in a broader 
range of bodies and agencies that are representative of ‘peoples’?426 The following sections 
suggest that a wider formulation of partial legal personality includes intemationallised 
territories slated for self-determination, and, on a provisional basis, territories whose future 
final status includes external self-determination.
(i) Two Points of Clarification Regarding Agency E x  L e g e
To further discuss agency in international law, it is at this stage imperative to supply three 
points of clarification that will allow us to consistently apply the terminology throughout the 
next sections. The first remark is of general nature. International representation is said to 
encompass situations in which (i) an entity acts on behalf of another on the international 
level and (ii) in which specific provisions are laid down by international law for the conduct of 
the former. This legal institution entails a split between the immediately acting international 
person and the entity to which the legal effects of these acts are imputed.427 According to
420 Manfred! Siotto-Pintor, 'Les sujets de dro it international autres que les États’, 41 RCADI 251 
(1932-111), at 278.
421 Id., at 278-279.
422 Cf. Hermann Mosler, 'Subjects o f International Law1, in 4 EPIL 710 (2000), at 715.
423 Appeal from a Judgment of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (Peter Pàzmàny 
University v. the State o f Czechoslovakia), PCIJ (Ser. A/B), No. 61 (1933), at 231.
424 Verzijl, International Law, vol. II, supra note 37, at 3.
425 The term Handlungsfähigkeit (contractual capacity) has been used extensively in German public 
international law literature and w ill be employed throughout this chapter.
426 Cf. Konrad Ginther, ‘Liberation Movements’ , 3 EPIL (1997), a t 213.
427 Angelo P. Sereni, ‘Agency in International Law', 34 AJIL 638-660 (1940), at 638.
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general principles, authorisation or delegation are required by the entity which is being 
represented. Any act of representation by the representative must be exercised in the name 
of and on behalf o f the entity.428 It follows that the authority exercised is that of the entity to 
which the legal effects of the agent’s actions can be imputed. This distinguishes representa­
tion in international law from all other cases in which governmental authority (of a state) is 
exercised by another entity.429 Accordingly, no transfer of government authority takes 
place.430 The represented entity itself becomes the party which is directly liable and who is 
the direct claimant vis-à-vis a third party.431
Secondly, we define agency as the relationship between the territorial agent and an entity 
that is under its temporary protection. This usage might differ from the regular application of 
the concept since agency is normally established between an agent and a 'principal’. In an 
asymmetric relationship, such as between a mandant and a mandatory, the usage of the 
term 'principal' would be entirely misleading. It would suggest that the mandant would have 
the capacity to appoint the agent (and revoke the agency) which is regularly not the case in 
an international fiduciary bond. It is in this sense that we can speak of ‘compulsory agency 
ex lege', insinuating that agency is assumed on grounds of necessity, and vested in the 
agent by international law. The term also suggests that the agent is obliged to only perform 
functions in fulfilment of the purposes for which agency was established.432 43As should be 
apparent from our discussion of the Mandate and Trusteeship systems' properties in the 
second chapter of the thesis, the agency relationship is essentially of a fiduciary nature. 
Features of this fiduciary bond, in which no advantage accrues to the agent, are inherent in a 
relationship of international agency ex lege and will re-appear when we discuss the 
performance of multilateral peace-building missions that are instituted to monopolise agency
I'M
and the position of occupation authorities vis-à-vis the occupied temtory.
The discussion so far offered formalistic definitions and introduced agency as essentially a 
legal relationship between the (authorised) territorial agent and an entity under its temporary 
administration. The third point of clarification posits that this conception is insufficient to 
gauge the extent to which subjectivity is actually performed.w  Having defined agency as a 
complex relationship through which entitlement is discharged on the international plane, our 
discussion of the ‘construction’ o f international legal personality w ill therefore draw on the 
practice of agency which we understand to be not only a set of relations but an action 
designed to perform this relationship by responding to choices and sets o f interests.435
428 Cf. Hermann Meyer-Lindberg, 'Organe des völkerrechtlichen Verkehrs’, in Wörterbuch des 
Völkerrechts (vol II, ed. by H.-J. Schlochauer, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter&Co., 1961), at 669-70.
429 See Verdroß, et a l.,’Gebietshoheit’, supra note 61, at 244-45.
430 Cf. Geiger, Beschränkung, supra note 156, at 143-44,
431 Id., at 67-68.
432 Sereni, ‘Agency’, supra note 427, at 651.
433 The essentially fiduciary nature of the occupant power will be briefly discussed in Chapter IV.2.2, 
infra note 535.
434 For a critique of the formalistic view that equates representation with authorisations see Hanna F. 
Pitkin, The Concept o f Representation (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1967), at 38-59.
435 In this broad understanding adopted from Giddens, agents are corporate entities whose acts 
materially affect the international system. Recognising the connection between the notion o f 
agency and that o f Praxis, an agent’s action will thus be presented as a stream o f “actual...
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3.2.1 Representatjon-in-Trust
Given the diverse nature of fiduciary administrations, the rule that an international agent is 
appointed for the conduct of all international relations has to be qualified. The capacity to act 
on behalf o f a territory, assumed by the agent, has been limited to different degrees in a 
number of anomalous situations -  among them territories administered under the Mandate 
system, territories under international occupation, in cases o f special territories designed to 
neutralise a conflict (Danzig), and generally in instances of political dependency.436 As 
Rauschning explained with regard to agency of necessity of dependencies, the limitation to 
their capacity to act is grounded in the transfer of external powers to the agent:
der beschränkende Rechtssatz ist gleichzeitig der zur Stellvertretung berechtigende. Rechts­
grund der Stellvertretung ist bei Protektoraten der Protektoratsvertrag mit dem protegierenden 
Staat, bei Staaten unter Mandat oder Treuhandschaft entweder die Mandats- oder Treuhand­
satzung, an deren Zustandekommen der Vertretene gar nicht beteiligt ist, oder auch der Akt 
des Treuhänders oder des Mandatars, m it dem dieser seine Treuhandgewalt zugunsten der 
Autonomie des neugebildeten Selbstverwaltungsverbandes im Bereich der inneren Angele­
genheiten beschränkt und sich die auswärtige Vertretung vorbehält. In Fällen der notwendigen 
Stellvertretung ist der Inhaber der Vertretungsmacht regelmäßig nicht an die Weisungen des 
Vertretenen gebunden -  deren angenommenes Unvermögen zu einer Außenpolitik bildet ja  
gerade den Sinn einer Beschränkung der Geschäftsfähigkeit.437
In the case of political dependencies, it was, however, possible for the local political institu­
tions of a colony under fiduciary administration to represent themselves if they had acquired 
capacity to act on the international plane with a view to dispensing certain functions.438 W ith 
regard to the residual functions of the metropolitan agent, it can be said that the latter 
remained the ‘representative’ o f the colony.439 Accordingly, the international legal status of 
protectorates and dominions and their concomitant treaty making power has varied.440 
Entities which were states before they became protectorates retained, in many cases, 
international legal personality in accordance with the functions their patron state/agent 
wanted it to perform, while their contractual capacity remained lim ited.441 In other cases, the 
subjection had been so complete that no more than a limited international legal personality
interventions o f corporal beings in the ongoing process o f events-in-the-world” (New Rules o f 
Sociological Method: A Positive Critique o f Interpretative Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 
1976), at 75).
436 Sereni, 'Agency', supra note 427, at 647.
437 Das Schicksal völkerrechtlicher Verträge bei der Änderung des Status ihrer Partner (Hamburg: 
Hansischer Gildenverlag, 1963), a t 39 (italics supplied).
438 Cf. Oppenheim, International Law, vol. I (9th ed., by Jennings/Watts, Harlow: Longmann, 1992), at 
278-9, §§14-17.
439 For representation within the British Commonwealth cf. generally Crawford, Creation of States, 
supra note 35, at 238-246. The treaty-making faculties of the British dominions vis-à-vis their 
continued commitment to imperial 'political' treaties is also discussed in Daniel P. O’Connell, 
■Independence and Succession to  Treaties’ , 38 BYIL 84 (1962), at 92-95. Cf. also Malcolm M. 
Lewis, The Treaty-Making Powers o f the Dominions’, 6 BYIL 31 (1925).
440 I—For an exhaustive study of protectorates and their partial subjectivity see Alfred M. Kamanda, A 
Study o f the Legal Status of Protectorates in Public International Law  (Ph.D. Thesis no. 125, 
Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, Geneva, 1961), at 188 et seq. Cf. also 
Geiger, Beschränkung, supra note 156, at 77 and 142; and Rudolf Kirchschläger, 'Protektorat', in 
Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts, vol. II, supra note 428, at 808-810.
441 See Alfred Verdroß and Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht (3rd ed., Berlin: Duncker& 
Humblot, 1984), at 235-6, as well as Crawford, Creation o f States, supra note 35,188-198.
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and, consequently, a very limited Handlungsfähigkeit was retained by the protected entity.
As far as the legal status of territories under the Mandate system was concerned, a 
distinction was drawn between ‘C'-class Mandates -  which had no international personality 
at all (the agency o f the Mandatory power being overarching) -  and ‘A* and ‘B'-class Manda­
tes -  which had a limited personality because they were endowed with a limited contractual 
capacity.442 The process of ‘immediatisation* had begun with provisional recognition of the 
international personality of those entities formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire in Article 
22(3) of the Covenant.443 In performing the commission, the mandatory usually acted in his 
own name (mandate without representation) while in some cases, an agency relationship 
was indeed collateral to the mandate (mandate with representation).444 In the latter case, the 
mandatory acted in the name of his mandant and the acts performed by the former had an 
immediate effect for the mandant as i f  the latter had acted in person. The fact that the 
conduct of the agent herself -  the mandatory -  was to a certain degree 'controlled' by 
another international subject -  the League of Nations -  was, at least for Sereni, no reason to 
doubt the agency o f the former.445 In his Dissenting Opinion in the 1962 South West Africa 
cases, Judge Bustamante directly inferred limited capacity from entitlement His approach is 
instructive in order to apprehend the overall concept of representation-in-trust that lay at the 
basis of the Mandate system:
Art. 22 of the Covenant recognised [the populations under Mandate] as having various rights, 
such as personal freedom (prohibition of slavery), freedom o f conscience and religion, 
equitable treatment by the Mandatory, and access to education, economic development and 
political independence (self-determination). They were thus recognised as having the capacity
442 This was the opinion o f the Institut de droit international which, at its Cambridge session in 1931, 
resolved that “les collectivités sous mandat sont des sujets de droit international. Elles ont un 
patrimoine distinct de celui de l’Etat mandataire, et peuvent acquérir des droits ou être tenues 
d’obligations propres... Les droits et obligations des collectivités sous mandat ne sont pas 
affectés par la cessation du mandat" (Resolution on ‘Les Mandats internationaux’, Annuaire de 
l ’Institut de droit international (1932, Vol. Il), at 234. For representation of trust territories before 
international organisations cf. Karl Zemanek, ‘State Succession After Decolonisation’, 116 RCADI 
187-300 (1965-111), at 245 et seq. Cf. also his highly relevant remarks regarding loans contracted 
by international agreements with the IBRD: "When a dependency was the contracting party, it 
thereby became, within the scope of the provisions of the agreement, a person of international 
law, directly responsible for the performance of the agreement" (at 259, italics supplied). This 
aspect w ill be taken up in Chapter V.2.1 (iii), inha p.174.
443 Cf. the arguments advanced by Verdroß preceding his conclusion that the Mandate territories 
“have an international legal personality in their own right’  (Völkerrecht, 5th ed., supra note 45, at 
211). As explained in Chapter 11.1.1, Palestine/Transjordan, Syria/Lebanon, and Mesopotamia 
had, in the terms of Article 22(4) o f the LON Covenant, reached a stage of development where 
their existence as independent nations could be provisionally recognised “subject to the rendering 
o f administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they (were) able to 
stand alone". The Powers mandated to administer the three entities in the Middle East acted, in 
any case, on behalf o f the mandated territory that lacked an autonomous capacity to act, in a 
manner that was compared to a relationship of a suzerain state with regard to his vassal (Verzijl, 
International Law, vol. II, supra note 37, at 546. Further on the subject of vassal states cf. 
Oppenheim, International law, vol. I, 8m ed., supra note 198, at 188 ef seq.). For a general 
discussion see Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Pervasive, Not Perverse: Semi-Sovereigns as the Global 
Norm’, 30 Cornell ILJ 651 (1997), a t 659 e f seq.
444 For representation especially in protectorates see Riad Daoudi, La répresentation en droit 
international public (1980), at 353-363.
445 Sereni, ’Agency’, supra note 427, a t 655. Evidence for a UN organs general capability to represent 
a territory is found in Article 72(d) o f the 1958 Convention on the International Maritime Organiza­
tion: In case the UN would assume the direct administration o f a trust territory, “the United Nations 
may accept the Convention on behald of one, several, or all o f the Trust Territories...".
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o f legal persons, and this is why in the Mandate agreements those populations are,..parties 
possessed o f a direct legal interest, although their limited capacity requires that they should 
have a representative or a guardian...
To Bustamante, the 'sacred trust* related not only to duties of a moral order but also to legal 
obligations correlative with the rights recognised as belonging to people under fiduciary 
administration. By these provisions, international law claimed fo r such peoples the quality of 
legal persons whose Handlungsfähigkeit was temporarily assumed by a ‘guardian’:
I cannot see any reason for not recognising the populations under international Mandate as 
having the status of legal persons and for not applying to them the principle of the necessity of 
their legal representation by ‘third parties' since these peoples have the rights recognised by 
the Covenant together with a certain capacity, although a diminished one, as in the case of 
wards under municipal law.46 47
Note that this quote from the dissenting opinion records, in the exact order, the three argu­
mentative stages which are followed here in the ‘construction’ o f legal personality: entitle­
ment, agency and functional limitation. A similar line of reasoning was employed with regard 
to a non-self governing territory in the ICJ's 1995 East Timor case. In his dissenting opinion, 
Judge Weeramantry offered a functional argument in favour of a continued agency of the ad­
ministering power, Portugal (that had lost effective control over the territory). His penetrating 
reflections on the contested status of the administering power were based on considerations 
of the essential needs of the territory while he inferred Portugal’s continued representative 
status from general considerations of functional necessity. The ‘umbilical cord’ linking East 
Timor to the international community must have survived Portugal’s loss o f authority, 
because
[ajny other view would result in the anomalous situation of the current international system 
leaving a territory and a people, who admittedly have important rights opposable to all the 
world, defenceless and voiceless precisely when those rights are sought to be threatened or 
violated.448
The findings of the present analysis can thus be summarised as follows: the capacity to 
possess rights (which equals subjectivity, in the terminology employed here) does not 
necessarily imply the capacity to exercise those rights 'oneself. As Lauterpacht aptly 
remarked with reference to the concept of procedural capacity, “the fact that the beneficiary 
of rights is not authorised to take independent steps in his own name to enforce them does 
not signify that he is not a subject of the law or that the rights in question are vested 
exclusively in the agency which possesses the capacity to enforce them."449 Doctrine and 
jurisprudence have leaned towards transposing the common law concept of wardship to the 
international plane and have established that a protected state can enter into a relationship
446 ICJ Reports 1962, supra note 192, at 354.
447 Ibid., at 354-355 (italics supplied).
448 ICJ Reports 1995, supra note 57, at 181.
449 Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1st ed. 1950, Archon Books. 
Cambridge, 1968), at 27. Similar Rauschning, Status, supra note 437, at 42.
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with other subjects through the agency of the protecting state.450 The protecting agent 
possesses the ju s  representations omnimodae, i.e. the plenary and exclusive competence 
in international law to represent the entity in the international sphere.
3.2.2 AGENCY AND ‘PERFORMATJVITY1
The institution o f international agency has been interpreted by one author in a rigid manner: 
"No international agency can be recognised where the alleged principal, agent or third party 
is not an international person".451 This logic is, of course, circular. It presents agency as a 
relationship between already existing international persons. The arguments advanced in this 
section, on the other hand, gravitate around the performance of the agency relationship and 
endeavour to d istil from it a normatively relevant essence for the 'construction' o f 
international legal personality. We will consider the following proposition: (i) if a series of acts 
performed by an agent are allowed to be legal acts in the sense that they access the 
international legal order, and (ii) if the agent is admitted to have the capacity to perform 
them, this performance activates the ‘latent’ subjectivity o f the entity on whose behalf the 
agent acts. The performance of its subjectivity by an agent hence renders a non-state 
territory an international legal personality with the capacity to pursue its abstract ‘interests’ on 
the international stage. We will conclude that the performance of a latent entitlement entails 
the establishment of relations between the entity in question and any kind of third persons452 
and thus constitutes legal personality.
The propositions advanced here are largely based on Lauterpachfs approach to partial 
personality in international law. He concluded that relationships of international legal nature 
are possible prior to 'recognition' o f statehood (which he saw as constitutive). For the areas 
in which such relationships have been instituted, he deemed partial legal personality as 
established: “A situation is thus created in which the unrecognised community is treated for 
some purposes as if it were a subject o f international law".453 In order to demonstrate the 
proximity of Lauterpachfs thinking on legal personality to the constitution o f human 
subjectivity through the utilisation of language, consider the following quote by Butler. She 
stresses the importance of discursive practices through which the foundational units of 
reality are constituted:
Language sustains the body not by bringing it into being...in a literal way; rather, it is by being 
interpellated within the terms o f language that a certain social existence of the body firs t 
becomes possible. To understand this, one must imagine an impossible scene, that of a body 
that has not been given social definition, a body that is, strictly speaking, not accessible to us,
450 For the contingency of a protectorate’s status as an international person on the terms of the 
particular treaty, see Oppenheim, International Law, S®1 ed., supra note 198, at 192-193. For US 
jurisprudence concerning the practice of agency cf. the case Porter v. United States in which the 
Court stated; "...the  Secretary [i.e. of the Interior] established in 1967 a Trust Territory government 
which included legislative, judiciaf, and executive branches, with the High Commissioner as chief 
executive of the Territory... The Secretary also reserved to himself or his delegate the power and 
authority to contract, “on behalf o f the Trust Territory“, for the purchase, charter, maintenance and 
operation of aircraft and surface vessels in the islands." (61 ILR 102, at 106-107, discussed in L. 
Erades Interactions Between International and Municipal Law. A Comparative Case Law Study 
(ed. by M. Fitzmaurice and C. Flinterman, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Institute, 1993) at 445).
451 Sereni, 'Agency’, supra note 427, at 639.
452 Cf. Mosler, ‘Subjects, supra note 422, at 712.
453 Lauterpacht, Recognition, supra note 419, at 53-54.
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that nevertheless becomes accessible on the occasion of an address, a call, an interpellation 
that does not ‘discover1 this body, but constitutes it fundamentally. We may think that to be 
addressed one must first be recognised... [T]he address constitutes a being w ithin the 
possible circu it o f recognition and, outside o f it, in abjection... One comes to 'exist* by virtue of 
[a] fundamental dependency on the address of the Other. One 'exists' not only by virtue of 
being recognized, but, in a prior sense, being recognizable454
In other words, the self manifests itself when speaking and being spoken to, because 
speech acts refer to the self as the speaker. The self is implied reflexively in the operations 
of, e.g., speaking or acting.455 In a re-formulation of post-structural thinking that conceives 
subjectivity through discourse -  perlocutionary speech acts that produce effects achieved in 
an addressee by a speaker’s utterance and that bring into being what they name legal 
personality can indeed be apprehended as ’constructed’ and mediated by agency. An 
agent’s acts are performative of an entity’s subjectivity. Without intending to reify 
international legal conceptions of personality, the parallels between Butler, R icoeur and 
Lautem acht are indeed striking: human subjectivity embedded in social structures (legal 
personality) is reflexively constituted through the discursive texture (legally significant acts) 
that is spun (concluded) between the ’inside’ of a body (a non-state territorial entity) and the 
'outside' of the interpellating society (the international legal system ). Both modes of con­
ceiving ’personality’ imply that a subject, understood as an addressee of speech acts (in ter­
nationa l norms) can be given effect through human (legal) agency which expresses the 
consciousness (legal interests) of the entity it represents. Performativity, in both cases, is 
“the vehicle through which ontological effects are established”.456 Practices of representation 
and its discursive mode reproduce a particular mode of subjectivity and are performative of 
it. As we will see at a later stage, the performance of international agreements is the most 
conspicuous manifestation of an entity's international legal personality. The reasoning that 
Cassese employed with regard to international treaty-making capacities of other non-state 
actors can also be considered here:
O f course it is not because they possess this personality that they can enter into these 
agreements. The contrary is true. It is because these agreements are regarded by the con­
tracting parties (states and international organisations) as international treaties proper, that the 
inference can be drawn that the national liberation movements entering into such agreements 
are endowed with international legal personality (albeit o f a lim ited kind).'457
One o f the conclusions we can draw from this contextual detour on our way to addressing 
contemporary international legal scholarship, is that personality -  as a concept applied to 
non-state territorial entities -  is nothing but shorthand for the proposition that an entity is 
endowed by international law with a set of entitlements and obligations (subjectivity) which it 
effectively discharges through international agency. The agent w ill henceforth temporarily re­
454 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics o f the Performative (New York/London: Routledge, 
1997), at 5 (emphasis in the original, footnote omitted).
455 Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (London: University o f Chicago Press, 1992), at 14.
456 Judith Butler, quoted by Peter Osborne (ed.), A Critical Sense: Interviews with Intellectuals 
(London: Routledge, 1996), at 112. For a discussion of the use of performative utterances in the 
creation of institutional facts see John R. Searte, The Construction o f Social Reality (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1995), at 54-55.
457 Cassese, Self-Determination, supra note 222, at 169. For a careful analysis see also J.A. Barberis, 
'Nouvelles questions concernant la personnalité juridique internationale’, 179 RCAD1145 (1983-1), 
at 259-64.
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present the entity and, in a post-structural reading, be ‘performative’ o f its subjectivity. Judge 
Weeramantrÿs approach in the East Timor case sought to construct a territorial unit’s perso­
nality from considerations of the essential needs of the territory while adopting a functional 
necessity perspective on the modes of its external representation. This is equally relevant 
and can be applied to territories under temporal international administration. In cases of 
internationalisation by way of reliance on Chapter VII o f the UN Charter, the territory's 
'subjectivity' is performed by an international territorial administration that is vested with the 
capacity to exercise treaty-making powers with regard to other subjects of international law.
These propositions lead to a more differentiated understanding of the importance of the 
temporary convergence between international normative space and 'the people’ who have 
become addressees of international entitlements. For once, the international legal order 
reaches the object of its concern directly, through vesting it with an agent without mediation 
by a constraining sovereign structure. As a corollary, the protected entity in question can 
accede to the international legal order without the intermediate level of state sovereignty. On 
the international plane, states henceforth concede to collaborate reciprocally with the 
territory in question through the medium of the international agent whose performative 
manifestations of intention are attributed to the entity. These practices install ontological 
effects for they are, in our submission, considered 'performative' o f the territory’s subjectivity 
in its spatio-temporal specificity.
At that stage, the relatively abstract concept of personality as an auxiliary concept of juristic 
thinking begins to present itself as a substantive theory concerned with the interrelationship 
between rights and duties afforded under international law and their representation. These 
insights illuminate our investigation into the normative properties o f an internationalised 
territory located at the intersection o f municipal and international law.458 59 Legal personalities -  
like selves -  are, in this understanding, ‘performed’ through fronts. One way of gauging the 
extent of legal personality is therefore to examine the phenomenology of representation -  a 
task that we have reserved for a later stage.460 For now, we conclude that as a direct con­
sequence of this complex interaction of the relevant normative behaviour performed through 
a relationship of agency, the territorial entity can enter into relationships with other persons 
of international law.461 If discretion to act is legal competence then it is true to say that the in­
ternational agent administering a non-state entity has Handlungsfähigkeit with regard to that
458 It is a separate question whether the thus mediated limited international personality o f a non-state 
territorial entity under temporary UN administration is also opposable vis-à-vis states which have 
not ‘conceded to collaborate’ with such an entity. Without intending to  enter the discourse on 
recognition (which has commanded the considerable attention of post-W ar legal scholarship), one 
may draw a cautious parallel to the ICJ's Reparation opinion in which it accepted the UN’s 
international personality to be effective against non-members (ICJ Reports [1949], supra note 120, 
at 185). The thinking underlying the parallel between the status of internationalised territories and 
international organisations will be clarified infra, at p. 115.
459 See the discussion in Chapter Vl.2.2, infra p.218
460 Chapter Chapter V.2.1 discusses the general capacity of an international territorial administration 
to enter into treaties on behalf o f the non-state territorial entity and points at specific instances of 
treaties concluded by UNMIK and UNTAET with other subjects of international law {infra, p. 165).
461 The admission of the Saar Territory to the Universal Postal Union (Berne) and to the International 
Telegraphic Convention (Petrograd) (LNOJ 1920, 67 et seq.) is correctly interpreted as an 
example of the limited personality o f an internationalised territory. In addition, the Saar Territory's 
Governing Commission was competent to represent the Saar railways in all matters relating to the 
application or revision of the International Railway Transport Convention (LN Council Resolution, 2 
October 1921; sources quoted in Hannum/Lillich, ‘Concept’, supra note 415, at 875).
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entity. The initial latent subjectivity of a territory -  addressed by norms of international law 
that circumscribe its content -  is activated qua 'performance* by an agent projecting both its 
duties and rights to the international plane. The latter’s general representation capacity can, 
however, be subject to qualifications and limitations.
Résumé: Functional Approaches to Legal Personality
As Crawford noted in his seminal study, it is difficult to assess the capacity of entities in statu 
nascendi to acquire rights under forms of international arrangement.462 Similar to inter­
national protectorates, non-state territorial entities vested with an international agent subsist 
within a grey area of international law -  between the two dimensions of being either a legal 
nullity or a fully-equipped member of the international community. Applying first a positivist 
and then a 'constructivist* frame to investigate the normative significance of entitlement and 
agency, we suggested that such territories veer towards legal existence. Accordingly, we 
presented international legal personality as a non-static concept. The capacity of an entity 
may increase or decrease to the extent to which functional areas where the international 
agent performs acts of representation expand or compress.463 The emerging legal perso­
nality o f a non-state territory is therefore functionally limited to the same extent that the 
agent’s mandate is limited by international law.464
It is time to collect the strands of a lengthy argument. By way of evaluation it appears 
appropriate to suggest that ‘international legal personality1 as well as 'functionally limited 
capacity’ are convenient terms for denoting the extent o f an entities' function on the 
international level as performed by its agent, as well as for drawing a non-rigid distinction 
between various categories of international legal subjects. This does not amount, as Allott 
proposes, to abandoning the conceptual category o f international legal subjects alto­
gether,465 but to rendering it more accessible and inclusive for new participants in internatio­
nal legal relations. When deliberating the status of entities other than states or international 
organisations, it seems particularly suitable to ‘unbundle’ the concept of legal personality to 
further develop it as a spectrum that recognises a range of varying statuses and severable 
entitlements, always contingent upon the degree to which a territorial agent has been man­
dated, ex lege, to perform them. In order to do this, we must take into consideration inter­
national law’s acknowledgement of several degrees of legal personality (abgestufte Vólker-
462 Creation o f States, supra note 35, at 394.
463 It has been shown above that certain colonies and mandated areas at one point enjoyed lim ited 
capacity and have subsequently acquired the unlimited international legal personality which flows 
from statehood. See also Hermann Mosler, 'Völkerrechtsfähigkeit’, in Wörterbuch des Völker­
rechts, vol. Ill (ed. by H.-J. Schlochauer, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter&Co., 1962), 665-677, at 675-6.
464 W hile we do not mean to equate the conglomerate o f rights and duties which makes up the 
position and legal status of international organisations with those o f non-state territorial entities, a 
careful analogy can be drawn to the PCIJ's conception o f functional limitation when it spoke o f the 
European Commission on the Danube as having only the "functions bestowed upon it by the 
Definite Statute with a view to the fulfilm ent o f that purpose, but it has the power to exercise these 
functions to the ir full extent, in so far as the Statute does not impose restrictions upon it" (Juris­
diction o f the European Commission o f the Danube between Galatz and Braila, PCIJ (Ser. B), No. 
14 (1927), at 64). Similarly, the extent o f a protectorate’s personality can be determined by the 
nature of its connection with, or functional dependence on, the protecting state. See Kamanda, 
Protectorates, supra note 440, at 200.
465 Philip Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford: OUP, 1990), at 372.
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rechtsfâhigkeitf66 which, following the precedent of international organisations, must be de­
fined in relation to the respective functions the subject in question fulfils regarding the needs 
shared by the international society.46 67 The capacité juridique of the entity, as manifested 
through an international agent, is contingent and depends upon its purposes and functions. It 
is delineated by a principle of functional limitation.468
This argument converges with the predominant (subjective) school of thought which, in 
reference to the legal personality of international organisations, holds that some act of 
explicit or implicit conferral by states is necessary for an entity to correspondingly become a 
‘derivative’ international legal person.469 The extent of this personality will depend on the 
functions the entity is to perform according to the will of its creators. In analogy to the 
doctrine concerning international organisations, one could concur with O’Connell that it 
would be a mistake to jump to the conclusion that such a non-state entity has personality 
“and then to deduce specific capacities from an a priori conception of the concomitants of 
personality."470 Following O'Connell, the correct approach equates personality with (i) latent 
subjectivity and (ii) the agent’s capacities to activate and perform those, and proceed to (iii) 
inquire into the limits of the agent’s capacities.
This conclusion complements our discussion in the preceding chapter expounding upon 
some of the novel aspects of the notion of fiduciary administration and how we could make 
sense of the relationship between an administering power and the people of ‘non-self- 
governing territories’. Was the traditional understanding of an administrating power as 
trustee replaced by some conception of it as an ‘agent’ of the people? Reading Chapters II 
and III together, the analysis of the relationship between the international organ and the 
constituted partial personality of an internationalised territory that it administers benefits from 
an understanding that combines the legal characteristics of both trust and agency. This syn­
thesis of an international administration’s obligations draws considerably upon the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s discussion o f the fiduciary relationship, in municipal law, between Indians 
and the federal government in which it held that “[while the Crown’s fiduciary obligations to 
the Indians is not technically a trust], the obligation is trust-like in character: As would be the 
case with a trust, the Crown must hold surrendered land for the use and benefit o f the
466 Bardo Faßbender, ‘Die Völkerrechtssubjektivität internationaler Organisationen’, 37 ÖZöRV 17-49 
(1986), at 26.
467 Cf. Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries, ICJ Reports [1949], supra note 120, at 174: “[t]he 
subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of 
their rights, and their nature depends on the need of the community". The doctrine of functional 
necessity was comprehensively formulated by Michel Virally, ‘La notion de fonction dans la théorie 
de l’organisation internationale’, in Mélanges offerts à Charles Rousseau: La communauté 
internationale 277-300 (ed. by S. Bastid et al., Paris: Pedone, 1974) and further developed by, 
inter alia, Peter H.F. Sakker, The Legal Position o f Intergovernmental Organizations: A Functional 
Necessity Analysis of Their Legal Status and Immunités (Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 1994). See 
particularly his discussion of the concept of function (at 42-51) and its application to the notion of 
personality (at 54-61)).
468 For international organisations cf. Rama-Montaldo, ‘Personality’, supra note 392, at 141.
469 The objective approach to international personality, on the other hand, focuses on criteria 
independent o f the subjective w ill of states. As long as an international organisations has at least 
one organ which can express its will, it is a general subject of customary international law ipso 
facto. As such it bears the inherent capacity to perform certain acts which it is in a practical 
position to perform. Cf. Finn Seyersted, 'Is the International Personality of Intergovernmental 
Organisations Valid vis-ä-vis Non-Members?’, 4 Indian JIL 233-265 (1964).
470 O’Connell, International Law, vol. I, supra note 62, at 98.
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surrendering Band... The fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the Indians also 
bears a certain resemblance to agency, since the obligations can be characterised as a duty 
to act on behalf of the Indian Bands".471
Similarly, the legal responsibilities o f an international administration are best captured when 
likening them to those of an agent which, in its internal relation with the territory, is bound by 
fiduciary obligations. In this understanding, we can argue that the concept of internationalisa­
tion gave a new structure to the ‘sacred trust* in that the features o f the trust in the Innenver- 
hSltnis were combined with legal features of agency in the Au&enverhSItnis. The constructive 
approach to international legal personality hence solidifies the argument in legal terms that 
the international community is obligated to act in the interest o f such transitorily administered 
entities. This insight, although for now relatively indeterminate, represents one of the bases 
from which the discussion of UNMIK’s role in relation to the territory of Kosovo will be 
launched in Chapter V.
Focusing on the status of the territory under international tutelage, another substantive thrust 
of this chapter consisted in advancing a set of arguments that international legal personality 
is deemed to be a contingent phenomenon and as such a function of the evolving require­
ments of international life. Generally speaking, the legal determination of internationalised 
territories is contingent upon two sets o f situations. In short, these are the needs and pre­
ferences of the territorial entity in question, represented as it is by an agent, as well as the 
public international legal interest of the whole of the international community, the Staatenge- 
meinschaftsinteresse.472 Limitations to the legal personality o f a non-state territorial entity will 
thus be determined firstly by reference to a specific territory’s particular circumstances, 
namely its needs and interests, defined as a pattern o f demands and its supporting ex­
pectations.473 Secondly, a determination must also account for the characteristics and pre­
sent needs of the international community, understood as the social preferences underlying 
its strategic calculations. This functionalist interpretation utilises international legal personali­
ty as an intermediary, rather than a barrier, allowing international law to reach "all the way 
down to the individual inside the collective”.474
The next chapter seeks to further build on these conclusions regarding the role of territorial 
agency. There, we explore the dual functions of such an administration before applying the 
framework to the decolonisation process of South-West Africa. The establishment of the UN 
Council for Namibia -  already discussed in Chapter II -  represents the seminal case in
471 Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, at 386-87 (ita lics supplied). The Crown’s breach o f duty 
in Guerin was therefore a breach o f both its fiduciary obligations and those arising from the 
relationship o f agency. For a juxtaposition of Guerin w ith the ICJ’s East Timor case cf. Karen 
Knopp, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), at 202- 
209.
472 Schoiswohl applies a similar line of argument to the international status o f de facto regimes in ‘De 
facto Regimes and Human Rights Obligations -  The Tw ilight Zone o f Public International Law1, 6 
Austrian RIEL 45 (2001), a t 54. The debate over whether it is heuristically useful to engage in 
such obvious reductionism that assigns ‘interests’ or 'social preferences’ to groups (of states) and 
whether the notion of Staatengemeinschaftsinteresse has any discernible content will be taken up 
in the introduction to the following chapter.
473 Cf. Harold D. Lasswell/Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale UP, 1950), a t 23.
474 Janne E. Nijman, The Concept o f International Legal Personality. An Inquiry Into the History and 
Theory of International Law (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser, 2004), at 120.
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which complex normatively relevant acts pronounced by both the territorial agent and the 
members of the international system installed temporary ‘ontological’ effects. The creation of 
the Council was not only an attempt to divest the Union of its right to represent South-West 
Africa in the international diplomatic arena. It was also meant to operationalise the latent 
international personality (subjectivity) vested in the territory itself. The picture that emerged 
with the admission of the territory to associated and full membership in International organi­
sations was that of a sui generis status that enabled it to stand on equal footing in these 




‘T he King 's Two Bodies1:
T he Dual Functions of International Administrations
Membership o f any association presupposes a dividing line between insiders and outsiders, 
a rule laying down criteria of inclusion and exclusion. The twentieth century, however, 
witnessed the rise o f unrecognised yet effective authorities stuck in transition somewhere 
between an international nihil and statehood, including individuals, peoples under colonial 
rule and de facto regimes.475 As highlighted at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of Internationa) Law,
there is an evolving, increasingly important role -  at this point almost a fait accompli -  by the 
sub-state entities. We have moved to a state at which, especially with respect to conflict reso­
lution, non-state and sub-state actors are equal participants in the making of peace accords 
and in their implementation.476
‘Unbundling’ international legal personality has an undoubtedly wider significance for 
conceptualising membership in the international society. The propositions advanced so far fit 
well into an evolving legal framework that ascribes increasing capacities for non-state terri­
torial actors to access international normative space. The imposition of international trustee­
ship in a post-colonial setting can therefore be presented in terms of inclusion in the sphere 
of international interest,477 rather than exclusion that thrives on notions of colonial inequality. 
Indeed, the previous chapter argued that an international agent ‘performs’ the subjectivity of 
a non-state territorial entity. By doing so, the entity is vested with a spatio-temporal perso­
nality which is limited in scope by the needs of the international community rationale. The 
argumentative structure has utilised an inductive approach to ‘constructing’ legal personality. 
It proceeded from entitlement to agency and pointed out that international legal personality is 
rigorously limited by the two sets of ‘interests’, or preferences, that the international territorial 
administration must simultaneously pursue.
In all, we demonstrated that the imposition of what some commentators have termed ‘neo- 
trusteeship’ lends agency to an otherwise voiceless entity existing at the margins of an 
international legal nihil. We implicitly portrayed the temporary assumption of agency ex lege 
by a subsidiary organ of the United Nations primarily as an empowering instrument through 
which ‘preferences’ and 'interests', held by the ‘people’, are projected to the international 
plane before they have constituted themselves as a polis. The methodology of linking a 
territory to the international plane through a subsidiary organ of the UN provides evidence, in 
our submission, that the rules of inclusion and exclusion from membership in the organised
475 For an authoritative treatment o f de facto regimes and particularly state practice involving their 
inclusion in multilateral treaties see Jochen A. Frowein, Das De Facto-Reg/me im Völkerrecht 
Eine Untersuchung zur Rechtsstellung ‘nicht-anerkannter Staaten' und ähnlicher Gebilde 
(Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1968), a t 115 etseq.
476 Steve Ratner in ‘Theme Pane! IV: The End of Sovereignty? Roundtable’, 88 ASIL Proceedings 71 
(1994), at 78.
477 For a discussion of ‘spheres of responsibility1, ‘spheres of abstention’, and ‘functional regimes’ as 
new devices for managing international relations in the modem state system see Friedrich 
Kratochwil, 'O f Systems, Boundaries and Territoriality: An Inquiry Into the Formation of the State 
System’, 39:1 World Politics 27-52 (1986), at 43 etseq.
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international community are undergoing a rapid change. This transformation occurs while 
the notion o f subjectivity in international law is partly re-conceptualised from its ideal dicho­
tomous form in order to allow for limitations to, and degrees of, legal personality.
The introduction presented on the following pages lays open one of the key premises of the 
argumentative stages which lead us to explore the phenomenon of 'dual functionality'. This 
is necessary as we have, until now, utilised the notion of ‘international community interest* in 
a haphazardly indeterminate manner. Drawing upon the notion of a ‘standard of civilisation’ 
that is to be shared with “people not yet able to stand by themselves"478 and the socio­
political arrangements devised under the Mandate and Trusteeship systems, we presented 
internationally-sanctioned models of territorial governance as a response to some ‘social 
preferences’ and ‘collective interests’. Arguments invoking international welfare and specific 
versions of what Francisco de Vitoria termed the bonum communae totius orbis are always 
o f a special quality, and it is appropriate in this context (in which the custodian function of an 
international administration w ill be discussed) to examine their premises. We briefly pose the 
following questions. Are there formulations of the international public interest, and how do 
they materialise? Secondly, if they materialise, are these legally relevant formulations or do 
they represent value conceptions and judgments which are o f meta- or pre-juristic (namely 
ethical and socio-political) nature? Alternatively, does international law, as Judge Huber 
posited, represent the legal crystallisation o f permanent collective interests o f states?479
Introduction: T he Elusive 'International Community Interest*
The question that concerns us here is whether we can engage in reductionism about group 
intentions and collective ‘interests’ without complete loss o f the meaning or content o f the 
properties and interactions of the international community’s constituent members. Only if we 
conceive that ‘we-intentions’ exist over and beyond interlocking ‘l-intentions’ toward a group, 
we can suggest that the Staatengemeinschaftsinteresse is, indeed, not tantamount to the 
sum of coinciding individual state interests.480 In as far as the society of states conceives 
itself to be bound by common set of rules in their relations with one another,481 it seeks to 
protect community values which presumably transcend the sum of values internally shared 
by individual members. As Bain notes, the notion of ‘international community’ asserts the su­
periority of a particular conception of the good life -  a ‘thin’ conception mediated by the 
values of human security -  over the procedural rights and duties that are associated with 
‘classical’ international society: sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-interference.482
478 Art. 22(1) League of Nations Covenant
479 Max Huber, ’Die Soziologischen Grundlagen des Völkerrechts’, in Vermischte Schriften, vol. Ill 
(Zurich: Atlantis Verlag, 1948), at 59.
480 Adapted from Alexander E. Wendt, The State as Person in International Relations Theory’, 30 
Review o f International Studies 289 (2004), at 299.
481 Cf. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study o f Order in Wortd Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977), at 13.
482 Anarchy, supra note 18, at 159. The debate over the distinct attributes of a ‘community’ versus a 
‘society’ o f states cannot be entered here. An interdisciplinary treatment o f the concept o f 
‘international community’ in public international law is provided by Andreas L. Paulus, Die 
internationale Gemeinschaft im Völkerrecht. Eine Untersuchung zur Entwicklung des Völkerrechts 
im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2001), a t 45 et seq. Cf. also the highly 
interesting forum ‘What Is the International Community’ , in 132 Foreign Policy (2002). For a useful 
formulation in which ‘society* and ’community’ are treated as distinct forms o f ideal-type social 
relationships, see Christoph W eller, ‘Collective Identities in W orld Society’, in Civilizing World
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Indeed, a discernible trend from consent to consensus as the basis of international legal 
obligation483 suggests that the aggregate Staateninteresse gradually transforms itself into a 
Staatengemeinschaftsinteresse.
This trend finds expression in formal organisation, the core of which is the United Nations. 
Recently, the Director of the UN Lessons Learned Unit provided observations concerning the 
establishment of international authority at the periphery. These comments invoke the notion 
of a loose volonté générale generated through the balancing of international social purposes 
against a cost-benefit calculus:
In opting for an international administration led by the UN, the nations o f the Security Council 
may be sometimes signalling that there is a will to act, but a qualified w ill -  not yet a will to act 
with the fu ll force and the fu ll cost o f a lead-nation commitment, but a willingness to join with 
others under the UN umbrella. At other times, the Council may be making a trade-off between 
the capacities and efficiencies of a single-nation administration and the quasi-legitimacy 
invested in an administration bom of the will o f the wider community of governments.484
The ‘international community interest* rationale (of which this thesis has spoken before) re­
presents, in its wider context, the United Nation's guiding ideology which finds expression in 
formal organisation.485 There, we can regularly detect no small amount of democratic 
teleology. An example of such commonly shared beliefs includes the notion of peace-buil­
ding that the former SG Boutros-Ghali defined (somewhat high-mindedly) as a broad set of 
activities which “tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense o f confidence and well­
being among people", suggesting that the UN has “an obligation to develop and provide... 
support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the 
strengthening of new democratic institutions".486 This obligation is met, according to Franck, 
if states join in “common protective measures and institute institutional processes to secure 
safety, peace, and the promotion of prosperity".487 The immanent tendency of 'interests’ to­
ward their realisation explains why they gradually acquire a legally relevant normative 
texture:
Politics: Society and Community Beyond the State (ed. by M. Albert, L. Brock, K.-D. W olf, Lanham 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), at 45-68.
483 Richard A. Falk, The Status of Law in International Society (Princeton University Press, 1970), at 
177. For an early discussion of the normative significance of a 'Völkergemeininteresse’ as the 
reciprocal interest in the creation of a legal community see Géza Birkás, Das Staatsinteresse als 
Grundlage des Völkerrechts (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1933), a t 74-77. Cf. also Simma’s 
discussion of the emergence, doctrinal expressions, and the substance of community interest in 
'From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law1, RCADI221-384 (1994-1V).
484 David Harland, 'Legitimacy and Effectiveness in International Administration’, 10:1 Global 
Governance 15-19 (2004), at 17.
485 Similar Robert H. Jackson, 'International Community beyond the Cold W ar, in Beyond West­
phalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention (ed. by G.M. Lyons and M. Mastanduno, 
Baltimore: JHU Press, 1995), 59-83, at 62 et seq. As Simma and Paulus put it, “what the [UN] 
Charter undoubtedly did achieve was the translation of the concept o f ‘international community’ 
from an abstract notion to something approaching institutional reality" (‘The “International 
Community": Facing the Challenge of Globalization’, 9 EJIL 266 (1998), at 274).
486 An Agenda for Peace -  Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping: Report o f the 
Secretary-General, GAOR/SCOR (47th), Preliminary List Item 10, at 55, UN Docs. A/47/277 and 
S/24111 (1992).
487 Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 
at 27.'
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Interessen werden...so zu Sollens-Sätzen und erhalten, m it der Weihe der Verbindlichkeit 
versehen, die erhöhte Chance der Verwirklichung... Die Gemeinsamkeit der Interessen findet 
...bedeutsamen Ausdruck in den universellen Völkerrechtsregeln, da ihrer Bindung grund­
sätzlich das Vorhandensein gegenseitiger identischer Interessen zugrund liegt.488
In order to grasp the currency of this idea, we must, however, recognise the enormity o f the 
task of ascertaining global ’community interests’ and expectations over the whole range of 
continuously-generated putative 'norms’.489 It is obvious that the complex bundle o f norms 
and ideas underpinning contemporary international society w ill not necessarily be internally 
coherent and might even promote values in stark contradiction with each other490 It may 
even comprise of a number of discrete interests since this kind o f normative indeterminacy is 
the result o f a plurality of values that are not entirely convergent.491 The pluralistic nature of 
the values simultaneously held by the organised society of states and the “conductorless 
orchestration of collective action and improvisations"492 does not, however, preclude our 
employment o f the term Staatengemeinschaftsinteresse, The intentions that the integrated 
community o f states forms are typically restricted to the narrow domain engaged by the 
pluralistic purposes that its members share. There is really no reason to discount those 
marks of intentional subjectivity as mere ‘appearances’.493
At a minimum, it appears that a legally relevant collective interest is directed towards the 
continuous existence of the legal community as such. The aggiornamento o f international 
society requires the international public order to incorporate minimum of standards without 
which a Rechtsgemeinschaft would be unthinkable.494 In its purest form, such community 
interest materialised, first, in the production of norms o f jus cogens and in the emergence of 
new classes o f acts considered punishable as crimes, namely, offences entailing the perso­
nal criminal liability of the individuals concerned.495 Both set o f norms can said to be “rooted
488 Klein, Statusverträge, supra note 116, at 53-54. For a conceptual division of the international 
community’s normative functions into a static body of available norms and a dynamic aspect (the 
procedure o f rule-setting and development) see Christian Tomuschat, ’Die Internationale Gemein­
schaft', 33 AdV  1-20 (1995), at 7-8.
489 Oscar Schächter, Towards a Theory o f International Obligation', 8 Virginia JIL 300-322 (1967- 
1968), at 316.
490 Cf. David W illiam s, 'Aid and Sovereignty: Quasi-States and the International Financial Institutions', 
26 Review o f international Studies 557 (2000), at 558.
491 Cf. Jean-Marc Coicaud, ‘Conclusions’, in The Legitimacy o f International Organizations (ed. by 
J.M. Coicaud and V. Heiskanen, Tokyo: UNU Press, 2001), at 538.
492 Pierre Bourdieu, quoted by Richard K. Ashley, ‘Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Proble­
matic of Governance’, in Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World 
Politics for the 1990s (edited by E.-O. Czempiel and J. Rosenau, Lexington, 1989), at 255.
493 Cf. Philip Pettit, ‘Collective Persons and Powers’, 8 Legal Theory 443 (2002), at 458.
494 Cf. Huber, Vermischte Schriften, supra note 479, at 107, as well as Klein, Statusverträge, supra, 
note 116, a t 55. For a discussion of theories that conceive the international community as formal 
Rechtsgemeinschaft see also Paulus, Gemeinschaft, supra note 482, at 89-91. For two inquiries 
into the nature of the ‘legal interest o f the community o f states' cf. Christian Tomuschat, ‘Obli­
gations Arising for States W ithout or Against Their W ill’ , 241 RCAD1195-374 (1993-lV), at 248 ef 
seq. (describing the UN Charter as “world order treaty") and at 355 (defining the maintainance of 
international peace as the essentiale o f the international legal order), and Jochen Frowein, ‘Das 
Staatengemeinschaftsinteresse -  Probleme bei Formulierung und Durchführung', in Staat, supra 
note 383, at 219.
495 Cf. Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd ed., New York: OUP, 2005), at 436.
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in international consciousness".496 497Norms juris cogentis set material limitations to the con­
tractual freedoms of subjects of international law -  essentially removing particular legal 
norms from disposition in order to protect fundamental community values. Considerations 
superseding particular state interests -  ‘community interest* -  are thus constituted as 
normatively relevant as they are protected by the prohibition to derogate from pertinent jus 
cogens norms.
This brief excursus sought to clarify that the abstract notion of ‘community interest* manifests 
itself in a legally relevant manner, particularly in variations pertaining to obligations erga 
omnes contractantes 497 Their conception invited the development, within the international 
legal system, of centralised institutions to ensure that responses to their violation are 
collective, coherent, and operate across the board.498 Once these reciprocal interests 
acquired a permanent normative texture through processes of collective organisation and 
constitutionalisation, they exercise what Franck termed ‘compliance puli’. His answer to the 
question -  why do states obey international rules? -  is that they do so because (and when) 
these rules are supported by the perceived needs of the global society for an orderly, 
peaceful community.499 As we observe the expressions and manifestations of a global 
version of the volonté générale in the international system that tends to promote extra-state 
interests that fall outside the interplay of reciprocity, we come to understand that the 
organised international society performs tasks with a view to ensuring a type of collective 
rationality which makes its mental commons indivisible.500
496 Mustafa K. Yasseen in International Law Commission Yearbook (1963, I), at 63, §39 (683rd mtg.), 
and id. (1966,1, Part 1), at 38-39, §29 (828th mtg.). Concerning the emergence of the notion o f jus  
cogens, it suffices to recall here Articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law o f 
the Treaties. Terms such as ‘legal consciousness of states', ‘awakening o f consciousness’, 
‘universal conscience’, ‘common good of mankind' recurred like a leitm otif during the ILC's work 
on the theories o f jus  cogens and international crimes.
497 Cf. Simma, 'Bilateralism ', supra note*483, at 293-300. For the case of international environmental 
law see Jutta Brunnée, '"Common Interest* -  Echoes from an Empty Shell?', 49 ZaôRV 791-808 
(1989), at 794 et seq. (carefully distinguishing between ‘coinciding interests’ and legally relevant 
‘common interests'). In this respect, we should take note of the increasing 'constitutionalisation' o f 
obligations erga omnes partes and the concomitant protection o f the collective interest, 
particularly in the area of state responsibility. Article 48 of the respective ILC Draft Articles (infra, 
note 947) is based on the idea that in case o f breaches o f specific obligations protecting the 
collective interest o f a group of states (or those of the international community), responsibility may 
be invoked by states which are not themselves injured in the sense o f Article 42. The provision 
intends to give effect to the ICJ’s statement in the Barcelona Traction case, where the Court drew 
an "essential distinction" between obligations owed to particular States and those "owed to the 
international community as a whole’  (ICJ Reports 1970, supra note 232, at 32, §33. For 
commentaries see James Crawford (ed.), The International Law Commission's Articles on State 
Responsibility. Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), at 276-280; id., 
Third Report o f State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507/Add.4, at §§106 and 107; Linos- 
Alexander Sicilianos, 'The Classification o f Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the 
Relations of International Responsibility1, 13:5 EJIL 1127 (2002), at 1135 ef seq.). In line with the 
arguments presented in Chapter III we may venture to say that the international community has 
become a legal person in international law w ithin the confines o f Art. 48.
490 Vera Gowlland-Debbas, 'The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International 
Legal System’, in The Role of Law in International Politics. Essays in International Relations and 
International Law 277-313 (ed. by M. Byers, Oxford: OUP, 2000), at 301. For a monist 
interpretation as to  the ways in which the international legal system regulates the international 
public realm and integrates subordinary legal systems, see Philip A llott, 'The Concept of Inter­
national Law1, 10 EJIL 31-50 (1999).
499 Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: OUP, 1990), at 37.
500 Cf. Wendt, ‘Person’, supra note 480, at 299.
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To some, institution-building at the periphery is merely a reflection of the international 
society’s ’interest’ in the advancement transmitting ‘standards of civilisation’ in an updated 
version of the mission civilisatrice. The discussion of the international intervention in the 
aftermath of the Kosovo conflict (Chapter V) and of the characteristics of a transitional legal 
order created by an international organ (Chapter VI) suggests that the 'community interest’ 
not only emerges from sets of strategic calculations but is based upon distinctly legal 
conceptions held by the international community. On the next pages, we distinguish between 
an international territorial administration pursuing the wider collective interest o f the 
organised community of states and its assertion of the ‘interest’ o f the territory qua its agent
it is appropriate to add a second preliminary comment at the outset. The account presented 
here is heavily indebted to Georges Scelle's doctrine of dédoublement fonctionnel in inter­
national law501 and aims at transposing its basic premises to international fiduciary ad­
ministration. According to Scelle, international law attributes to national gouvernants and 
agents both national and international competencies. He saw the roles o f national members 
of the executive as 'split': they act as state organs whenever they act within the national legal 
order, and qua international agents when they operate within the international legal system 
('agents exécutifs internationaux).502 In the course of the thesis, we will reversely apply 
Scelle’s doctrine by focusing on an international collective organ that acts qua territorial 
agent. ’Dual functionality1 will thus be utilised as an analytical device to separate the 
functions, and the two-tiered set of responsibilities, an international territorial administration 
is mandated to perform.
4.1 O f I n t e r n a t io n a l  A g e n t s  a n d  O r g a n s
A former senior UNTAET official recently asked: “Should the [international] mission repre­
sent the world community in the territory, or is it acting in loco parentis for the territory, 
representing its interest to the world?“503 The answer to this question must in any case be 
that an international fiduciary administration will have to perform both functions. In the case 
of East Timor’s transitional administration, the confusion surrounding the Mission’s roles as 
a UN organ and territorial government complicated relations with East Timor's stakeholders 
and the donor community. For the purposes of the following inquiry it is worth quoting in fu ll a 
paragraph from a World Bank report on post-conflict reconstruction planning:
Coordination between the Bank and UNTAET w as...initially hampered by UNTAETs dual role
as the United Nations Mission in East Timor and as the Transitional Administration... W hile the
501 Cf. both his Manuel supra note 185, at 165 etseq. and ‘Le phénomène juridique du dédoublement 
fonctionnel', in Rechtsfragen der internationalen Organisation -  Festschrift für Hans Wehberg 
324-342 (ed. by W. Schätzei and H.-J. Schlochauer, Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1956), 
at 331; ’ Les agents dotés d’une compétence institutionnelle, ou investis par un ordre juridique, 
utilisent leur capacité "fonctionnelle’  te lle  qu’elle est organisée dans l’ordre juridique qui les a 
institués mais pour assurer l’efficacité des normes d ’un autre ordre juridique, privé des organes 
nécessaires à cette réalisation, ou n'en possèdent que d’insuffisants" (emphasis in the original).
502 Cassese discussed the doctrine’s ideological underpinnings concisely in ‘Remarks on Scelle’s 
Theory of “Role Splitting“ [dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law’, 1 EJIL 210-231 (1990).
503 Peter Galbraight, ’The United Nations and Administration o f Territory: The United Nations 
Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET)’, 97 ASIL Proceedings 210-215 (2003), at 210.
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former implied mission structures and a role in anchoring and promoting the operations of UN 
agencies in East Timor, the latter suggested that UNTAET -  as government -  should establish 
full governmental structures and act as a government counterpart to UN agencies, [IFIs] and 
donors. By extension, relations between the Bank and UNTAET would be governed by their 
roles and mutual obligations as partners within the UN system whenever UNTAET would be 
seen acting as a UN mission. The usual business model would prevail whenever UNTAET was 
seen as acting as the ‘Government'... Despite good relations...neither side had fu lly under- 
stood what this relationship (of the UN as Government financed by the Bank) would entail.504
The trajectory followed in this chapter appreciates the increasing intensity with which inter­
national legal conceptions are pursued by an international custodian and how the territorial 
interest is being ‘performed’. Its aim is to carefully distinguish between instances in which an 
international administration, behaving as a territorial agent, pursues 'national' (or domestic) 
interests, and instances in which it realises values or interests of the international community 
at large. After clarifying the agency and organic framework in which an international gover­
nance mission is situated, we will depart from the case of colonialism and proceed to that of 
military occupation. Next, the UN Council for Namibia, of whose creation this thesis spoke at 
the end of the second chapter, will serve as the prime example of a body with dual functions. 
It had the legal capacity to act on behalf of a territorial entity that was conceived as a limited, 
or partial, person of internal law. Its institutional quality, however, derived from it being an 
organ of the UN General Assembly. We conclude, somewhat speculatively, with a 
discussion of the nature of foreign policy in an internationalised territory and posit that under 
condition of ideal-type internationalisation, foreign and domestic policy are identical.
The findings should eventually support our argument, presented in Chapter V, that a Special 
Representatives o f the UN Secretary General and his subordinate administrative authorities 
charged with the administration of territory are not only conceived as subsidiary organs o f 
the United Nations. Their interrelation with domestic institutions confirms the propositions 
advanced in Chapter III; namely, that they are at the same time acting as agents o f the 
territories concerned.
4.1.1 Agency Relationship (Summary)
By exploring the origins of the concept of trust and its transposition to the international plane, 
we have earlier followed the theory that explains the emergence of the fideicommissum as a 
result of positive-law deficiencies, and its rigid restrictions of the jus civile concerning owner­
ship and devolution of property. We attempted to demonstrate that the institutionalisation o f 
trust as an administrative method through the two global organisations of the twentieth
504 Klaus Rohland and Sarah Cliffe, The East Timor Reconstruction Program: Successes, Problems 
and Tradeoffs (World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, Working Paper No. 2, 
November 2002), at 15. As examples of the difficulties emerging from such dual functions, the 
authors mention, inter alia, the question of whether projects financed by the Trust Fund fo r East 
Timor (TFET) should be undertaken by a normal 'government' procurement department under IDA 
procurement guidelines as mandated by TFETs donors or whether UN procurement rules would 
apply, given that UNTAET was a UN Mission. For TFET and UNTAETs external relations role see 
Chapter V.2.1 (i), infra p. 167. Cf. also Jonathan Morrow and Rachel White, 'The United Nations in 
Transitional East Timor: International Standards and the Reality of Governance', 22 Australian YIL 
1-45 (2002), at 25-30 as well as the study by the Conflict Security and Development Group (Easf 
Timor, supra note 149), which lists a number of instances where UNTAETs priorities (as a 
mission accountable primarily to the SC and its priorities as a government in some sense 
accountable to the East Timorese) came into conflict
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century had a deep impact on the application of international law to ‘dependent territories’. 
Chapter III sought to enrich the concept of fiduciary administration with a model under which 
one entity delegates to another the responsibility to act as an agent on her behalf. It argued 
that the method of internationalisation of territory under Chapter VII of the UN Charter entails 
the imposition o f agency through which the non-state territorial entity is represented. Since 
agency may possess the elements of trust and confidence of a fiduciary relation, the present 
analysis classified agents and trustees together as fiduciaries. By interpreting international 
legal instruments such as the Mandate- and Trusteeship Agreements, and even authoritative 
SC Resolutions establishing an international territorial administration, as devices to deter­
mine not only the scope of an agent's authority to act in the interest o f the ‘principal’, but also 
his substantive obligation to ensure her interests are effectively promoted, we aimed at re­
casting a fiduciary relationship as an agency that is constructive o f an entity’s partial perso­
nality in international law.505
In order to recapitulate, we demonstrated how the performative acts of a territorial agent 
constitute the spatio-temporal legal personality o f a non-state territorial entity which is limited 
in scope by the needs o f the international community rationale. The constitution of personali­
ty is achieved (i) through an instrument o f international law that abstractly addresses and 
‘entities’ the territory; (ii) by the ‘lending of an agent/organ’ through which the entity can 
perform its subjectivity; and (iii), via the ‘discursive’ mode through which the agent/organ 
relates the territory to the international plane. An international administration represents the 
territory as an agent of necessity, providing it with a conduit to the international plane.
4 .1 .2  O r g a n ic  Fr a m e w o r k
Agency ex lege is, however, undertaken by an organ o f organised international society: in 
the case of Namibia, by an organ o f the UN General Assembly; in the case o f the 
international administrations of Kosovo and East Timor, by a subsidiary organ of the UN 
Secretary-General. The legal construction of Organleihe, the ‘lending of an organ1, has 
recently been used to describe this international practice.506 507For further analysis, it is pivotal 
to keep in mind that a relationship of international agency is fundamentally different from the 
relationship between a state or an international organisation and its respective organs: the 
latter is not of a fiduciary nature. As Jellinek observed in 1905, there is a fundamental 
difference between these two legal relationships:
Der Staat kann nur verm ittelst seiner Organe existieren; denkt man die Organe weg, so bleibt
nicht etwa der Staat als Träger seiner Organe, sondern ein juristisches Nichts übrig. Dadurch
unterscheidet sich das Organverhältnis von jeder Art der Stellvertretung. Vertreter und Vertre-507
tender sind und bleiben zwei, Verband und Organ sind und bleiben eine einzige Person.
505 The two concepts are, however, distinct. In legal literature, this distinction is sometimes expressed 
by noting that all trustees are agents but not all agents are trustees: a trustee is an agent and 
something more. See George T. Bogert, Trusts (6,h ed., St. Paul, MN: W est Publishing Company, 
1987), at 36. For a recent application o f both fiduciary and agency analysis to nation-building see 
the chapter Trusteeship, Paternalism and Self-Interest’, in Feldman, Iraq, supra note 22, at 52-91.
506 Ruffert, ’Administration’, supra note 144, at 626-627.
507 Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre ([1905] reprint o f 3rd ed., Darmstadt: W issenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1960), at 546.
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This is a pivotal point as it allows us to consider the application of rules governing organic 
associations to the relationship between the UN mother organisation and its field Mission 
qua territorial administration. Firstly, consider the delegation of powers from the Security 
Council to the Secretary General. Through S/RES/1244, the Council authorised the SG “to 
establish an international civil presence in Kosovo.“ For East Timor, the Council decided to 
establish a UN Transitional Administration (S/RES/1272). Such a specific delegation of 
powers does not necessarily involve the transfer of power (to the SG) in toto. The delegating 
organ does not prime facie denude itself of the right to exercise them.508
The second important point is that an SRSG is not a delegate of the SG (delegatus non 
potest delegare); he is his organ. A subsidiary organ such as a UN Mission under the 
leadership of an SRSG is regularly mandated to execute certain tasks, on behalf o f the 
organisation to which it remains directly responsible.509 All the various tasks performed by a 
subsidiary organ have one point in common: they are functions of assistance.510 In the 
context of the Secretary-General’s 'good office’ role, SRSGs are conceived as surrogates for 
the SG, essentially as extensions of his person who do what the SG would and could do if he 
were personally present, carrying out their assignments under the authority given to the SG 
in Article 101 of the UN Charter.511 *
A similar surrogate role has been vested with SRSGs in their function of chief executives of 
UN field operations. In the late 1980s, the SRSG function metamorphosed to incorporate 
political and peacekeeping functions in what came to be termed ‘complex emergencies’. His 
role was broadened to cover political affairs, civil police and administration, human rights
508 This was arguably the case as the SRSG's initial sceptical approach to the FRY-fYRoM boder 
agreement met with a strong response of the Security Council (see infra note 791).
509 As Judge Hackworth observed in his dissenting opinion in the Administrative Tribunal case: "The 
' term 'subsidiary organ’ has a special and welt recognised meaning. It means an auxiliary or
inferior organ; an organ to furnish aid and assistance in a subordinate or secondary capacity“ 
(Effect of Awards o f Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports [1954] 47, at 79). Several writers have, however, pointed out that that its 
subordinate nature does not imply a hierarchy of functions between principal and subsidiary 
organ, in the sense that the latter deals only with minor tasks. Generally, see Kelsen, United 
Nations, 1950, supra note 105, at 136 etseq. For a discussion of Article 7 of the UN Charter and a 
typology of subsidiary organs see Santiago Tones Bernárdez, ‘Subsidiary Organs', in Manuel sur 
les organisations internationales 100-146 (Hague Academy of International Law, ed. by. R.-J. 
Dupuy, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1988) as well as Paul Reuter, ‘Les organes subsidiaires des orga­
nisations internationales', Hommage d'une génération de juristes au Président Basdevant (Paris: 
Pedone, 1960), at 418.
510 Tones Bernárdez, 'Subsidiary Organs’, supra note 509, at 118.
511 See Donald J. Puchala, 'The Secretary-General and his Special Representatives’, in International 
Organization. A Reader (ed. by F. Kratochwil and E.D. Mansfield, New York: Harper Collins 
College, 1994), at 278. As the UN’s Legal Council noted, *[i]t is the usual practice in the United 
Nations to consider ‘Special Representatives’ and ‘Special Rapporteurs’ as organs of the body 
establishing them..." (Opinion on the Appointment of Special Representatives, 13 April 1992, 
reprinted in The Principle o f Legality in International Human Rights Institutions. Selected Legal 
Opinions (ed. by B.G. Ramcharan, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1997), at 287 (my emphasis)). In the 
case of subsidiary organs established by one of the principal bodies of the UN, this responsibility 
may be discharged through the intermediary of the UN Secretary-General pursuant to Art. 98 of
the Charter (cf. Paulus, ‘Article 29’, supra note 143, at 553). As Tomes Bernárdez notes, 
subsidiary organs primarily assist the principal in the performance of his respective functions “with 
a view to facilitating the adoption/or the implementation of the decisions* of the principal. As a 
corollary, the functions performed by the former cannot go beyond the functions o f the 
international organisation concerned ('Subsidiary Organs’, supra note 509, at 141).
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monitoring, humanitarian affairs and genera) rehabilitation and development tasks.512 
Attempts to make the organisation more responsible to the growing demands of peace­
building were reflected in the SG's calls for a more integrated chain o f command and unified 
reporting lines, both at UNHQ and in the field. To this effect, he gave his SRSGs more 
authority and instituted a system of 'integrated missions’.513 However, a UN field Mission’s 
leadership (as part o f the UN Secretariat) remains accountable to the SG who exercises 
control over all acts unless the instrument establishing the organ stipulates otherwise.514
Discussing the relationship between the state and its organs, Anzilotti, in a development of 
Jellinek’s thinking on the subject, noted that organs do not have a distinct identity from the 
state (or, applied to our case, the international organisation) which they represent:
The intent and the act o f the organ...is the intent and the act o f the state. It is the state itse lf 
that declares its intent and acts by means of these individuals. There is no distinction between 
organ and state: there are not two different subjects, one o f which acts for the other; there is 
one single subject, the state, which declares and acts through its organs.515
Applied to the subject matter in question, it is the SG who is acting through his SRSG. A UN 
mission’s exercise of power is hence limited to the same extent as the initial SC’s delegation 
of power to the SG. As a corollary, the delegation of powers carries with it the concomitant 
responsibility for the way in which these powers are being exercised. This implies that the 
Security Council, through the initial delegation of powers to the SG, exercises overall 
authority and control over the decisions of the subsidiary organ.516
4.1.3 A Custodian’s Parallel Set of Duties
In order to synthesise the two relationships discussed so far -  one of agency and one of or­
ganic quality -  it proves helpful to employ a cautious analogy that centres on the temporary
512 See UNDP, Governance Foundations for Post-Conflict Situations: UNDP’s Experience (1999), at 
7.
5,3 In his 1997 Report Renewing the United Nations: A Programme fo r Reform (UN Doc. A/51/950, 14 
July 1997) the SG declared that the SRSGs should be given “authority over all UN entities* in field 
operations. For a comprehensive discussion o f the historical context cf. Espen B. Eide, et a/., 
Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations (UN ECHA Core 
Group, May 2005), at 10-12. Generally on the expanded role of the SRSG, see also the Handbook 
on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO Best Practices Unit, 
December 2003), at 9-22.
514 Cf. Torres Bernárdez, 'Subsidiary Organs’, supra note 509, at 141. For a comprehensive 
discussion o f the legal considerations relating to the delegation o f powers by the SC to the SG to 
establish UN peace-keeping forces as subsidiary organs, and the lim itations to their exercise by 
the SG, cf. Dan Sarooshi, 'The Role o f the United Nations Secretary-General in United Nations 
Peace-Keeping Forces', 20 Australian YIL 279-297 (1999).
513 Dionisio Anzilotti, Corso di Diritto Intemazionale (vol. I, 1912), at 126, quoted by Serení, 'Agency’, 
supra note 427, at 639, note 5 (italics supplied).
516 Sarooshi, ‘Role o f the UNSG’, supra note 514, at 292. For the argument that UN peace-keeping 
forces are UN subsidiary organs, established by the SG pursuant to  the delegation o f such powers 
by the SC see also his The Legal Framework Governing United Nations Subsidiary Organs’, 67 
BYIL 413-478 (1996), at 436-438. The adm inistrative model under the Dayton Peace Agreement 
is slightly m ore complex. As Stahn correctly notes, the High Representative in BiH is not a 
subsidiary organ o f the United Nations, but an international agent nominated by the Steering 
Committee o f a group of states, whose mandate has been approved by the SC (’international 
Territorial Adm inistration in the former Yugoslavia: Origins, Developments and Challenges Ahead’, 
61 ZaóRV 107-172 (2001), at 116).
*129 •
appointment, by a municipal court, of a legal guardian. Guardianship represents an 
institution which is similarly grounded in the notion that the public interest is best served by 
an objective party which discharges both her duties towards society (as an organ of the 
judicial system) and her obligations towards the entity to be protected (an agent o f the 
minor). The custodian owes a parallel set of duties both to society and to the minor. To 
society, the guardian ensures its interest in the well-being and proper upbringing of the minor 
so as to integrate him into society, but also protects society from the adverse affects of a 
lack of autonomous capacity (for instance, by representing the minor on the legal plane and 
guaranteeing the performance of any contracts he might have entered into, thereby ensuring 
the security of legal relations).
In an institutional analogy confirming what has previously been noted regarding the charac­
ter of trust operationalised through Article 22 of the League Covenant, the Mandatory power 
protected both the territory and international society through performance of the fiduciary 
bond. The simultaneous pursuit of public and individual interests by the 'guardian' is rooted 
in what we term his dual functions as organ and agent Ideally, the performance of these two 
roles can be accommodated where the two sets of ’interests' -  public international interest 
and territorial interest -  converge. The two functions can, however, also stand in fundamen­
tal tension with each other in case an essentially desert-based focus that the 'entitled' 
territory merits substantially diverges from a needs-based approach called for by the inter­
national community. In the case of divergence, dual functionality can aggravate a situation in 
which political authority is subject to gradual erosion. At its worst the 'trap of dual function- 
nality* exacerbates a dynamic that might jeopardise pursuit of the territorial interest to the 
same extent that it endangers the Staatengemeinschaftsinteresse, the collective preferences 
in the protection of one or more community values that underlie the strategic calculations of 
the international society.517
From the perspective of representation we may conclude that the internationalisation of a 
non-state territorial unit involves two discrete legal dimensions. Firstly, latent subjectivity is 
activated through ‘performativity’. This dimension is inherent in the agency framework, 
expounded upon in the previous chapter, in which a particular non-state territorial entity's 
preferences are pursued. The second legal dimension flows from the subordinate nature of 
a subsidiary organ that administers territory in relation to its mother organisation. Hence, we 
investigated the organic framework through which an ancillary organ of the international 
organisation dispenses temporary political authority in order to carry out the functions, and 
meet the needs, of the international community. Itself a subject of international law that fulfils 
functions ancillary to those of the mother organisation,518 the organ is endowed by inter­
national law with the capacity to act on behalf of a territory. The subsidiary organ/agent ex 
lege will therefore act in relation to those rights and duties vested in the territory itself and in 
relation to the mandate it has been endowed with by the mother organisation. These two 
discrete dimensions serve to frame the next stage of the argument which is mainly con­
cerned with the consequences resulting from an international agent/organ’s temporary 
pursuit of two sets o f ‘interest1: the public international legal interest it is bound to pursue as 
a subsidiary organ of the organised international community and the territorial interest it is 
mandated to observe as agent of a non-state territorial entity. Both the dual representation
517 Such instances will be discussed in the Kosovo case study in Chapter V.3.1
518 Cf. Mosler, ‘Subjects’, supra note 422, at 715.
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framework and the dual preference (or interest) perspective will aid our understanding of 
how the international legal personality of a non-state territorial unit is temporarily construc­
ted at the intersection of municipal desert and international need. The next stage of our 
argument consists in applying the dual preference frame to capture more succinctly the 
position of an international territorial administration, a hybrid body situated in the grey zone 
between purely domestic and purely international authority.
4 .2  C a s e s  o f  D u a l  Fu n c t io n a l it y
4 .2 .1  T h e  ‘D u a l  M a n d a t e ’
The dual functionality lens has been employed to analyse a variety of cases, particularly in 
the context o f states that performed ‘domination’ or trustee obligations. Consider an example 
from the writing on British colonial administration which suggested that “Europe is in Africa 
for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes, and of the native races in their progress 
to a higher plane; that the benefit can be made reciprocal, and that is the aim and desire of 
civilised administration to fulfil this dual mandate".519 The interpretation of the ‘dual mandate’ 
of colonial administration was, no doubt, substantially different from what we nowadays 
identify as the key objectives of an international territorial administration. The parallels are, 
however, striking as we recall Lord Lugard a question that reflected upon England’s 
assumption o f effective control over tropical Africa’s interior: “How has her task as trustee, 
one the one hand, for the advancement of the subject races, and on the other hand, for the 
development o f its material resources for the benefit o f mankind, been fulfilled?”520
The ‘dual mandate’ which Lugard expounded and popularised -  an essentially progressive 
outlook -  was given clearer and more solemn expression through the League Covenant's 
operationalisation o f the principle o f the ‘sacred trust1 as a basis for a new system of inter­
national supervision devised for the former enemy territories.521 Substituting the enlightened 
self-interest of a colonial administration with the Staatengemeinschaftsinteresse outlined 
above, we can draw fundamental parallels with the practice o f a fiduciary administration 
whose functions are performed both towards the metropolitan core and the periphery. As the 
High Court of the Trust Territory o f the Pacific Island held in 1967,
The Trust Territory...appears to be quite definitely o f a dual nature. It is certainly the means by 
which the United States carries out the major part o f its responsibilities as administering 
authority under the Trusteeship Agreement and its activities are included in the annual reports 
of the [US] administration o f the territory made by the [US] to the Trusteeship Council. 
Furthermore the Trust Territory Government seems clearly intended to come w ithin the 
meaning o f the words ‘ such agency or agencies as the President of the [U.S.] may direct or 
authorize” as used in 48 USC 1681(a) in providing for the Government of the area. The Trust
519 Frederick D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Archon Books, [1922] 1965), at 
617.
520 Ibid., at 606. For a brief discussion of the powerful impact of Lugard’s ‘dual mandate’ principle cf. 
Bain, Anarchy, supra note 18, at 58-63.
521 Cf. Hall, Mandates, supra note 177, at 33. The transposition of the ‘sacred trust’ conception from 
colonial possession to Mandate administration is well discussed in Charles H. Alexandrowicz, ‘The 
Juridical Expression of the Sacred Trust o f Civilization’, 65 AML 149-159 (1971).
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Territory appears to act sometimes as part of the Department of Interior and sometimes as a 
separate, though subordinate, body having a will on its own...522
Not unlike colonial and protectorate administrations,523 an international fiduciary administra­
tion will have to simultaneously pursue the interests of the ‘metropolitan core’ as well as 
represent the interests of a non-self-goveming territorial unit These two functions have, in 
the case of Mandate administration, been in conflict with each other. In his in-depth analysis 
of the 1919 Nauru Island Agreement, signed by the three future mandatories -  the UK, 
Australia and New Zealand -  establishing the British Phosphate Commissioners, Weera- 
mantry concludes that a clear contradiction between the duties and interests of the three 
governments acting through their appointed representatives became the legal basis for the 
administration of the phosphate industry for nearly 50 years: "[l]t will be self-evident that the 
interests of the three mandatories in obtaining phosphate at the lowest possible price 
clashed with the interests of the Nauruans in obtaining the best possible price for their 
product"524 Moreover, the Commissioners not oniy acted as suppliers but as agents for the 
purchasers of superphosphates in New Zealand and Australia -  a practice that had already 
been repeatedly criticised by the League’s Permanent Mandates Commission.525
4.2.2 The Allied Control Authority
Aspects of dual functionality have not only been observed in the colonial or Mandate context. 
The identity of the Allied Control Authority has also been described as dual -  it represented a 
German as well as an Allied representative organ and as such it acted as trustee, 
representing German interests while its trusteeship responsibilities emerged not from a 
explicit trusteeship title but through the Sequestrationsbesetzung. the assumption o f 
supreme authority following the Berlin Declaration of 5 June 194552® and its exercise in the 
interest of the ‘sequestered’ territory that lasted until the re-institution o f autonomous organs 
that would be vested with full powers. From the outset, the Allied Powers made it clear that 
the acts of the German occupation authorities were in law attributable not to the Allied States 
but to the State of Germany “which is accordingly deliberately maintained in being a legal 
person", with the occupation authorities constituting the German government, whether acting 
jointly or individually.527 This view was later confirmed in a memorandum of the Legal 
Advisor's Office of the State Department which opined that
522 Aligv. Trust Territory o f the Pacific Islands, [1967] High Court, Appellate Division, 6 1 ILR 88, at pp. 
93-94 and 96-97, quoted by Erades, Interactions, supra note 450, at 444.
523 The ‘dual functions' o f the protectorate executive, being on the one hand the political agent 
representative of the protecting state (and thus of the contracting of the protectorate treaty), and at 
the same time the single and supreme authority within the protectorate, ar briefly discussed by 
Kamanda, Protectorates, supra note 440, at 159-160.
524 Christopher Weeramantry, Naum: Environmental Damage under International Trusteeship 
(Melbourne: OUP, 1992), at 57.
525 Ibid., at 104-122. For Nauru’s claim for restitution in integmm see the case concerning Certain 
Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports [1992], at 240 
et seq., as well as the respective ICJ Pleadings, Ora! Arguments, Documents, vol. I (The Hague, 
2003), at 17-18.
526 Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with 
Respect to Germany, reprinted in Ingo von Munch, Dokumente des geteilten Deutschland 
(Stuttgart, 1961), at 19. Frowein provides a succinct summary in ‘Potsdam Agreements on 
Germany (1945)’, in 3 EPIL 1087-92 (1997).
527 R.Y. Jennings, ‘Government in Commission', 23 BYIL 112 (1946), at 122.
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there was from the time o f the conquest a military government o f the Allies, distinct from  the 
governments o f their respective countries though unilaterally receiving instructions from those 
countries... The [governments of the four powers] were neither individually nor collectively the 
government o f Germany. There was a distinct government of Germany, even though it was not 
German in personnel or origin....528
This legal construction thus secured the continuity o f the German state, regardless o f its 
debellatio,529 530*Grewe built on this opinion when he argued that
[d]ie Besatzungsmächte, repräsentiert durch ihre Kontrollorgane, nehmen damit eine eigen­
artige rechtliche Doppelstellung ein: sie üben einerseits die m ilitärische Besatzungshoheit in 
Deutschland aus, die ihnen nach überliefertem Völkerrecht in den Schranken der Haager 
Landkriegsordnung zusteht... Daneben besitzen sie andererseits die deutsche Staatshoheit in9 *  550
allen ihren Funktionen, die sie durch die Berliner Erklärung an sich genommen haben.
The dual quality of the Control Authority as an organ of military occupation on the one hand, 
and an agent administering the German Staatshoheit on the other, was recognised by the 
Conseil d'lztat In a series of decisions it held that the French occupation authorities exer-
£31
cised powers attributable to the government of Germany and not to the French state. 
Similarly, the British Government stated that, for the purposes of the United Kingdom 
Immunity Act o f 1878, the persons to be regarded as the government of Germany included
528 Memorandum o f 13 July 1950 quoted In M.M. Whiteman, Digest o f International Law (vol. II, 
Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1963), at 794.
529 Debellatio is defined as a process "whereby armed conflicts are terminated unilaterally by the 
destruction o f a party to the conflict as an independent organised entity" (Georg Schwarzenberger, 
International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (vol. II, London, StevensÄ 
Sons, 1968),*at 730. For arguments supporting the continuity o f the German state see W ilhelm  
Grewe, Ein Besatzungsstatut für Deutschland. Die Rechtsformen der Besetzung (Stuttgart: K.F. 
Koehler, 1948), at 16 and 17. Similar: Max Rheinstein, ‘The Legal Status of Occupied Germany’, 
47 Michigan LR  23 (1948), at 25 ef seq. (who refers to the "dual position of the occupying powers", 
at 27); Erich Kaufmann, Deutschlands Rechtslage unter der Besatzung (Stuttgart: K.F. Koehler 
Verlag, 1948), at 11-15 (arguing that Germany was rechtsfähig but not handlungsfähig); and Rolf 
Stödter, Deutschlands Rechtslage (Hamburg: Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftlicher Vertag, 
1948), at 82 e t seq.
530 Grewe, Besatzungsstatut, supra note 529 (with reference to the Berlin Declaration of 5 June 
1945), at 82-83. See also Kaufmann, Rechtslage, supra note 529, at 28-29 (arguing that conflicts 
arising from the ’duplicity’ o f the position o f an occupation force would be unavoidable). Like 
Grewe and Kaufmann, von Laun presented convincing arguments that qua m ilitary victors, the 
occupying powers exercised effective control over the territory which simultaneously constituted 
the govem-ment of Germany. The Control Council was a German as well as an Allied 
representative organ and as such it acted as trustee; i.e., represented German interests ('The 
Legal Status o f Germany’, 45 AJIL 267 (1951), at 284 et seq.).
631 This point is made by I.D. Hendry and M.C. Wood, The Legal Status o f Germany (Cambridge: 
Grotius Publications, 1987), at 55, referring to  the judgments of 29 June 1951 (Société Bonduelle 
case); 21 November 1952 (Association pour reconstruction à Paris et à Metz du monument du 
général Mangin case), 10 July 1954 (Keim  case); 15 December 1954 (Roucante case) and 15 
June 1955 (Groupement des scieurs alsaciens et mosellans case). The Conseil had earlier 
declined jurisdiction in cases concerning organs acting on behalf o f another entity. In Re Lurin the 
Conseil dealt w ith the High Commissioner o f the French Republic in Syria and the Lebanon who 
had dismissed an inspector o f the Merchant Navy and Fisheries who, in turn, applied for the order 
to be cancelled. The Conseil concluded that it had no jurisdiction: “Such an order is not an act o f a 
French adm inistrative authority capable of being reviewed by the Conseil d’Etat". (11 AD no. 32, 
12 October 1939, at 51, quoted by Erades, Interactions, supra note 450, at 441).
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the members of the Allied Kommandatura Berlin and the British Military Commandant.532 
The functions of the allied control machinery were seen to include, firstly, that of the national 
government o f Germany, and secondly, that of an agent jointly acting on behalf of the four 
Powers.533 The recognition of the dual functions of an organ of military occupation had, in 
any case, important implications for delineating the obligations the Authority was subjected 
to. As Grewe pointed out in his remarkable study, the simultaneous exercise of those two 
functions predicated the assumption of a dual set of obligations by which the Control 
Authority was bound.
Während die militärische Besatzungshoheit, die der Verfolgung der .m ilitärischen Notwendig­
keiten" (nécessités militaires) der Okkupationsmächte dient, in ihrem eigenen Interesse und 
nur m it einer im Völkerrecht, insbesondere in der HLKO, fixierten Rücksicht auf die deutsche 
Bevölkerung auszuüben ist, ist die den Kontrollorganen übertragene deutsche Staatshoheit 
umgekehrt im Interesse der deutschen Bevölkerung, wenn auch zugleich mit Rücksicht auf die 
Ziele der Besetzungspolitik wahrzunehmen.534
Hence the notion of temporary trustee occupation that the Control Authority undertook to 
perform in its second function as agent of the German government.535 The wider point here 
concerns the structural similarities between the condition of dual functionality in the case of 
occupied Germany and the 'de-sovereignising' effects of the application of the concept of 
trust with which we commenced our debate of the Versailles Treaty in Chapter II. The 
machinery of Article 119 of the Treaty employed to transfer the former German and Ottoman 
territories to the Mandatory Powers provides an instructive analogy. Like the fiduciary 
arrangements made in 1919, the Berlin Declaration studiously avoided any reference to 
‘sovereignty’.536 It spoke only of an assumption of 'supreme authority' (oberste Regierungs- 
gewalt) which is not without qualification: it is assumed by the occupying powers for the 
stated purpose of preparing "for an eventual reconstruction of German political life on a
532 Certificate o f the Secretary o f State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs dated 17 September 
1984 issued in connection with the case of Trawnik v. Lennox (1985] 1 W.LR., at 532, printed in 
55 BYIL 525 (1984).
533 Jennings, 'Commission', supra note 527, at 140.
534 Grewe, Besatzungsstatut, supra note 529, at 87 (italicised in the orginial).
535 The idea that all occupants are in some vague sense trustees is not new. Sir Arnold W ilson first 
suggested that "enemy territories in the occupation of the armed forces of another country con­
stitute... a sacred trust, which must be administered as a whole in the interest both of the 
inhabitants and of the legitimate sovereign or the duly constituted successor in title" ('The Laws of 
W ar in Occupied Territory’, 18 Transactions of the Grotius Society (1933), at 38). Sim ilarly, 
Sauser-Hall described the German situation as comparable to a Melle temporaire in which the 
military government would act ‘à la manière d'un comité de tuteurs, ou de trustees" (^ ’occupation 
de I'Aliemagne par les Puissances Alliées', 3 Annuaire suisse de droit international 9-63 (1946), at 
36). The idea that a fiduciary bond operates in occupation law has been advanced (albeit on a 
fa irly unsubstantiated basis) in order to exclude the application of all provisions of the law on 
occupation (and specifically the 1949 Geneva Conventions) in cases such as the Israeli 
occupation o f the W est Bank. See Allan Gerson, Trustee Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel’s 
Presence in the W est Bank', 14 Harvard ILJ1-49 (1973).
536 Kelsen shared the contrary -  indeed contested and, it is submitted, mistaken -  view, arguing that 
German territory, together with its population, has been placed under the ‘joint sovereignty’ o f the 
four Powers after its existence as a sovereign state had been destroyed and after debellatio 
entailed the destruction of “the existence of Germany as a sovereign state" (The International 
Legal Status of Germany to be Established Immediately Upon Termination of the War', 38 AJIL 
689 (1944). See also his ‘The Legal Status of Germany According to the Declaration of Berlin’ , 39 
AJIL 518 (1945), at 522).
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democratic basis and for [its] eventual peaceful cooperation in international life”.537 Similar to 
the concept o f fiduciary administration employed at the end of WWI, the Allies had, in the 
aftermath of W W II, assumed supreme authority in order to impose upon Germany a special 
and temporary regime without prejudice to the ultimate disposal of German territory and 
government: W hile its occupation went beyond the letter of the Hague Regulations, it fell 
short of the annexation or assumption of sovereignty.538
(0 Bona F ide Representatio n  by th e  O ccupying  Power
Once the fiduciary functions of the occupant are ascertained, certain legal consequences 
flow from it. They chiefly pertain to the preservation of the economic structure and capital 
assets of the occupied territory and its bona fide representation in external affairs.539 540The 
discussion o f double functionality in the case of Germany’s occupation has direct 
implications fo r our wider conclusions regarding the dyadic sets of interests a temporary 
governance regime is bound to pursue. We attempted to demonstrate that an organ 
temporarily vested with supreme authority over territory, needs to strike a difficult balance 
between nécessités militaires and the imperatives that flow from the fiduciary character of 
such a temporary regime. As a direct consequence o f the dual functions of an international 
administration vested with supreme authority, those imperatives -  what is, and what is not in 
the interests o f the administered people -  are determined by the same organ that would 
arrive at such determination as the territory’s agent. The special problématique o f the 
fiduciary sequestration of state power and its implication for the limitations to arbitrary rule 
was expanded upon by Grewe, and is worth quoting in full:
Wenn die sequestrierte deutsche Staatsgewalt auch im Interesse der deutschen Bevölkerung 
auszuüben ist, so entscheiden...doch nicht deutsche Instanzen, sondern...die Besatzungs­
mächte darüber, was als im Interesse des deutschen Volkes liegend zu erachten ist. Darüber 
können die Meinungen auseinandergehen, sowohl zwischen den Besatzungsmächten und der 
deutschen Bevölkerung als auch zwischen den Besatzungsmächten untereinander. Aber wenn 
es auch in das Ermessen der Besatzungsmächte gestellt ist, welche gesetzgeberischen, 
administrativen und wirtschaftspolitischen Maßnahmen im wahren deutschen Interesse erfor­
derlich sind, so hat doch jedes Ermessen seine unübersteigbaren Schranken. Ermessens­
mißbrauch und Ermessensüberschreitung (détournement de pouvoir) sind verboten.
537 Protocol o f the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference o f 2 August 1945, House of Commons 
Accounts and Papers, XXIV, 194(M7 (London, 1947), at 4, quoted by Richard L Merritt, 
Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945 -  1949 (New Haven: 
Yale UP, 1995), at 270.
538 Adam Roberts, 'W hat Is a M ilitary Occupation?’, 55 BYIL 249 (1985), at 269.
539 Cf. Articles 42-56 o f the Hague Regulations o f 1907 that regulate the occupatio bellica. For their 
partial application in the transition to an occupatio pacifica, see the discussion by von Laun, 
‘Status’, supra note 530, at 274, and by Grewe, Besatzungsstatut, supra note 529, at 118 et seq. 
Grewe convincingly held that ‘trotz des vollständigen politischen und militärischen Zusammen­
bruchs des Reiches befindet sich das besetzte Deutschland seit 1945 nicht im Zustande der 
absoluten Rechtlosigkeit gegenüber den Besatzungsmächten... Die Annahme..., Deutschland 
hätte sich durch die „bedingungslose Kapitulation“ aller Rechte und Rechtsschutzpositionen und 
jeder Rechtsfähigkeit überhaupt begeben, entbehrt jeder juristischen Begründung“ (at 148-149). 
The majority o f court decisions at the time, however, held that the Allied occupation after 
Germany's surrender was not subject to the Hague Regulations. For a brief listing of cases see 
Morris Greenspan, The Modem Law o f Land Warfare (Berkeiey/Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1959), at 215.
540 Grewe, Besatzungsstatut, supra note 529, at 152.
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A general observation, based on our earlier conclusions, would therefore posit this fiduciary 
function at the precise intersection of the Staatengemeinschaftsinteresse (defined in the 
case of German occupation as the pursuit of military necessities) and what we have termed 
'territorial interest’. A fiduciary administration’s function as the territory’s agent will naturally 
have to take account of the interests of the entity in statu nascendi. As supreme bearer o f 
German Staatshoheit, the Control Council was an inter-Ally organ of occupation which 
grounded its claim to effective control in the fiduciary duties of the occupant It hence 
exercised the functions of a German government; it issued German laws and the acts of its 
executive branch were acts of the German state. As a dependent territory, Germany re­
mained capable o f relations with third parties and continued to bear rights and duties. For 
the external representation of the territory, the ‘sequestration’ of German government meant 
that the Allied Powers were able to enter into treaties with third states for the period of the 
occupation, on behalf of the territory they represented as agents.541
The dual functions of the Allied Powers in the external field are most visible when we recapi­
tulate the practice o f the Military Governors of the British Zones of entering into economic 
cooperation treaties with the British government, which anticipated their registration by the 
UN Secretariat.542 Applying the framework developed in the previous chapter’s focus on 
external representation, Germany’s foreign relations were conducted by means of the 
machinery provided by the Allied powers as agents of necessity through which government 
was earned ou t543 Their performance of a fiduciary bond constituted Germany’s spatio- 
temporal legal personality under Allied occupation.
The arguments developed here, seeking to relate an entity’s partial international personality 
to the performance of a fiduciary bond by an international agent, are highly relevant to 
Namibia’s decolonisation process. Two caveats apply, however. Firstly, we do not seek to 
equate the functions of a military occupation power with those of a 'benign' international 
trustee who of course operates beyond the imperatives of military necessity. Secondly, the 
Allied Control Council’s exercise of powers was' not tied into a machinery of international 
accountability, as the UN Council for Namibia’s performance was. The task in the next 
section is therefore restricted to exploring structural, rather than substantive, similarities of 
the 'dual functions' o f an international organ/agent temporarily administering territory.
541 I.-1
The principles governing the conduct of foreign affairs were set forth in Control Council 
Proclamation No. 2 (20 September 1945): T he  Allied Representatives w ill regulate all m atters 
affecting Germany’s relations with other countries. No foreign obligations, undertakings or 
commitments o f any kind will be assumed or entered into by or on behalf o f German authorities or 
nationals without the sanction o f the Allied Representatives" (cited by Jennings in ’Commission’, 
supra note 527, at 126).
542 Abkommen über wirtschaftlîche Zusammenarbeit (14 July 1948), quoted by Hermann Mosler, ’Ein 
Besatzungsstatut fiir  Deutschland’ (review of Grewe’s book), 75:4 AdV 382 (1945), at 383.
543 The effect of the Berlin Declaration was considered by the English courts in the case o f Rex v. 
Bottrill, Ex parte Kuechenmeister [1946] 1 All E.R. 635 (K.B.), affirmed by the Court of Appeal 
[1947] 1 K.B. 41. In the course of the proceedings, the Court was furnished with a certificate from 
the British Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs which stated that the “Allied Control Commission 
are the agency through which the Government of Germany is carried on".
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4 .3  T he UN C o u n c il  f o r  Na m ib ia
The novel developments that were set in motion by the establishment o f the UN Council for 
Namibia can only be appraised in tight of the fundamental change of approach to 
international legal rules which accompanied the operationalisation of the Mandates system. 
As submitted in Chapter II, the Mandate system necessitated departure from the classical 
rules of international law if only because the system postulated the new status of two sorts of 
potestates hitherto not recognised in international law. These were, on the one hand, the 
individual human being exercising her collective right to self-expression, and, on the other 
hand, the organised international authority as it expresses the collective will of the world 
community. As the Court gave judicial recognition to the nexus established by the General 
Assembly between the inchoate ‘sacred trust’ concept and a contemporary definition of self- 
determination, it cleared out the normative space through which these two legal persons 
could become in direct contact with each other.
The UN Council for Namibia -  which represented both the inhabitants of a dependent terri­
tory as an agent of necessity, and the w ill of the organised international community as a UN 
organ -  embodies an instance in which these two new legal personalities connected within a 
normative framework consisting of both municipal and international dimensions. On an 
institutional level, the creation o f the UN Council for Namibia represented the vehicle 
mandated to effectuate Namibia's legitimate claim to self-determination by sequestering the 
trust that South Africa had disavowed with regard to the territory:
L’istituzione, da parte deH'Assemblea generale nel 1967, del Consiglio delle Nazioni Unite per 
il Sud-Ovest africano...costituisce il logico coronario della dichiarazione di cessazione del 
mandato esercitato dall’Unione del Sudafrica, e dell’assunzione di una responsibilità diretta da 
parte dell’ONU per l’amministrazione del Territorio.544
International law, it seemed, had given birth to a new relationship between a territory and its 
inhabitants545 without an intervening level o f state sovereignty. One way of understanding the 
activities of the UN exercising, through its subsidiary organ, the functions of a territorial 
government, is through the prism of a novel link between the territory -  entitled, as it was, to 
the exercise o f a right -  and the organised international community to which the territory 
sought access. The UN Council for Namibia appears to have discharged these response- 
bilities in its dual capacity.546
This duality o f status had been conferred by the General Assembly which specified the 
functions the Council should exercise, firstly, as a policy-making organ of the United 
Nations547 responsible to the GA for the over-all exercise of its functions and powers,548 and 
those it should undertake as Namibia’s legal administering authority. In this latter capacity, 
the UN Council acted on behalf o f a territorial entity for which it had assumed responsibility.
544 Barsotti, ‘Amministrazione diretta’, supra note 316, at 55 (italics supplied).
545 Cf. McNair, ICJ Reports 1950, supra note 173, at 150.
546 For a similar conclusion see Zacklin, ‘Problem ', supra note 330, at 309.
547 Cf. A/RES/32/9F, supra note 325, at §2(0-
548 A/RES/2372, supra note 340, at §3.
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In the former capacity, it exercised its powers on behalf of the organised community o f 
states.
This duality o f status had been confirmed by a number of UN pronouncements.549 The series 
of GA Resolutions adopted regarding the 'Situation in Namibia' made regular reference to 
the Council’s organic function -  e.g., monitoring of the boycott of South Africa submitting 
reports to the GA.550 As already noted in Chapter II, the legal fiction of recognising the 
Council in its two roles continued to operate not only in the framework of the interna! 
workings of UN organs.551 In addition, GA Resolutions addressed the functions which the 
Council should undertake “as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia until 
independence”552 -  e.g. the “promulgation of additional legislation in order to...promote the 
interests of the people of Namibia"553 or the Council’s representation function in international 
organisations.554 Its admission to membership of international organisations was not 
effectively challenged on grounds of incompatibility with its status as a United Nations organ 
and/or the legal Administering Authority of a territory. After all. it was not the Council but the 
territory that was granted associated or full membership of these organisations, as repre­
sented by the Council.555
This provides evidence for, and lends plausibility to, the argument that an internationalised 
territory vested with an organ to discharge its international rights and obligations, does 
indeed possess a partial legal personality to the extent that its (and the international 
community’s) needs can be better served. With equal force, one may take the argument one 
step further and suggest that, given the relevant public international legal interest, 
temporarily internationalised territories are capable of seeking membership of international 
organisations through an international organ. The instance of Namibia's accession to 
international organisations showed that, firstly, an international organ’s mediating activities 
through which a territory is granted access to the international plane is not incompatible with 
the former’s status either as an organ of the United Nations or as the de jure administering 
authority and agent ex lege of a territory. This argument is even more convincing if the 
international administering authority has effective control over a non-state territorial entity to 
which the benefits o f participating in international life directly accrue.
549 Cf., e.g., the statement o f the President of the UN Council for Namibia during the 1584m meeting of 
the UN Security Council, especially §78, in Djonovich, Resolutions, Vol. VIII, supra note 318, at 
362. This has led von Lucius to observe: »Der [Namibia] Rat unterscheidet sich von anderen 
Unterorganen der Vollversammlung: Er ist...zugleich, in einer Art Doppelkapazität, die gesetz­
mäßige Verwaltungsinstanz für ein Territorium* (‘Die Vereinten Nationen und die Beschlagnahme 
Urans aus Namibia’, in Festschrift für Wolfgang Zeiler (vol. II ed. by W. Fürst, 1987), 1939-1962, 
at 1953 {my italics)).
550 A/RES/42/14 (42nd), supra note 326, section A §80.
551 For the participation o f the President of the Council for Namibia in the meetings of the Security 
Council see, e.g., SCOR (XXVII), 1628th meeting, 28 January 1972.
552 A/RES/32/9F, supra note 325. Cf. Osieke, ‘Membership’, supra note 326, at 193, as well as 
Junius, UN Council, supra note 226, at 48-51.
553 A/RES/42/14, supra note 326, section A §77.
554 Id., section C §7 e f seq. Cf. also A/RES/3295 (XXIX), 13 December 1974. section Vl(1), which 
requests international organisations and conferences “to take such steps as w ill enable the UN 
Council for Namibia to participate fully, on behalf of Namibia, in the work o f those agencies and 
organisations”.
555 Cf. Chapter lt.2.3 (iii), supra p.86.
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4.3.1 Normative Content of the Council’s Decree...
The UN Council for Namibia was positioned at the interface between international and 
municipal law. By applying the dual functionality frame to the Council’s legislative pronounce­
ments, we seek to demonstrate that the normative content o f its decrees has differed, 
depending on whom the norm was addressed to (‘target audience’). This becomes 
immediately apparent when we turn to the areas in which the UN Council for Namibia 
legislated. Having obtained jurisdiction over the territory by the GA, the UN Council adopted 
Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources o f Namibia on 27 September 
1974.556 The instrument was adopted despite considerable scepticism on the part o f many 
member states who had already doubted the grant o f overall legislative power under GA 
Resolution 2248 (S-V)557 or who failed to see how such power could be enforced in the 
absence of effective control over the territory. Addressed directly to persons and entities,558 
the Decree stated that consent of the Council would be required for any exploitation of 
Namibia’s natural resources,559 and that resources removed without such consent could be 
seized,560 including the carrier, vehicle, ship or container in which resources would be 
transported,561 hence infusing an element of uncertainty into dealings with South Africa 
concerning the disputed resources. Any person, entity, or corporation which violated the 
Decree “may be liable for damages by the future government o f an independent Namibia".562 
As indicated in the text of the Decree, the Council entrusted the implementation of this 
enactment to the UN Commissioner for Namibia.563
In what can be seen as another phase in the gradual emergence of legal personality o f an 
internationalised territory, the instrument purported to have direct legislative impact inside 
Namibia and internationally. This enforces the preliminary conclusion that the GA had 
created an entity capable o f raising issues which may only be raised by states possessing 
international legal personality. Prior to making such wide-reaching conclusions about the 
extent o f legal personality, the nature o f the decree must be determined. Due to the dual 
nature of the competent legislating organ, questions about the decree’s position in form ative 
space (Rechtsstufe) are pertinent; so is the issue of whether the instrument had any 
normative content at all, and if yes, on what level.
(i) ...Within the United Nations Legal Oroer
A first approach to investigating the Decree’s normative content under international law
556 The Decree was endorsed in A/RES/3295 (XXIV), supra note 326, reprinted in 13 ILM  1513 
(1974). It requested member states to take all appropriate measures to ensure its fu ll application 
and compliance.
557 A/RES/2248 (S-V), supra note 124, pt. 11(b). charged the Council to "promulgate such laws, 
decrees and adm inistrative regulation as are necessary fo r the administration of the Territory until 
a legislative assembly is established follow ing elections conducted on the basis of universal adult 
suffrage". Chapter 1.2.1 (i) (supra p. 36) provided an account o f the confusion regarding the 
correct legal basis o f A/RES/2248 (S-V).
550 Not to  states, see Decree No. 1, supra note 556, §1.




563 For the role o f the ‘Commissioner fo r Namibia’ (to be organisationally distinguished from the 
Council) see Junius, UN Council, supra note 226, at 52-53.
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delimits the UN Council’s competencies as a subsidiary organ of the GA. Since nemo plus 
iuris (ad alium) transferre potest, quam ipse habet, the Assembly could not have delegated 
to one of its organs powers greater than those possessed by her. Since the GA cannot take 
binding decisions vis-à-vis member states, Resolution 2248 (S-V) cannot from a constitu­
tional point o f view, be interpreted to mean that the Council was empowered to make laws 
and regulations that would have bound member states in either their domestic legal order or 
in relations between states.564 Zacklin ascribes to the Resolution an ‘operative design’ that 
remained contingent upon further implementing action by the member states, therefore 
essentially attributing to it the normative content that a General Assembly resolution to 
member states would normally possess.565 Within the UN’s internal legal sphere, the 
functions qua constitutional authority of the Council -  grounded as they were in the UN 
Charter, various resolutions of the UN GA and SC -  related to the administration of the terri­
tory until it achieved independence. It is proposed here to agree with Zacklin who argued that
[w]ithin the Organisations’ internal legal order then, the Council for Namibia must be regarded 
as the sole authority with the power to legislate for Namibia, there being no other authority 
recognised as such since the termination of the Mandate.566
This implies that as long as the Council acted infra vires (primarily by not infringing upon the 
Security Council’s authority to impose sanctions), its decisions regarding Namibia applied 
within the legal order of the UN.567 *As Schermers puts it,
[the GA] can take decisions, binding on Namibia, as it can take decisions binding on its subsi­
diary organs ... [T]his means that UN decrees on Namibia are part of a legal order separate 
from that o f the members of the UN, but not necessarily superior to it.566
(ii) ...Within the Domestic Legal Order of States
The Council for Namibia had to look to the courts and authorities of the respective UN 
member states for the Decree’s enforcement Within the legal order of member states, the 
instrument was regarded as similar to the lawful acts of a foreign authority. It was subject to 
the 'public policy’ test which, given the vagueness of the notion, clearly left wide discretion to 
the national courts whether to apply foreign acts of a public nature.569 Based on ordre public 
considerations, the Decree’s ineffective was therefore assured almost from the beginning 
as the major Western states refused to recognise its validity, or the legislative and adminis-
564 For a discussion of the applicability of the Decree in relations between states, and the invalid legal 
basis of acts contravening the Decree cf. Schrijver, ‘Urenco’, supra note 314, at 40.
565 Zacklin, ‘Problem’, supra note 330, at 320-21, with reference to the 'operative design’ doctrine 
developed by the ICJ in the Legal Consequences opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, supra note 56, at 50. 
For a similar conclusion see Schrijver, 'Urenco', supra note 314, at 38.
566 ‘Problem’, supra note 330, at 321. Similar Henry G. Schemners, The Namibia Decree in National 
Courts’, 26 ICLQ 81-96 (1977), at 88.
567 That would have meant, for instance, that UNDP or th World Bank could not grant any loans to 
South Africa to assist the exploitation of natural resources in Namibia. For an analysis o f the 
limitations o f other UN specialised agencies by the Decree see Schrijver, 'Urenco', supra note 
314, at 39-40.
566 ‘Namibia Decree’, supra note 566, at 89. Junius derived from the ‘organic’ status of the UNCfN in
the internal legal order of the UN the obligation to recognise it as sole representative and 
administrator of the territory (UN Council, supra note 226, at 119 and 124-128).
569 This is essentially the conclusion of Schemers, ‘Namibia Decree', supra note 566, at 90.
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trative competence of the UN Council of Namibia to proclaim it.570
The general rules covering govemments-in-exile (whose status is recognised by the inter­
national community yet not by the illegal authority in situ), who are usually not permitted to 
enforce their laws themselves within the territory of another state,571 were deemed to apply 
in this case.572 In line with these considerations in 1986, the German federal government 
declined to recognise that the Decree would have a binding effect in international law and 
concluded that the government would not be in a position to transform it into municipal law. 
The question of whether an international obligation arising under the Charter automatically 
creates a domestic legal obligation without specific domestic legislation was therefore, in 
application of the ‘dualist’ doctrine, answered negatively in the case of Germany.573
(hi) ...W ith in  the  Namibian  Legal O r d er
Barsotti generally submits that the normative effects of legal pronouncements of the UN 
Council varied according to the respective organisational identity the Council assumed:
Le norme giuridiche prodotte dal Consiglio nell’esercizio della propria competenza a stipulare 
presentano non indifferente rilievo per un duplice ordine di motive. In prima luogo, perché 
sono l’espressione del riconoscimento concreto, da parte degli Stati, del ruolo di ente di 
governo della Namibia attribuito a l Consiglio. In secondo luogo, perché impongono precisi 
vincoli giuridici agli Stati contraenti, obbligandoli ad assicurare la loro cooperazione per il
570 For a discussion o f the Act o f State doctrine which served as a defence against inquiry into the 
validity o f the title  to resources removed with the authorisation o f the South African administration 
see George R. Shockey, 'Enforcement in United States Courts o f the United Nations Council for 
Namibia’s Decree on Natural Resources', 2 Yale Studies in World Public Order 285-341 (1975- 
1976), at 311 et seq. A defence of the South African position (and a critique o f the “dictatorial 
nature o f the decree") can be found in H. Booysen and G.E.J. Stephan, ‘Decree No. 1 o f the 
United Nations Council for South W est Africa’, 1 South African YIL 63-86 (1975), esp. a t 68 
■(referring to the dual functions o f the UN Council).
571 Cf. F. Oppenheimer, ‘Governments and Authorities in Exile’, 36 AJIL 568-593 (1942), 586-87.
572 Cf. Barsotti, ‘Amministrazione diretta’, supra note 316, at 133-4. Against their application Junius, 
UN Council, supra note 226, at 56-63 as well as François Rigaux, ‘Le Décret sur les Resources 
Naturelles de la Namibie adopté le 27 Septembre 1974 par le Conseil des Nations Unies pour la 
Namibie', 9 RDDH 467 (1976), at 471. The policy considerations underpinning the rules governing 
govemments-in-exile were, however, applicable to the Namiia situation. Talmon convincingly 
argues that if one questioned the representative competence o f an exile government fo r lack of 
effective control, it would benefit the illegal authority in situ and lead to the (at least partial) 
incapacity o f the former to act on behalf o f the entity (Recognition o f Governments in International 
Law. With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), a t 115. 
Courts which give extraterritorial effect to  laws of govemments-in-exile usually have to decide two 
main questions: whether the law in question is constitutionally valid and, if so, whether its reco­
gnition and enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of the ir state. For an in-depth study 
of the extraterritorial legislative authority o f a government-in-exile, including national case law, cf. 
id., at 233-238 and 245. For an early discussion of the question whether the United Nations, 
through the Council for Namibia, could obtain physical possession o f Namibian products and 
resources (despite not being in control o f the territory) and how it could establish its title  cf. Itse 
Sagay, The Right of the United Nations to Bring Actions in Municipal Courts in Order to Claim 
Title to Namibian (South West African) Products Exported Abroad’, 66 AJIL 600-604 (1972).
573 Cf. Bundestags-Drucksache, 10/5312, 14 April 1986, quoted by von Lucius, ‘Beschlagnahme 
Urans', supra note 549, at 1951. For a survey of the Belgian, French, German, Japanese, Dutch, 
British and U.S. American municipal legal system’s putative response to the enforcement of 
Decree No. 1 and particularly the 'public p o lie / aspect see the Report by the UN Commissioner 
for Namibia, ‘Implementation of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of 
Namibia. Study on the Possibility o f Instituting Legal Proceedings in the Domestic Courts of 
States’, UN Doc. A/AC.131/194' (1985), reprinted in 80 AJIL 442 (1996).
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riconoscimento e I'attuazione, nei rispettivj ordinamenti intemi, degli atti esecutivi emanati 
dall’organo di govemo del Temtorio574
While the previous observations pertained to the legislative acts o f the UN Council for 
Namibia as a subsidiary organ of the GA, a different conclusion is reached when taking into 
account the Council’s legislative competence within the territory, based upon the General 
Assembly’s entitlement to directly administer Namibia. Taking up this second function of the 
UN Council as a territorial government in whose capacity the Decree was issued, the 
Commissioner for Namibia submitted proposals, in July 1980, for the so-called ‘Uranium 
Hearings’ which aroused considerable interest in this specific aspect of the exploitation of 
Namibian natural resources. The Panel's conclusions, subsequently approved by the Council 
and the UN General Assembly, emphasised the normative importance of the Decree in the 
territorial dimension;
Decree No. 1, the first major legislative act o f the United Nations Council for Namibia, is a 
domestic law o f Namibia... Removal o f uranium from Namibia in contravention of Decree No. 
1, in addition to being a violation o f the domestic law of Namibia, has the additional effect that 
persons or entities which remove uranium in this way have no legal title  to any Namibian 
uranium which may be in their possession.575
While its normative range was doubted by individual member states (and its enforcement 
depended on the attitudes of national courts to this sui generis legal instrument), Decree No.
1 formed part of the body of law of Namibia, promulgated by the only authority which could 
lawfully legislate in that territory. As positive law of Namibia with Gestaltungswirkung, it 
would presumably be retroactively effective once an independent state of Namibia had 
emerged.576 Indeed, the retroactive effect o f these instruments might have shown its 
strongest normative force when the new government of Namibia was able to claim damages, 
based on §6 of the Decree, from persons and companies which violated its terms.577 
Regardless of the obstacles that Decree No. 1 faced in municipal courts, and their varying 
recalcitrance in applying foreign public acts,578 the deeper impact of a creative construction 
to activate international law in support of a territory unable to govern itself can hardly be 
overstated. In the process, the UN had created a body that exercised two functions and 
legislated with sui generis instruments. In accordance with the relevant decisions of the GA, 
the powers of the UN Council concerning the territory were exercised on behalf of the entity. 
This lends plausibility to our earlier assertion that the legislative acts o f the UN Council were 
acts of an agent through which the legal person of a non-state territorial entity acted.
574 Barsotti, 'Amministrazione diretta’, supra note 316, at 76 (my emphasis).
575 GAOR (XXXV), Suppl. No. 24 (UN. Doc. A/35/24), voi. III. approved by A/RES/35/227, 3 March 
1981.
576 Junius, UN Council, supra note 226, at 153. Cf. the GA’s continued pronouncements on the 
illegality o f foreign economic activities within the territory that would incur liability “to the future 
legitimate Government of an independent Namibia“ (A/RES/42/14, supra note 326, section A, 
§69).
577 See Schrijver, 'Urenco', supra note 314, at 41.
578 C f./'d .,at 43 etseq.
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RSsu m £: Weltinnenpolitik an d  the T em po r a r y  Identity  of Do m e s tic  and Foreign  Po lic y
The present chapter highlighted two aspects that advance the investigation of the legal 
proprieties o f an international administering authority. Firstly, we analysed the dual nature of 
the body that administers and represents a non-state territorial entity. The reasoning 
employed by the ICJ in its first Opinion on the International Status of South-West Africa, in 
1950, offered a first glimpse into the two sets of interests a fiduciary administrator has to 
pursue, when it stated that “(t]he Mandate was created in the interest of the inhabitants of 
the territory, and of humanity in general, as an international institution with an international 
object -  a sacred trust of civilisation".579 Secondly, we emphasised that -  flowing from the 
agent-organ’s dual identity -  an international administration’s legislative acts were capable of 
mobilising an increased normative content when they were targeted towards the specific 
local environment in which the organ was competent to legislate.
In its wider significance, 'dual functionality' -  which we observed in the cases of Germany 
under Allied occupation and Namibia under temporary UN administration -  is not a theory 
but a central analytical device to separate the functions, and two-tiered set of responsibilities 
of a temporary international administration. The preceding discussion drew our attention to 
the key actor in an internationalised territory and directed us to disaggregate the intersecting 
influences that converge around this ‘bicephalous’ body in its agency and organic functions, 
facing simultaneously 'outward' to the international community as its organ and 'inward' 
towards a domestic audience which depends on the agent to perform the fiduciary bond. 
Examining an international administration from a dual functionality angle has a distinct ad­
vantage over unidirectional explanations that conceive it as solely responding to a territorial 
need, hence dismissing the constraints imposed by the organic relationship in which the 
international agent is embedded. The frame applied here to exemplify the UN Council for 
Namibia’s dual identity gives equal conceptual weight to both organic structure and agency 
and hence to each of the two functions an international territorial administration fulfils. It 
allows us to comprehend that in its quality as situated territorial agent an international 
mission is constrained in its articulation by the operation of a fiduciary bond between it and 
the ones it governs. In its corollary identity as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, an 
international administration is constrained in its ‘domestic’ strategic choices by international 
law and the politics o f its mother organisation.
The incidence of dual functionality is not only capable of refining our analysis of the distinct 
sets of international legal obligations a fiduciary administration is bound by. It also allows us 
to make tentative statements which touch upon the field of international relations theory. By 
way of concluding our discussion of the construction of limited personality of a temporarily 
internationalised territory and the dual functions of an agent governing it, we shall take note 
of the curious convergence of domestic and foreign policy that we were able to witness in 
the operation o f the Council for Namibia. As we demonstrated, this international agent was 
situated at the exact interface between domestic and international politics and law. The UN 
Council for Namibia’s ‘foreign policy’ represented Namibian politics to the same extent as its 
‘internal’ policies -  designed to alleviate pressures on the Namibian people -  were performa­
tive of the public international legal interest. In case of convergence of the performance of 
territorial and international community interests, we encounter doubts as to whether the
579 ICJ Reports 1950, supra note 173, at 132.
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‘external acts’ of the agent/organ -  its ‘foreign policy* -  are indeed ‘boundary producing’ 
political performances that Campbell suggests to be central to the production and 
reproduction of a territory’s ‘identity1.580
These observations are to a certain extent capable of generalisation beyond the context of 
the Council for Namibia. Our investigation into the properties of an internationalised territory 
is enhanced by the imminent realisation tha t once UN imperium is established,581 the 
domestic legal order which the UN promulgates for a transition period is part of the UN legal 
system, but with reference to a specific territory.582 In such a situation, the international agent 
administering an international territory is the nexus between the fields of domestic and 
foreign policy; the conceptual duality between the international and the domestic has 
collapsed into agency. The graphic below identifies the position of international territorial ad­
ministration as the nexus between the territory and the wider community interest
By applying Scelle1 s doctrine of dédoublement fonctionnel to the political arena, we can 
account for an international administration’s simultaneous pursuit o f meta-national values
580 Cf. David Campbell. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics o f Identity 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, (1992) 1998), at 68.
581 What of course distinguishes the UN Council for Namibia from UNMIK is, apart from a different 
mode of conception, mandate and dissim ilar organic relationship with its mother organisation, the 
latter's assertion o f effective control over territory.
582 Cf. Ruffert, ‘Administration’, supra note 144, at 623. The import and domestification of international 
law into the municipal context o f an internationalised territory and the specific properties o f such 
temporary normative order w ill be discussed in Chapter VI.2.1, infra p.215.
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(international community interest) on the one hand and those value schemes connected with 
safeguarding the ‘territorial' interests on the other.683 The dual functions of an international 
administration hence relate to the performance of both the organic and the agency relation­
ship -  each o f which is tied to the pursuit of a distinct set of 'interests’. If, then, we under­
stand foreign policy as the matrix of representations o f subjectivity available at a particular 
place,* 584 we can cautiously approach the phenomenon of international administration as an 
instance in which the need to discipline and contain the contingency of the ‘domestic’ realm 
-  at the centre of the realist paradigm -  is, per definitionem, fulfilled.
Internationalisation of territory, in this liberal rendering, represents the mechanism that 
temporaryly transcends the ‘container concept’ of states, and with it the boundaries between 
domestic and foreign politics and the corresponding territorial opposition o f ‘interior’ and 
‘exterior’.585 The modalities through which, for instance, the yearly budget of an internationa­
lised territory (such as Kosovo) is passed -  both as local law through the representative 
Assembly and as a UN Regulation, to whose formulation the IMF and the World Bank 
substantially and directly contribute -  reveals the utter absence of ‘boundaries’ which would 
serve to differentiate domestic and international spheres of practice.586 Territorial inter­
nationalisation represents, in Keohane's terminology, an arrangement in which domestic 
decision-making by the inter-national administration becomes 'institutionally enmeshed’ with 
international legal norms.587 As a corollary, it is through international agency that the 
expression and representation of the composite entity’s interests takes place. Arguably, this 
administrative regime gives rise to a spatio-temporal phenomenon of an ideal type o f Welt- 
innenpolitik in which 'domestic' politics cannot be analytically separated from ‘external’ 
affairs. Perfect internationalisation thus creates the conditions under which the domestic 
public interest (‘territorial interest1) is projected against the ‘exterior1, while permitting 
simultaneous reflection of the 'international community interest’ to the 'interior1.
At first glance, these hypotheses reveal a disturbing inconsistency when contrasted with our 
earlier conclusions arguing that ‘discursive patterns’ and representational practices of an 
international administration construct international legal personality and produce boundaries 
between the ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ spheres. An attempt to accommodate this paradox 
would suggest that while the dichotomy between domestic and foreign policy appears to be 
temporarily suspended as an international agent/organ projects community interest onto the
683 For a critique o f Scelle’s doctrine as unable to distinguish between these two sets o f interests see 
Cassese, 'Scelle’s Theory’, supra note 502, at 219.
584 Cf. Mark Laffey, ‘Locating Identity: Perfoim ativity, Foreign Policy and State Action’, 26 Review o f 
international Studies 429 (2000), at 431.
585 For an account o f the realist container scheme and its inside-boundary-outside logic cf. Paul A. 
Chilton, Security Metaphors: Coid War Discourse from Containment to Common House (New 
York: P. Lang, 1996), at 79-119. For a critique o f such approaches and the continuing relevance 
o f boundaries as ‘markers o f security1 see Marta C. Johanson, ‘Kosovo: Boundaries and the 
Liberal Dilemma’, 73 NJIL 535-549 (2004), a t 543.
586 Cf. Rick Ashley, ‘Foreign Policy as Political Performance’, 13 international Studies Notes 51-54 
(1987), at 53.
567 Institutional enmeshment occurs “when dom estic decision making w ith respect to an international 
commitment is affected by the institutional arrangement established in the course o f making or 
maintaining the commitment" (‘Compliance with International Commitments: Politics w ithin a 
Framework o f Law1, 86 ASIL Proceedings 176-180 (1992), at 179). A more general discussion o f 
the temporary collapse of the dualist construction in cases of plenary international administration 
w ill be undertaken in Chapter Vl.2.1, infra p.215.
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domestic sphere and the territorial interest onto the international plane, ontological effects 
are still installed by way of those representative practices: the construction of the ‘foreign’ is 
made possible by practices that also constitute the ‘domestic’.688
While these conclusions pertain to an ideal-type international administration, this chapter 
followed a trajectory that outlined the phenomenon of dual functionality throughout colonia­
lism, trusteeship administration, military occupation and territorial administration on the basis 
o f an international mandate. The notion of the fiduciary bond underpinned all examples 
which illustrated that the more ‘international’ the mandate o f a territorial administration, the 
more pronounced its assumption of agency and pursuit of the ‘territorial' interest The 
tensions resulting from the simultaneous performance, by the same actor, of the functions of 
territorial agent and international organ will accompany our investigation into the properties 
o f an internationalised territory in the next chapters of this thesis. As we will see in the case 
o f Kosovo, both functions are integral to capturing the nature of an international administra­
tion, and both functions impose constraints and supply resources.




T he Extent of U N  Authority in Kosovo and the Problem 
of an O pen-E nded In stitutio n -Building Mandate
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first section investigates the status of inter­
nationalised territories in light of earlier conclusions. It places UNMIK’s administration of 
Kosovo within the normative framework that emerged from the dynamic shift from horizontal 
to vertical assumption of effective control, as presented in the firs t chapter. Further, it 
contextualises the specific findings by reviewing major constitutional and policy develop­
ments in Kosovo over the past six years. The second section aims to crystallise the findings 
of Chapters 111 and IV regarding the dual functions of an international administration and the 
partial personality o f the territory itself, applying them to the case o f Kosovo. We conclude 
that an international organ may indeed be torn between performing the 'interests’ of a 
territory and pursuing the collective interest o f the international community.
Intro du ctio n : T he U nited  Natio ns ’ Partial Imperium over the Territory
Two preliminary comments regarding the particularities of Kosovo’s interim international 
administration are in order. Since June 1999, the status of Kosovo in public international law 
has been the focus of heated debate among legal scholars. There has been an equally 
ferocious exchange of letters between UNMIK (as well as its component organisations) and 
the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Republic of Serbia, who 
have on occasion taken issue with an alleged encroachment of the right to exercise effective 
control (UNMIK) or the claim to titular sovereignty (FRY). Serbian state organs continue to 
claim that Resolution 1244589 enshrines their right to carry out certain state functions in what 
they still view as a Serbian province. Based on this claim (and in active violation of 
Resolution 1244), FRY and Serbian authorities have maintained parallel structures of 
government in the Kosovo Serb majority municipalities and enclaves, particularly in the field 
of health care, education, and justice. After June 1999,'some courts in Kosovo were 
relocated to Serbia proper and to the northern part of Kosovo and continue to function as if 
UNMIK did not exist.590 In the field of health care, the Serb Ministry for health has 
aggressively pressured Kosovo Serbs not to co-operate with UNMIK, e.g., by openly 
demanding health workers not to follow instructions of Kosovo authorities and withdrawing 
social benefits from Kosovo Serbs who work with UNMIK A similar pattern has occurred in 
education with Belgrade authorities effectively running Serbian language schools in 
Kosovo.591
589 S/RES/1244,10 June 1999.
590 As the Ombudsperson in Kosovo noted in his recent report, “Oust as (decisions and judgments o f 
parallel courts] are not accepted by UNMIK structures, Kosovo courts established by UNMIK are 
in turn not accepted by the parallel courts and administrative offices, or by the regular courts or 
administrative offices in Serbia proper" (Fifth Annual Report (2004-2005) (Prishtina, 2005), at 20.
591 Cf. the excellent OSCE Mission in Kosovo Report on Parallel Structures in Kosovo (October 2003) 
as well as Parallel Security Structures in North Mitrovica (21 May 2002). References to parallel 
structures are also made in Collapse in Kosovo (ICG Europe Report No. 155, 2004), at 7 et seq. 
When looking at practical aspects o f daily life, it might appear surprising that certain Serbian 
enclaves such as GraCanica, Strpce and Serbian villages in Gjilan municipality, as well as 
Northern Mitrovica and surrounding areas are still using the Serbian postal service and telephone 
lines that have continued to operate in those areas throughout the armed conflict to this day
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When discussing the notion of impenum, or effective control, exercised by the United 
Nations, we therefore deploy terms that abstract from the palimpsest of illegal structures and 
the overlapping footprints of public authority that continue to exercise influence on the 
territory. A second caveat may be appropriate. As a case study which draws from the 
theoretical foundations laid out in the first four chapters, the following discussion only covers 
the Kosovo’s institutional development until mid-2005. This snapshot of a process, along 
with the criticism advanced against policies that deeply affected the position o f an 
internationalised territory, might, in hindsight, look distorted or incomplete. But at the time of 
writing, the success or failure o f this experiment in international administration was a matter 
that still lay in the uncertain future.
5.1 Kosovo’s Status and Serbia’s Bare T itle to the Territory
‘(T]he mandate is the floor (but not the ceiling) 
for everything the Mission does. ' 592
When considering the establishment of an international territorial administration in the final 
stages of the a ir campaign, the United Nations was able to draw on two separate institutional 
experiences: on the one hand, the Mandate- and Trusteeship systems, and on the other, 
’complex peacekeeping’ operations. UNMIK’s authority was based on a Chapter VII 
mandate, within the spirit of transferring effective control on a vertical basis, without explicit 
invitation by the target state. It fell in the category o f peacekeeping operations, with the 
Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) providing the institutional anchor. On the 
other hand, UNMIK (much like UNTAET) was set up to operationalise an underlying doctrine 
of development concerning ’dependent territories’ which, exiting from authoritarianism and 
societal conflict, appeared to be defenceless and voiceless in a world order which had not 
yet granted them final political status. In interim arrangements, the UN and its subsidiary 
organs undertook obligations regarding what was once called the “well-being and 
development of peoples" from a “sacred trust of civilization’’,593 while providing the umbilical 
cord tying such dependent territories to the international community.
The resort to an international territorial administration to promote the existence of an 
organised territorial government raises difficult questions concerning the residual sovereignty 
claims of the former holder of ultimate authority over the territory. The answer to the question 
of who exercises administrative control -  or, in the words of Sole Arbitrator Huber in the 
Island o f Palmas case, the entity that engages in a “continuous and peaceful display o f state 
authority”594 -  is often held to be determinative of who is the titular sovereign.
(Ombudsperson, Fifth Report, supra note 590, at 30). For UNMIK’s (unimplemented) strategy to 
combat parallel structures see Michael Steiner, 'A Choice for Mitrovica. The Seven Point Plan' (1 
October 2002).
592 Jacques-Paul Klein, quoted in Simon Chesterman, 'You, The People: Transitional Administrations, 
State-Building and the United Nations’, paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International 
Studies Association (Montreal, 2004), at 7.
593 ICJ Reports 1950, supra note 173,at 131.
594 United States v. Netherlands, 2 RIAA 829 (1928), at 867.
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The first chapter of this thesis has examined the relevant body of international law, both 
state practice and jurisprudence of the Permanent Court and the ICJ, regarding the transfer 
of administrative capacity. There, we demonstrated that the transfer of administrative 
prerogatives over territory and the exercise of effective control by a protecting entity are not 
necessarily preceded by a parallel transfer, or even a corresponding loss, o f sovereignty 
claims. The following exposition wishes to build on this analysis in arguing that claims that a 
fully internationalised territory such as Kosovo constitutes a 'UN condominium’, a territorial 
extension of ‘complex peacekeeping’, or even an open-ended “protectorate...not dissimilar 
from the condition o f Class ‘A’ Mandates of the League of Nations, which were sovereign but 
not independent"595, are all in a certain way mistaken. The view interpreting the UN mandate 
to build institutions o f self-government as a manifestation of an alleged transfer of territorial 
sovereignty from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY, or, in the meantime, the Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro -  SCG) to the UN Security Council may be equally erroneous.
The term ‘suspended’ sovereignty has been employed in this context to describe constella­
tions in which a multilateral institution, vested with administrative prerogatives, exercises 
effective control in an internationalised territory. In such circumstances, it is argued that 
sovereignty is an empty legal proposition, or, alternatively, no longer an applicable legal 
concept596 We suggest that this is not the case. Chapter I demonstrated generally that 
'suspending’ sovereignty involves the transitory inapplicability of a sovereign entitlement in 
international law. Previous parts of this thesis have addressed this phenomenon that was 
observed as the notion of ‘tm sf became operational in the governance of the periphery 
following the Versailles Treaty. We also suggested that sim ilar processes of ‘de- 
sovereignisation’ were at play as the UN Security Council ‘vertically imposed’ UN imperium 
on East Timor with Resolution 1272 (1999). Kosovo, however, presents a markedly different 
case. The present chapter illustrates that the concept of residual sovereignty, and the 
pertaining sovereign rights, may well survive their premature obituaries.
5.1.1 Resolution 1244 and Its First Implementing Regulations
In the aftermath of NATO’s successful a ir campaign against the FRY which resulted in a 
rapid (albeit not immediate) withdrawal of military and administrative personnel from Kosovo, 
the UN Security Council addressed Kosovo's legal status in UN Security Council Resolution 
1244 on 10 June 1999. The Resolution establishes the framework and responsibilities of the 
interim international administration, which continues to exercise supreme executive and 
administrative authority. As one author notes, the Serbian government had, from the 
inception of UNMIK, understood that its dominum had been suspended and reduced to a 
nudum jus :
Formally, Kosovo will be a corpus separatum within the territorial framework o f Serbia, but in
fact it will be a separate state without certain external signs of statehood... In this way the
595 A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor, The United Nations System and the Kosovo Crisis’, in 
Schnabel/Thakur (eds.), Kosovo, supra note 155, at, at 303.
596 Yannis, ‘Suspended Sovereignty' supra note 38, at 1038. For a sim ilarly problematic conclusion 
(namely, that "sovereignty is not suspended; it simply does not exist anymore"), see Barbara 
Delcourt, 'International Administration of Foreign Territories and Sovereignty; Some Preliminary 
Reflections’, Paper delivered at the SGIR 5th Pan-European Conference (The Hague, September 
2004), at 12.
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fiction of Serbian territorial integrity is maintained... A high degree o f autonomy for Kosovo 
could only mean autonomy within the state o f Serbia, and not autonomy for itself, independent 
o f Serbia’s state prerogatives. Otherwise there would be separate statehood for Kosovo. But 
under the veil o f the UN, NATO has in fact created the State o f Kosovo.597
Resolution 1244 vested the SRSG and UNMIK with “[a]Il legislative and executive authority 
.... including the administration of the judiciary" over the territory and people of Kosovo, and 
the power to issue “legislative acts in the form of regulations" as necessary.598 Such 
Regulations would “remain in force until repealed by UNMIK or superseded by such rules as 
are subsequently issued by the institutions established under a political settlement”,599 The 
Resolution’s first implementing Regulation listed a series of main responsibilities which 
effectively self-institutionalised all powers that would normally be attributed to a state govern­
ment. Moreover, the Secretary-General conferred the final authority of interpretation of the 
Resolution, and hence of UNMIK’s mandate as such, upon his Special Representative, a 
power which had previously never been stated expressly.600
A deeper analysis of the operation of law in a transitional setting occurs in the next chapter. 
Meanwhile, we can, at the outset of this discussion, submit that in the case of Kosovo, a 
territorial legal system was established stemming from an international legal source.601 Since 
summer 1999, an international territorial administration has adopted norms with direct and 
immediate effects (i.e., norms which have normative content directly binding upon persons 
under UNMIK's jurisdiction, regardless of whether they correspond to a higher source of law 
such as the basic norm of Resolution 1244 or international human rights treaties), without 
requiring domestic incorporation. The rules set by international authority in internationalised 
territories are, by definition, part of the UN legal system, but refer to a specific territory.602
97 Interview with Ratko Markovic, Deputy Prime Minister o f Serbia, in Kosovo and Yugoslavia: Law in 
Crisis, debate forum on www.iurist.law.edu. quoted by Marcus Brand, Kosovo under International 
Administration: Statehood, Constitutionalism and Human Rights (dissertation on file w ith the 
University o f Vienna, 2002), at 82.
598 UNMIK/REG/1999/1 On the Authority o f the Interim Administration in Kosovo (25 July 1999), §1.1 
and s.4. The self-authorisation o f the administration contained in the first regulation was equally 
comprehensive in the case of UNTAET whose first Regulation stipulated that ‘,[a]ll legislative and 
executive authority with respect to East Timor, including the administration of the judiciary, is 
vested in UNTAET and is exercised by the Transitional Administrator" (UNTAET/REG/1999/1 On 
the Authority o f the Transitional Administration in East Timor, s.1.1). For a strong critique see Outi 
Korhonen, ‘International Governance in Post-Conflict Situations’, 14 LJIL 495-529 (2001), at 499.
599 UNMIK/REG/1999/1. s.4.
600 Report o f the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(12 July 1999), S/1999/779, §44. See also UNMIK/REG/2001/19 On the Executive Branch o f the 
Provisional Institutions o f Seif-Govemment in Kosovo (13 September 2001) which stipulates that 
the SRSG “shall have the final authority to interpret the scope and any other parameters of the 
executive responsibilities of the Provisional Institutions o f Self-Government set out in the present 
regulation’  (s.19). As Sarooshi points out, this power of interpretation is necessary for the effective 
exercise by the SG of powers delegated to him. Once his reports to  the SC are adopted, the SG 
w ill often use the report to provide evidence that the Council supports his particular interpretation 
of the way in which delegated powers are to be used -  which is precisely what happened in the 
case of his Report o f 12 July 1999. This means that the SG exercises a power of authoritative 
interpretation ever his delegated powers ('Role of the SG’, supra note 514, at 286-87).
601 Cf. Michael B* :ne and Thiio Marauhn, ’UN Administration of Kosovo and East Timor: Concept, 
Legality and Lim itations of Security Council-Mandated Trusteeship Administration’, in Kosovo and 
the International Community. A Legal Analysis 217-242 (ed. by C. Tomuschat, The Hague: Kluwer 
Law, 2002), at 228.
602 Cf. Ruffert, ‘Adm inistration’, supra note 144, at 623-624.
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These rules may be complementary to, and interlaced with, municipal legal provisions that 
have not been superseded by UN legislation.603 The direct applicability of UNMIK legislation 
is justified when interpreting Resolution 1244 as a legal instrument that ‘opened’ the legal 
order of the FRY, but not because of the ‘approval’ of the FRY expressed its Annex 1,604 but 
solely by way of its basis in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Its grounding in Chapter VII en­
abled Resolution 1244 to derogate FRY’s legal order.605
(i) UNMIK’s D eployment S trategy and  ‘P illar* Structure
SRSG Heekkerup envisaged UNMIK’s deployment strategy in four integrated phases. In the 
first phase, the mission would set up administrative structures, deploy an international 
civilian police and provide emergency assistance to returning refugees. Throughout the 
second phase, the focus would be on the administration o f social services and utilities and 
the consolidation o f the rule of law. In the third phase, UNMIK would conduct elections for a 
Kosovo Assembly and finalise preparations for the creation of provisional institutions of self- 
government while promoting the establishment of ‘substantial autonomy’ of Kosovo. The 
concluding phase would concern a final settlement of the territory’s status.606
Following Resolution 1244 and its first implementing Regulations, a plenary system of terri­
torial administration has emerged.607 As the surrogate state,608 UNMIK remains composed of 
a structure of ‘pillars', each reporting to the SRSG. Divided into four major components, the 
structure reflects the heavy dependence of the operation on the efforts and resources of 
various states and international organisations. While one pillar remained with the UN, 
namely the one concerned with the interim civil administration, the other pillars were 
distributed to UNHCR for humanitarian affairs, to the OSCE for institution building, and to the 
EU for economic reconstruction.609
More specifically, the UNHCR was put in charge of preparing the winterisation and humani­
tarian aid programme in the framework of Pillar I; Pillar ll/UN was given the responsibility of
603 Some o f the problems surrounding the subsidiary applicability of FRY and Serbian municipal 
status w ill be discussed in Chapter Vl.2.1 (i), infra p.213.
604 As argued by Carsten Stahn, 'The United Nations Transitional Administrations in Kosovo and East 
Timor A First Analysis’, 5 Max Planck U N Y 105-138 (2001), at 146. Elsewhere, Zimmermann and 
Stahn suggest, equally problematically, that by agreeing to Resolution 1244 and its Annexes, the 
FRY “ceded its administrative authority over the territory to the United Nations" ('Yugoslav 
Territory’, supra note 153, at 443). This interpretation is open to the critique that FRYs consent 
was void since its conclusion was procured by the use of force (Cf. Milano, ‘Action’, supra note 
138).
605 This re-states the conclusions o f Chapter I.2.2, supra p. 41
606 Cf. Ismije Berishie, Bernhard Knoll, et al., ‘OSCE Mission in Kosovo -  Two Years into Institution 
Building’ in International Organisations in Kosovo: Finding the Path through the Maze, 4 Favorita 
Papers (Diplomatic Academy Vienna, 2001).
607 For a concise study on the constitutional history of Kosovo and the recent attempts to build 
political institutions cf. Carsten Stahn, 'Constitution without a State? Kosovo under the United 
Nations Constitutional Framework for Self-Government', 14 LJIL 531-561 (2001).
608 This expression was used by the Kosovo Ombudsperson Institution in a study on the Compatibility 
with Recognized International Standards o f UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47 on the Status, 
Privileges and Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and Their Personnel in Kosovo (18 August 2000), 
and on the Implementation of the Above Regulation, Special Report No. 1, (26 April 2001), at 8.
609 See Report o f the Secretary-General (12 July 1999), supra note 600, §§54-109. The OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo was mandated by OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 305, 237th Plenary 
Meeting (PC.DEC/3050,1 July 1999).
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the civil administration and the management of public affairs (in particular, to revive health, 
education, and other public services); Pillar Ul/OSCE was given the portfolio of 
démocratisation and institution building (including the promotion of independent media, the 
organisation of elections, the training of a local police force, and a human rights monitoring 
brief); and Pillar IV/EU was put in charge of coordinating the economic reconstruction of key 
infrastructure and other economic and social systems such as the development of a market- 
based economy, the co-ordination of international financial assistance, and the resolution of 
trade, currency and banking matters. A fter UNHCR had left the Pillar structure in June 2000, 
a new Pillar l responsible for Law Enforcement and Justice was created in spring 2001. It 
was charged with ensuring the integration and coordination of functions that would under 
different circumstances be carried out by Ministries o f Justice and Interior and includes the 
Kosovo Police Force, the local judiciary, and the local corrections service.
The structure below illustrates the composition of the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) 
that operated as part of the Joint Interim Administration Structure (JIAS) between January 
2000 until the adoption of the Constitutional Framework in May 2001 and the holding of the 
first general elections later that year.610 Represented in the IAC -  the embryonic government 
tasked with recommending to the SRSG amendments to the applicable law and the setting 
of policy guidelines for the administrative departments -  were the entire Pillar Structure, 
headed by the respective deputy SRSGs, and their local political counterparts in what will 
later be termed 'dual-key’ governance setting.
SRSG
Jean-C hristian Cady 
DSRSG P illa r I 
Police and Justice
Tom Koenigs  
OSRSG P illar II 
U N  Civil Adm inistration
Pascal Fieschi 
DSRSG P illa r III 
Institution Bulding
Andy Bearpark  
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6'° For the competencies o f the IAC see s.3 o f UNMJK/REG/2000/1 On the Kosovo Joint interim Ad­
ministrative Structure (14 January 2000). The emerging institutions created under the JIAS agree­
ment o f 15 December 1999 are authoritatively discussed by Brand, international Administration, 
supra note 597, at 87 et seq. See also Michaela Salamun, Democratic Governance in 




It is not our intention to assess the success of this integrated 'pillar structure’ or its impact 
compared to the different institutional set-up in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It suffices to note 
that the purpose underlying the establishment of an ‘integrated* international administration 
consisted in the creation of unity o f purpose, the exploitation of synergies and the avoidance 
of duplication. From its inception, different 'institutional cultures’ and dissimilar approaches 
to phenomena of normative change have, however, hampered pillar-wide policy formation 
and implementation. At times, the incomplete integration of bureaucracies has also bred 
suspicion among international actors. As a recent internal assessment conducted by the UN 
remarks, the pillar structure created frustration over the lack of visibility for the accessory 
organisations while it also enabled them to ‘hide* behind the UN "without developing their 
own strategies within their areas o f responsibilities".611
UNMIK-wide strategies and the formulation of inter-pillar priorities had only seriously began 
in the summer of 2002 with the drafting o f a set of ‘benchmarks' against which progress in 
several key areas of institution-building was to be measured -  an optimal internal manage­
ment tool that was employed in a strategically erroneous fashion.612 Equally, inter-pillar co­
operation and co-ordination has been weak with joint strategic and operational panning 
being the exception rather than the rule. Apart from numerous duplications of mandates and 
efforts (the issue of minority returns613 as well as resolving property disputes614 primarily 
spring to mind), resurfacing discussions on ‘restructuring’ UNMIK and ‘aligning’ its 
component organisations has absorbed much energy. By taking attention away from the 
substance of the international mission’s work, this has undoubtedly slowed down the 
projected timeline for the hand-over of competencies to local institutions.
Interestingly, the military aspects of the operation -  what would normally be viewed as the 
more classical peacekeeping duties -  fall entirely outside of UNMIK’s mandate. Military 
aspects are instead the direct responsibility of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), whose 
Commander (ComKFOR) reports to NATO and whose Secretary General answers directly to 
the UN Security Council. KFOR is, as Zwanenburg correctly observes, a subsidiary organ of 
the North Atlantic Council. It exercises control through the Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR), who delegated his command to the Commander in Chief Allied Forces 
Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH).615 KFOR contingents are grouped into five Multinational 
Brigades which, although falling under the unified command and control of ComKFOR,616
611 ‘The Situation in Kosovo. Report to the Secretary General o ft t le United Nations. Summary and 
Recommendations’, undertaken pursuant to the UNSG Report o f 30 April 2004 (S/2004/348), 
henceforth referred to as the Eide Report\ Brussels, 15 July 2004, at 23. The frictions resulting 
from UNMIK’s m ultipillar structure are criticized in Ruth Wedgwood and Harold J. Jacobson, 
'Symposium: State Reconstruction After C ivil Conflict -  Foreword’, 95 AJIL 1-6 (2001), at 2-3.
612 For a critique o f the 'standards’s approach, cf. Chapter V. 1.2 (ii), inha p.163.
613 Cf. UNHCR, Critical Appraisal o f Response Mechanisms Operating in Kosovo for Minority Returns 
(February 2004).
614 See Leopold von Carlowitz, 'Crossing the Boundary from the International to the Domestic Legal 
Realm: UNMIK Lawmaking and Property Rights in Kosovo’, 10:3 Global Governance 307-331 
(2004).
615 Accountability under International Humanitarian Law for United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Peace Support Operations (Ph.D., Leiden University, E.M. Meijers Instituut, 2004), at 
48.
616 S/RES/1244 (1999), Annex II, §4. A special agreement was concluded concerning command and 
control of Russian troops. The underlying reason for such a complex arrangement is the desire of 
troop contributing states to preserve as much political responsibility and control over their troops 






















are responsible for specific areas of operation. As opposed to ‘full control’, ‘unified command 
and control’ only encompasses a limited transfer of authority over troops, with the authority 
affecting the soldier’s personal status and disciplinary action being reserved for the 
commanders of the respective national units. Even though it is generically provided for under 
UN auspices, national KFOR commanders have been granted substantial room for autono­
mous action, which appears to be subject only to coordinative efforts undertaken by the 
SRSG to ensure that the military partner operates “towards the same goals and in a mutually 
supportive manner".* 617 The interim governance framework established by Resolution 1244 
and subsequent vertical instruments has thus created an alliance between a UN Mission -  a 
subsidiary organ of the SG -  and two regional bodies (OSCE and EU), together with a 
separate military presence which encompasses a strong contribution from NATO.
Since the adoption of the Constitutional Framework (CF) by UNMIK in 2001,618 this system 
of plenary international administration has begun to operate alongside local actors. The 
document recognises the special internationalised status of Kosovo, arising from a 
disjunction of sovereignty and exclusive administering authority, or imperium. With a view to 
protecting the civil identity of the new political community, the drafters of the CF defined 
Kosovo as “an undivided territory* under interim international administration and an “entity... 
which, with its people, has unique historical, legal, cultural and linguistic attributes”.619 The 
document also acknowledges “Kosovo’s historical, legal and constitutional development"620 
while containing no reference to the authority of FRY organs in Kosovo. By determining the 
institutional structure and the power of Kosovo's political organs, the framework document 
lays the foundation for the transfer of administrative responsibilities while overseeing and 
supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions.621
Following the general elections held in autumn 2001, UNMIK has begun to transfer the daily 
administration of important parts of its responsibilities to the local institutions established by 
the dual key system of governance under the CF as well as under UNMIK Regulation 
2001/19.622 However, crucial areas such as external relations, law enforcement and justice,
Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on Human Rights in 
Kosovo: Possible Establishment o f Review Mechanisms (Opinion No. 280/2004, 60th Plenary 
Session (Strasbourg, 11 October 2004), at 4 etseq.).
617 S/RES/1244, at §6. Yannis comments that the '[djualism at the top of the command o f an 
international adm inistration...reflects the reluctance of key NATO states to place their m ilitary 
forces under UN command, which inevitably creates an accountability gap in the chain of 
command’ (‘Kosovo Under International Administration’, 43:2 Survival 31-48 (2001), at 32). The 
relationship between UNMIK and KFOR is succinctly discussed by Diana Rossbacher, Friedens- 
sicherung -  am Beispiel der Interimsverwaltung der Vereinten Nationen im Kosovo (UNMIK) 
(Hamburg: Veriag Dr. Kovai, 2004), at 168-171. For a discussion o f coordination between UNMIK 
and KFOR on an operative and tactical level, see also John G. Cockeil, ‘Civil-M ilitary Responses 
to Security Challenges in Peace Operations: Ten Lessons from Kosovo', 8 Global Governance 
483-502 (2002).
618 UNM1K/REG/2001/9 On a Constitutional Framework for Self-Government (15 May 2001). Cf. 
Bernhard Knoll and Kara Molina-Johnston, ‘A Rocky Path: Kosovo’s Transition To Provisional 
Self-government. General Elections in 2001 and Beyond’, in OSCE-Yearbook 2002, 8 Institute for 
Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH-Hamburg University, 2002), at 131 ef seq.
619 UNMIK/REG/2001/9, §§1(2) and 1(1), emphasis added.
620 Ibid., preamble.
621 S/RES/1244, §11(d).
622 UNMIK/REG/2001/19, supra note 600, The Regulation is o f a constitutional character, defining 
inter alia the functions of the Prime Minister and Ministers. It creates the organisational structure
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the protection of minority communities, and budgetary control remain under the direct 
authority of the SRSG. In addition to reserving certain competences, he retains the power to 
correct any actions of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) that he deems 
incompatible with Resolution 1244. As a vehicle to begin the transfer of substantial 
responsibilities from UNMIK to the PISG, the SRSG announced, in 2003, the establishment 
of a Transfer Council (co-chaired by himself and Kosovo’s Prime Minister) to decide upon 
the method and timetable to implement, coordinate, oversee and review the transfer of an 
initial list of 44 competencies.623 An analysis of the dual-key governance framework will be 
taken up again in Chapters VI. Prior to that, we will re-apply the Roman law frames presen­
ted in Chapter I in order to continue our investigation into the status of Kosovo in public 
international law.
(») Sovereignty  v . Imperium: A pplying  the in rem Framework
As a policy institution, Kosovo’s emerging international territorial administration was charged 
with taking over administrative functions from the FRY, in the framework of a loosely bound 
system. Its exercise o f imperium continues to depend on the coordination and cooperation o f 
a range of military, political, administrative and non-govemmental organisations. As already 
stated, the drafters of Resolution 1244 clearly refrained from recognising Kosovo as an inde­
pendent state and abstained from making binding determinations with respect to Kosovo’s 
future status in international law. The Resolution merely authorised the UN Secretary 
General to establish an international civil presence to oversee the “transfer of authority from 
Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement" and 
tasked UNMIK with facilitating “a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future 
status".624 In accordance with widespread legal opinion, UNMIK's mandate under Resolution 
1244 to perform basic civilian functions and to maintain law and order while simultaneously 
developing democratic institutions has, from its inception, meant the complete take-over and 
exercise of all executive and legislative powers, including the administration of the judiciary 
over the territory.625 The developments surrounding the transfer of effective control, and the 
United Nations' subsequent normative practice of self-authorisation as the holder of Kompe- 
tenz-Kompetenz in all branches of territorial government, underline the need to reconsider 
the discourse on the determination of Kosovo's status under public international law.
of the Ministries and introduces general principles of civil service. The Regulation was revised by 
UNMIK/REG/2004/50 On the Establishment o f New Ministries and Posts o f Deputy Prime Minister 
and Deputy Ministers in the Executive Branch (2 December 2004), which marked a transfer o f 
responsibilities to thee PISG. Further detail relating to the legal framework of the PISG executive 
branch can be found in the following documents: UNMIK/REG/2001/36 On the Kosovo Civil 
Service {22 December 2001); UNMIK/REG/2002/5 (4 March 2002) and 2005/15 (16 March 2005), 
both Amending UNMIK/REG/2001/19\ UNMIK/DIR/2002/10 Implementing UNMIK Regulation 
2001/19 (31 May 2002).
623 See UNMIK/PR/930 of 7 March 2003 and an internal O/SRSG Paper, ‘Terms of Reference, 
Tasking and Membership of the Working Groups' (15 April 2003). Parallel to the transfer compe­
tencies on central level, the SRSG announced the full devolution o f executive responsibilities to 
the most successful municipalities, and withdrew into a monitoring and oversight function. See 
UNMIK Internal Discussion Paper, ‘Transfer of Responsibilities to the PISG at the Municipal Level’ 
(12 February 2003). On 30 December 2003, the SRSG confirmed that all remaining non-reserved 
competencies had been transferred to the PISG. Cf. UNMIK European Union Pillar IV, Kosovo 
Outlook 2004 (Prishtina, 13 May 2004), at 6.
624 S/RES/1244, §§11(f) and (e), with reference to the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648). A dis­
cussion of the ‘open-endedness’ o f UNMIK’s mandate will be undertaken in the next section.
625 See the Report o f the Secretary-General (12 July 1999), supra note 600, at §35.
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The opinion that the FRY has “forfeited its ability to exercise sovereign jurisdiction over 
Kosovo"626 under UNMIK’s authority seems to have gained considerable currency among 
scholars. It is based on the understanding that UNMIK, as “the only legitimate authority in 
Kosovo,"627 628has responsibilities both vis-à-vis the population of the territory and what is often 
termed the ‘old sovereign’. Noting that the FRY has been “deprived of its sovereign rights", 
Stahn, for instance, suggests that for a limited period o f time, international missions 
administer a ’sovereign-free’ zone.623 De Wet describes the process of internationalisation 
as the “provisional transfer o f sovereignty of the territory to the United Nations...on the basis 
of the Security Council’s implied or customary powers".629 In an equally radical fashion, 
Ringelheim concluded that the establishment of an international administration amounts to a 
suspension of the FRY’s sovereignty and suggests that sovereignty over Kosovo has been 
temporarily vested in the UN itself.630
These propositions are incompatible with prevailing scholarly opinion that the United Nations 
cannot have territorial sovereignty.631 The proposition that the Security Council ‘swapped’ 
FRY sovereignty for UN sovereignty632 is also untenable. As already highlighted in Chapter I, 
the acquisition and maintenance of sovereign title depends, at least in traditional internatio­
nal law, on the presence of two distinctive elements: actual effective control and the intention 
to be bearer o f the title.633 W hile the element of effective control need not necessarily be 
concrete (as we have previously demonstrated, the exercise of government authority can be 
vested in another entity while a nudum ju s  remains with the sovereign), the most convincing 
counter-argument to Ringelheim and de Wet would recati that the United Nations, as an 
international territorial administration, lacks the animus possidendi upon which a claim to 
territorial sovereignty must be based. The UN, as an administrative authority, would pre­
sumably not harbour proprietary or other sim ilar interests in a ‘modem trust’ territory.634
Resolution 1244, as explained in the following section, tries to reconcile two conflicting
626 Marcus G. Brand, 'Institution-Building and Human Rights Protection in Kosovo in the Light of 
UNMiK Legislation', 70 Nordic JIL 461-488 (2001), at 463.
627 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(23 December 1999), UN Doc. S/1999/1250, § 35.
628 'Constitution W ithout a State?’, supra note 607, at 540-541. This argument is also presented in his 
Transitional Administrations’, supra note 604, at 119, and his ‘Orgins’, supra note 516, at 135- 
136.
£29 Erika de W et, The Direct Adm inistration o f Territories by the United Nations and its Member 
States in the Post Cold War Era: Legal Bases and Implications fo r National Law*, 8 Max Planck 
UNYB 291-340 (2004), at 331.
630 ‘Legal Status’, supra note 63, s.2.2.
631 Lauterpacht, 'Capacity to Administer*, supra note 42, at 409-13.
632 Paul R. W illiam s, 'Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolve the Conflict over Kosovo’s Final 
Status’, 31 Denver JILP (2004), 387, at 405-406.
633 Cf. the Legal Status o f Eastern Greenland case in which the PCI J held: “A claim to sovereignty 
based not upon some particular act or title  such as a treaty of cession but merely upon continued 
display of authority, involves two elements each of which must be shown to exist: the intention and 
w ill to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such authority’’ (supra note 51, at 
45-6).
634 For arguments that sovereignty could conceivably reside with the UN if it were to acquire 
proprietary interests, see Ruth E. Gordon, ‘Some Legal Problems w ith Trusteeship’, 28 Cornell ILJ 
301-347 (1995), at 342-3. The argument does, however, not stand on firm ground. Permanent UN 
territorial sovereignty seems incompatible with the broader objectives of self-determination which 
are at the heart o f the UN Charter.
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objectives: first and foremost, the realisation o f meaningful self-government mediated by the 
fiduciary powers o f an international territorial administration; and secondly, the preservation 
of the FRY’s continued dominium over the territory. Within the vertical paradigm presented in 
Chapter 1.2.2, the adoption of a Security Council Resolution, based on Chapter VII of the 
Charter, entailed the suspension of the FRY/SCG’s right to exercise residual powers during 
the period of international territorial administration. It also prevents UNMIK from any act that 
would render FRY/SCG’s sovereign claims meaningless in the long term.635 In short, behind 
the thick layers of the UN’s legislative, executive and judicial powers over the territory, there 
lurks the thin veil o f the bare title, or dominium, of the entity f.k.a. Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.
(in) C o d a : A C ase  S tudy
The conclusion that sovereign title is no longer a comprehensible legal concept in situations 
where international territorial administration assumes effective control is, in the case of 
Kosovo, erroneous. The following hypothetical case study involves a scenario that synthe­
sises a number of arguments made throughout the first chapter which sought to revitalise 
the positivist assumptions underlying the instruments used to divorcing title to territory from 
effective control (imperium). The assumptions relating to the first part of the scenario are 
informed by an ongoing debate regarding the extent and speed with which UNMIK should 
devolve competencies to local institutions.
1. Following a highly emotional debate in the Kosovo Assembly (elected to its third term 
of office in September 2006) on the issue of the continued monopolisation of key 
competences by the UNMIK interim administration which, according to a caucus 
leader, "continues to impede opportunities for self-determination by the inhabitants of 
Kosova", and the slow progress made in the Council for the Transfer of Competences, 
a two-thirds majority of the Assembly members decides to boycott the Provisional 
Institutions o f Self Government (PISG) until “Kosova’s final status is resolved in the 
interest of its people". In a co-stgned press release, leaders of the three most eminent 
Kosovo Albanian political parties declare their dissatisfaction with what they regard as 
an incomplete and slow transfer o f powers, particularly in the fields of external 
relations, law enforcement and security, to the democratically elected Kosovar institu­
tions, and announce a territory-wide referendum on the independence of Kosovo.
2. The Republic of Serbia is predictably terrified by the prospect of an independent 
Kosovo, and sees its continued claim to territorial sovereignty, reaffirmed by both
635 Cf. Tobias H. Inmscher, The Legal Framework for the Activities of the United Nations Interim Ad­
ministration in Kosovo: The Charter, Human Rights, and the Law of Occupation’, 44 GYIL 353-395 
(2001), at 365-6. Recently, it has been suggested that the UN organ administers the property of 
the former title-holder of sovereign rights over the territory “in the interest and on behalf of the 
latter' (Zimmermann/Stahn, 'Yugoslav Territory’, supra note 153, at 443). Another monograph 
identifies the FRY as Treuhandgeber’ (Rossbacher, UNMIK, supra note 617, at 94). Both views 
must be unambiguously rejected. In the case under consideration, this would mean that UNMIK 
acted in the interest of SCG which would not only contradict the mandate contained in SC 
Resolution 1244(1999) but also the primary objective o f an international trust: “Dem Begriff der 
Treuhand... [ist] der Zweck immanent, die zur treuen Hand übernommenen Befugnisse zum 
Wohle der Nutznießer, im völkerrechtlichen Kontext also der Bewohner des betroffenen Landes, 
auszuüben“ (Hufnagel, Friedensoperationen, supra note 104, at 213). This position is also suppor­
ted by the arguments advanced in Chapter III that expounded upon the agency relationship bet­
ween an international administration and the territory it represents.
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Resolution 1244 and its new republican Constitution (2003),636 637undermined by what it 
considers to be an ineffective and pro-Albanian international administration. In a 
petition to the UN, the Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) asks whether 
sovereignty over the territory of ‘Kosovo and Metohija’ (Kosmet) 'belongs' to SCG and 
whether it is entitled to re-establish effective control following a threat to its territorial 
integrity in the guise of a popular consultation that the subsidiary organ of the UN 
Secretary-General appears unable to defuse. The second question raised by SCG 
concerns the intended transfer of its sovereignty title if it is not permitted to re­
establish effective control over Kosmet SCG submits that it would, in this case, enter 
into preliminary discussions with the government of Albania with the aim of immedia­
tely transferring sovereignty over the territory to the latter, notwithstanding UNMIK’s 
continued exercise of effective control and mandate laid down in Resolution 1244.
3. Following an immediate response from the UN Security Council declaring the out­
come of a future referendum null and void, 84 percent o f Kosovo’s eligible population 
seem to have embraced the referendum -  unsupervised as it was by the international 
community. In an urgently convened meeting, the Contact Group confirms that it will 
not recognise any moves to unilaterally establish political arrangements for the whole 
or part o f Kosovo.
4. Rejecting the call from the SCG government to end international involvement in 
Kosovo, UNMIK affirms that it continues to implement Resolution 1244 by building 
local institutions until a political solution to the territory’s final status will be agreed 
upon. In the same vein, UNMIK dismisses SCG’s intention to engage with Albania in 
preliminary talks on the cession o f sovereignty over Kosovo in what it calls an “irres­
ponsible and cynical ploy”. In a written reply UNMIK’s Legal Adviser asserts that the 
transfer o f sovereign rights was “inconceivable since Kosovo was placed under an 
international administration which lim its SCG's ability of disposition in accordance with 
the principle of nemo plus tuns (ad alium) transferre potest, quam ipse habet
In this purely hypothetical case, we detect a number o f features that render the notion o f an 
internationalised territory more concrete and embedded in the context of international norms 
that continue to govern the traditio o f effective control over territory. Drawing together the 
threads laid out in the course of this and the first chapter, one could evaluate the case in the 
following manner
1. The claim to sovereign title over the territory of Kosovo has not been ceded, conveyed 
or transferred to the United Nations by Resolution 1244. UNMIK Regulation 1/1999 
merely confers full jurisdiction over Kosovo (imperium) to UNMIK. The transfer of im- 
perium  to an international territorial administration, a subsidiary organ of the UNSG, 
was based on Chapter VII which prevents SCG exercising competence over the
637territory (for example with respect to internal boundaries) during UNMIK’s presence.
636 Cf. Reinald Eckhardt, ‘Die Verfassungs-Charta der Staatengemeinschaft ‘Serbien und Monenegro” 
vom 4. Februar 2003’, 49:2 Osteuropa Recht 165-177 (2003).
637 .Ruffert, ‘Adm inistration’, supra note 144, at 620. See the case of the FRY-fYRoM border 
agreement discussed in Chapter VI.1.2, infra p. 200. Generally, it should be noted that the SCG's
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2. Notwithstanding its administration by a UN Security Council-mandated organ, Kosovo 
has not ceased to be part of SCG. The latter remains the titular sovereign, her claim 
having been reduced to a nudum jus in the sense that she is obliged to accept 
important restrictions to the exercise of her sovereign rights over Kosovo. A practical 
consequence of the sovereign’s interest in such a case is her continuing right of 
disposition, a significant proprietary right The existence of such residual sovereign 
title hence includes SCG’s ability to carry out an act of disposition, such as the cession 
of its sovereign rights to Albania. Until she has regained effective control over the terri­
tory, SCG is, however, unable to give what matters most, undisturbed possession.638
3. SCG can exercise its right to dispose of the territory by virtue o f its bare title qua titular 
sovereignty, for the benefit o f another state. Albania would hence acquire a title over 
territory, which is similarly reduced to a nudum jus. This situation is comparable to the 
acquisition o f a territory with a servitude or restriction in the interest of another 
administering entity which has juridical effect erga omnes and even binds successor 
states. Albania must accept the United Nation’s imperium as a limitation to its exercise 
of effective control in accordance with Resolution 1244.639 The transfer of dominium 
would neither affect the status o f Kosovo as effectively controlled by UNMIK, nor 
Kosovo’s internal power-sharing agreements with the PISG.
4. Were such transfer is envisaged, the states involved are arguably duty-bound to 
ascertain the wishes of the population concerned, by means of a referendum, or by 
any other appropriate means that ensure a free and genuine expression of will.640
Departing from the in rem perspective presented above, the remainder of this chapter
examines some of the pitfalls inherent in an ‘open-ended’ institution-building operation where
likely disintegration would not have an impact on the status of Kosovo. The Agreement on 
Principles of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro within the Framework of a Union o f States 
(Belgrade, 14 March 2002) stipulates that "in the event that Montenegro leaves the union of 
states, the international documents relating to the FRY, especially [SCR] 1244, would relate in 
their entirety to Serbia as successor'.
638 Cf. Schwarzenberger, International Law, vo l.ll, supra note 529, at 173.
639 Adapted from the Lighthouses in Crete and Samos case, in which the PC1J held that in 1913 the 
islands o f Crete and Samos were under the sovereignty o f Turkey, which therefore had the power 
to grant or renew concessions with regard to the islands. Though autonomous, Crete had not 
ceased to be part of the Ottoman Empire. Even though the Sultan had to accept restrictions to the 
exercise of his sovereign rights, “sovereignty had not ceased to belong to him” (France v. Greece, 
PCIJ (Ser. A/B), No. 71 (1937), at 103). Article 103 of the UN Charter is a primary source o f 
obligation for present purposes. It stipulates that in the event o f a “conflict between the obligations 
of the Members o f the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement", their obligations under the Charter shall prevail.
640 Cf. Judge Dillard who stated separately in the advisory opinion on Western Sahara that “it is for 
the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people’  
(ICJ Reports [1975], supra note 369, at 122). Cassese appears in favour of conditioning such 
cession upon a plebiscite. He argues that “any inter-state agreement that is contrary to the w ill o f 
the population concerned would fall foul o f the principle of self-determ ination.... [T]he agreement 
would be in conflict with jus cogens" (Self-Determination, supra note 222, a t 190). The contrary 
view is held by Brownlie: “[A]t present, there is insufficient practice to  warrant the view that a 
transfer is invalid simply because there is no sufficient provision for the expression of opinion by 
the inhabitants" (Principles, 4th ed., supra note 45, at 170).
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the future status of the entity in statu nascendi remains undecided.641 It first analyses the 
policy of conditionality through which an international mission propels local institutions into 
assuming ownership over normative change and through which it tries to measure their 
performance under imported ‘standards’.
5.1.2 From Benchmarking to Status?
You cannot stage the play Hamlet without having the scene o f the ghost 
in the same way, every time we meet to discuss Kosovo, 
there seems to be a ghost hanging around this room, 
asking us, what is the ultimate destination 
and how are we going to get there.’ 642
In the wake of NATO’s 77-day military campaign against the FRY, the adoption of Resolution 
1244 enshrined a minimalist consensus regarding the position o f a non-state territorial entity 
in international law. One of the tasks o f the international territorial administration was, as one 
author described it, to struggle to preserve the peace while “trying to balance between the 
Scylla of Kosovo’s independence and the Charybdis of Yugoslav's sovereignty".643 While the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity o f the FRY were reaffirmed, the strong aspirations 
towards independence voiced by the majority of the population were temporarily kept in 
check and mollified by UNMIK. As previously demonstrated, the Resolution vested the right 
to exercise effective control within the territory in a UN subsidiary organ, thus reducing FRY’s 
sovereign rights to a nudum jus. For want o f more original options of supra-nationally 
integrated sovereignty for non-state entities, such as a long-term EU trusteeship,644 the UN 
strove to defer the definitive investiture of a sovereign. It sought to freeze the dispute by 
trying to divert attention away from the international status,645 effectively leaving the territory 
in limbo between statehood and disempowered neo-trusteeship.
Rather than promoting particular statehood and self-determination claims -  as Resolution 
1272(1999) did with regard to the future political status of East T im o r-, Resolution 1244 and 
its implementing mission have been concerned with the creation o f organised political institu­
tions. Together with the body of law subsequently promulgated by UNMIK, Resolution 1244 
laid the groundwork for an outcome that has not yet been agreed upon. The Resolution 
stopped short of making the more enduring promise at the core of the UN Trusteeship 
system: that sovereignty, suspended as it was under fiduciary administration, would even­
tually be reconstructed along the lines of, and vested in, the actor newly established under 
the UN Charter, 'the peoples’.
641 Parts of the following section are published in my ‘From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo 
and the Problem o f an International Adm inistration’s Open-Ended Mandate’, 16:4 EJIL 1-25 
(2005).
642 Statement o f Singapore on the situation in Kosovo, 27 March 2002, UN Doc. S/PV, at 4498.
643 Alexandras Yannis, 'The UN as Government in Kosovo’, 10:1 Global Governance 67-81 (2004), at 
68. Timothy Garton Ash noted that those objectives combined ‘virginity and motherhood’ {‘Anarchy 
& Madness’, New York Review o f Books, 10 February 2000,48-53, at 48).
644 For the idea o f a European trust cf., e.g., Friedhelm Frischenschlager, 'Eine Europäische 
Perspektive für das Kosovo?’, in Jahrbuch für Internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2004 (ed. by E. 
Reiter, Verlag E.S. Mittler: Vienna-Beriin-Bonn, 2005), 349-372 and Thomas E. Grant ’The EU 
Must Take Over Kosovo’, Watt Street Journal, 25 August 2004.
645 Yannis, 'UN as Government’, supra note 643, at 69.
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(i) The G overnance  C hallenge W rapped in a  S overeignty Enigma
In the words of Wilde, contemporary international territorial administrations are framed to 
respond to two problems: the first is a 'sovereignty problem' regarding the identity and status 
of those local actors exercising effective control. In the second place, an international terri­
torial administration aims to solve the perceived ‘governance problem* affecting local actors 
which are deemed to be either actively opposed to a particular political agenda or unable to 
govern satisfactorily because of their insufficient anchorage in a democratic tradition.646 With 
regard to the international territorial administration in Kosovo, this chapter has so far aimed 
at exploring the ’sovereignty problem’ behind the creation o f an international territorial 
administration, and more specifically, the authority and status of UNMIK as well as its Pillar 
structure.
More than six years o f institution-building in vacuo have borne ambiguous consequences. 
On the one hand, the international community’s unwillingness to synthesise the dialectics of 
sovereignty and self-determination has not kept it from actively interfering with the exercise 
of sovereignty by suspending the administrative control o f Serbia and Montenegro. On the 
other, continued recalcitrance in addressing the final status of a UN-administered territorial 
unit has undoubtedly depreciated the UN’s political capital.647 648Echoing a widespread senti­
ment among the population, the former Kosovo PM Rexhepi made the criticism that “being 
ruled 5,000 miles away in New York is simply not working", adding that “with no road maps, 
or political deadlines, or sense of resolving their unclear international status as a non-state 
entity, Kosovars are fast losing hope’ .646
To dismiss such propositions as mere political posturing would be perilous. The spectre of 
West New Guinea -  an institution-building exercise conducted by the UN and designed to 
produce self-government that was aborted with the territory’s effective re-integration into 
Indonesia in 1963649 -  continues to haunt Kosovar actors operating in a political entity caught 
in the grey area between international personality and a legal nihil. What makes the situation 
in an 'open-ended' institution-building context so fluid is that the international agents of 'neo- 
trusteeship' lack a meaningful and coherent theory of how to build viable state institutions. 
They are unable to give credible assurances that a transfer of full effective control will ever 
take place. This severely circumscribes their capacity to exercise public power. As we shall 
see, this situation is worsened by the fact that a matrix of norms, rules, and legal practices 
through which an international mission could navigate the treacherous waters of an ‘open- 
ended’ administration mandate such as the one over Kosovo, does not exist.
In what will be remembered as his legacy to the UN-administered territory of Kosovo, a 
former SRSG, Michael Steiner, based the determination of Kosovo’s future status in 
international law on the idea that certain standards need to be achieved. In order to couch
646 Ralph Wilde, 'From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role o f International Territorial 
Administration', 95:3 AJIL 583-606 (2001), at 599. See also his presentation The United Nations 
as Government: The Tensions of an Ambivalent Role’, in 97 ASIL Proceedings 212-215 (2003).
647 The problem of political legitimacy o f a UN territorial administration mission is discussed in 
Chapter VI. 1, infra p.194.
648 Helen Smith, 'Angry Kosovars Call on 'Colonial' UN Occupying Force to Leave’, The Observer (19 
October 2003).
649 Cf. supra note 121.
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the transfer o f competencies from the UNMIK to the nascent PISG in a wider framework of 
responsible government, the SRSG, in 2001, instituted a policy of ‘benchmarking’ through 
which indicators were to be developed in eight areas of governance.650 As put forth by the 
SRSG, the rationale behind this approach was that Kosovo can only advance towards a fair 
and just society once certain minimum preconditions are met. Steiner argued that these 
standards mirrored those required for Kosovo’s potential integration into European 
structures: "It must be a democratic, safe and respectable Kosovo on the way to Europe.”651
The roadmap drawn up for Kosovo indicated mile markers but no direction. The policy of 
‘standards before status' was framed in the context o f an idea that has garnered increased 
academic following under the terms of 'earned sovereignty1.652 Its operational elements seek 
to formulate indicators of good governance through which progress of a polis is measured; 
local institutions are then to be shepherded from one mile marker to the next, from the inter­
mediate phase to the discussion of final status:
Rather than forcing the negotiating parties to determine during negotiations whether the sub­
state entity may or may not be capable or allowed to exist as an independent state, earned 
sovereignty allows the parties to make evaluations of the effect o f independence on the parent 
state as w ell as [the] emerging state's success at meeting certain benchmarks before deter* 
ining [the] final status.653
The benefits of this conditionality policy accrued in the provision of opportunities for the 
parties to agree on basic requirements that the nascent entity must meet during a transition- 
nal phase in order to qualify for such discussion.
650 These areas are: the democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, returns and 
reintegration, economy, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the Kosovo Protection Corps. 
See ‘UMIK Benchmark Implementation Plan, April 2004', as well as the notes from ‘UNMIK’s Du­
brovnik Retreat Between 21-22 April 2002’. The latest version o f the 'Kosovo Standards Imple- 
enation Plan’ (KSIP) meanwhile comprises 120 pages.
651 Address to the UN Security Council by Michael Steiner (UNMIK Press Release, 30 July 2002). 
Steiner continued: "I offer this to the Council as an exit strategy which is, in reality, an entry 
strategy into the European integration process. Since the EU-Westem Balkan Summit of 2003 in 
Thessaloniki, such appeals to the territory’s European destiny have been regularly employed as 
part o f the IC’s rhetoric machinery in order to exhort civic virtues in the absence o f a nation state. 
Cf., recently, the invocation of 'standards’ as the 'admission tickets’ for Europe in the 
Commission’s Communication ‘A European Future for Kosovo’ (20 April 2005) and UNMIK SRSG 
Jessen-Petersen’s speech to the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 10 February 2005.
652 Generally, see James R. Hooper and Paul R. W illiams, 'Earned Sovereignty: The Political Di­
mension’, 31 Denver JILP 355 (2004); Michael P. Scharf, ‘Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Under­
pinnings’, 31 Denver JILP 373 (2004); Karen Heymann, ’Earned Sovereignty for Kashmir: The 
Legal Methodology to Avoiding a Nuclear Holocaust’, 19 American University ILR 153 (2003); and 
Paul R. W illiam s and Francesca J. Peed, 'Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap Between 
Sovereignty and Self-Determination’, 40 Stanford JIL 347 (2004), and Williams, 'Earned 
Sovereignty’, supra note 632.
653 Paul R. W illiam s, Michael P. Scharf and James R. Hooper, 'Resolving Sovereignty-Based 
Conflicts: The Emerging Approach of Earned Sovereignty’, 31 Denver JILP 349 (2004), at 438. Cf. 
also Robert O. Keohane, ‘Political Authority after Intervention: Gradations in Sovereignty1, in 
Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (ed. by J.L. Holzgrefe and R. 
Keohane, CUP 2003), at 290. The idea was initially spurred on in the context of the proposal of 
the 'Goldstone Commission'. Cf. the two reports by the International Commission o f Kosovo: First, 
The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (2000) and, second, The 
Follow-Up Report: Why Conditional Independence? (2001).
( ii) Of R o adm aps  and Roadblocks: T he ‘Earned Sovereignty’ A pproach
As a policy instrument, 'benchmarking' hardly represented a novel tool for aiding the 
determination of a territory’s status. Attempts at the ‘standardisation’ o f the local environment 
had formed an elaborate practice within the Trusteeship system under which the UN 
collected full Information on whether the administrating authority had implemented 
obligations assumed under the Trusteeship Agreement Covering issues such as political 
and economic development, public finance and taxation, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, public health and educational advancement, the Trusteeship Council’s 
‘Questionnaire’ provided a matrix against which progress of the native population was to be 
measured.654 In its modem embodiment, conditionalities requiring states to undertake 
specific economic and political reforms in exchange for economic aid have been adopted as 
key policy tools by the World Bank and the IMF.655 Similarly, UNMIK’s development of 
'standards’ clearly emulates the Brussels Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC) of 2000, in which specific benchmarks were established to measure the performance 
of Bosnian institutions.656
UNMIK has presented regular baseline reports to the UN Security Council on the implement- 
tation of ‘benchmarks’ since summer 2002. Until 2003, however, the process remained an 
exercise that lacking local ownership and served more as an internal managerial tool than a 
policy adopted by the local provisional institutions. Since early 2003, the benchmark process 
has been reinforced by the Tracking Mechanism for Kosovo, through which the European
654 Cf. Chowdhuri, Mandates, supra note 163, at 202-203. The UN machinery employed in the 
process of decolonisation emulated a process through which the European centre made the 
provision of international legal rights and capacities contingent on the fulfilment o f certain 
‘standards of civilization’. The 19th century hence saw a reinforcement o f the boundaries between 
‘civilized’, ‘semi-‘ and ‘uncivilized’ countries which qualified only for partial membership in the 
international society. Cf. Gong, Standard, supra note 223, at 5-6.
655 There is an extensive literature on lending conditionality in developing economies. See, e.g., 
Gordon Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Refomr. A Comparative Analysis o f Democracy 
Assistance and Political Conditionality (Basingstroke: Palgrave, 2001); Tony Killick, Aid and the 
Political Economy o f Policy Change (London: Routledge/ODI, 1998); Olav Stokke, Aid and 
Political Conditionality (London: Frank Cass, 1995); Georg Sorenson (ed.), Political Conditionality 
(London: Frank Cass, 1993). Since the early 1990s, reforms in EU applicant countries have 
similarly been dictated by ‘conditionality1, a set o f relatively opaque requirements that had to be 
met if a state were to qualify for membership. The vast literature on this topic cannot be 
reproduced here. Cf., eg, Heather Grabbe, ‘European Union Conditionality and the Acquis 
Communautaire*, 23:3 International Political Science Review 249-268 (2002). For a discussion on 
the ways in which ‘benchmarking’ directly affects governance in candidate countries and gradually 
changes institutional practices and behavioural standards, see id., 'How Does Europeanization 
Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity’, 8:6 Journal o f European Public 
Policy 1013-1031 (2001), at 1022. The SAP towards the Western Balkan countries is reviewed by 
Christian Pippan, ‘The Rocky Road to Europe: The EU's Stabilisation and Association Process for 
the Western Balkans and the Principle of Conditionality’, 9 European Foreign Affairs R 219-245 
(2004), and Bartlomiej Kaminski and Manuel de la Rocha, Stabilisation and Association Process 
in the Balkans: Integration Options and their Assessment (World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 3108, August 2003). For an in-depth comparison of SSAs (specifically those concluded with 
fYRoM and Croatia) with the Europe Agreements, cf. David Phinnemore, 'Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements: Europe Agreements for the Western Balkans?', 8 European Foreign 
Affairs R 77-103 (2003). The passive approach taken by the Proposal for a Council Regulation 
Establishing an Instmment for Pre-Accession Assistance (presented by the Commission, 
COM(2004) 627 final, Brussels, 29 September 2004) is powerfully criticised in European Stability 
Intiative, Breaking Out of the Balkan Ghetto: Why IPA Should Be Changed (Berlin, 1 June 2005).
656 Cf. Declaration o f the Peace Implementation Council as well its Annex (Brussels, 24 May 2000) 
and European Stability Initiative, Turning Point: The Bmssels PIC Declaration and State-Building 
Agenda for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 June 2000.
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Commission tracks the development of, and provides sector-specific recommendations for, 
different policy areas as part of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for Serbia 
and Montenegro.657 Under the Tracking Mechanism, Kosovo is obliged to gradually bring its 
legislation and institutions into line with the EU acquis, and receives access to the EU 
market in return.658 A real turning point came in November 2003, when the US announced a 
new initiative on behalf of the Contact Group nations, promising a review of Kosovo’s status 
in mid-2005 if a set of specified standards on governance and treatment of ethnic minorities 
was achieved by that date. The SC-endorsed ‘Standards for Kosovo’ plan, flowing from the 
Contact Group initiative, established five jo in t UNMIK-PISG working groups to plan and 
coordinate the fulfilment of the standards to be evaluated by UNMIK in quarterly reports to 
the SC via the SG.
Conditioning final status talks on the fulfilm ent of a bundle of ‘standards’ provoked criticism 
not only from local political leaders, but also from international commentators, who argued 
that the task o f institution building is made more complex in an environment of suspended 
sovereignty.659 Strikingly, the policy does not link a particular future territorial status to the 
fulfilment of such conditions. Rather, it makes the fulfilment of standards a condition for 
commencing discussions over that status. More worryingly, Kosovo’s political institutions are 
asked to meet standards that are not under their control but under that of UNMIK and of 
Serbia. The dismantling of parallel structures that continue to be financed by Belgrade660 
does not fall to the responsibility of local Kosovo actors, but to Serbia.661 A lack of “progress 
in resolving practical issues of mutual concern" in the dialogue with Belgrade662 should not 
be held against the PISG. Similarly, as discussed below, the privatisation and liquidation of 
socially owned enterprises remains a ‘reserved competence’ o f UNMIK, without meaningful 
participation o f Kosovo institutions.663 The same reasoning applies to the reform o f the 
justice system, which is under the authority of UNMIK's Justice/Police component pillar.664
The concrete experience of institution building in Kosovo, discussed in the next section, 
suggests that an approach based on the fulfilment of what were once named ‘standards of
657 The SAP Tracking Mechanism is a technical working group co-chaired by the European 
Commission, UNMIK and the PISG. Commission Staff Working Paper, Serbia and Montenegro. 
Stabilisation and Association Report, Brussels, SEC(2003). For a more general introduction into 
the EU's CARDS programme and the SAp process see two papers o f the European 
Commission/DG RELEX, CARDS Assistance Programme to the Western Balkans: Regional 
Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia Country Strategy Paper 2002- 
2006 (Directorate Western Balkans, Brussels 2002). Cf. also Chris Patten, EU Strategy in the 
Balkans (International Crisis Group, 10 July 2001); European Stability Initiative, Western Balkans 
2004. Assistance, Cohesion and the New Boundaries o f Europe (3 November 2002); International 
Crisis Group, Thessaloniki and After (III): The EU and Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo (Balkans 
Briefing 20 June 2003); Wim van Meurs and Alexandras Yannis, The European Union and the 
Balkans. From Stabilisation Process to Southeastern Enlargement (Centrum fur angewandte 
Politikforschung, September 2002).
658 Cf. Andreas Wittkowski, Next Step for Kosovo’s  Medium-Term Economic Development (UNMIK 
Pillar IV, 31 January 2003), at 3.
659 On a strategy o f 'standards w ith status’ see Janusz Bugajski, et a!., Achieving a Final Status 
Settlement for Kosovo (Center fo r Strategic and International Studies, April 2003), at 6 etseq.
For parallel structures cf. the introduction to th is Chapter and notes 590 and 591.
661 But cf. Standard 1.17 of the KSIP, supra note 650, at 21.
662 Standard VII.3 o f the KSIP, at 109.
663 But see Standard V.5 of the KSIP, at 81.
664 As correctly noted by Dominik Zaum, ‘Letter to the Editor', Financial Times, 24 March 2004.
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civilization’ might bear the seed of its own undoing. Policies of conditionality, devised to 
make the spectre of nominal sovereignty, or independent statehood, disappear from the 
daily political business, have so far not amounted to the long-term consolidation of gains 
from 'humanitarian intervention' in the socio-economic stabilisation, and improvement of 
domestic governance capacity, of Kosovo. In what can be seen as a severe backlash to a 
conditionality policy directed at an internationalised territory, the Eide Report, submitted to 
the UN Secretary-General in summer 2004, recommended the immediate replacement of 
the 'standards’ strategy for Kosovo with a more 'dynamic' approach.665 In June 2005, this 
changed approach led to the appointment of a Special Envoy (Amb. Eide, author of the initial 
assessment) who was charged with conducting a comprehensive review of the standards 
and with an assessment of the conditions for the “possible next steps in the process".666
5 .2  U N M IK  a s  T e r r it o r ia l  A g e n t  a n d  UN Or g an
You gave us freedom, but not a fu tu re 667
The objective of the second part o f this chapter is to examine certain aspects of the dual- 
faceted role of the UN in administering territory and the inherent constraints presented by an 
open-ended mandate. In this undertaking, we draw on the theoretical discussions presented 
in Chapter IV (on the dual functions of an international administration). A memo to Kosovo’s 
Prime Minister provides a field for the practical application of the conclusions reached in 
Chapter III. The external representation function of an international administration acting on 
behalf of a non-state territorial entity as an agent of necessity is addressed, considering 
recent and little known developments and suggesting that UNMIK's practice supports the 
argument that internationalised territories possess limited international legal personality. 
Section 5.2.2 will then examine UNMIK’s performance of the 'international public interest 
which it pursues as a subsidiary organ of the UN. The example of the privatisation o f public 
assets by UNMIK illustrates the difficulties of balancing these competing interests. The 
chapter concludes that an international territorial agent’s ability to contribute to the resolution 
o f the ‘final status’ of its ‘ward’ is severely compromised by the dual functions it is mandated 
to pursue. It should, as a rule, not attempt to mediate a solution, but continue to represent 
the territory in good faith.
5.2.1 T e r r it o r ia l  Agency
Moving beyond the ‘standards before status’ policy still being pursued in Kosovo, this section 
analyses the sphere of external representation o f a non-self governing territorial entity. Here, 
an international administration pursues the ‘interests' of the people under its mandate which 
hold an inchoate title to determine their own political status. Notions of representation of a 
non-state territorial entity are crucial to its constitution as partial subject o f international law.
665 Cf. infra note 667.
666 Report o f the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(23 May 2005). UN Doc. S/2005/335, at §22.
667 Kosovo Albanian student, quoted in the Eide Report, supra note 611, at 4. For the scope of 
investigation of the DPKO Assessment Mission that produced the report, see OMIK Weekly 
Report 24/2004 (11-23 June 2004).
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Representation does, indeed, supply the background in light o f which much of the subse­
quent discussion w ill be more readily intelligible. International representation, as discussed in 
Chapter III, encompasses a situation in which (i) an entity acts on behalf o f another on the 
international level and in which (¡i) specific provisions are laid down by international law for 
the conduct o f the former.668 This entails a split between the immediately acting international 
person and the entity to which the legal effects of these acts are imputed.669 When acting 
within its power, the agent assumes no personal responsibility toward either the ‘principal’ or 
third parties;670 the represented entity itself becomes the party who is directly liable and who 
is the direct claimant vis-à-vis a third party.671
(i) UNTAET and the  T imor Gap T reaty
As a starting point for the discussion o f Kosovo under international administration, the case 
of the Timor Gap Treaty is of considerable interest.672 In 2000, after the Security Council had 
assumed temporary imperium over the territory, its subsidiary organ -  the UN Transitional
Chapter III.2 (i), supra p.106. Under pain o f acting ultra vires, an agent representing a non-state 
territorial entity cannot perform functions or exercise powers other than those provided in the 
constituent document, nor convert functional means into purposes. For ultra vires acts of 
international organisations see, in general, Elihu Lauterpacht, 'The Legal Effect o f Illegal Acts of 
International Organisations’, in Cambridge Essays in International Law: Essays in Honour o f Lord 
McNair (Cambridge, 1965), 88 etseq.: Toshiya Ueki, ‘Responsibility o f International Organizations 
and the International Court o f Justice', in ü b e r Amicorum Judge Shigerv Oda (ed. by N. Ando, 
Kluwer Law: The Hague, 2002), 237-249. A brief discussion o f the notion o f a Wrongful act' w ill be 
undertaken infra, p. 235.
669 Sereni, ‘Agency’, supra note 427, at 638.
670 Agency is understood here as the relationship between the territorial agent and an entity that is 
under its temporary protection. As already explained in Chapter III.2 (i), this usage might differ 
from the regular application of the concept since agency is normally established between an agent 
and a ‘principal’. In an asymmetric relationship such as that between a mandant and a mandatory, 
the use of the term ‘principal’ would be entirely misleading since it suggests that the mandant has 
the capacity to appoint the agent (and revoke the agency) which is not the case in an international 
fiduciary bond. It is in that sense that we can speak of ‘compulsory agency ex lege' and Insinuate 
that agency is assumed on grounds o f necessity, vested in the agent by international law. In order 
to capture the phenomenon o f agency o f a multilateral peacekeeping mission more succinctly, we 
shall mention, in passing, that no rule o f international law prohibits the agent being granted the 
power of appointing a sub-agent for the purpose of the agency (Sereni, ‘Agency’, supra note 427, 
at 653). This constellation accounts for UNMIK’s sub-contraction of international organisations 
such as the OSCE, to fu lfil one of the purposes for which agency was established 
(Erfüllungsgehilfe).
671 Geiger, Beschränkung, supra note 156, at 67-68.
672 Treaty Between Australia and the Republic o f Indonesia on the Zone o f Cooperation in an Area 
Between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, 11 December 1989, 29 
ILM (1990), 475. On this subject, see generally David M. Ong, ‘The Legal Status of the 1989 
Australia-lndonesia Timor Gap Treaty Following the End of Indonesian Rule in East Timor’ , 31 
NYiL 67 (2000); Michael S. French-Merrill, The Role o f the United Nations and Recognition in 
Sovereignty Determinations: How Australia Breached its International Obligations in Ratifying the 
Timor Gap Treaty’, 8 Cardozo JICL 285 (2000); Julie M. Sforza, 'The Timor Gap Dispute: The 
Validity o f the Timor Gap Treaty, Self-Determination, and Decolonisation', 22:2 Suffolk 
Transnational LR  481-528 (1999). The Treaty had earlier formed thé substance o f the 1995 East 
Timor case, supra note 57. In litigation before the ICJ, Portugal had alleged that in negotiating and 
concluding the 1989 Treaty, and in initiating its performance, Australia had breached erga omnes 
obligations founded in the right to self-determination, and the permanent sovereignty over wealth 
and natural resources. It asked the Court to find that Australia was infringing Portugal’s powers as 
the administrating authority o f the territory, and was impeding the fulfilm ent of Portugal’s duties to 
the East Timorese and to the international community. The validity o f the Timor Gap Treaty was 
also questioned without success in the Australian High Court. See Brian F. Fitzgerald, 'Horta v. 
Commonwealth: The Validity o f the Timor Gap Treaty and its Domestic Implementation’, 44 ICLQ 
643-649(1995).
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) -  was charged with re-negotiating the treaty on 
behalf o f the East Timorese people.673 According to the account of Amb. Galbraight, 
UNTAET’s Head of Political Affairs between 1999 and 2001,
[the] formation of an East Timorese government made it possible for UNTAET to do something 
the United Nations has never done before: negotiate a bilateral treaty on behalf of a country. 
At issue were the vast oil and gas resources beneath the Timor Sea between East Timor and 
Australia [...that] had been administered jointly by Indonesia and Australia, with the two 
countries splitting the revenues. Australia wanted UNTAET, and then an independent East 
Timor, to simply step into the shoes o f Indonesia. However, both Sergio Vieira de Mello and 
the East Timorese believed that East Timor had a strong claim to all the oil and gas. The East 
Timorese asked UNTAET to negotiate a new treaty that would take effect on East Timor's 
independence. These negotiations proved highly contentious. Australia argued that the United 
Nation’s involvement on behalf o f East Timor violated UN neutrality among member states; it 
complained about the negotiating tactics o f the lead negotiator.674
Australia had apparently failed to fully appreciate that UNTAET had assumed two functions, 
one of which involved the agency on behalf of the territory whose territorial integrity it 
protected as guardian. In this function, UNTAET was mandated to advance and pursue the 
interests of a future independent state against competing state interests that happened to 
include, most prominently, the interests of Indonesia and Australia.675 For our purposes, it is 
important to note that the administration of an internationalised territory required the 
establishment of external relations with other subjects of international law. This necessity 
has been recognised by the UN Secretary General who referred specifically to UNTAET’s 
capacity to “conclude such international agreements with states and international 
organisations as may be necessary for the carrying out of the functions of UNTAET in East 
Timor'’.676 In light of the conclusions drawn earlier, UNTAET acted as an agent ex lege 
representing East Timorese economic interests on the international plane, thus lending 
limited international legal personality to the territory.677 While the agreement itself was not 
regarded as binding upon the future sovereign state of East Timor without the formal 
consent of its new government,678 the interesting aspect here remains that UNTAET clearly 
asserted its power to act as the territorial government -  as the agent ex lege through which a 
non-state territorial entity acted.
UNTAET has made further use of its treaty-making power by concluding grant agreements 
with the Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET), administered by the World Bank in co-operation 
with the Asian Development Bank. In this specific case, as Chopra reports, the Bank 
demanded that the agreement be accorded the status of an international treaty between the
673 Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between the Government of Australia and the UNTAET, the 
first adopted on 10 February 2000, the second on 5 July 2001. Cf. the Report o f the Secretary- 
General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (26 July 2000), UN Doc. 
S/2000/738, §23.
674 'UNTAET, supra note 503, at 211.
675 Morrow/White, ‘East Timor1, supra note 504, a t 25.
676 Report o f the Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor (4 October 1999), UN Doc. 
S/1999/1024, §35.
677 Cf. the repeated reference to ‘acting on behalf o f East Timor' in the MOU, supra note 673.
678 Cf. David M. Ong, ‘The Legal Status o f the Timor Gap Treaty Post-UN East Timor Referendum: Is 
State Succession to Joint Development Mandated by International Law?’, Proceedings of the 
Australian and New Zealand SIL 143 (2000), a t 152 etseq.
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International Development Association (IDA) and the SRSG, signing as “head of state, not 
merely as representative of the UN".679 It also institutionalised its relationship with foreign 
states by providing for the establishment of Liaison Offices of foreign governments in East 
Timor whose function was largely identical to those of diplomatic missions under the 1961 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.680
( i i) U N M IK 's P erformance of A gency
Before entering the substantive discussion on UNMIK’s RELEX activities, a brief clarification 
is in order. The issue of agency ex lege to act on behalf of a non-state territorial entity must 
be separated from the wider set of questions whether international treaties that have been or 
are being concluded by FRY/SCG require implementation by UNMIK. On the issue of 
succession into international treaty obligations, UNMIK has, upon the advice of the UN 
Secretariat, followed a case by case assessment. One Adviser suggested that, as UNMIK “is 
not exercising sovereignty in Kosovo", it may be “appropriate...to take on certain internatio­
nal obligations due to its empowerment under Chapter VII o f the UN Charter to exercise 
certain basic functions“. The extent to which international treaty obligations should be 
assumed should accordingly be determined “in terms of capacity and political sensitivity”681 
This opinion was recently affirmed by UNMIK:
679 a
Chopra, ‘Kingdom’, supra note 9, at 30. The IDA -  UNTAET Trust Fund for East Timor Grant 
Agreement was concluded opn 21 February 2000. For more background to the Trust Fund see 
Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor. The Path to Independence 
(London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), at 87-88, as well as Rohland/Cliffe, East Timor Reconstruction, 
supra note 344, at 13-28. For references to UNTAET -  Indonesia agreements concerning trade, 
the establishment of a border regime and cooperation in legal and human rights matters cf. Report 
o f the Secretary-General o f 26 July 2000, supra note 673, §§8-1 1. As a former Legal Adviser 
recalls, UNTAET made use o f its external representation competence beyond agreements 
regulating the receipt o f development grants. Arrangements were concluded between UNTAET 
(On behalf o f the East Timor Public/Transitional Administration) and Indonesia on such topics as 
establishing postal links, the transfer o f Indonesian rupiah to Indonesia, and on pension payments 
to former civil servants of Indonesian m ilitary and police. The validity o f some arrangements has 
been extended after independence (Christa Meindersma, ‘Application of the Principle o f Good 
Governance by International Organizations in Practice: United Nations Transitional Administra­
tions’, in From Government to Governance. The Growing Impact o f Non-State Actors on the 
International and European Legal System 145-154 (ed. by Wybo P. Heere, The Hague: TMC 
Asser Press, 2004), at 150.
680 This point is made by Stahn in Transitional Administrations’, supra note 604, at 177-78. S.3.1 of 
UNTAET/REG/2000/31 On the Establishment o f Representative Offices o f Foreign Governments 
in East Timor (27 September 2000) provided that the Offices shall, inter alia, represent and 
conduct the relations o f a foreign government with the Transitional Administration and protect the 
interests of th is government and its nationals in East Timor. For Kosovo, see UNMIK/REG/ 
2000/42 On the Establishment and Functioning o f Liaison Offices in Kosovo (10 July 2000). Both 
M issions had liaison offices in neighbouring states: cf. the Report o f the Secretary-General (3 
March 2000), UN Doc. S/2000/177, §19 (for Kosovo) and UN Doc. S/2000/738 (26 July 2000), §12 
(for East Timor). For a different view that explicitly denies the legal personality of East Timor (and 
Kosovo) see Ruffert, ’Administration’, supra note 144, at 630. He bases his arguments on the 
absence of an explicit conferral of the right to enter in diplomatic relations upon the local 
institutions o f the internationalised territory and accordingly considers the national Liaison Offices 
in internationalised territories as special m issions to a UN subsidiary organ.
681 Internal memo by Michel Pelletier, ‘Note to Mr. Guehenno' (4 April 2001), quoted by Brand, 
International Administration, supra note 597, at 170. A more profound analysis of this issue is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. For a discussion of UNMIK’s and KFOR’s functional succession 
with regard to FRY’s human rights obligations cf. John Cerone, ‘Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR 
Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo’, 12 EJIL 469-488 (2001), at 474 et seq., as well as Bothe/ 
Marauhn, 'UN Administration’, supra note 601, at 237.
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it must be remembered...that the situation in Kosovo under interim administration by UNMIK is 
sui generis. Accordingly, it has been the consistent position o f UNMIK that treaties and 
agreements, to  which the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro is a party, are not automati­
cally binding on UNMIK. In each case, a specific determination as to the applicability of the 
principles and provisions must be made. Where necessary and appropriate, UNMIK may 
develop arrangements with relevant States and international organisations in order to establish 
a proper legal basis for achieving objectives of mutual interest.682
While there is no consistent practice with regard to the assumption of SCG’s obligations 
arising out of international treaties,683 UNMIK has followed established international rules 
regarding agency: acts performed by UNMIK within the limits of its internationally conferred 
authority bind the entity as though they had been performed by the latter. UNMIK has 
authorised itself to exercise external affairs powers by providing, in the Constitutional 
Framework, that the SRSG remains exclusively responsible for “concluding agreements with 
states and international organisations in all matters within the scope of UNSCR 
1244(1999)\684 The realities of external representation in an internationalised territory are, 
however, slightly more complex than one would be led to believe. On one hand, Memoranda 
o f Understanding and other non-binding instruments falling within the purview of the local 
institutions’ ‘transferred’ competencies are regularly signed by local officials only, usually with 
the necessary references to Resolution 1244.685 External agreements in the 'reserved areas’ 
entered into by the international administration are, however, of a different nature. As acts of 
agency performed by the international territorial administration, they are nof attributable to 
the UN, whose subsidiary organ has signed up to them, but bind the local institutions and will 
continue to bind them for as long as the UN assumes the competence of sector-based rule­
making in specific policy areas (i.e., as long the local legislature has not acquired the 
competence to negotiate divergent agreements).
Indeed, the UN has followed a practice of signing international treaties with states and 
international organisations on behalf of the local institutions, whose representatives initial the 
text of the agreement. To the outside world, the duty to perform an internationally binding 
agreement concluded by the international agent and a third party -  such as the Free Trade
Report Submitted by UNMIK Pursuant to Article 2.2 o f the Agreement Between UNMIK and the 
CoE Related to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (CoE Doc. 
ACFC(2005)003, Prishtina, 30 May 2005), at 31. The UNMIK -  CoE agreement is discussed infra, 
note 688.
683 Problems arising from SCG’s increased willingness to ratify human rights treaties which are 
considered to be applicable within the territory of Kosovo will be discussed infra, note 883.
684 Chapter 8, §8(m) o f UNMIK/REG/2001/9, supra note 618. The Memorandum o f Understanding on 
the Regional Energy Market in South East Europe and its Integration into the European 
Community Internal Energy Market (Athens, 8 December 2003, Doc. No. 15548/03/bis), signed by 
the UNMIK D/SRSG (‘EU’ Pillar IV), is an example of such exclusive representation, by the inter­
national agent, o f a non-state territorial entity in international affairs. The Energy Community 
Treaty was eventually initialed in March 2005 by representatives o f the European Commission, 
Southeast European countries and UNMIK after SCG and Bulgaria withdrew their objections. See 
also the UNMIK -  FRY Agreement on the Transfer o f Sentenced Persons (4 April 2002) and the 
UNMIK -  Iceland Agreement for the Provision o f Civil Aviation Services in Kosovo (29 January 
2004).
685 Cf. e.g., Memorandum d’lntesa between the Prime Minister o f Kosovo and the Sindaco o f Verona 
(24 February 2004). For the power-sharing agreement between UNMIK and P1SG cf. Chapters V 
and VIII o f the Constitutional Framework, supra note 618.
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Agreements signed to date606 -  will henceforth fall upon the actor who is constitutionally 
competent to do so according to the internal power sharing agreement (Constitutional 
Framework). This practice is intended to encourage a continued commitment to treaties 
concluded between a third actor and the international agent once the latter has transferred
6 fl7sector-based competencies to the locally constituted institutions.
Two examples from UNMIK’s performance of external relations support the argument that 
the SRSG and his subordinate machinery are conceived not only as a UN subsidiary organ 
but also as agent of the territory concerned. Firstly, in the field of human rights law, the 
SRSG for Kosovo has signed an agreement with the Council of Europe (CoE) re- 
incorporating the Framework Convention of National Minorities into Kosovo’s applicable 
law.68 788 The substance of the agreement, signed by the SRSG under the powers vested in 
him, falls within the ‘reserved powers' of the international administration; no PISG represen­
tation was deemed necessary for its conclusion. While the preamble of the agreement ex­
plicitly states that the agreement “does not make UNMIK a Party to the Framework Conven­
686 On 29 May 2003, UNMIK submitted a Statement of Intent to the Stability Pact, committing itse lf to 
the obligations set out in the Memorandum o f Understanding on Trade Liberalisation and 
Facilitation (Brussels, 27 June 2001). Pursuant to this, UNMIK has concluded a number of FTAs 
and other instruments under the auspices of the respective Stability Pact Working Group. Cf., e.g., 
the UNMIK (Acting for PISG) -  Albania (Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications) 
Agreement on Road Transport o f Passengers and Goods (Tirana, 17 June 2002). Futher, see the 
UNMIK (on behalf of the PISG in Kosovo) -  Albania (Council of M inisters) Free Trade Agreement 
(7 July 2003) that seek to link the territory into the network of FTAs in South Eastern Europe by 
foreseeing the immediate liberalization o f 50% o f traded goods between Kosovo and Albania. Like 
the Road Transport Agreement, it was signed by the SRSG and the Albanian M inister o f 
Economy, and initialed by the responsible Kosovo Minister in charge. In the latter case, the SCG 
protested to the UN Secretariat (see Beta News Agency, ‘Sahovic Protested over Steiner's Move’ 
(8 July 2003)). Follow-up measures included the UNMIK -  Albania Agreements on the Avoidance 
o f Double Taxation (28 September 2004). For the current external trade regime in Kosovo see 
UNMIK European Union Pillar and Ministry o f Trade and Industry, Trade Policy fo r Kosovo 2004 
(Trade Policy Working Group, 8 April 2004). A t present, the network o f FTAs negotiated under 
Stability Pact is not a true Free Trade Area as there are different exemptions and timetables of 
liberalisation among the participating countries. See Constantine Michalopoulos, Kosovo’s 
Internationa/ Trade: Trade Policy, Institutions and Market Access Issues (Report to the UK DFID, 
February 2003), at 3. See also the Agreement on the Field of Plant Protection and the Public 
Veterinary Services Agreement, concluded between UNMIK and the Government o f Albania (by 
the D/SRSG fo r Civil Administration and the Albanian M inister for Agriculture and Food, Prishtina, 
21 November 2003). For an early agreement concluded by UNMIK on behalf o f the territory, cf. 
Cooperation Agreement on Cross-Border Economic Issues with fYRoM o f 7 March 2000 (UN Doc. 
S/2000/538, 6 June 2000). This MoU complemented the FTA between the FRY and Macedonia 
concluded in 1996, which came into operation on 1 January 1999 (which UNMIK deemed 
applicable in Kosovo). An Interim Free Trade Agreement between UNMIK and the Macedonian 
government was reportedly concluded in June 2005 (See ‘Breakthrough on Free Trade 
Agreement between Kosovo and FYR Macedonia’, 29 June 2005, UNMIK/PR/1381).
687 W ith regard to the fluid co-governance framework of an institution-buiding project, the gradual 
increase in capacity of local institutions implies that their Verpflichtungs-, Rechts- and Han­
dlungsfähigkeit in external relations increase as well. W ith regard to  political dependencies see 
Rauschning, Status, supra note 437, at 55-57).
688 * 
Agreement between the UNMIK and the CoE on Technical Arrangements Related to the
Framework Convention for the Protection o f National Minorities, signed on 23 August 2004. The 
Council o f M inisters authorised the CoE SG to conclude such agreement at its 890m Meeting (30 
June 2004). Article 3.2(h) o f Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework had already incorporated the 
Framework Convention into Kosovo’s municipal legal system. As Kosovo is not a party to the 
ECHR or its additional Protocols, its constitutional ‘incorporation’ did not remedy the curious 
situation under which the inhabitants of Kosovo remain effectively deprived o f their access to inter­
national human rights mechanisms that have recently been accorded to  the inhabitants o f Serbia 
proper and Montenegro. Cf. Ombudsperson Institution, Fourth Annual Report (2003-2004) 
(Prishtina, 2004), at 30, as well as the discussion in Chapter Vl.2.3, infra p. 222.
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tion", UNMIK affirms “on behalf of itself and the PISG that their respective responsibilities will 
be exercised in compliance with the principles contained in the Framework Convention".639 
In what may represent the very first measure ever to tie an international territorial administra­
tion Into a multilateral accountability framework, UNMIK committed itself to submit full infor­
mation to the CoE Committee of Ministers on the legislative and other measures taken to 
give effect to the Framework principles.689 90 This lends concrete expression to some of the 
content of the Constitutional Frameworks’ enumeration of human rights instruments, which 
are supposed to be applicable in the territory of Kosovo.691
Consider the second example of the performance of external relations functions by the 
UNMIK SRSG, in which his office served as legal conduit to channel financial assistance 
from international institutions to local beneficiaries. The narrative proceeds in three stages. 
First, the World Bank provided initial grant support to Kosovo through its post-conflict fund 
and net income. In reaching its decision to endorse the first Transition Support Strategy via 
the establishment o f a trust fund for Kosovo, the Bank’s Board of Directors concluded that 
such an engagement was in the interest of the Bank’s member states.692 With the 
introduction of expanded post-conflict grants mechanisms in the second stage, the 
International Development Association (IDA) provided grants to UNMIK, serving as the 
recipient “for the benefit of Kosovo",693 “a subsidiary organ o f a principal organ...of the UN, 
which is a public international organisation”.694 The background to this intricate lending
689 Article 1 o f the CoE Agreement. Curiously, UNMIK thereby committed itse lf to fulfil some of the 
legal obligations which Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) has undertaken by acceding to the CoE. 
See the discussion infra, note 883, p. 223.
690 Article 2.2 of the CoE Agreement. The reporting schedule (which remains in force for the duration 
of UNMIK’s mandate) foresees that UNMIK submits reports on a 'periodic basis’ and whenever the 
Committee of Ministers so requests (Article 2.3). UNMIK shall participate, in an observer capacity, 
in the CoM meetings in which information on compliance with the Framework Convention are 
considered (Article 2.5). A different monitoring measure is foreseen in the Agreement between 
UNMIK and the CoE on Technical Arrangements Related to the European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment o r Punishment (23 August 2004). 
Under this agreement, the respective CoE Committee will obtain direct access to places where 
persons are deprived of their liberty by UNMIK (Article 1.2). KFOR has so far refused to permit this 
Committee unlimited access to the detention centre located at the US KFOR Camp 'Bondsteel’ 
(Ombudsperson, Fifth Report, supra note 590, at 27).
691 UNMIK has regrettably outsourced reporting obligations to its OSCE institution-building pillar, 
which has always struggled to maintain a precarious balance between its existence as an integral 
part o f an international administration and the maintenance of an independent human rights 
portfolio that includes the monitoring of UNMIK’s human rights performance. While ‘taking the 
lead' in reporting on compliance within the Framework Convention, the OSCE Mission’s 
Department for Démocratisation incidentally also prepared a ‘shadow report' on the same topic 
(interview with OMiK Démocratisation Officer, Prishtina, 26 January 2005).
692 At that time, in 2000, the FRY -  subsequently SCG -  had not yet succeeded to the membership o f 
the SFRY in the W orld Bank. Kosovo was thus not a territory o f a ‘member country’. See Kosovo, 
FRY Transitional Support Strategy 2004 (W orld Bank SEE Country Unit, 18 March 2004), at 13.
693 As in the case o f East Timor where UNTAET was designated as the recipient o f the IDA Trust 
Fund for East Timor (supra note 590), WB assistance to Kosovo took the form of IDA grants to 
UNMIK since "under the current circumstances, the use of regular resources -  either in the form of 
direct lending to Kosovo or through the FRY — is not feasible" (Kosovo, FRY Transitional Support 
Strategy 2002 (W orld Bank SEE Country Unit, Report No. 24275-KOS, 2 July 2002), at 8).
694 ibid., at 9. Those grants were only held permissible under Article V(2c) of the IDA's Articles of 
Agreement, which allow for the provision o f the financing of an international organisation. An IDA 
report noted that “in the post-conflict context, grants could be made available, in special cases, to 
territories within member countries that are under UN-administration on an interim basis" (IDA, 
Report o f the Executive Directors o f IDA to the Board of Governors. Additions to IDA Resources: 
1 T  Replenishment (IDA/SecM2002-0488, 25 July 2002), at 28, §85). '
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mechanism of course lay in the ambiguity surrounding the trustee's powers in relation to 
public assets -  a direct consequence of the uncertainty of the territory's future international 
status. This has discouraged and continues to discourage private investment and hinders 
lending from international financial institutions. As the Bank admitted in 2004, “[g]iven the 
uncertainties, a series of relatively short Transition Support Strategies has guided Bank en­
gagement”. While financial support has been fairly substantial, constraints on lending meant 
that the Bank has not assumed the share of the burden it might have in other situations.695
The lack of a comprehensive economic development strategy and vision for the territory has, 
in this second phase, been aggravated by the absence of procedures to be followed prior to 
the conclusion of an international financial agreement by the SRSG.696 The related 
indeterminacy of Kosovo’s equitable share of the former FRY’s sovereign debt has equally 
prevented I FI lending for capital projects.697 In the third stage beginning in March 2004, 
access to international finance was included as one of the sub-standards within the Kosovo 
Standards Implementation Plan's economic sphere.698 Numerous challenges have, however, 
hampered progress on the issue, among them (i) the lack of counter-guarantees; (ii) 
questions surrounding the level of involvement of the PISG in negotiating and implementing 
international financial agreements and (iii) legal succession of obligations under international 
financial agreements. As regards the last issue, legal uncertainty over the future status of the 
territory raised worrying questions concerning the capacity of a UN organ to enter into long­
term financial agreements on behalf of local beneficiaries, i.e., beyond the expiry of UNMIK’s 
mandate.
Having been asked to provide loans for the reconstruction of infrastructure, the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) has insisted on obtaining counter-guarantees that the post-determi­
nation sovereign be bound to perform obligations contracted by UNMIK In a letter to the 
UNSG, both the President of the European Commission and the President of the EIB 
requested “confirmation from the UN that...(a) obligations contracted by UNMIK w ill be 
binding on any authority that* w ill administer Kosovo after the replacement or termination of 
UNMIK’s mandate; and (b) this authority will unconditionally accept those obligations as 
continuing obligations o f Kosovo..,".699 The ElB’s demands are remarkable, as they reveal
695 Cf. World Bank, 2004, supra note 692, at 11. The IMF took a more explicit line: “Resolution of 
Kosovo's final status would provide the right enabling environment to the extent that political 
uncertainty may hinder investment and economic activity more generally” (IMF, Kosovo -  Gearing 
Policies Toward Growth and Development, 18 November 2004).
egg
Insurance o f risk management therefore took the form o f bilateral agreements in which UNMIK 
offered certain fiscal advantages to investors whose interests were guaranteed. See, e.g., U.S.- 
UNMIK Agreement for Investment Support for Projects in Kosovo (Washington, DC, 17 May 2002 
and Prishtina, 30 May 2002). Agreements covering public investment and donor contributions 
included the UNMIK (acting for PISG) -  Sweden Agreement on the General Terms for Develop­
ment Cooperation (11 March 2003); the UNMIK -  Albania Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion 
and Protection o f Investments (19 February 2004); the UNMIK-UK Agreement Concerning 
Financial Contribution by the FCO in Support of the Office on Missing Persons and Forensics (29 
June 2004); the EAR -  UNMIK Financial Agreement on Cards 2004 Annual Action Programme for 
Kosovo for 51.5 Million Euro (20 May 2004); and the EC -  UNMIK Contribution Agreement for 
Combating Fraud and Financial Crime in Kosovo for Euro 2,000,000.00 (25 August 2004).
697 Samuel Skogstad, et al., Evaluation o f the USAID/Kosovo Economic Reconstruction Project 
(USAID, November 2003), at 51.
698 Standard V.1 (action point 4) o f the KSIP, supra note 650, at 78.
699 Letter from Philippe Maystadt and Romano Prodi to UNSG Kofi Annan, D (2004) 340 (Brussels, 20 
October 2004, emphasis supplied).
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the intricacies underlying a territorial entity’s access to IFls absent a status perspective. 
While discussions on the appropriate legal mechanism through which local institutions 
succeed to the liability provisions agreed upon with IFls are ongoing, it has become clear 
that granting investment funds for the benefit of projects in Kosovo depended on the 
acceptance by the PISG of responsibility for the repayment of loans duly accepted by UNMIK 
acting on behalf o f the former. It has therefore become routine to insert a ‘roll-over’ clause in 
an agreement between UNMIK and international financial institutions. By initialling the agree­
ment, the PISG acknowledge that obligations contracted by UNMIK are undertaken for and 
on behalf o f the PISG which normally excludes liability of the United Nations and UNMIK.700
The legal basis fo r such 'roll-over' had only been created in 2004, five years after the 
beginning o f the institution-building and reconstruction e ffort701 The law on International 
Financial Agreements now provides that a negotiating delegation shall include three UNMIK 
representatives and three government appointees. It foresees a four-pronged procedure 
through which such agreements create obligations for Kosovo.702 Liability for financial
700 Article 15 of UNMIK/REG/2004/30 On the Promulgation of the Law on International Financial 
Agreements (9 August 2004) stipulates that "PISG acknowledge the obligations undertaken by 
UNMIK on their behalf...and undertake to take all measures within their power to ensure the full 
respect o f this agreement". The roll-over clause in Article 15(a) provides that “neither the United 
Nations nor UNMIK shall bear any responsibility for the performance of such obligations or any 
liability with regard to the performance or non-performance of such obligations by the PISG or any 
successor to the PISG". The agreement and the performance of obligations thereunder ‘are 
neither guaranteed nor otherwise secured by UNMIK or the UN" (Article 15(b)).
701 Id., Article 5 provides that "[a]ll obligations occurred...shall be binding upon the PISG. Upon 
completion of the mandate of UNMIK...information on all outstanding obligations under such 
agreements to be resolved in line with general principles o f International Law, shall be duly 
brought to the attention o f the Security Council*. For a discussion o f the law, cf. Economic 
Strategy and Project Identification Group, Towards a Kosovo Development fían. The State o f the 
Kosovo Economy and Possible Ways Forward (Prishtina, August 2004). The principles refened to 
by the law are not entirely clear. One view suggests that a newly independent Kosovo shall not be 
automatically bound by obligations incurred by the former administrating power. The post-colonial 
rule of tabula rasa could arguably be utilised in analoguous application of the ‘general rule* 
codified in Article 16 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession o f States in Respect to 
Treaties. On the other hand, the scope o f the Convention is expressly lim ited so to exclude its 
application “to the effects of a succession of States in respect o f international agreements 
concluded between States and other subjects of international law" (Article 3, UN Doc. 
CONF.80/31, reproduced in 17 ILM  (1978), at 1488). It is also questionable whether Kosovo 
would, should its final status be determined in this manner, qualifie as ‘newly independent state’ 
as UNMIK is, for a ll purposes, not a ‘predecessor state'. It is suggested to agree with Junius who, 
in the comparable problématique in the context of Namibia’s fulfilment o f obligations contracted by 
the UNCfN, concluded that ‘ [d]ie Frage der Bindung des zukünftigen unabhängigen...Namibia an 
die Verträge, die der Namibiarat vorher abgeschlossen hat, ist damit kein Problem der 
Staatennachfolge, sondern der selbstverständlichen Bindung des Völkerrechtssubjekts an 
Verpflichtungen, die das frühere dazu berufene verfassungsmäßige Organ wirksam eingegangen 
hat” (UN Council, supra note 226, at 187-191). The issue o f heritability o f treaties -  raised by the 
evolution o f an entity through various intermediate stages of internal autonomy to full maturity -  is, 
in any case, far from  novel. Cf. O'Connell. ‘Succession’, supra note 226. For an overview of 
international legal sources to resolve (likely) disputes over intergovernmental claims see Perritt, 
‘Resolving Claims When Countries Disintegrate: The Challenge of Kosovo’, 80 Chicago-Kent LR 
119-184 (2005).
702 Articles 3.2-3.S of UNMIK/REG/2004/30, supra, stipulate that international financial agreements 
have to be (1) submitted to the government by the Minister for Finance and Economy, (2) 
approved in writing by the government, (3) endorsed by the Assembly, and (4) signed by the 
SRSG for UNMIK. The law also provides the legal basis for the future cooperation between 
UNMIK and the EBRD, according to the MoU signed on 4 March 2005. At the margins, it should 
be noted that sim ilar arrangements were envisaged for the internationalisation of Trieste and 
Jerusalem after WW II. Article 24(2) of the Permanent Statute of the Free Territory (Annex VI of 
the Treaty of Peace with Italy, supra note 113) designated the Governor and a representative of
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obligations incurred before 1999 is seen to be borne by Serbia and Montenegro (SCG).703 It 
can be surmised that an across-the-board resolution of the debts incurred after 1999 and 
those undertaken under UNMIK Regulation 2004/30 will be part o f the final status settlement 
(to which SCG will be a party).
(m) T ow ards a  Limited  L eg al  Per so n a lity? A M emo  to  th e  K oso va  Prime  M in ister
The previous section highlighted new developments in the performance of external repre­
sentation of a non-state territorial entity by an international agent Upon further considera­
tion, it is extraordinary that certain problems encountered in new frameworks of international 
tutelage precisely mirror those bearing sim ilar circumstances under the League’s Mandate 
system. There, the 'defective' legal title  to territory also presented an obstacle to capital 
investment and was thought to “deter a mandatory from guaranteeing loans or making 
advances for the development of its mandated territory, unless it could have some tangible 
security”.704 In a similar fashion, insistence on obtaining counter-guarantees represents a 
continuation o f a practice established under the UN Trusteeship system. When a depen­
dency was a party to loans contracted by international agreement, IBRD regulations required 
that a separate guarantee agreement be concluded between the Bank and the metropolitan 
power internationally responsible for the territory. As Zemanek noted, the dependency 
thereby “became, within the scope of the provisions of the agreement, a person of inter­
national law, directly responsible for the performance of the agreement”.705
Is this conclusion equally applicable to non-state territorial entities under the direct adminis­
tration of the United Nations? When deliberating the position of entities other than states or 
international organisations, it seems fitting to ‘unbundle’ the concept of legal personality and 
further develop it as a spectrum recognising a range of varying statuses and severable 
entitlements, always contingent upon the degree to which a territorial agent has been man­
dated to perform them. These were at least the conclusions that we arrived at in Chapter III. 
Following the precedent of international organisations, we defined personality in relation to 
the respective functions the subject in question fulfils in regarding the needs shared by inter­
national society. The capacité juridique o f the entity is thus delineated by a principle of 
functional limitation. Its legal personality may increase or decrease in accordance with the 
expansion or compression of functional areas where the international agent performs acts of 
representation.706
The gradual assumption of obligations by Kosovo's local institutions, encouraged by the 
international administration, indeed suggests that such a territorial entity gradually acquires a
the Government as competent to jo intly sign treaties and agreements, exequaturs and consular 
commissions (which would also have been subject to ratification by the Legislative Assembly). As 
with Trieste, the Governor o f Jerusalem would have had the power to sign treaties and 
international undertakings which would have had to be' submitted for ratification to the Legislative 
Council (Article 37(5) and (6), Statute fo r the City of Jerusalem, supra note 107).
703 Conversation with EC RELEX official, 22 October 2004.
704 This opinion was voiced in the third session of the Permanent Mandates Commission (July-August 
1923), quoted by Evans, ‘Termination', supra note 242, at 736.
705 Zemanek, ‘State Succession', supra note 442, at 259.
706 As noted earlier, certain colonies and mandated areas that enjoyed limited capacity at one point 
have subsequently acquired the unlim ited international legal personality which flows from 
statehood (Cf. the discussion in Chapter 111.2.1, supra p. 108).
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limited subjectivity in order to comply with the evolving requirements o f international life. The 
initial latent subjectivity of the territory -  addressed by norms of international law circum­
scribing its content707 -  is activated qua 'performance' by UNMIK projecting both its duties 
and rights to the international plane. As a direct consequence of this complex interaction of 
the relevant normative behaviour performed through a relationship of agency, Kosovo 
temporarily manifests its specific spatio-temporal identity by entering into relationships with 
other international legal persons.
As we have concluded in Chapter III, this functionalist interpretation uses international legal 
personality as an intermediary, rather than a barrier, allowing the international legal structure 
to reach “all the way down to the individual inside the collective".708 As a corollary, Kosovo 
can accede to the international legal order without mediation by a constraining sovereign. On 
the international plane, states henceforth con-ceded to collaborate reciprocally with Kosovo 
through the medium of the international agent whose acts are attributed to the entity.
The following memorandum provides, in 10 points, a field of practical application for the 
manifold conclusions we reached in Chapters II and III regarding an international agent's 
‘performance1 of a territory’s emerging partial legal personality. Abstracting from the ‘final 
status’ issue, it also synthesises some of the earlier arguments regarding the spheres o f 
agency and trusteeship in which an international administration’s obligations can be situated.
MEMO
Bajram Kosumi, Prime Minister of Kosova 
Bernhard Knoll, EUI, Florence




1. Membership occupies an important place in the constitutional law and practice of international 
organisations for many reasons. Most importantly, it is the means by which an international legal 
person acquires the right to participate, on an equal footing with other persons, in the proceedings 
of an international organisation.
2. Subjectivity, on the other hand, is a key concept of international law through which a territorial 
entity may access the international legal plane. Subjectivity -  or personality — is regularly awarded 





707 As explained above, the machinery devised by S/RES/1244 provides fo r a progressive conferral o f 
broad governmental responsibilities “under which the population can enjoy substantial autonomy" 
within the FRY and in which the establishment o f self-governing institution should ensure the 
conditions for a peaceful life. As Tomuschat suggests, the notion o f ‘self-government’ has taken 
on a legal meaning which denotes a collective entitlement to a higher level o f self-responsibility in 
the exercise of public affairs, inside a larger political system (‘Damaged Sovereignt/, supra note 
141).
708 Nijman, Personality, supra note 474, at 120.
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state. In turn, personality is widely seen as precondition for membership of international organi- j 
sations. The status of a territory under an interim UN administration is such that its personality is \ 
subject to certain limitations flowing from the mandate of the UN organ responsible for its 
administration. Subjectivity is arguably ‘performed’ by the international agent who provides the 
umbilical cord linking the ‘protected territory’ to the international normative sphere.
3. UNMIK represents the territory vis-à-vis the outside world, having assumed ‘agency of necessity’ 
in external relations. Recent examples of such performance include the bilateral trade agreements 
between UNMIK and FYRoM and Albania respectively which the former concluded on b eha lf of 
the PISG. Similarly, UNMiK ‘represented’ the territory in international relations in its recent 
application for a SWIFT code as well as in bilateral agreements with international financial 
institutions (e.g., EBRD) and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. By carrying out the 
external relations of Kosovo, UNMIK creates rights and obligations for Kosovo’s PISG.
I. Objective
4. From the standpoint of public international law, a territory temporarily placed under UN ad­
ministration is positioned within the grey zone between international personality and a legal nihil. 
The inclusion of Kosovo in multilateral arrangements would enhance the entity’s international legal 
capacity which would, in turn, be difficult to abrogate in the future.
5. In order to expand Kosovo’s capacity for external representation and to ensure genuine 
participation of PISG in international public life, your Office should launch an initiative targeting 
specialised international organisations. Your government should pursue an aggressive strategy that 
seeks to prod UNMIK to apply, on behalf of the PISG, for membership of the ILO, WHO, 
UNESCO and UNICEF. Labour standards, health policy, the preservation of cultural heritage, and 
policies related to children/youth all fall within the competencies of the PISG.
6. The precedent of Namibia (below) suggests that territories temporarily administered by the UN 
possess the capacity to apply for membership of international organisations. The two-fold 
challenge for your Office consists in, firstly, adjusting the international legal reasoning that guided 
the successful application of Namibia (undertaken by the UN Council for Namibia in the 1970s), 
and then applying it to the case of Kosovo under UN administration. While the position of Kosovo 
in international law differs in numerous respects from that of Namibia, your Office must focus on 
the parallels between those two non-state territorial entities and develop an international legal 
strategy for future communications with the Legal Offices of ELO, WHO, UNESCO and UNICEF.
H. Background: the Namibia precedent
7. In 1966, the UN General Assembly terminated South Africa’s Mandate over Namibia that it had 
acquired from the League and declared its presence in Namibia illegal. South Africa, which did not 
accept the termination of the Mandate, responded by declaring its intention not to withdraw from 
the territory. In order to confront the problem, the GA established an eleven-member United 
Nations Council for Namibia, based in New York. The Council was charged with the task of 
‘remotely’ administering the territory until independence, with the complementary legislative 
authority’ to “promulgate such laws, decrees and administrative regulation as are necessary for the 
administration of the Territory until a legislative assembly is established following elections 
conducted on the basis of universal adult suffrage.”
8. Although the UN Council could not directly administer the territory, it did carry out some of the 
normal functions of an administrating authority. Through the UN Fund for Namibia, the Council 
helped Namibian refugees, organised training programmes and established an emergency program 
of economic and technical assistance. In its representative and administrative functions, the
•  177 *
î ■ . ■ • ■ ■ -
Council also exercised its competence to issue travel and identity documents. In a note verbale on
12 December 1968 addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the UN Member States, the SG
requested them to accept as valid the travel and identity documents issued by the Council to
Namibians abroad. In various exchanges of letters between the UN Commissioner for Namibia and
government representatives, the recognition of travel documents issued by the Council was
finalised. The Council also opened liaison offices in various East African countries.
9. From its inception, the Council was faced with the problem that it had to operate as a kind of 
govemment-in-exile. One of the more successful activities of the UN Council for Namibia 
consisted in its quest to represent the territory on the international plane, hence seeking member­
ship in various UN specialised agencies. The hurdles on the way to international representation of a 
non-state territorial entity by a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly were obvious: 
membership in such bodies is regularly accorded to ‘States’, ‘countries’ or ‘nations’. Like Kosovo 
under UNMIK administration, Namibia under the administration of its UN Council certainly did 
not possess the positive attributes of a ‘state’, ‘country’ or ‘nation’.
10. Because of its international status, Namibia was, however, treated as a sui generis entity for the 
purpose of being admitted to full membership of international organisations. UN organisations 
indeed admitted Namibia, represented by the UN Council, into associated (WHO, ILO) and even 
fu ll membership (UNESCO), despite provisions under which non-independent territories could 
only be admitted as Associate Members, and even though the UN Council lacked the adminis­
trative structures and capacity of a state.
nr. Recommendations
Your Office may want to consider the development of two strategies to further Kosovo’s status in 
international law.
1. Strategy in partnership with UNMIK
In the first stage, the issue of multilateral inclusion must be raised with the SRSG who will refer the 
case to the Office of the Legal Adviser. In this process, it will be important to emphasise that a UN 
organ has, in the past, successfully applied for membership of international organisations on behalf of 
a territory under its temporary administration. Secondly, your Office will have to prepare a line of 
reasoning that refutes possible claims that these activities could be in breach of UNSCR 1244 (1999).
a. Temporary military occupation does not necessarily supply arguments for rejecting Kosovo’s 
membership. The cases of Japan and Germany are instructive as they illustrate instances in which 
the respective military authorities (the Representative of the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers on the one hand, and the Allied High Commission for Germany on the other), in 1951, 
declared that the government is “fully competent to assume and carry out the obligations of
' membership in the ÏLO" (ILC, 34th Session (1951), 508-509 and 505-506).
b. The reasoning to be adopted by your Office could include the argument that Kosovo’s 
representation in international organisations by UNMIK (agency) stems from certain obligations it 
assumed with respect to the territory under its protection. Those are of fiduciary nature (trust). 
Kosovo’s membership of UN specialised agencies is an indispensable element in fulfilling the 
international community’s responsibilities towards the people of Kosovo. The UN General 
Assembly adopted a similar reasoning when requesting specialised UN agencies to admit the non­
state territorial entity of Namibia.
c. In particular, your Office could argue that the gradual inclusion of Kosovo in international public 
life by no means pre-empts final status negotiations. Rather, its accession to specialised organi­
sations would effectively facilitate the realisation of the objectives of SCR 1244 and contribute to
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the implementation of the ‘Standards’ through an increased PISG commitment to incorporate best 
international practices (UNICEF, ILO).
d. Resistance to this line of argument can certainly be expected from Belgrade and UNHQ’s Office of 
Legal Affairs. It will be critical for your Office to devise a communication strategy directed at 
lobbying UN specialised agencies (some of which have offices/advisers in Prishtina).
2. PISG back-up strategy
It will be crucial to devise a back-up strategy if UNMIK refuses, for whatever reason, to sponsor the
first application bid. In this case, your Office should directly apply to the General Secretary/Secretariat
of an international organisation.
a. It is suggested that your Office begins by selecting an international organisation with the lowest 
‘barrier’ to membership of non-state territorial entities (UNESCO) or an organisation whose 
decision-making body includes non-governmental representatives (cf., e.g., Art. 1(4) of the ILO 
Constitution which vests the International Labour Conference (ILC) with the power to admit new 
members and stipulates a two-third majority requirement that, according to the principle of 
tripartism, includes the votes of the employers’ and workers’ delegates). The first successful 
application resulting in Kosovo’s associated membership creates a precedent with much relevance 
to the next bids.
b. Other applications can be simultaneously pursued at a later stage. In selecting organisations, your 
Office should seek out those which specialise in areas falling within the transferred competencies 
of the PISG (e.g., labour standards or health and youth policy, as opposed to security or justice). 
This is of the utmost importance as it emerges from the established practice of, e.g., the ILO that a 
‘state’ (for the purposes of membership) means an entity which possesses the status necessary to 
enable it to discharge the obligations involved in membership (for this reason, the application of 
the Free City of Danzig for membership in the ILO was rejected, in 1930, by both the ILC and the 
PCIJ).
By internationalising the territory, the Security Council had initially endowed a non-state 
territorial entity with an agent who is, at the same time, an organ of the organised 
international community -  a subsidiary organ o f the UN that fulfils functions ancillary to those 
of the mother organisation.709 The subsequent section seeks to draw the contrast with the 
present analysis, where representation o f ‘domestic’ interest took the form of territorial 
agency. Turning ‘inwards’, the sphere of domestic administration proves to be an ample field 
for studying the inherently contradictory sets o f interests that a territorial agent/intemational 
organ is mandated to pursue.
5.2.2 UNMIK a s  A d m in is t r a t o r  o f  a n  I n t e r n a t io n a l  T r u s t
UNMIK is mandated, on one hand, to restructure Kosovo’s public economy. On the other, it 
is prevented from infringing upon the territorial integrity of the FRY/Serbia and Montenegro 
(SCG). The lack of a ‘road-map’ for the territory has undoubtedly caused these two man­
dates to directly collide in the sphere of privatisation, given that the UN’s legal advisers have
7C9 Cf. the discussion of the organic framework within which a UN mission is situated, in Chapter 
IV.1.2, supra p. 126.
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effectively interpreted Resolution 1244 as prohibiting UNMIK from making any lasting 
changes to the ownership status of socially owned enterprises (SOEs) which may prejudice 
the rights of former owners or claimants.710 The issues at stake emerged as the international 
community began to engage in state-building without the perspective of statehood. They 
highlight the gap between an international dual mandate, through which UNMIK pursues the 
territory's economic interest, while desperately trying to balance it against the wider 
international public interest that includes SCG’s reversionary sovereign title to the territory. 
This has caused the European Union Pillar of UNMIK to fall behind the ambitious 
performance benchmarks established by the World Bank.711 Not surprisingly, an IMF 
forecast published in 2002 concluded that ‘ Kosovo's long-term economic prospects are 
clouded by considerable uncertainty...domestic and especially foreign private investors are 
unlikely to undertake major projects...as long as uncertainty about the province’s future 
status persists."712
(i) Privatisation, or: To Be or not To Be immune?
The issues underlying Kosovo’s privatisation disaster strike at the heart of the international 
community’s inability to effectively delineate the legitimate scope of an international 
administration and the extent to which it should exercise political authority in the field of 
corporate governance. The capacity to transfer property rights and allocate land and assets 
had been determined with the creation of the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA, vested with the 
right to initiate privatisation through spin-offs)713 and the adoption of a law which allows for 
long-term leases of socially owned land and determines the recipients of the privatisation 
process.714 However, the underlying key problem that caused the privatisation process to
710 For a study on the nature of the Yugoslav brand of self-management socialism cf. Janez 
Smidovnik, ‘Disfunctions of the System of Self-Management in the Economy, in Local Territorial 
Communities and in Public Administration’, in Yugoslavia in Turmoil: After Self-Management? (ed. 
by J. Simmie and J. Dekleva, London/New York: Pinter Publishers, 1991), at 17-32. For an exami­
nation of the different strategies employed by UNMIK between 2000 and 2002 to fulfil its mandate 
as trustee of social property see European Stability Initiative, 77ie Ottoman Dilemma. Power and 
Property Relations under the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (Prishtina, 8 August 2002).
711 World Bank, 2002, supra note 693, Annex VI.
712 Dimitri G. Demekas, et a/„ Kosovo: institutions and Policies for Economic Growth (International 
Monetary Fund, 2002), at 14. For a financial risk assessment see also The World Bank, Kosovo 
Economic Memorandum (Report No. 28023-KOS, 17 Maya 2004), at 10. Cf. also the Report o f the 
Secretary Genera/ on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (26 January 
2004), UN Doc. S/2004/71, §35.
713 See UNMIK/REG/2002/12 On f/ie Establishment of the Kosovo Trust Agency (13 June 2002). S.8 
stipulates the powers of the KTA to establish subsidiary corporations of SOEs. The spin-off model 
involves the setting up of a subsidiary company using SOE assets, and the subsequent selling off 
the shares of these subsidiaries. The new company would thus find new investors while the old 
company would be liquidated. The proceeds are to be deposited into trust accounts to satisfy 
liabilities remaining with the SOEs, including ownership claims. For interim analyses of the 
privatisation process cf. Institute for Development Research (Riinvest), Socially Owned Enterpri­
ses and Their Privatisation (Research Report, 20 June 2002), at 24 ef seq. as well as Demekas, 
Gmwth,' supra note 712, at 19. The passing of the KTA Regulation was preceded by a standoff 
between SRSG Steiner and the UN's legal advisers in New York who consistently argued that the 
permanent change -  understood as transfomnation -  of property rights -  would exceed UNMIK’s 
mandate and scope of authority laid down in UNMIK/REG/1999/1, supra note 598, whose s.6 
merely authorises UNMIK to administer immovable property of the FRY/Serbia which is in the 
territory of Kosovo. Interview with UNMIK Legal Officer, The Office of the Legal Adviser, Prishtina, 
3 February 2005.
714 UNMIK/REG/2003/13 On the Transformation of the Right of Use to Socially-Owned Immovable 
Property (9 May 2003). Cf. also Angela Rapp, 'Gesellschaftliches Eigentum und Privatisierung. 
Die KTA -  eine Treuhandanstalt fur den Kosovo’, 51:5 Vereinte Nationen 167-171 (2003) and
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stagnate has yet to be addressed. It relates to the ways by which the UN attempted to lim it 
UNMIK’s risk of liability for claims by owners and creditors. It did so by establishing the KTA 
as an “independent body” with “full jurid ical personality and in particular the capacity... to sue 
and be sued in its own name”.715
The underlying controversy was triggered by different conceptions of UNMIK’s fiduciary 
obligations. UNHQ in New York favoured a restrictive view, prioritising the international admi­
nistration’s responsibilities towards the SOE owners (hence initially rejecting the privatisation 
of their assets). According to this view, the privatisation of public assets represents a case of 
détournement de pouvoir, in that UNMIK took administrative action which, though not ex­
cluded in its mandate laid down in Resolution 1244, may be inconsistent with, or outside the 
scope of, the objectives of the organisation.716 UNMIK’s European Union component, on the 
other hand, conceived its trustee obligations as primarily directed toward the territory’s 
economic recovery and the creation o f a functioning property system.717 In the eyes of the 
EU Pillar, this includes the competence to restructure economic institutions through 
rearranging property interests.
Due to the legal distance that had been created between UNMIK and the KTA, international 
officials -  particularly those serving on the KTA’s management board -  have raised
Manuel Eising and Philipp Reszat, ’Die intemationale Notstandsverwaltung im Kosovo’, 49:1 
Osteuropa Recht 1-24 (2003), at 22.
715 UNMIK/REG/2002/12, supra note 713, s.1. The subsequent UNMIK/REG/2002/13 On the Esta­
blishment o f a Special Chamber o f the Supreme Court o f Kosovo on Kosovo Trust Agency Rela­
ted Matters (13 June 2002) offers a legal remedy for potential owners and creditors to receive 
compensation for the loss of property. The passing of this Regulation was seen as sine qua non to 
protect the UN against damaging liability claims in courts outside of Kosovo.
716 The view that UNMIK’s mandate does not extend to the compulsory transfer of property interests 
(as necessarily occurs when assets are leased to investors for 99 years through the privatisation 
process) is mainly based on the limitations imposed by the international law of occupation. Cf. the 
interesting discussion by Irmscher (‘Framework’, supra note 635, at 383-395), who claims that the 
law of occupation applies to UNMIK, although second in rank after the authorisations in Resolution 
1244. Disappointingly though, he does not commit himself on the issue of whether Article 55 of the 
1907 Hague Regulations (“it must safeguard the capital of these properties”) is actually applicable 
to UNMIK (which would certainly prevent the privatisation of socially owned property). For two 
reasons, the answer to this question must be in the negative. Firstly, it is doubtful whether the 
legal reasoning underpinning the minimum standards incorporated in the Regulations is generally 
applicable to a UN organ temporarily administering territory. Presumably, these protective 
functions are already built into its fiduciary mandate. In short, Kosovo is certainly not a territory 
“placed under the authority of a hostile army1 (Art. 42). In the case in question, an international 
territorial administration has been specifically charged with the reconstruction of key economic 
infrastructure (S/RES/1244, §11(g)}- Secondly, drawing a general analogy with belligerent 
occupation fails to appreciate the particular situation o f an open-ended mandate in which the pre­
existing sovereign (and arguably the holder o f titular sovereignty qua nudum jus) may return intact, 
should the status of the territory be determined in this direction. It would therefore appear that a 
SC Resolution under Chapter VII can override existing obligations under international humani­
tarian law, including the law of occupation (Zwanenburg, Accountability, supra note 615, at 1 SI- 
152, discussing SC Res. 1483 (2003) that arguably set aside Art. 43 of the Hague Regulations by 
authorizing the CPA to make important changes to Iraqi governing structures). It is suggested to 
agree with Perritt who convincingly argues that “the Security Council has, since the issuance of 
Resolution 1244, exercised continuous oversight over the U.N.’s administration of Kosovo, 
receiving notice of UNMIK regulations and also receiving regular reports..., some of which have 
expressly referred to privatization of socially owned assets as a priority... Failure by the [SC] to 
take action to limit the exercise of this authority by UNMIK evidences concurrence..." ('Resolving 
Claims’, supra note 701, at 172).
717 Cf. Dana Eyre and Andreas Wittkowski, The Political Economy o f Consolidating Kosovo: Property 
Rights, Political Conflict and Stability (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2002), at 9-11.
•181 ■
concerns as to their personal liability in future litigation regarding their involvement in the 
privatisation process.718 As attempts to distance UNMIK and the SRSG’s deputies from 
possible liability claims reverberated through communications between UNHQ, UNMIK and 
its component Pillar responsible for economic reconstruction, the latter tried to obtain 
immunity for KTA personnel from the UN. The UN, however, maintained that EU-seconded 
KTA directors and international members o f the KTA board who are not UN staff members 
did not enjoy the privileges accorded to the UN under the 1946 Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities o f the United Nations (CPIUN).719 As a consequence, those international 
board members are exposed to the risk o f being personally sued before courts outside the 
territory and being held liable for actions undertaken in the course of their official 
functions.720
In what can be termed the Battle of the Legal Advisers, UNMIK’s P illar IV insisted that the 
two key international staff vested with executive authority -  the Deputy o f the Deputy SRSG 
for Economic Reconstruction and KTA’s Managing Director -  would indeed be covered by 
the aforementioned UN Convention which grants immunities to the category of ‘experts on 
missions’ performing functions on behalf o f the UN (and who are not UN officials)721 -  an 
argument that was firm ly grounded in the ICJ’s interpretation of the Convention.722 This legal 
opinion has also been supported by two ancillary arguments relating to the international 
administration's plural identity. Firstly, the international civil presence, headed by the SRSG, 
remains responsible in the final instance for supporting the reconstruction of key economic 
infrastructure.723 Secondly, the KTA, including its Board, was established by the SRSG by 
virtue of an UNMIK Regulation in the pursuit of a key UNMIK responsibility. Consequently, 
any action undertaken by international KTA staff with executive authority (which is intra vires 
with regard to UNMIK regulations and subsequent legislation promulgated by the SRSG) 
represents an action performed on behalf o f the UN and hence attributable to i t 724 This 
organic link is also supported by the fact that the key KTA managers are appointed by the
718 Skogstad, Reconstruction, supra note 697, at 64.
719 A/RES/22A(1), UN Doc A/43Ann.l, 13 February 1946,1 UNTS 15 (corrigendum in 90 UNTS 327). 
See UN Code Cable 3154 (13 November 2003).
720 The case of Wood Industries LLC v. United Nations, UNMIK, and the Kosovo Trust Agency 
(12003], Supreme Court of the State of New York, Index No. 03/602741) appears to demonstrate 
that the risk of being sued is considerable (Wood industries withdrew the complaint and re-filed 
the case in the Special Chamber of the Kosovo Supreme Court where it is now pending the 
decision to dismiss. The case is also discussed by Henry H. Perritt ‘Providing Judicial Review for 
Decisions by Political Trustees', 15 Duke JCIL 1-74 (2004), at 16-17). Due to the financial risks 
involved, professional indemnity insurances for KTA Board members are not available on the 
private insurance market (interview with Pillar IV Legal Officer, 1 February 2005).
721 Article VI, s.22, CPIUN, supra note 719.
722 As pointed out in the Mazilu case, this category encompasses a wide variety of persons to whom 
the UN “has had occasion to entrust missions* (i.e. assignments), as long as they are neither 
representatives to nor officials of the organisation (Applicability o f Article VI, Section 22, o f the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities o f the UN, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports [1989], at 
20). For a discussion of the term ‘official’ used both in the Charter and in the CPIUN see Paul C. 
Szasz and Thordis Ingadottir, The UN and the ICC: The Immunity of the UN and Its Officials’, 14 
LJIL 867-885 (2001), at 869-873
723 §11(g) of S/RES/1244 (1999). Although the European Union provides financial and technical 
assistance within the UNMIK structure, such assisting operations are undertaken under the overall 
responsibility of the UN.
724 By characterising the KTA as ‘independent body1 rather than as a ‘corporation’, UNMIK arguably 
manifested an intent to classify the KTA’s functions as governmental rather than commercial 
(Perritt, ‘Judicial Review’, supra note 720, at n 79).
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SRSG as members of the KTA Board and also by the continuing authority of the SRSG who 
may repeal o r modify all Board decisions,725 In the latest stage of the legal controversy, 
UNMIK’s Legal Adviser recommended that the UN not grant 'experts on mission’ status to 
non-UN officials, thereby following a restrictive interpretation that effectively excludes those 
officials from immunity.726
As a result o f this standoff, the KTA Board has not been officially convened in the period 
between March 2004 to the end of May 2005.727 The suspension of the privatisation process 
is best described by the German term Kindesweglegung, a situation in which a reckless pa­
rent abandons her responsibility towards a minor. At best, this tale illustrates the detrimental 
impact of an open-ended status situation and the constraints on the use of privatisation to 
promote economic recovery. A t worst, the narrative provides an embarrassing example of an 
international organisation’s disastrous hesitations embodied in its failure to first assert, and 
then exercise, legal authority over an area as a 'surrogate state’ due to ambiguity surround- 
ding the scope of its rights and responsibilities. Creating acceptable conditions for private 
investment has become an essential part of state-building; UNMIK activities in this sphere 
may have been more successful had it been more willing to consider the link bet-ween eco­
nomic progress and political stability and face up to its function as government.728 UNMIK 
should have anticipated the trials and tribulations emerging from the contested conceptions 
of a trustee’s functions and could have been counselled to request an early advisory opinion 
from the ICJ on this particular legal question arising within the scope of its activities.729
Regardless o f the interpretation adopted, as international Board members remain unwilling 
to actively participate in the relevant decision-making process, an international administra­
tion’s ‘indecisionism’ has spawned a dysfunctional regulatory body that remains unable to 
implement its mandate. This, in turn, has not only compromised the legitimacy of the 
process. The most negative impact o f stagnation in the field o f privatisation was fe lt by 
buyers of the tendered enterprises: the transfer of the SOEs was considerably delayed;
725 S.12.3 and s.24.3(a) of UNMIK/REG/2002/12 respectively, supra note 713.
726 Cf. Note to the SRSG (30 March 2004).
727 The KTA completed three rounds of privatisation before the process was suspended in October 
2003. See UNMIK Pillar IV, ‘Statement to clarify the current situation regarding the privatisation 
process’ (7 October 2003) as well as Sasha Brubanovic, ‘Privatization Halted’, Balkan Reconstruc­
tion Report/Transitions Online (13 October 2003, available at www.tol.cz). UNMIK/REG/2005/18 
(22 April 2005), which amends UNMIK/REG/2002/12 {supra, note 713), now allows for a change 
of ownership for public purposes (’eminent domain') even if the SOE status of an enterprise is not 
yet fully determined. Accordingly, the KTA Board can now make final ownership determinations 
after the sale of assets. Whether this w ill lead to the re-constitution of the KTA board prior to the 
resolution of the immunity issue remains to be seen.
728 Cf Henry H. Perritt, ’Stabilizing Kosovo: ‘Enterprise Formation and Financial Markets’, 2:2 Journal 
o f Global Financial Markets 28-39 (2001), at 33-34 (arguing that in analogy to the trustee- 
occupant concept, UNMIK has the power to transfer trust property, even when a transfer cuts off 
reversionary interests, as long as it exercises this power in line with the terms of the trust). For a 
similar conclusion regarding UNTAET see Morrow/White, ‘East Timor, supra note 504, at 43
729 Article 96(2) of the UN Charter provides that “[ojther organs of the United Nations and specialised 
agencies, which may at any time be so authorised by the General Assembly, may also request 
advisory opinions of the court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities’ . The 
GA has previously authorised some UN organs to request opinions at any time, without requiring 
special authorisation for each individual case (cf. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, ‘Claims Against 
International Organizations: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes', 7:2 Yale J o f World Public Order 131- 
176 (1980-1981), at 172, with reference). See also Karel Wellens, Remedies against International 




buyers had to start repaying the loans they engaged for the purchase, and the enterprises’ 
economic activity ceased while buyers were prevented from managing them.730 It has also 
undermined the UN mission's basic goal of creating a viable economy under the rule of law 
and has proven harmful to Kosovo’s socio-political stability. In fact, control over some of 
Kosovo's most valuable public assets continues to be decided outside a legal framework, in 
various local disputes.731
5 .3  U N M IK ’s  P r o b l e m a t ic  Pa r t ic ip a t io n  in St a t u s  N e g o t ia t io n s
Having examined a governance sphere that plagued UNMIK in its first six years of existence, 
this chapter’s final section now draws attention to the key actor in an internationalised 
territory and directs us to disaggregating the intersecting influences that converge around 
this bicephalous body in its agency and organic functions. It faces simultaneously ‘outward’ 
to the international community as a territorial agent, and 'inward' to a domestic audience as 
an international organ to perform the fiduciary bond. In its quality as situated territorial agent 
an international mission is constrained in its articulation by the operation o f a fiduciary bond 
between it and the govemees. In its corollary identity as subsidiary organ of the United 
Nations its mission is constrained in its ‘domestic’ strategic choices by international law and 
the politics of its mother organisation.732 73Both aspects are important to capture the nature o f 
an international administration, and both impose constraints and supply resources. Yet, their 
simultaneous performance manoeuvres the territorial agent qua international organ into an 
untenable situation should it choose to participate in final status negotiations.
5.3.1 O p t io n s  f o r  t h e  S e c u r it y  C o u n c il
As the decision concerning the status of the entity over which the UN has temporarily 
assumed effective control has been deliberately left open, it will fall to the Security Council 
(SC) to determine this at a future point in time in the form of a resolution amending 1244. 
This, in itself, can be considered as a revolutionary moment in the Council’s practice for the 
closest it has previously come to imposing territorial boundaries on a state was arguably its 
decision to demarcate the Iraq-Kuwait boundary under its Resolution 687.730 In directing 
permanent change to the status and the political structure of territory still remaining within a 
state, the SC has two options, the first of which can be discarded at the outset
The SC could opt to further expand its powers in a post-conflict administration context and 
vertically impose a permanent change in Kosovo’s political status without the consent of the 
current holder of a nudum jus  to exercise sovereignty to the extent that it deems such
730 Institute for Development Research (Riinvest)/UNDP, Early Warning System Project, Kosovo 
Report No. 6 (January-April 2004), at 17.
731 Cf., e.g., Institute for War and Peace Reporting, ‘Gangs and Red Tape Deter Investors’, 6 April 
2005.
732 This re-states the conclusions we reached in the discussion of the dual roles of the UN Council for 
Namibia, supra p. 142.
733 SCOR (XLV), 3 April 1991, UN Doc. S/INF/47 (1991), §§2-4, reprinted in 30 ILM  847 (1991). Here, 
the Council merely undertook to give precision to the boundary already concluded between the 
two states (see the Agreed Minutes Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition 
and Related Matters, Kuwait -  Iraq, 4 October 1963,485 UNTS 321 (1964).
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determination necessary to the maintenance of international peace and security. Such a 
decision has no precedent in public international law. It would essentially imply that the 
international legal order draws the contours of state frontiers and grants title over territory to 
an entity that it simultaneously recognises as self-determination unit. Unilateral determination 
of a territory’s status against the explicit wishes of the sovereign title holder may lie beyond 
the competences of the SC.734
The second option is more likely to materialise. The SC could endorse a horizontal 
agreement between the parties in a resolution based on Chapter VII. Negotiations w ill no 
doubt take the form of a general plurilateral (or limited multilateral) treaty.735 Such 'Kosovo 
Accords’, concluded under the auspices of the Contact Group, would effectively end the 
status of the ‘international trust’ and resolve the sovereignty puzzle. Parties to the 
determination of the future permanent political boundaries of the territory of Kosovo include, 
on the one hand, Serbia (and Montenegro) -  the holder of a reversionary title to the exercise 
of sovereign powers -  and on the other hand, Kosovo’s local institutions. The latter will, in 
some form or the other, be supported by an UNMIK delegation (which remains authorised to 
represent the territory in its foreign affairs). Even to the casual observer of international 
relations, it is obvious that the double functions of an international territorial administration 
could collide at that point.
(i) Walking the T ightrope: UNMIK’s Dual Functions
Resolution 1244 tasks UNMIK with facilitating “a political process designed to determine 
Kosovo’s future status",736 envisioning that at some point of the institution-building sequence, 
the UN's subsidiary organ will be called upon to participate in finding solutions to the 
permanent status of the territory it administers. The idea that UNMIK has to facilitate such 
dialogue is entrenched in the dominant culture of the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO), according to which a UN Mission supplies an element o f disinterested 
outside assistance that can help the parties to disengage from  a conflict.737 This under­
734 Chapter VII of the UN Charter arguably does not vest the UNSC with the power to prescribe 
changes in the international territorial order. As Klein concluded in 1980, “[d]ie Zuständigkeit der 
Vereinten Nationen zur Aufrechterhaltung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit im 
allgemeinen, aber auch die Befugnisse des Sicherheitsrates nach Kapitel VH im besonderen, 
ermächtigen...nicht zu territorialer Ordnung und Zuordnung* (Statusverträge, supra note 116, at 
107). This view is shared by Stahn (‘Constitution Without a State’, supra note 607, at 541) as well 
as by T.D. Gill ( 'Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to 
Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII o f the Charter', 26 NYIL 33-138 (1995), at 
86). Matheson, on the other hand, believes that the SC has the competence to direct changes in 
political boundaries “if it should consider this necessary to restore and maintain international 
peace and security and if such measures are exercised in good faith observance of the Charter 
principles" (‘Governance*, supra note 33, at 85). Although referring to a territorial unit that was 
earmarked for self-determination, Judge Fitzmaurice’s separate opinion is relevant to the case of 
Kosovo: “Even when acting under Chapter V ll of the Charter, the Security Council has no power to 
abrogate or alter territorial rights... The Security Council might, after making the necessary 
determinations under Article 39..., order the occupation of a country or piece of a territory to 
restore peace and security, but it could not thereby, or as part of that operation, abrogate or alter 
territorial rights" (ICJ Reports 1971, supra note 56, at 294).
735 See article 20(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 386. ‘Plurilateral 
treaty’ means treaty participation which is open to a restricted number of parties and which purport 
to deal with matters of concern only to such parties.
736 S/RES/1244 (1999), §11(e), with reference to the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648).
737 Impartiality and neutrality were laid down as principles of UN peacekeeping by SG Hammarskjöld 
in his 1956 report to the General Assembly on the first major UN peacekeeping operation, the
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standing is deeply rooted in the UN's mediation experience stemming from situations in 
which it was invited to do so by the warring parties. A governance mission in which complete 
agency is assumed on behalf of a non-seif governing territorial unit, is, however, funda­
mentally different from a situation in which the UN merely prods the parties to fulfil their 
promises. Yet not only was UNMIK set up by procedures that developed as part of standard 
UN peacekeeping; the mission continues to operate within the chain of command o f the 
DPKO. In keeping with this tradition, UNMIK has already attempted to convene a forum in 
which it assumed the role of a ‘mediator1 with a view to facilitating a political process that 
would yield such a horizontal status agreement The first round of technical negotiations 
between Kosovo and Serbian delegations held in October 2003 in Vienna, however, 
collapsed spectacularly.
An international agent representing an emerging entity of international law is, in this analysis, 
precisely the wrong policy institution to attempt to bridge the gap between claims to self- 
determination on the one hand, and to the reclamation of sovereign dominium, on the other. 
in concreto, a UN administrative mission is ill-suited to host, and even less suited to conduct, 
negotiations on the mandated territory's readiness to join the international community of 
states. Even to the novice, these two functions appear incompatible. Firstly, they involve the 
representation of territorial interests according to the fiduciary bond and their projection to 
the international arena. UNMIK’s second function in this context involves its participation, as 
subsidiary organ of the Secretary General, in a horizontal agreement that provides the basis 
for a SC Resolution determining the future political status of the territory. Regardless o f its 
substance, it appears deeply questionable whether the SC, as the final authority to authorise 
permanent changes to the political boundaries of a sovereign member state, can endorse a 
status treaty in whose negotiation it participated through a subsidiary organ o f one o f the 
UN's principal organs.
Résumé
The decision to suspend a territorial dispute reflects one of the chief dilemmas of a post­
colonial international law which upholds two sets of contradictory concepts; rights associated 
with territorial possession claimed by and on behalf o f a sovereign on the one hand; and 
claims to sovereignty framed by and on behalf of a ’people’, on the other.738 June 1999 was 
merely the latest instance in which the institution o f an international trust served to 
temporarily suspend state sovereignty while shying away from identifying a unit of self- 
determination which would, in time, be entitled to formulate and exercise its claim to the 
disputed territory.
United Nations Emergency Force. Cf. Report of the Secretary-General, Study o f the UNEF 
Experience (9 October 1958), UN Doc. A/3943, at §12. On the issue of the impartiality of 
peacekeeping mandate see Ratner, Peacekeeping, supra note 101, at 25-41 and 55-56 and Jane 
Boulden, ‘Mandates Matter An Exploration of Impartiality in United Nations Operations', 11 Global 
Governance 147-160 (2005). The conceptual underpinning of disinterested neutrality that 
characterized the ‘new peacekeeping’ was criticized in the ‘Brahimi Report’: “impartiality is not the 
same as neutrality or equal treatment o f all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a 
policy of appeasement" (supra note 33, at §50).
738 This dichotomy was discussed in Chapter III. For a neo-Kelsenian re-interpretation of the promise 
of self-determination as an application of the principle of non-intervention, cf. Christopher M. 
Ryan, ‘Sovereignty, Intervention and the Law: A Tenuous Relationship of Competing Principles’, 
26:1 Millennium: Journal of International Studies (1997), at 176.
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The ‘standards before status’ approach, so closely fashioned after policies of conditionality 
and the idea of ‘earned sovereignty’, operates in almost naive denial of the continued 
relevance of self-reliant statehood. Serbia’s assertion of sovereign rights over the territory 
thus hovers perpetually in the background of Kosovo politics, menacingly to some, beguiling 
to others. The history o f institution building over the past six years suggests that exhorting 
civil virtues of minority protection and good governance is, in the absence of real incentives, 
an inadequate means o f engendering normative change in a post-conflict setting. It has 
reinforced a climate o f heightened insecurity in which the conflict remains frozen rather than 
resolved. Under the stewardship o f the former SRSG Holkeri, Kosovo spiralled into a wave 
of violence that, in March 2004, exposed UNMIK’s veritable governance crisis.
The eclectic mix of models devised to respond to this crisis included a proposal that the 
transfer of competencies to local institutions be accompanied by a more ‘neocolonialist’ 
posture: “The new SRSG should be prepared to introduce a robust policy of interventions 
and sanctions in cases o f inappropriate performance [of local actors]."739 This ambiguous 
recommendation serves to underscore a highly significant point: an ‘open-ended’ setting in 
which the future status o f an entity will be negotiated on the basis of the performance of local 
agents increases the hurdles on the path to maintaining a coherent political structure that 
enables the international agent to renounce its 'proconsular role’ and exit. This call has 
apparently been heeded by the successor SRSG, Jessen-Petersen, who declared upon his 
arrival in Prishtina: “I think there is a lim it to how long you can keep a place in limbo."740
As Axelrod has observed, for cooperation to prove stable, the future must have a sufficiently 
large shadow that is cast in a stable set of relationships and expectations.741 The Eide 
Report addressed those systemic constraints that arise from the absence o f a ‘shadow*. 
With undisguised impatience it concluded that
[unfulfilled aspirations and ambitions cannot be handled by policies without a clear political 
perspective... [W]ell functioning institutions depend on a strong sense of local ownership. 
Such ownership cannot be achieved if the owners do not know what they own and what they 
are intended to govern...The ‘standards before status’ policy is untenable in its present form. It 
must be replaced by a broader policy where standards implementation takes Kosovo in an 
orderly way from the present through future status discussions and into a wider regional and 
European integration process. In the current situation... we can no longer avoid the bigger 
picture and defer the most difficult issues to an indefinite future.742
The privatisation tale illustrated that in circumstances where final ‘ownership’ over both 
economic resources and the political process is deferred, an international territorial agent 
may be tom asunder by two contradicting sets of interests it purports to pursue: the 
economic interest of the territorial entity on the one hand, and the international legal interest 
in the maintenance o f SCG’s territorial integrity (which includes the protection of its 
reversionary title to exercise state functions, should a determination of Kosovo’s final status 
be made in this direction), on the other. Trusteeship of publicly owned assets proved to be a
739 Eide Report, supra note 513, at 5.
740 UNMIK Press Conference, Prishtina, 7 August 2004.
741 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution o f  Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), at 174.
742 Eide Report, supra note 513, at 13 and 16.
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double-edged sword which divided an international administration to an extent that it 
abandoned its responsibility to wield authority for the greater good of Kosovo's economy and 
society. The pursuit of objectives that are perceived to be in possible contradiction with each 
other yields negative externalities. One of the objectives of this chapter has been to 
demonstrate that an ambiguous mandate can render an international administration an 
inherently unstable, if not destabilising, policy institution. What we might term the tragedy of 
its ‘civilising mission’ in ambiguous, open-ended circumstances, an international agent has, 
six years into an institution-building mandate, shown itself incapable of administering an 
important part of the public economy.
In endeavouring to facilitate negotiations over the territory’s final status, UNMIK may even 
deviate from the fiduciary duties it has assumed as territorial agent, as is the case with the 
privatisation o f public assets. Such duties include the bona fide representation of the territory 
held in trust vis-d-vis the outside world as well as the compelling and overriding obligation to 
give primary consideration to the interests of the territory and its people.743 For these 
reasons, UNMIK cannot allow itself to be cornered into checkmate where its roles of 
territorial agent and international organ are mutually compromised. As the International 
Crisis Group recently argued, the UN Secretary General should, in consultation with the 
Contact Group, appoint a Special Envoy to conduct exploratory discussions on Kosovo’s 
final status to "move the issue into high gear”.744 The appointment of a mediator other then 
UNMIK would help avoid a conflict o f interest Alternatively, it is conceivable for a UN SRSG 
to assume the role of an ‘honest broker" in status discussions while UNMIK’s jurisdiction is 
transferred to the European Union which would administer the international trust (EUMIK) 
through the grant of a ‘special membership’ to Kosovo.
The legacy of the UN Council for Namibia bolsters the argument that the same agency 
cannot simultaneously conduct bona fide negotiations with concerned parties, and perform 
the ward’s interests. In this case, the UN Council’s functions as administrative organ o f the 
territory were separated from that of the SRSG, whose functions were framed independently 
to facilitate diplomatic negotiations.745 746The events of spring 2005, in which UNMIK’s 
capacities were pointlessly stretched as it tried to facilitate meetings between Kosovo’s 
President and Prime Minister and their counterparts on the SCG and Serbian side lend 
credence to the claim that UNMIK’s administrative and representative activities should, once 
and for all, be detached from wider questions concerning the territory’s future status. A 
sounder approach could involve the Security Council’s utilisation o f its Provisional Rules of 
Procedure allowing for the appointment o f “a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a
743 Integrating the principle of good faith into the law of the Charter, Article 2(2) provides that "all 
Members...shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the 
present Charter'. This principle was arguably breached in the case of Nauru’s administration 
under the Mandate and Trusteeship systems (Weeramantry, Nauru, supra note 524, at 307 et 
seq.). Although the obligation refers to members in the first place, there are strong arguments that 
it extends to UN organs as welt: "It would be fantastic to assume that United Nations...agencies 
are authorized to violate the principles they were established to serve” (Arsanjani, ‘Quis custodies, 
supra note 729, at 133. For a discussion cf. also Schweigman, Security Council, supra note 7, at 
173-178).
744 ICG, Kosovo: Towards Final Status (Europe Report No. 161,24 January 2005), at 23.
745 Cf. Chapter 1I.2.3 (iii)., supra p. 83.
746 Cf. International Crisis Group, Kosovo After Haradinaj (Europe Report No. 163, 26 May 2005), at 
26.
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specified question".747 The determination of territorial status, conducted in the context of a 
structured forum independent from a territorial administration, should witness UNMIK solely 
representing the territory’s interests, in good faith and in close collaboration with local 
institutions.
747
Provisional Rules o f Procedure o f the Security Council, Rule 28, UN Doc. S/96/Rev.7 (1983). The 
basis for this rule is found in Article 29 of the UN Charter: T he  Security Council may establish 
such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions”.
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C hapter V I
Law and  L egi ti macy  in an Inte rnat i onal i s e d  T erri t ory
‘Legitimacy is most articulated when it justifies the actions of governors 
rather then when it explains the subjection o f subjects...’ 748
The previous chapters of this thesis were devoted to an appraisal of the position o f a non­
state territorial entity subject to temporary administration by an international organisation and 
its status in the international legal order. From an in rem perspective, we concluded that the 
Security Council pierced the layer o f Yugoslav sovereignty and reduced its entitlement to rule 
over a bounded territory to a nudum jus. From an obligation perspective, we noted that the 
investiture of an international organ to perform a fiduciary bond has further 'de- 
sovereignising’ effects. In the previous chapter we then addressed concrete issues arising 
from the problem of residual sovereignty and the extent to which it derails an international 
mission’s institution-building sequence under an open-ended mandate.
Given the scope of authority the United Nation has taken upon itself to exercise as territorial 
administrator, it is, as Korhonen correctly remarks, rather surprising that the issue of the 
‘legitimacy’ of the internationalisation of state structures through international post-conflict 
governance has so far inspired little debate beyond the old peacekeeping discourse.749 This 
chapter hence turns ‘inwards' in an attempt to more succinctly define the properties o f a 
temporary coercive order established by an international territorial administration. It is 
generally concerned with phenomena accompanying an international legal and political 
authority as it ‘meets’, and interlaces with, a municipal legal and political order. Upon 
consideration, the metaphor of 'encounter* is not at all ill-conceived. The first section will 
inquire into some of the problems o f an international political authority as it tries to assert 
itself in relation to both a 'domestic' and an international audience. The second section 
argues that the unmediated import of international legal forms into thus internationalised 
territories creates partially defective legal orders in which international authority remains 
beyond challenge. The phenomena observed are inherently contradictory. On the one hand, 
they confirm our suppositions about the fundamentally liberalising agenda o f international 
administrations. On the other, they do not conform to some o f the ideal conceptions o f the 
rule of law which we wish international administrations to ‘transplant’ into foreign settings. 
The analysis o f a temporary legal order, presented in the second section of this chapter, will 
thus follow a more normative perspective exploring the extent to which legitimacy is 
contested in situations of temporary UN territorial governance.
More specifically, this chapter ponders the following four questions: (i), on what arguments 
does an international territorial administration base its claim to the ‘legitimate’ exercise of 
power and towards which audience does it address these arguments?; (ii), what informs the 
work of the international community as it internationalises territories and could a 'transitional 
paradigm’ capture the anomalies we encounter in such a temporary normative order?; (iii), 
what functions does such a transitional legal order serve and which specificities does it 
exhibit?; and (iv), what are the challenges faced by an international administration in the
748 Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), at 190.
749 ‘International Governance’, supra note 598, at 526.
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construction of a transitory administrative system that should provide the foundations for a 
liberal future? In answering some o f these questions, our assumptions are guided by an 
understanding that ‘legitimacy’ is not a single quality or characteristic that a system of 
government possesses but a set o f distinct criteria that operate on different levels. As 
Beetham lucidly observes, each of these multiple criteria provides grounds for compliance or 
cooperation on the part of those subordinate to a given power relation.750
The ‘anomalous’ situation created by the exercise in internationalised territories has been 
abundantly emphasised before when we dealt specifically with the extent of UN authority in 
Kosovo. To recapitulate, the anomaly stems from the position o f an internationalised territory 
as directly submitted to international law and possessing an agent that ‘performs’ the partial 
legal personality of the territory. In the following discussion we shall argue that the notion of 
legitimacy exhibits a number of abnormalities as well, notably an instability which mirrors the 
fluctuations in the structure of political institutions tenuously tied together by a ‘dual-key’ 
governance framework. Our analysis will not, however, dwell in exceptionalism for too long. 
Arguments framed as claims to legitimate government have typically cross-temporal and 
cross-spatial significance. A historical parallel may be appropriate. Enlightened monarchs 
such as Joseph II of Austria based their claim to potestas imperandi increasingly on the 
salus publica rather than on their feudal title to the exercise of authority. As Kratochwil 
observes with reference to the rule of the late 18* century Habsburgs, this new 
conceptualisation of legitimacy had two implications:
it raised the issue of popular participation in the determination o f public policy conceived as the 
exercise of sovereign rights, and it provided the decisive wedge to distinguish between the 
interest of the state (and later, o f the 'people’) and that of the sovereign.751
One conclusion of this chapter’s first section is that an international territorial authority needs 
to concern itself with the legitimacy o f its rule, as seen through the eyes of the people under 
its tutelage. In order to underline the shift in ‘argument that is designed to bolster the 
legitimacy o f rule and domination, an international territorial administration should adjust its 
idiom of ‘empire’ to enlightened conception o f service to the entity it holds in trust.
In t r o d u c tio n : Prem ises  and  C ha lleng es
At the outset, it is advisable to spell out what this analysis w ill not touch upon. Our elabora­
tion of political authority does not claim to advance a sector-specific theory of legitimacy or 
regime design; it proposes no compelling basis for the legitimate exercise of extensive 
powers in an internationalised territory. Nor is it our intention here to ‘measure’ legitimacy 
according to pre-established criteria, to establish a typology of modes through which 
authority is legitimised, or to empirically identify which mechanisms of social control might 
operate better in a real-world situation such as Kosovo. W hile there are myriad reasons for 
the erosion of political authority -  corruption, local obstructionism, a failure to promote 
government transparency, a tenuous link between civil administration and the military 
command structure, the operation of (international networks o f patronage, sheer incompe­
tence, to name a few -  this analysis seeks to stress some of the inherent tensions
750 David Beetham, The Legitimation o f Power (London: Macmillan, 1991), at 20.
751 'Dominium’, supra note 40, at 30.
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underlying international institution-building. We portray the dynamics that unfold in a process 
in which notions o f legitimacy are subject to institutional contestation. We shall introduce the 
variety of actors operating in an internationalised territory as they approach the problem of 
social control, and as the quest for legitimacy creates tensions between them.
This project presents us with two major challenges. The first relates to our treatment of 
aggregate social preferences called ‘interests’, the second concerning the inapplicability of 
Voluntarist1 models to provide a foundation for legitimacy in an internationalised territory. 
Firstly, given the ecumenical quality o f the concept of legitimacy, we must assume the 
existence o f unitary rational actors whose actions are purposive, and who represent social 
preferences. For our treatment o f legitimacy to be coherent, we suppose that we can 
aggregate social preferences from a community that is in the process of establishing itself as 
polis. After all, the notions of legitimacy and 'public interest* are intrinsically interwoven, with 
the latter functioning to justify claims and demands in the name of the communitas ('public 
policy’) and obliging its members to defer the pursuit of diverging individual preferences.752 
Following a liberal conception of domestic politics, we assume that emerging political 
institutions are equally capable of representing some subset of domestic society and hence 
of expounding a common will or a common interest; they represent the ‘transmission belt' by 
which the preferences of groups are translated into policy.753
The treatment of a polity as capable of holding, and expressing, social preferences and 
intentions through policies cuts deeply into the debate that has been bubbling through social 
sciences for some years. At issue here is the ontological status of the state and, in 
particular, the agent-structure problem -  whether the assumption of corporate agency 
denudes the social field of human agents.754 The “attempt to breathe life into collective social 
forms" is, of course, challengeable.755 By assuming that an agent of a polity can indeed 
frame normative claims that express aggregate social preferences and 'collective 
sentiments’ held by human agents, we do not mean to anthropomorphise a polity beyond the 
extent necessary to juxtapose sets o f preferences held by bureaucratic actors that are 
engaged in a discourse over the exercise of social control in a ‘dual governance’ setting. For 
the purposes of this chapter, it will therefore suffice to delineate the notion of 'territorial' 
interest and contrast it to the Staatengemeinschaftsinteresse a fiduciary administration is
752 This account thus goes beyond the circumscription o f interests as idiosyncratic preferences. 
Interests, following Kratochwil, stand for preferences that ‘ought to be chosen because certain 
reasons can be marshalled to support this claim when challenged". See his illuminating ‘On the 
Notion of “Interest" in International Relations’, 36:1 International Organization 1-30 (1982), at 6.
753 Andrew Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’ , 51:4 
International Organization 513 (1997), at 518 et seq. This transmission belt is, of course, 
restrained as the international administration remains in charge of setting the agenda for 
numerous policy areas.
754 See, e.g., Alexander E. Wendt, ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’, 
41:3 International Organization 335 (1987); Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International 
Society (Ithaca/London: Cornell UP, 1996), at 14-31; Roxanne L. Doty, 'Aporia: A Critical 
Exploration of the Agency-Structure Problématique in International Relations Theory’, 3:3 EJIR 
365(1997).
755 Colin Wight, ‘State Agency: Social Action Without Human Activity?', 30 Review o f International 
Studies 269 (2004), at 273. Cf. also Hidemi Suganami, 'On Wendt’s Philosophy: A Critique’, 28 
Re-view o f International Studies 23 (2002). For a critical study of ‘organologie’ metaphors in social 
science used by, inter alia, Durkheim and Tönnies see Susanne Lüdemann, Metaphern der Ge­
sellschaft. Studien zum soziologischen und politischen Imaginären (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Vertag, 
2004).
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bound to pursue as a subsidiary organ of the UN Secretary-General. One backdrop to our 
focus will however consist in the weakness and generality o f its core presuppositions which 
we already discussed in Chapter IV: that there indeed exists an ‘international society’ that 
has developed a specific framework -  a plurality of rules -  that allows for the formulation of a 
set of community interests, pursued with the same intensity through one of its organs, and 
for the evaluation of the latter’s performance against its set o f social preferences. Even more 
problematically when discussing international legitimacy, we w ill have to presuppose not only 
a set of rules but also an ‘order’ that sustains certain community interests and which 
provides an international value system against which it is possible to make judgments about 
the legitimacy o f international institutions, practices and procedures.756 it is important to note 
at this point that by providing necessary but not sufficient causes for a process of de- 
legitimisation to occur, and by relying on probabilistic rather than deterministic causes, our 
narrative is underpredictive.
Secondly, theories of legitimacy that build on voluntarist models and international law’s 
strong consensualist basis for obligation757 758encounter difficulties when approaching a 
situation in which an international territorial administration’s mandate is, as some would say, 
unprecedentedly ‘deep’, and its temporal width undefined. In an internationalised territory, 
the question of legitimacy is necessarily one of domination, not of consensual assumption of 
obligation. Challenges to the legitimacy of international territorial rule in Kosovo are also 
advanced from a foundational point of view as the existence of such a mission was 
predicated on the breach o f a (presumably ‘legitimate’) international rule of non-intervention. 
Moreover, the unaccountability of international authorities has been used as a key explana­
tory variable to capture phenomena of the erosion of international political authority in a 
territory held in trust Our discussion of the notion of accountability in the second part of this 
chapter is therefore closely related to that of legitimacy. Like legitimacy, accountability is a 
relational concept denoting the interaction between the accountable (the holder of authority) 
and the accountee (the authority to whom accountability is owed) with respect to the task 
which has been the object of a-delegation of power by the latter.
The majority of social scientists writing about legitimacy during the second half o f the last 
century have identified legitimacy in an ‘attitudinal’ sense, focusing on perceptions and 
orientations towards society or its regime. In this, they take themselves as following Weber’s 
social theory o f Herrschaft in which he distinguished between perceived legitimacy and the 
qualities of legitimacy in an order itself.756 An institution perceived as legitimate gives rise to
756 John Williams, Legitimacy in International Relations and the Rise and Fall o f Yugoslavia (New 
York: St. Martins Press, 1998), at 12.
757 Cf. Daniel Bodansky, 'The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for 
International Environmental Law?’, 93 AJIL 596 (1999), at 597.
758 One prominent proponent of the Weberian view sees legitimacy as means to “designate the 
beliefs and attitudes that members have toward the society which they make up" (Charles Taylor, 
'Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity, and Alienation in late 20th Century Canada’, in Communi- 
tarianism: A New Public Ethics (ed. by M. Daly, Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth, 1994), at 58). Franck 
suggests that “ in a community organised around rules, compliance is secured...by perception of a 
rule as legitimate by those to whom it is addressed" (‘Legitimacy in the International System’, 82 
AJIL 705-759 (1988), at 706). Another sociologist identifies legitimacy as a “generalised per­
ception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed systems o f norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" that furthers com­
pliance (Mark C. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’, 20:3 
Academy o f Management Review 571-610 (1995), at 574). For three critiques of the ‘subjectivist’
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symbols possessing a mobilising power to instigate social action because of their asso­
ciation with the institution and the political process.759 In turn, perceptions of legitimacy lead 
actors to behave differently than they otherwise would, because they believe an institution 
requires them to. The agent recognised in a community as authorised to make such a 
dispensation of symbols is in a position of power relative to the res t760
Yet, as Hurd  also suggests, it is power in a broader sense rather than the coercive power of 
the bully: “[TJhe character of power changes when it is exercised within a structure of 
legitimate relations, and the two concepts of power and legitimacy come together in the idea 
of ‘authority’".761 For this transformation to occur, a belief system must emerge that legiti­
mates the exercise of control.762 Legitimacy is hence understood to be 'socially constructed’ 
in that it reflects a congruence between the behaviour of the entity that claims legitimacy and 
the shared beliefs of a social group.763 As Clark emphasises, this subjectivist Weberian 
approach leaves the task of developing exogenous schemes of adjudging the legitimacy of a 
political system to political philosophy, and concentrates instead on the quality of the endo­
genous relationship.764 In the exogenous sphere, the emergence of a system which 
furnishes the basic distinguishing legitimising criterion of authority is then seen as crucial to 
the efficiency of social action. As a device of social control, legitimacy is believed to have 
long-term advantages over coercion in reducing enforcement costs.765 76In times of adversity, 
widespread belief in an organisation's good character may dampen the delegitimising effects
approach, and a more normative conception that posits legitimacy as the moral right of an institu­
tion to impose political obligations see A. John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy. Essays on 
Rights and Obligations (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), at 134-157; Frederick M. Barnard, Democracy 
and Legitimacy. Plural Values and Political Power (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s UP, 2001), at 30-33; 
and Beetham, Legitimation, supra note 750, at 8 et seq. (arguing that Weber's influence on the 
subject of legitimacy has been an "almost unqualified disaster").
759 Cf. David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics and Power {New Haven, Yale UP, 1988), at 5-14.
760 Ian Hurd ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the Security Council’, 8 Global Governance 
35-51 (2002), at 38.
‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, 53:2 International Organization 379 (1999), at 
401-402. In the same vein, Inis Claude observed that power and legitimacy are not antithetical, 
but complementary. Legitimacy "makes all rulers more effective -  more secure in the possession 
of power and more successful in its exercise” (‘Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of 
the United Nations’, 20 International Organization 367 (1966), at 368 etseq.).
762 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: OUP, 1947), 101-109.
763 Cf. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy*, supra note 758, at 574, and Beetham, Legitimation, supra 
note 750, at 100 et seq.
764 Ian Clark, ‘Legitimacy in a Global Order*, 29 Review o f International Studies 75-95 (2003), at 79-
80.
766Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority’, supra note 761, at 388. This is a fair assumption which does not, 
in a way, interfere with the more complex issues of finding a methodology for interpreting the 
motives for behaviour that happens to be in compliance with a certain directive. As Weber put it, 
"the merely external fact of the order being obeyed is not sufficient to signify domination in our 
sense; we cannot overlook the fact that the command is accepted as ‘valid’ norm" (Economy and 
Society: An Outline o f Interpretative Sociology (Vol. II, ed. by G. Roth and C. Wittich, Berkeley, 
CA: Univer-sity o f California Press, 1978), at 946). Connecting the level of effectiveness to the 
level of legi-timacy, Upset argued that long-term effectiveness can to some extent compensate for 
insufficient legitimacy, while strong legitimacy can compensate for insufficient effectiveness 
(Political Man. The Social Bases o f Politics (Baltimore: JHU Press, 1981), at 64. It would, 
however, be a mistake to regard legitimacy as a necessary condition for effective government; the 
two are not interde-pendent but separate issues (Barker articulates this concern in Political 
Legitimacy, supra note 748, at 14), Following these caveats, we avoid advancing an argument for 
a causal relationship between legitimacy and stability within an 'internationalised’ polity. As Clark 
correctly points out, the causality also works in the opposite direction (‘Legitimacy’, supra note 
764, at 95).
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of failures, miscues, and reversals. An organisation that is perceived as legitimate is in a 
position of power over the actor; legitimacy becomes the “reservoir of loyalty on which 
leaders can draw".766
Having introduced the relational nature o f the notion of legitimacy, we have so far concluded 
that nothing is legitimate in itself but only in relation to an audience. ‘Legitimacy’ in the 
Weberian conception thus has two aspects: it both contributes to domination, and justifies it. 
It is both a belief held by subjects and a claim made by rulers.76 67 The object of legitimacy -  a 
government -  raises a claim of legitimacy, and the conditions for meeting this claim are de­
pendent on an audience as a party to the relationship.768 Applied to our investigation, this 
implies that we will have to circumscribe the discursive spheres in which a claim to legitimate 
government is framed. The next section hence distinguishes conceptually between 
‘domestic’ and ‘international’ legitimacy, for we believe that each sphere involves a special 
audience perceptive to diverse arguments about the nature o f authority. While borderline 
cases exist, we will, for heuristic purposes, treat notions o f international and domestic 
legitimacy as discrete discursive contexts in which different strategies of legitimisation are 
pursued.
6.1 T he A n o m a lo u s  L e g it im a c y  C y c le
The contours o f legitimacy are most clearly discemable when it is contested. In Kosovo, 
diverging conceptions of government produced negative externalities and generated un­
stable equilibria. The following discussion attempts to explain some of the reasons behind 
processes of de-legitimisation. The firs t section conceptualises the notion of legitimacy in 
order to develop a framework in which we can locate the internal dynamics of normative 
change in an internationalised territory. The analysis proceeds in essentially two stages. 
Firstly, we attempt to describe the basic components on which legitimacy in an asymmetrical 
'dual-key' constitutional arrangement rests. We conclude that it rests on a process that 
seeks to gradually devolve public authority from an international agent to local institutions. 
Secondly, we suggest that international agents and local actors rely on discrete sources of 
legitimacy to justify the exercise of public power. A discussion of the situation in which 
international and local actors are posited side by side, both exercising social control through 
reference to different sources of authority, provides a vital key to understanding the tensions 
which m ay  accompany the presence o f an international territorial administration. Of 
particular significance will be the realisation that efforts to legitimise the exercise o f inter­
national power in a domestic setting can generate efforts by local institutions to de-legitimise 
the former and jeopardise the projected sequence of devolving competencies. This prelimi­
nary conclusion is indispensable for a wider argument that in an anomalous situation in 
which legitimacy is contested between international and local institutions, their interactions 
can affect the trajectory of normative change.
766 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), at 26.
767 Barker, Political Legitimacy', supra note 748, at 59.
768 Kaarlo Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002), at 246.
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6.1.1 A  T r a n s it io n a l  a d m in is t r a t io n  in  T r a n s it io n
Wo ethnic ties, no shared traditions, no voluntary act 
o f political confidence unite the rulers and their subjects. ' 769
As we have already explained in the previous chapter addressing UNMIK’s relations to the 
nascent Provisional Institutions, the pronouncement of the Constitutional Framework 
entrenched a highly dynamic mechanism of dual-key governance. A focus on the division of 
powers between international and local actors and on their respective strategies of 
legitimisation further assists u$ in approaching issues of legitimacy in an internationalised 
territory. The following sketch represents a live snapshot of an institution-building process in 
which competencies are successively transferred from an international to a local agent 
under an asymmetrical constitutional co-government arrangement, the specific legal 
parameters o f which will be addressed in the second section of this chapter. This 
arrangement constitutes a sui generis type, loosely bounded political system in which policy 
is made by both international and national institutions, and its exercise depends on the 
coordination of a range of political and military organisations. Along the unfolding institution­
building sequence, the international agent is vested with a (decreasing) measure of Organi- 
sationshoheit -  the authority or competence to draw up a constitution, to choose a system of 
government, and to obtain means to enable the ‘state’ to execute its functions. The local 
institutions, on the other hand, will gradually assume competencies for a certain range of 
issues and discharge municipal functions according to their autonomous sphere of action 
(autonomer Wirkungsbe reich).770
In accordance with Talbotts designation of Kosovo as a “ward of the international 
community",771 we can compare the fluid matrix of competences of the emergent local insti­
tutions with the capabilities o f a minor who grows into a certain age. Similarly, the 
competencies of the guardian should be seen to shrink as they are matched by the 
increasing capacity of the ward. The local institution's competence within their autonomous 
sphere will continue to be subject to the international agent's supervision while the range of 
competencies tends to increase. This model seeks to encourage pluralism in order to en­
hance legitimacy and local ‘ownership’ o f measures undertaken during the transition.
769 Ernst Fraenkel, Military Occupation and the Rule o f Law: Occupational Government in the 
Rhineland 1918-1923 (Oxford: OUP, 1944), at 205.
770 Cf. Verdroß, Völkerrecht, 5th ed., supra note 45, at 195. An example of a local power-sharing 
agreement that delineates the spheres of competence of the international and local actor while 
providing the former with a supervisory competence over the latter can be found in the Art. 11 of 
Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement which obliges the High Representative to "respect [the local 
institution’s] autonomy within their spheres of operation while as necessary giving general 
guidance to them about the impact of their activities on the implementation of the peace 
settlement" (35 /U lf 35 (1996), 147 etseq.).
771 Strobe Talbott, 'The Balkan Question and the European Answer*, Address at the Aspen Institute 
(Aspen, 25 August 1999), at 5; quoted in William Bain, 'The Political Theory of Trusteeship and 




There is no doubt that the co-government model presents a significant innovation in post­
conflict governance, fostering both short-term legitimacy and long-term démocratisation. 
Albeit grossly simplified, the above sketch however illustrates the observable tensions bet­
ween the constitutionally entrenched local institutions and their continuing supervision by 
UNMIK. At a particular point of the institution-building trajectory, the two actors might occupy 
opposing positions based on the pursuit of conflicting sets o f 'interests’, or corporate inten­
tions. The example of privatisation, discussed in detail in Chapter V.2.2(i), illustrated the 
dilemma of the pursuit of pursuing divergent 'interests’: While the provisional institutions of 
self-government (PISG) have, since 2002, pursued an intensive campaign to kick-start the 
privatisation o f public assets in Kosovo, the international agent has stalled the process by its 
continued recourse to international law and the limits it imposes on UNMIK in its fiduciary 
exercise of powers.772
(i) T he Tw o D im ensio ns  of the  Leg it im a c y  Disco urse
Political transitionality provides the tableau against which the following discussion on the 
sources of legitimacy can be projected. By now it should be apparent that our attempts, in
772 Supra p. 179.
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the previous paragraph, at framing the tensions between international and local institutions in 
the terminology o f pursuing differing sets of ‘interests’ can be easily recast in the palette of 
legitimacy. W e mean nothing else than to suggest that international and internal legitimacy 
may be negatively correlated. Consider a line that frequently appears in our political vocabu­
lary when we, usually in a condescending manner, refer to a particular governmental policy 
as “designed for local consumption". W e mean simply that internal, or domestic, ‘interests’ 
are pursued at the expense o f international legitimacy. Accordingly, we will set apart these 
two target audiences when investigating claims to legitimate government.773
Firstly, we consider the international validation of UN governance of a territory. We term this 
sphere international legitimacy because the UN addresses its claims to legitimate govern­
ment towards an international constituency, particularly donor countries.774 As the sequence 
of institution-building unfolds, the SRSG, in whom the executive, legislative and judicial 
powers are initially combined, relies on a multi-faceted set o f arguments to justify the 
exercise of largely unchecked powers. His arguments appeal directly to and articulate the 
shared values o f the international community.775 They are largely framed to convince the 
international public that its sundry actions are consistent banal with established best 
practices of good governance.776 The importance of those legitimising strategies in the case 
of Kosovo's international administration cannot be overstated. UNMIK was not, like 
UNTAET, legitimised by the obligations o f trusteeship that applied to non-self-governing 
territories. Nor can its exercise of power be based on an international treaty, sanctioned by 
the consent o f the contracting parties, as in the case of Bosnia. As Bain lucidly observes, 
UNMIK was created in the wake of a “controversial, if not dubious, use of force that obtained 
retroactive assent from the Security Council in form of resolution 1244".777 Without inter­
national validation -  which, one might add, cannot be taken for granted -  the task o f UN 
territorial governance is fraught with difficulty. Legitimacy in the eyes of a global audience 
naturally increases with the representativeness of such an administration (in terms of partici­
pating states and the availability of lead-nation resources), with the rate at which an 'exit 
strategy’ is formulated and with the speed at which the devolution of government power to 
local institutions takes place.778
773 This categorisation is inspired by Thomas M. Franck, ‘Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement’ , 
in Democratic Governance and international Law 25 (ed. by G.H. Fox and B.R. Roth, Cambridge: 
CUP, 2000), at 29. The separation o f ‘target audiences’ in the legitimacy debate within an 
internationalised territory is, o f course, highly artificial, yet required by our earlier conclusions 
about the dual functions of an international administration. See Chapter IV.1.3, supra p. 128.
774 Cf. the reference to the UN Security Council and donor countries as UNTAETs primary 
‘constituencies' in Joel C. Beauvais, ‘Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of U.N. State-building in 
East Timor’, 33 NYUJILP1101-1178 (2001), at 1106 and 1166.
775 For the problematic notion of international community interest see, however, the introduction to 
Chapter IV, supra p.120.
776 A UNDP report, for instance, notes the “ inevitable importance of being able to show concrete and 
tangible results for public consumption in donor countries" (Governance Foundations, supra note 
512, at 28).
777 Bain, Anarchy, at 153.
778 A similar argument is presented by Harland, ‘Legitimacy’, supra note 484, at 18 as well as by 
Caplan, international Governance, supra note 19, at 34. For the argument that the UN is affected 
by the shift from ‘traditional’ to ‘performance criteria' of legitimacy as are states, see James N. 
Rosenau, The United Nations in a Turbulent World', International Peace Academy Occasional 
Paper Series (Lynne Rienner, 1992), at 52: “Its legitimacy is bound to undergo incremental 
enrichment as it becomes even more enmeshed in...world politics and enjoys successes that are
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Secondly, we consider the UN’s authority within the territory where it exercises the function 
o f government We term this sphere domestic legitimacy. As a relational concept domestic 
legitimacy captures the properties of the performance o f the fiduciary bond in which an 
international agent is appointed ex lege to supervise a formally constituted, locally based 
management structure operating with respect to a particular territorial un it779 As the UN 
conceives ‘good governance’ as ersatz for democratic legitimisation in an internationalised 
territory, it is important to note that its claim to legitimacy is based on the exercise of its 
powers in a manner inviting societal trust. In the words of Caplan, "the idea of international 
rule over foreign territory can be legitimate only if that rule is exercised on behalf of, and for 
the benefit of, the foreign population”.780 In this domestic sphere, the legitimacy o f a UN 
territorial governance mission thus depends upon its ability to incorporate the views of the 
people's representatives. Phrased differently, legitimacy in this sphere reflects the extent to 
which ‘imported’ institutions and rules resonate with public opinion and the widely shared 
values within the target community. The reception of such socialisation mechanisms -  the 
extent to which an international organisation actually manages to implement certain 
ideational standards and normative underpinnings to the community under its tutelage -  is 
crucial. Adversely, organisations that lack acceptable legitimated accounts of their activities 
are vulnerable to claims that they are negligent and unnecessary.
The manner in which an international administration resorts to arguments legitimising the 
exercise of imperium in an internationalised territory thus depends on the function it is cast 
in: as territorial agent, an international mission’s arguments possess a domestic dimension; 
as collective organ of the international community, a UN mission is under pressure to justify 
its plenary administration to an international audience. This follows the main conclusions of 
Chapter IV in which we described the ‘dual roles’ o f an international territorial administration. 
We have accordingly termed these two discrete dimensions ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ le­
gitimacy, with the former denoting an attribution of the relationship between the international 
agent and the people temporarily governed by it, and the latter indicating an attribu-tion of 
the relationship between the international organ and the organised international community.
By discussing legitimacy in both its domestic and international dimensions in dyadic terms, 
we do not intend to assume a neat separation between the two realms of domestic and 
international politics. Such a separation is merely an analytical device to contextualise the 
various claims to legitimate government As we emphasised earlier, an international 
administration collapses the conceptual separation between domestic and foreign policy -  
from a theoretical perspective it is the nexus that connects the ‘interior’ and the ‘exterior’.781 
Accordingly, arguments advanced towards one audience reinforce claims made to the other; 
they occasionally can come into conflict with each other as well. Pragmatic appeals to the 
local population to sustain more power cuts during a harsh w inter may debase lofty claims, 
made towards the international community, that the funds utilised to stabilise the energy 
supply have been put to good use. Hollow platitudes regarding the fulfilment of 'standards’
increasingly assessed in terms of what happens than in terms o f traditional criteria that delineate 
what forms of action are constitutionally or politically appropriate”.
779 This definition of an international territorial administration is drawn from Wilde, ‘Danzig’, supra note 
646, at 585.
780 New Trusteeship, supra note 13, at 57-58.
781 Chapter IV, supra p.144.
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made to the local institutions may signal the shirking of pragmatic exchanges with the inter­
national community as to how the UN itself can be subject to good governance benchmarks. 
On the other hand, a boost in a UN mission’s domestic credibility (as witnessed under the 
leadership o f SRSG Jessen-Petersen) facilitates its re-legitimisation in the international 
sphere.
6.1.2 Pursuit of Domestic Legitimacy: Two Promises
An international authority’s construction of ‘legitimate rule’ within the administered entity is of 
a special quality. An instrumental logic designates it as an agent whose short-term purpose 
is to solve problems associated with the immediate aftermath of war enormous social 
dislocation and human protection. The special position of a trustee administration implies 
that it cannot draw legitimacy from foundational myths, scientific doctrine, alleged providence 
or the political will of a nationally constituted demos.782 This is, o f course, a sociological 
triviality. Yet it serves to illustrate the point that an international administration can be 
supposed to rely on other legitimising strategies that resemble those of national public admi­
nistrations. In its governorship role, a trustee’s ability to generate domestic legitimacy hinges 
then, firstly, on the effective provision of public goods and, secondly, on their compatibility 
with prevalent local ideology and cultural background. In the subjectivist rendering, domestic 
legitimacy rests on the concurrence of policies with citizens’ preferences.783 Beyond 
traditional considerations of 'output legitimacy’, an international administration bases its 
claim to exercise authority on two argumentative 'pillars’.
(i) T he Fo undational Pro m ise
As a first-order legitimising strategy within an internationalised theatre, the international 
agent relies on its primary competency to activate the latent subjectivity of the territory. In 
what we may term the foundational promise of fiduciary administration, the international 
agent establishes and sustains the identity and status of a particular polity qua polity.784 It 
lends a temporal political identity to a non-state territorial unit through ‘performativity’.785 786In 
the case of Kosovo, the drafters of the Constitutional Framework pursued such foundational 
promise by positing that Kosovo would be an undivided territorial unit under interim 
international administration -  an “enMy... which, with its people, has unique historical, legal, 
cultural and linguistic attributes\ 788 The foundational promise inherent to an institution­
building mandate is also visible in its reconstitution of the collective, ideally across divisive 
ethnic and religious lines.787 The expectations arising from the constitutional promise of
782 Adapted from Jens Steffek, The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach’, 
9:2 EJIR 249-275 (2003), at 271.
783 Various types of conflicts are imaginable: democratically elected leaders campaign on a platform 
hostile to minorities: an established judicial machinery offends traditional dispute resolution 
practices; appeals to ideology and customs undercut effective government associated with 
modernisation.
704 This expression is lifted from Neil Walker’s approach to sovereignty that involves a discursive 
claim to ordering the social and political world (‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union*, in 
Sovereignty in Transition (ed. by N. Walker, Oxford/Portland, Or.: Hart Publishing, 2003), at 6).
785 Cf. Chapter 111.2.2, supra p. 111.
786 UNMIK/REG/2001/9, §1.2 and §1.1, supra note 618 (emphasis added).
787 Cf. Report of the Secretary-General, No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making
and the Closure or Transition o f United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. S/2001/394 
(20 April 2001), at 2.
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temporary protection and institution-building represent the primacy source o f UNMIK’s 
domestic legitimacy, which depends on the extent of trust it maintains in pursuing the 
interests of the thus constituted polity.
The following two examples illustrate these propositions. The exercise of fiduciary functions 
of UNMIK have been subject to fierce local contestation as the UN responded ambiguously 
to a 2001 border demarcation agreement, concluded between Belgrade and Skopje, which 
concerned Kosovo's southern border with Macedonia (fYRoM).788 One year later, the 
agreement had severe repercussions on Kosovo’s institutional structure. As UNMIK and 
KFOR continued to state that the agreement was irrelevant,789 FRY’s President addressed a 
letter to the UNSG in which he stressed that the border accord between the FRY and fYRoM 
was reached “between two sovereign and independent countries, members of the United 
Nations" and that it reaffirmed the existing border between the two republics (Serbia and 
Macedonia) o f the former Yugoslavia.790 This view was eventually also adopted by UNMIK 
SRSG Steiner who announced that the agreement must be respected.791 UNMIK’s 
astounding volte-face  was necessitated by the SC’s (erroneous) belief that FRY had the title 
to dispose of parts of Kosovo territory.792 This decision had severe consequences for 
UNMIK’s ability to generate domestic legitimacy as it openly demonstrated to the wider 
public that the administration does not wholeheartedly perform Kosovo’s interests on the 
international stage. It instead became clear that, in its second identity as subsidiary organ of 
the UN, UNMIK would have to pursue the Staatengemeinschaftsinteresse, directing it to 
respect the territorial integrity of the FRY. These observations serve to highlight that the 
fiercest challenges to the political legitimacy of an international agent's governorship emerge 
as the agent is perceived to breach the trust the cornerstone o f the international intervention
788 The agreement was signed on 23 February 2001 and promulgated by Serbia on 16 June 2001 
following its ratification by both countries' parliaments.
789 The UNMIK Spokesperson noted that “it is not up to us to recognize the Agreement or not. We 
administer the territory as it was defined by the 1244’  (UNMIK Press Briefing Notes, 21 February 
2002). This view was initially shared by the new Kosovo PM Rexhepi who (correctly) believed that 
the agreement did not preserve but change Kosovo’s borders, as a territory of 2,500 hectares of 
pastures claimed by Kosovo residents had fallen under the control of fYRoM border guards.
790 President Kostunica quoted in Brand, International Administration, supra note 597, at 143.
791 The subsequent Resolution by the Kosovo Assembly on the ‘Territorial Integrity of Kosovo' was 
declared void by the SRSG and was strongly condemned by the SC (see infra note 904).
792 Following our earlier suggestions in Chapter 1.1.2 (iii), supra p.30, which likened the properties of 
an internationalised territory to those of an international objective regime with erga omnes 
character, it is more than questionable that SCG was -  or is -  in a position to exercise aspects of 
foreign relations with regard to territorial dispositions during the period o f its ‘protected* status. To 
recapitulate, we argued that UNMIK's temporary assumption o f effective control, from an in rem 
perspective, can be likened to that o f the beneficiary o f an international servitude. Such servitude 
is imposed by the international community following considerations of ordre public. UNMIK, 
according to the foundational logic referred to in this section, does not benefit from the servitude 
itself, but exercises it on behalf of the people under its protection. By signing away land to fYRoM 
during UNMIK’s interim imperium over the territory, SCG failed to recognise the United Nations 
jurisdiction therein. Such interpretation would see both fYRoM and SCG in breach with their 
obligations under the UN Charter, It is contended that the assumption of UN responsibility over 
Kosovo precludes any contractual form that fails to recognise UNMIK’s jurisdiction. These 
propositions go hand in hand with our earlier conclusions that UN members states were under a 
legal obligation to recognise the UN Council for Namibia as sole representative and administrator 
o f the territory. As demonstrated by the hypothetical scenario in the previous chapter, SCG can 
indeed exercise its right to dispose o f the territory by virtue of its bare title qua titular sovereignty, 
for the benefit of another state. The recipient state must, however, accept UNMIK’s jurisdiction as 
a limitation to its exercise of effective control in accordance with Resolution 1244. This follows 
from Art. 103 of the UN Charter,
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On the flipside, domestic legitimacy can be bolstered by active performance o f the fiduciary 
bond under which UNMIK acts as territorial government in the interests of the entity under its 
temporary protection. One such example involves the provisional release of former Prime 
Minister Haradinaj from the custody o f the ICTY after protracted proceedings, upon decision 
of the Trial Chamber in June 2005.793 UNMIK, in a confidential written submission and during 
the course o f oral pleadings before the Chamber, decided to offer guarantees to the ICTY 
that it was in a position to secure the arrest of the Accused, should he violate the terms of 
his provisional release. UNMIK was ordered, in the operative part of the decision on release, 
to take custody of the accused, and the Trial Chamber did note that “the fact that the 
Acccused’s former position as Prime Minister implicates that guarantees would carry less 
weight were they to be provided by his government, whereas the situation in this case funda­
mentally differs in that UNMIK is an international agency headed by the United Nations”. 
Strengthening its domestic legitimacy by that same token, UNMIK fulfilled the duties 
stemming from the performance of its fiduciary bond vis-à-vis the territory.
Several ancillary arguments flow from these postulates. International and local institutions, 
tied to each other by an institution-building mandate, share a commitment to the long-term 
interest of the population. Their internal relations are necessary in a sense that both 
international agent and emergent local institutions depend upon the performance of this 
relationship: in a trustee-ward relationship, neither entity is conceivable without the other.794 795
The ward would be without representation, hence unable to access the international legal 
space, whereas the trustee would cease to be a trustee were it to sever its relationship with 
the ward. As this necessary relationship between two actors is built, each entity relies on a 
distinct set of criteria to legitimise the exercise o f public power.
(u) D evolution  of Power ano the  D em o cratic  Moment
W e pledge to first raise the living standards o f Bosnia-Herzegovina- 
then to concentrate on education; and finally to turn to political self-government79i
An international agent’s governmental decisions will be empirically accepted to the degree 
that its 'foreign rule’ is perceived to set in motion constitutional processes that fill the initial 
administrative vacuum and later shape the political structure's transition while nurturing 
participation. International rule exercised within such territory will be deemed legitimate to 
the extent that local institutions are able to participate in policy-making. The holding of
793 Decision on Ramush Haradinaj’s Motion fo r Provisional Release, Case No. lt-04-84-Pt, Trial 
Chamber II (6 June 2005), at 5: “the legitimate authority and administration of Kosovo, UNMIK, 
has agreed to provide the necessary guarantees to ensure compliance with any conditions the 
Trial Chamber may impose if the Accused is provisionally released". In any case, UNMIK’s 
guarantee represents a curious case in which one subsidiary organ of the UN exercises quasi- 
consular activities towards another. The background to the Haradinaj indictment is presented in 
ICG, Haradinaj, supra note 746, at 2-3.
794 Adapted from Wendt, 'Agent-Structure Problem', supra note 754, at 346.
795 Austrian Foreign Minister Count Andrassy, making the case for the occupation of Bosnia to the 
Congress of Berlin in 1878, quoted in: European Stability Initiative, Governance and Democracyc 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation (Berlin, 
2004), at 8.
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elections is precisely the means to increase the sense of participation and ownership and to 
bring the broad public into its proper position of authority.796 Domestic legitimacy will, in the 
medium term, be defined as a property of international governance that is measured, firstly, 
by the extent to which it creates a thick weave of enabling structures to set local institutions 
on a sustainable path, and secondly, by the degree and pace it devolves authority in a 
sequence of instituted transfer to local actors under a 'participatory model'.797
Hence, the second strategy in pursuit of domestic legitimacy builds upon an international 
administrations promise to transfer competences to local stakeholders in order to vest them 
with a sense of ownership. The démocratisation o f a polity administered by the international 
community serves not only as an organisational arrangement vesting local institutions with 
the power o f legitimacy, but also as a legitimisation principle to which the international organ 
has recourse. As Chesterman suggests, the transfer o f power to the legitimate and 
sustainable local authority, typically mediated through an election, is the central purpose of 
any transitional administration.798 Conceived as a procedure facilitating the transfer of 
legitimacy from international to local actors, the international agent's reliance on democratic 
reform is a second-order argument. Its normative essence emphasises the 'constitutionalisa- 
tion’ -  i.e., the entrenchment within the municipal constitutional order -  o f the position of 
local political institutions which, reaping the benefits of popular sovereignty, operate within 
the terms set for reaching legitimate decisions. The international agent enters into a power­
sharing agreement with the local institutions precisely with a view to establishing the latter’s 
functional limitations to the legitimate exercise o f local administration and governance. 
According to this second-order legitimising strategy, the international agent itself has brought 
about the institutions whose legitimacy it has not only assisted to activate but indeed created: 
“The more powers conferred on local representatives, the closer power is to the people and 
thus the more legitimate the nature o f the administration".799 80As a corollary, the democratic 
moment endows the local agent with confidence to represent the perspectives o f the new 
political collective. The emerging self-confidence can be well demonstrated by pointing at the 
ongoing discussions about the transfer of competencies from the international administration 
to local institutions in Kosovo. In a conversation with the former Principal Deputy SRSG 
Brayshaw, the Speaker of the Kosovo Assembly, Dad, is reported to have said:
UNMIK cannot set the priorities for the Kosovo Assembly. The MPs are responsible before80Dtheir electorate and they know what their priorities are.
This is an interesting claim. While the language of law and accountability, introduced by the 
international agent, imbues the local institutions with legitimacy and authority, the latter relies
796 Cf. Feldman, Iraq, supra note 22, at 98.
797 For a similar argument see Henry H. Perritt, 'Final Status for Kosovo’, 80 Chicago-Kent LR 3-27 
(2005), at 10-11. As Beauvais notes, the shift from the factional representation in East Timor’s 
National Consultative Council to the expanded representation in the East Timorese National 
Council led to a considerable increase in the legitimacy of UNTAET. As a corollary, the more 
limited the scope of participation in relation to the actual political and civil society spectrum, the 
more limited the degree of legitimacy the co-government mechanism will confer (‘Benevolent 
Despotism’, supra note 774, at 1129-1134).
798 You, the People, supra note 14, at 223 et seq.
799 UNTAET SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello, ‘How Not to Run a Country’: Lessons for the UN from 
Kosovo and East Timor* (unpublished manuscript, 2000), at 4
800 Koha Ditore, 16 June 2004.
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on the criterion of popular legitimacy in order to challenge international tutelage.
6.1.3 Institutional Contestation and the Erosion of Political Authority
The texture o f legitimacy is, in this reading, fungible, and its transfer under an asymmetrical 
'dual-key1 constitutional arrangement can be accompanied by a struggle to appropriate 
powers in accordance with different sets of interests pursued by international and local 
actors. While a local institution wielding a measure of political authority will initially pursue a 
strategy of building domestic legitimacy (including developing mechanisms for aggregating 
interests, organising political agendas, etc), the challenge for an international institution- 
building mission consists in ensuring that international and local institutional activity do not 
compete for legitimacy at the expense of the other.
In ‘open-ended’ status situations, in which the international administration claims to have 
created the conditions under which the conduct of free and fa ir elections and the ensuing 
establishment of local institutions takes place, a curious phenomenon can be observed. It 
relates to the utilisation of the second-order argument the international agent makes in order 
to resist the rapid transfer of competencies. On the one hand, the argument appears 
plausible: after all, the international agent is mandated to first bolster the democratic 
credentials of such local institutions and increase the capacity o f a troubled society to act 
collectively before it devolves powers to it. Gradually, however, the international administra­
tions' claim to hold on to the exercise of power becomes less plausible the more stable, 
representative, and effective the local agent becomes. The tactic line of defence the 
international agent will choose to employ in order to oppose the further transfer of 
competencies to local actors will sound increasingly hollow and self-defeating as the local 
political institutions assert their democratic credentials and rely upon the legitimising criterion 
of popular elections. In such a scenario (which is lifted from the ongoing battle between 
respective spheres of competency between the PISG and UNMIK), the internal power 
sharing agreement itself is prone unravelling and likely to be contested.
From what can be gleaned from the past six years of international institution-building in 
Kosovo, local institutions have effectively drawn upon such weaknesses and built effective 
methods of resisting international authority. At times, their elected leaders have borrowed 
from the rational-legal language of the international administration and argued that, in the 
discharge of UNMIK’s remaining powers, it would not be true to its professed values. Local 
institutions have mounted increasing challenges that are primarily framed in the aspirational 
idiom of Western constitutionalism. A key instance in which an attentive observer of 
Kosovo’s domestic politics would conclude that a process of institutional contestation of 
legitimacy was well under way occurred in July 2004. The veritable governance crisis 
following the tumultuous events of the March 2004 riots reinforced efforts to redefine the 
principal government structure. In October 2003, the Kosovo Assembly had endorsed an 
initiative to establish a working group charged with proposing amendments to the 
Constitutional Framework (CF). It met several times throughout the following months, and 
eventually rejected an offer from UNMIK to form a joint working group in order to identify
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amendable provisions.801 The Working Group's proposal802 was approved by the Kosovo 
Assembly endorsing amendments to the CF that would, among other infringements of 
Resolution 1244, also have negatively affected the interests of minority communities. While 
UNMIK concluded that a “comprehensive review of the Constitutional Framework is outside 
the competence of the Assembly",803 an OSCE Report explained more sensibly that
such a seemingly illogical and desperate initiative may reveal the depth of frustration within the 
PISG due to the perceived slow rate of transfer of powers to local institutions and the 
unresolved status of Kosovo. Supporters of the initiative expected that either UNMIK would 
ultimately make some concessions, or, more likely, it would appear stiff and bureaucratic, the 
PISG thereby having won a “moral victory" in the eyes of the public, at UNMIK’s expense.804
Another report by this component UNMIK-pillar even surmised that
UNMIK’s strategy in responding to this challenge to its own authority and that of the UN has 
been low-key but should it be deemed necessary, DPKO and ultimately the UN Security 
Council can be asked to make a pronouncement on the issue. The SRSG is in a strong posi­
tion vis-à-vis the Assembly as he retains the final decision-making authority in this matter and 
may selectively approve amendments proposed by the Assembly or reject the entire 
package.805
In this instance, a local institution, confident that it would be in a position to take over new 
competencies from the international administration, intended to de-legitimise the interna­
tional agent's reliance on its legitimate claim to the continued exercise of effective control in 
key areas, accusing it of implementing ‘foreign rule’ that would be increasingly alienated 
from the interests and opinions of the 'people' that it, the local agent, represents as a 
structured social group.
(i) T he Tw o  F ronts of the S trug gle  over  D o m estic  Le g it im a c y
The progressive erosion of an international mission’s authority can hence be explained in the 
following way: the internal legitimacy o f an international agent -  the extent to which its rule is
001 For the background to the amendment process cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Spot Report: On the 
Monitoring o f the Assembly o f Kosovo (7 July 2004), as well as the Mission’s Background Report: 
On the Assembly's Proposal o f Amendments to the Constitutional Framework (12 July 2004).
802 Working Group on Preparing Proposals to Amend and Complete the Constitutional Framework, 
Proposal o f Amendments and Supplements to the Constitutional Framework, 24 May 2004. The 
proposed amendments foresaw new competencies for the PISG in a number of areas including 
international relations, public security, justice and judicial review, energy, and local government. 
The Kosovo Protection Corps -  the infant army -  would have been placed under the authority of 
local institutions. Extensive changes to the right to hold referenda on issues of "particular 
importance to the people of Kosovo” were proposed as well, all o f which would have encroached 
upon UNMIK’s reserved competencies. The draft 44 amendments for changes to the CF were 
printed in the daily Zeri (27 May 2004), at 1 and 4-5.
803 UNMIK Press Release, UNMIK’s Statement on Today's Session o f the Kosovo Assembly, 
UNMIK/PR/1202 (8 July 2004). DSRSG Brayshaw was quoted as saying that "at present there can 
be no substantial changes, especially not in the reserved powers" and that “constitutional changes 
are not a priority for Kosovo” (Koha Ditore, 16 June 2004, at 3).
804 Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK), Spot Report On the Monitoring o f the Assembly o f Kosovo 
(7 July 2004), at 3.
805 OMIK, Spot Report on the Assembly o f Kosovo’s Adoption o f Proposed Amendments to the 
Constitutional Framework (13 July 2004), at 2.
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accepted as just and worthy of recognition806 -  decreases as the local actor refuses to 
comply with a rule that it perceives as contradicting its aggregate ‘interests’. An international 
agent's domestic legitimacy weakens the more its rule is perceived to gradually undermine 
the realisation o f self-government, and the less it is perceived to create the conditions under 
which self-government can be exercised. Following the subjectivist account of legitimacy 
presented in the introduction of this chapter, de-legitimisation can be understood as a 
process of gradually weakening the capacity of a system to engender and maintain the belief 
that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for a particular society.807
The substantive struggle between local institutions and its international ‘guardians’ takes 
place on two cognitive fronts. On the one side, local institutions perceive it as a conflict over 
the degree of local participation (devolution). In the minds of international officials, the 
conflict looms over the quality of local participation (standards). On this second front, local 
institutions will find further grounds for disclaiming the authority and legitimacy of an 
international agent as the latter endeavours to evaluate the former’s governance perfor­
mance against a set of ‘benchmarks’ without making the performance of its own governance 
apparatus subject to any scrutiny whatsoever.808 The international agent, convinced that the 
local political institutions are not yet ready to meet the standards they are charged to 
implement, will tend to de-legitimise the latter in the eyes of the ‘people’ who have chosen 
them. By portraying the local agent as, i.e., overly corrupt and incapable of conforming to the 
standard set for local self-government, an international authority communicates that the 
institutional resources for democratic authorisation are lacking.
In the process, the international agent w ill, however, contribute to the de-legitimisation of its 
own claim to legitimate rule for, as we have demonstrated, it also relies on the second-order 
argument of democratic institution-building. Well into the institution building exercise and the 
‘civilising mission’ it is bound to pursue, UNMIK (as well as the OHR) tended to increase its 
vigilance as to popular aspects of legitimacy and fell back upon more coercive means. Both 
in Kosovo and Bosnia, the international*administrations were accordingly inclined to 
‘perennialise’ their stronghold over ‘reserved competencies'. They have done so by putting 
forth, and defending, the argument that they deem that the conditions for the proper exercise 
of effective control by the local agents are not met at a given point in time. This argument is 
incoherent to the extent that it verges on self-invalidation. It not only impacts on the 'popular* 
dimension of legitimacy in a sense that it further enrages attitudes and weakens an 
international agent’s capacity to attract domestic approval. More worryingly, it undermines 
the congruence of a system of power and its justification and hence the normative 
foundation of legitimate rule itself. The very purpose of the initial concentration of plenary 
authority within the international institutions, it must be recalled, is precisely the mobilisation 
of institutional resources for democratic authorisation for government and the rapid 
establishment o f a local architecture that is capable of assuming competencies in a 
sequence of projected transfer. Unless a derogation from the participatory paradigm might 
be temporarily necessary to manage emergencies, the maintenance of, or reversion to, the
806 Cf. Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution o f Society (McCarthy trans., 1978), 178.
807 Cf. Seymour M. Upset, ‘Social Conflict, Legitimacy, and Democracy’, in Legitimacy and the State 
(ed. by W. Conolly, New York: NYU Press, 1984), at 88.
008 The ‘benchmarking’ process as policy instrument to advance the determination of an entity’s final 
status was discussed in Chapter V.1.2 (ii), supra, p. 163.
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coercive model will be perceived as nothing but a contradiction to the initial mandate.
( i i) N eg ative  Externalities
These processes of reciprocal de-legitimisation between the international agent and local 
actors not only impose heavy additional enforcement costs on the controllers. They cause 
confusion on the part of a population over which institution, if any, is the right one to make 
authoritative declarations and may also lead to the effective diffusion of what Raz termed 
'normative power*.809 Where the realisation of legitimate domestic political order in one 
jurisdiction threatens its realisation in others, conflict is more likely. Facilitated by conditions 
that widen the cleavage of ‘interests’ among international and local actors, the contestation 
o f legitimacy results in negative externalities in that such a process threatens to derail the 
institution-building sequence. As a consequence, the international agent is more likely to be 
tempted to abandon a ‘consent-based’ dual-key model of authority that has placed the local 
institutions in a partnership role. It might adopt a coercive model which permits it to regain 
centralised control In order to make rapid decisions and to reduce the disruptions that it 
perceives to be caused by local actors.810 By basing its authority more and more on 
‘international legitimacy’ and the pursuit of the 'international community interest1, an inter­
national territorial administration perennialises its position into what some authors have 
termed 'enlightened despotism’ and formulates policies that are not perceived as providing 
gains for society as a whole.
A t its best, such a return to centralised control that effectively rolls back the process through 
which local stakeholders have gained a voice in decision-making helps to minimise the 
short-term risk o f open political conflic t811 However, the effective reversal of building local 
‘ownership’ can, in the medium term, undermine the capacity o f local institutions to develop 
legitimate mechanisms to resolve internal conflict.812 As a result of this dialectic relationship 
whereby the responsibility ascribed to one actor is undermined by the responsibility ascribed 
to another,813 an experiment in international political authority may lose the support of those 
subject to its norms. While it is commonplace to argue that uncertainty breeds instability, one 
o f the conclusions here is that the international community w ill indeed have to assume a 
degree of responsibility for setting in motion a destabilising political dynamic that renders the 
power-sharing agreement in Kosovo subject to local contestation. On the security side, it has 
proven to be extremely difficult to call on reluctant players o f the prospective democratic 
(and multi-ethnic) game to renounce alternatives. The challenge for an interim administration 
has therefore been to compel them to work within uncertain parameters and to build a
809 Joseph Raz, The Authority o f Law. Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 
at 16 et seq.
810 As Paddy Ashdown, the BiH High Representative, remarked: “If spending limits are about to be 
breached, or a Standby Agreement about to fall, we tend to intervene, the problem disappears 
and life goes on. So, the symptoms are relieved, the immediate crisis averted; but too often the 
chronic disease remains unaffected” (Speech at the Launch of the UNDP Governance Perception 
Survey, Sarajevo, 9 June 2003).
811 Cf. Beauvais, 'Benevolent Despotism’, supra note 774, at 1116.
812 See Knaus/Martin, ‘Raj’, supra note 8. For a definition of 'self-enforcing peace’ as a policy 
objective for peace-building see Elisabeth M. Cousens, ‘Introduction’, in Peacebuilding as Politics: 
The Cultivation o f Peace in Fragile Societies (ed. by E.M. Cousens and C. Kumar, London: Lynne 
Rienner, 2001), 1-20.
813 Ralph Wilde ‘The Complex Role of the Legal Adviser When International Organizations Administer 
Territory’ , 95 ASIL Proceedings 251-261 (2001), at 256.
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presumptive legitimacy.814 This challenge has been met only to a certain extent Moreover, 
the dismal economic situation in Kosovo after six years of international administration, and 
its documented failure to quickly address its roots is equally illustrative of a system of power 
which became chronically unable to meet the interests of the people under its tutelage. A t its 
most grim, the international administrative presence in Kosovo may face local upheaval as 
anxiety about the 'future status' mounts and as the power-sharing agreement with the local 
institutions unravels.
RÉSUMÉ
Entropy is a persistent feature of social life and few institutions can safely ignore the task of 
legitimacy maintenance. This is especially significant in a temporarily internationalised terri­
tory in which the notion of legitimate authority is constantly contested between international 
agent and emergent local actors. It is a commonly held wisdom that the success o f any 
strategy for Kosovo's future w ill very much depend on the confidence and satisfaction of the 
population with the relevant international and domestic institutions. Recent surveys indicate 
a trend of decreasing satisfaction with the performance of institutions.815 There are several 
theoretical and policy implications that flow from an analysis that seeks to study the impact 
of structures and processes upon normative change. Processes of erosion of political 
authority are more likely to occur in an ‘open-ended’ institution-building setting in which a 
multi-dimensional peacekeeping force acting as trustee also assumes tasks going beyond 
that of a traditional fiduciary bond, such as participation in the determination of the 'final 
status’ o f its ward. Second, and tragically so, an international presence might have to revise 
the scheduling of the timing and extent to which authority is devolved to local actors.
In his analysis of institution-building in East Timor, Beauvais demonstrates that an inter­
national mission’s mandate can be broken down into two distinct aspects, which he terms 
‘UN governorship’ mandate and a ‘local self govemmenf mandate. While conceptually 
compatible, he writes in his concise study on UNTAETs activities, “in practice these two 
mandates are in deep tension with one another, particularly with respect to control over 
decision-making and allocation of resources".816 The consolidation of UN governorship is 
predicated on the establishment and maintenance of centralised international control over 
decision-making; the ‘participatory governance’ model, on the other hand, places a premium 
on broadly sharing of power with local stakeholders. As another author put it, an international 
administration is functioning as “both state and state builder".817 We concurred with this 
perspective and noted that the pursuit o f different sets of interest by the international agent
814 Cf. Giuseppe di Palma, To Craft Democracies. An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1990), at 31.
815 The past two years saw a rapid decline of local satisfaction with UNMIK’s performance (from 
51,9% in January/March 2003 to 20.7% in May/August 2004) and the SRSG’s performance (from 
71.4% in May/August 2003 to 32.4% in January/April 2004), while the level of satisfaction with 
local institutions (executive branch) remained approximately equal (from 74.9% in January/March 
2003 to 71.9% in May/August 2004). Cf. Riinvest/UNDP, Early Warning System Project, Kosovo 
Report No. 6 (January-April 2004) and 7 (May-August 2004). One of the key issues related to the 
fall of credibility of international institutions is a perception that they are not effective enough in the 
sphere of law enforcement. Satisfaction with the SRSG’s performance has, however, sharply 
increased to over 80% after Jessen-Petersen assumed the position (June 2005, cf. Report No. 10 
(May-August 2005)).
816 'Benevolent Despotism’, supra note 774, at 1108.
817 James Cotton, ‘Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention’, 43 Sun/ivai 127 (2001), at 139.
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and the local political institutions created under the ‘foundational’ dimension of the institution­
building mandate may place those two institutions in opposition to each other. International 
agent and local institutions derive the legitimacy to exercise public power from different 
sources and work to satisfy different 'constituencies'. While the international agent relies on 
a dual set of arguments legitimising its authority, local institutions rely on the mandate of the 
electorate to the same extent that they base their claim to legitimate authority on the telos of 
the participatory model the international agent promises to implement. In Kosovo, those 
tensions came to the fore in the course of drafting the Constitutional Framework which put 
UNMIK in the odd position of having to resist Kosovo-AIbanian attempts to include referen­
ces to the ‘w ill of the people’.818
However, it is at this point important to remind ourselves that the hypothesis that pursuing 
either of these objectives necessarily undermines the other, is tenuous.819 Phenomena of 
reciprocal de-legitimisation of public authority are not path-dependent. They do not occur as 
a by-line of the methodology of internationalisation of territory, as can be easily shown by the 
overlapping, mostly simultaneous and mutually reinforcing activities of the UN Council for 
Namibia and the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) as 'sole and authentic’ 
representative o f the Namibian people’ during the 1970’s.820 Post-conflict international 
administrations, like occupation administrations, do not get to choose between these two 
functions. Rather, their reconciliation and integration and the management of the anomalous 
legitimacy cycle should be seen as the primary problématique of state building under 
international tutelage.
To summarise, the exercise of dual functions by an international administration yields 
negative externalities only when it is charged with pursuing objectives perceived to be in 
possible contradiction with each other. By exposing the inherent constraints faced by an 
international agent, our analysis should help policymakers understand why such challenges 
to political authority arise. Under the constraints imposed by an ‘open-ended’ deployment 
mandate, in which the final status o f a UN-administered territory remains contested, we 
should be able to predict negative externalities in the form o f a gradual erosion o f political 
authority. In such a setting, the essence of the democratic method -  the regulation of un­
certainty of outcomes through participatory means -  is diluted. The ‘crisis of legitimacy’ in an 
internationalised territory -  understood as the loss of public confidence and the concomitant 
loss o f normative power held by institutions -  should ideally prompt the United Nations to 
search for solutions that bridge the gap between normative ideal and observable reality. Yet, 
as a response to the challenges mounted against it, an international agent tends to reverse
818 Cf. the preamble of the provisional draft of the CF of 17 April 2001, quoted by Chesterman, You, 
the People, supra note 14, at 228. According to established UN practice, an inclusion of the ’will o f 
the people’ in its foundational promise would have implied the holding of a referendum under 
international supervision. In its promulgated version, the CF’s Preamble provides that the process 
to determine Kosovo’s future status "shall...take full account o f all relevant factors including the 
will of the people". In spring 2001, local outrage and frustration at the idea that the importance of 
other ‘relevant factors' (international legal concerns? regional security interests? doubts about 
Kosovo’s economic viability?) could outweigh arguments mobilised in support of self-determina­
tion by referendum were palpable.
819 Ralph Wilde, The Ambivalent Mandates of International Organisations in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
Kosovo and East Timor1, Australian and New Zealand SIL Pnoceed/ngs o f the Joint Meeting with 
the ASIL (2000), at 319.
820 Supra, note 326.
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the political trajectory towards self-governance and ‘perennialise’ its stronghold over key 
government competencies, making itself a target of local outrage and further processes of 
de-legitimisation that directly impact upon its performance.
As Weber noted, “the basis o f every authority, and correspondingly o f every kind of willing­
ness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent 
prestige".821 His observation that the stability and effectiveness of a political order of domi­
nation depends on its recognition as legitimate is equally applicable to an institution-building 
environment As territorial government, the UN must realise that prestige of its rule emerges 
only to the extent that its governmental output is compatible with the value patterns of the 
societies under its tutelage. To maintain its domestic legitimacy, an administration that 
assumes the governance of territory for an undefined time cannot merely be the handiwork 
of a diplomatic leadership, but must also resonate deeply with the inhabitants under its 
guardianship. The notion of trusteeship will escape its imperial past only if an international 
agent publicly engages with local institutions and represents the interests of the territory in 
good faith. Legitimacy, as Beetham correctly notes, requires the demonstration of a common 
interest which unites dominant and subordinate.822 Since an international territorial authority 
cannot have recourse to the normative power of divine will, tradition, scientific doctrine, or a 
plebiscite mandate, the continuation of legitimate rule within the territory is predicated upon 
its ability to exercise power on behalf, and in the interest, of the polity it transitionally ad­
ministers. In that sense, considerations of legitimacy are crucial: the UN must rely on a ‘par­
ticipatory’ model -  on the co-operation o f the wider public in effectuating its purposes.823
Incidentally, these propositions could not be further from the ones contained in the 2003 
Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations which reminds SRSGs to “be 
sensitive to any identification with partisan positions*.824 Applying the terminology so far 
employed, the Handbook clearly prioritises the pursuit of the Staatengemeinschaftsinteresse 
over the territorial interest. One consideration that underlies these conclusions is therefore 
whether the United Nations is really uniquely positioned to assume the role of interim 
government, given that UN DPKO’s top management priority -  namely to ensure that a 
state-building project is conceptualised as a peace-keeping operation with a strong empha­
sis on UN governorship through the SRSG -  is at odds with an international mission’s de­
mand for legitimacy on the local level.825 The institutional treatment of complex governance 
missions as peacekeeping operations with a civilian governance function attached does, as 
correctly identified in the Brahimi Report, raise the question of “whether the United Nations 
should be in this business all”, and if yes, which body should be charged with the transitional
821 Weber, Economy and Society, vol. I, supra note 765, at 263.
822 Beetham, Legitimation, supra note 750, at 59.
823 For a similar conclusion -  namely, that "any kind of international administration must increasingly 
seek political participation of the local populations’  -  cf. Bothe/Maraun, 'UN Administration’, supra 
note 601, at 239.
824 Supra note 513, at 21.
825 Salamun suggests (somewhat originally) that the appointment of an SRSG shall be conducted 
through a ’co-decision procedure’ of the Security Council and the local legislature which would 
preliminarily rank the candidates (Democratic Governance, supra note 610, at 222). Such a view 
however lacks a legal basis in the UN Charter and is predicated on the existence of functioning 
local institutions (which is regularly not the case in an environment which requires the intervention 
of the international community).
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administration of territories.826
So far, this chapter has stressed that the struggle over the conferral or denial of legitimacy 
takes place within the context of the transfer of public authority from international to local 
institutions. We have described an institutional dynamic that breeds conflicts over the 
appropriation of political capital and have generally referred to such an environment as 
political transitionality. Continuing the strands of discussion thus laid out, the next section will 
focus on an international administration’s capacity to engender normative change in order to 
affect the belief system upon which legitimacy is said to be founded. This is necessary as we 
have approached legitimacy in terms of political assessment but have neglected normative 
points of convergence on which it m ight be possible to appraise the legitimacy of a particular 
institution or action in terms of their ‘lawfulness1. Following an understanding of the concept 
o f legitimacy which we hold to be posited at the intersection o f norms and their perception, 
the following exposé complements the ‘perspectival1 view w ith a more rule-based approach.
Indeed, a given power relationship is not merely legitimate because people acquiesce in 
assertions o f authority (surely, normative perceptions can be subject to manipulation if 
treated as empirical ‘feelings’), but because it can be justified in terms o f their beliefs.827 
Inter-subjectively held value patterns and normative expectations feed our conceptions of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law which may provide the justification for power. These 
justifications in turn depend on beliefs current in a given society about what is the rightful 
source of authority. Our aim in the next section is thus to sketch out certain characteristics of 
a transitional legal order under conditions o f internationalisation.
6 .2  T h e  P r o p e r t ie s  o f  a  t r a n s it o r y  l e g a l  O r d e r
Trie struggle to bring kings and presidents...within the confínes of the fundamental laws... 
has leñ too indelible an impression upon too many peoples to make plausible any supposition 
that the founders o f the United Nations intended to create, or have created, 
an organization free of its own basic principles.' 828
No democratic state operating under the rule o f law accords itself 
total immunity from any administrative, civil or criminal responsibility. ’829
The first part of this section explores the intersection of international and municipal law830 in
826 Supra note 33, at §78. The discussion of whether a revived UN Trusteeship Council should 
assume temporary tasks will be briefly taken up in the concluding appraisal of this thesis.
827 Cf. Beetham, Legitimation, supra note 750, at 11. For a powerful assault on the Weberian 
approach to legitimacy and Franck’s ‘fairness’ as deeply ideological, indeterminate and 
complacent evocations of controversial, theories of justice, see Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Legitimacy, 
Rights and Ideology: Notes Towards a Critique of the New Moral Internationalism’, 7:2 
Associations 349-373 (2003), at 361-364.
828 Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell and Chen, Lung-chu, Human Rights and World Public Order. 
The Basic Policies of an International Law o f Human Dignity (New Haven/London: Yale UP, 1980), 
at 332.
829 Kosovo Ombudsperson Institution, Special Report No. 1, supra note 608, at §23.
930 The term ‘municipal’ law is usually employed to refer to the domestic law of a particular nation-sta­
te, hence contrasting it with ‘international’ law. In this section, the terms 'municipal’ and ‘domestic 
law’ will be used to refer to the internal legal order of the ‘internationalised territory’ of Kosovo.
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which an international territorial administration regulates the transition of societies through 
the dissemination of beliefs and practices and their institutionalisation via models of 
international-yet-territorial governance. We propose that international norms and practices 
do not merely provide a value-free framework for multilateral intervention in the socio­
economic structure of an entity. More concretely, we argue that the establishment o f an 
international administrative regime, designed by law, is meant to effectuate a normative shift 
in the very principles underlying and legitimising the exercise o f state power and to assist in 
the transformation of social relationships and structures. The path to liberal-democratic order 
is, according to this transitional setting, carved out by legal practices against the background 
of transitional constitutionalism and historical patterns of oppression and discrimination.831 
The second and third sections are concerned with the broader issues of the ‘legality’ of an 
international administration’s acts. The main argument relates to the 'messiness’ of con­
stitutional arrangements in an interim period in which our expectations of an emerging 
Rechtsstaat under international tutelage (that include institutions of norm control) appear 
compromised.
(i) In tr o d u c tio n : T he Transitio nality  Frame
Before moving into forward gear in the treatment of the matter, two points of clarification 
regarding the term ‘transitionality’ are in order. We have so far described the institutional 
environment under an international regime of one of political transitionality in which public 
authority is gradually devolved from international to local actors. In what follows, the term is 
employed as a heuristic tool to assist in understanding the specific functions law has to per­
form. The next section is built around the proposition that the incorporation of international 
legislation in a conflict-torn theatre is meant to spearhead this transition and to affect the 
construction of political change in a ‘bounded’ period spanning two regimes.832 To the extent 
that we can describe the peculiar 'curvature' of a Rechtsraum within an internationalised 
territory and conceptualise the role of international and municipal law in these anomalous 
situations, we might be able to develop the analytical tools necessary to approach the 
phenomenon of an internationally managed territory as an interregnum between two types of 
regimes, in which an illiberal repressive past is to be reconciled with a future liberal demo­
cratic order.
Secondly, the term ‘transitionality’ as used in this section refers to the temporally limited 
sphere o f validity o f a particular legal order -  in our case the legal order created by UNMIK 
which since summer 1999 has exercises effective control over (parts of) the territory. This 
transitional legal order will cease to be valid with the departure o f the United Nations 
following either Kosovo’s re-integration into Serbia’s territorial legal order, or the creation of 
an autonomous legal order.833 Re-positioning the underlying ‘sovereignty’ issue o f an inter­
nationalised territory in terms of the ‘birth’ and ‘death’ o f a legal order allows us to examine 
its properties during its ‘lifetime’. The temporally limited validity of the UN’s legal order and 
the uncertainty over whether Kosovars will be permitted to freely determine their political
831 Parts of this section are forthcoming as 'Beyond the *Mission Civilisatricet  The Properties of a 
Normative Order Within an Internationalised Territory’, L JIL (January 2006).
832 Cf. Ruti G. Teitel’s intriguing study focusing on regime change in South Africa, Eastern Europe and 
Latin America, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press, 2000), esp. at 220.
833 For a discussion of the ambivalence of UNMIK’s open-ended institution-building mandate cf. 




future also furthers our understanding as to why the current normative set-up provides for 
the continuing partial applicability o f the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia’s (FRY) and Serbian 
legislation.
Theorising about the operation of law in an internationalised territory involves at least three 
discrete dimensions, according to which the present section is structured. First, liberal legal 
forms are transmitted without being subject to mediation by a 'sovereign'. The diffusion of 
imported norms represents the precise telos of a mission civiiisatrice of a post-colonial 
institution-building mission at the periphery of the international system. Such internationalisa­
tion projects realise their liberalising potential through a complex process where they provide 
legal continuity while importing legal forms that emphasise discontinuity and progress. In the 
second dimension, we account for the asymmetric co-government setting exhibited in 
Kosovo in which law is both municipal and international. The syncretic nature o f legal 
sources lim its our attempts to establish a 'hierarchy' of norms in an internationalised territory. 
Further, the promised advent of a liberal future will be challenged by what we identify as the 
third characteristic of such transitory legal order -  the unaccountability of the international 
administering agent. Upon consideration, the three properties of a normative order entail a 
paradox in which the aspirations of a fiduciary administration operating in the slipstream of 
liberal internationalism and its ‘civilising mission’ are qualified by the absence of key criteria 
of a Rechtsstaat -  the democratic creation o f laws, the separation of powers, legal certainty 
and the judicial control of normative acts.
6.2.1 T he  Unmediated Import o f  International Law
‘What law applies in  countries that do not yet exist? '834
By vesting the SRSG with *[a]ll legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo',835 836
the UN Security Council partially derogated the FRY’s normative order within the territory.838 
Owing to its basis in Chapter VII o f the UN Charter, Resolution 1244 'vertically opened’ 
Kosovo’s normative space. In the wake of UNMIK’s deployment in summer 1999, the 
already complex questions surrounding the operation of the Emergency Judicial System837 
were, however, compounded by what a commentator called “a major course correction on
834 Vieira de Mello, ‘Lessons', supra note 799.
835 UNMIK/REG/1999/1, supra note 598, s.1(1).
836 FRYs legal order was not derogated because of the FRY’s ‘approval’ to UNMIK’s deployment 
expressed in the Annex 1 of Resolution 1244, as argued by Stahn (’Transitional Administrations’, 
supra note 604, at 146). For a discussion see Knoll, ‘UN Imperium* supra note 36, at 26. The term 
‘derogation’ is used in the sense as Kelsen developed it: The repeal o f the validity of an already 
valid norm by another norm” (General Theory o f Norms (transl. by M. Hartney, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1991), at 106).
837 See Report o f the Secretary-General of 23 December 1999, supra note 627, §§54-60, 70-78. For 
three accounts of UNMIK’s approach to reinstall the judicial system see David Marshall and 
Shelley Inglis, ‘The Disempowerment o f Human Rights-Based Justice in the United Nations 
Mission in Kosovo’, 16 Harvard HRJ 95-146 (2003), 100-102; William G. O’Neill, 'Kosovo: 
Unexpected Barriers to Building Peace and Security’, in Honoring Human Rights Under Inter­
national Mandates: Lessons from Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor (The Aspen Institute: Washing­
ton, D.C., 2003), at 87; and Strohmeyer, ‘Collapse’, supra note 33. For a critique of UNMIK’s
failure to address the lawmaking process quickly and introducing priorities, cf. Wendy S. Betts et 
al., ‘The Post-Conflict Transitional Administration of Kosovo and the Lessons-Leamed in Efforts to 
Establish a Judiciary and Rule of Law\ 22 Michigan JIL 371-389 (2001), at 382, and Anthony J. 
Miller, 'UNMIK: Lessons Learned from the Early Institution-Building Phase’, 39 New England LR 9- 
24 (2004), at 16 ef seq.
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the most fundamental legal question in Kosovo'.838 Crumbling under the recalcitrance of 
Kosovo Albanian prosecutors and judges to apply Serbian and Yugoslav statutes as required 
by UNMIK's first Regulation covering the issue of applicable law,839 the SRSG revised it to 
exclude laws passed by Belgrade authorities between March 1989 and 1999 if they were 
‘discriminatory' and contravened international human rights instruments applicable in 
Kosovo.840 W ith this Regulation, SRSG Kouchner reinstated the law applicable in 1989 
without explicitly exempting the then-applicable body o f constitutional law. Presumably, the 
intention was not to re-create the institutional arrangements existing in Kosovo in March 
1989. This Byzantine arrangement of partial re-institution of the pre-UNMIK legal order was 
rendered more obscure by vesting the singular faculty to decide whether the legal avenue to 
the past should be opened within the supreme authority of the SRSG. According to this 
arrangement, domestic courts are allowed to seek from the SRSG a binding clarification on 
whether to apply law in force between 1989 and 1999.841
(t) Po licing  th e  Border betw een  Pa s t  and  Future Government A uthority
To present this complexity in a simplified manner, at least three layers of applicable norms 
can be distinguished. The first is the (diminishing) legacy of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’s (SFRY) legislation and Serbian municipal statutes. The second layer corres­
ponds to the body o f UNMIK Regulations and Administrative Directions as well as those laws 
passed by the Kosovo Assembly which were subsequently promulgated by the SRSG.842 
The third layer represents the instruments of international law imported into the domestic
F.M. Lorenz, The  Rule of Law in Kosovo: Problems and Prospects’, 11 Criminal Law Forum 127- 
142 (2000), at 130.
839 UNMIK/REG/1999/1, supra note 598, provided that the “laws applicable in the territory of Kosovo 
prior to 24 March 1999 shall continue to apply in Kosovo...” (s.3). For a concise background to the 
concerted act o f 'civil disobedience’ by Albanian judges, see Brand, International Administration, 
supra note 597, at 148 etseq. and Miller, ‘UNMIK’, supra note 837, at 14-15. Fora perspective on 
the practical problems encountered in the sphere of law enforcement, cf. also Colette Rausch, 
The Assumption of Authority in Kosovo and East Timor: Legal and Practical Implications’, in 
Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peace Operations 11-32 (ed. by R. Dwan, New York: 
OUP, 2002).
840 UNMIK/REG/1999/24 On the Applicable Law in Kosovo (12 December 1999), stipulates that “[i]f a 
court of competent jurisdiction...determines that a subject matter or situation is not covered by the 
law set out in s.1(1)...but is covered in another law in force after 22 March 1989 which is not 
discriminatory..., the court...shall, as an exception, apply that law” (s.1.2). As the Ombudsperson 
in Kosovo correctly observed, it has become “somewhat difficult to determine...whether or not a 
certain law is discriminatory if there is no independent judicial organ to do so" {Fourth Annual 
Report (2003-2004), Prishtina 2004, at 16). For a similar problématique in East Timor see 
Morrow/White, 'East Timor’, supra note 504, at 8 as well as Beauvais, ‘Benevolent Despotism', 
supra note 774, at 1151-1152. UNTAET/REG/1999/1, supra note 598, provided that the body of 
law that had applied in East Timor before the adoption of S/RES/1272/1999 should continue to 
apply unless it contradicted internationally recognised human right standards. Previously 
applicable Indonesian law would not apply if it conflicted with that Regulation or any subsequently 
promul-gated UNTAET regulation or directive (s.3).
841 According to UNMIK/REG/1999/24, “[cjourts in Kosovo may request clarification from the [SRSG] 
in connection with the implementation of the present regulation. The [SRSG] shall provide such 
clarification for the consideration of the courts in the exercise of their functions" (s.2). This 
provision is hardly justifiable, especially in the field of criminal law, as the SRSG basically turns 
into an organ that provides binding guidance to the courts. See Frowein, ‘Notstandsverwaltung’, 
supra note 141, at 51. For an argument that such 'clarification', if amounting to a binding inter­
pretation, violates the right to a fair trial guaranteed under Art. 6 ECHR see Nuala Mole, ’Who 
Guards the Guards -  the Rule of Law in Kosovo’, 3 EHRLR 280-299 (2001), at 296.
842 All laws thus promulgated, as a rule, contain omnibus provisions stating that they supersede all 
previous laws concerning the same subject matter.
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legal order. The normative arrangement established in Kosovo hence suggests that the prin­
ciple according to which the validity of one domestic legal order excludes the application of 
any other domestic legal order843 was temporarily suspended. Predictably, this has caused 
uncertainty as to which (S)FRY laws have been superseded by UNMIK legislation, and which 
ones continue to remain valid and/or applicable within the territory.844
The transition from illegitimate and illiberal to legitimate and liberal under these three norma­
tive layers exemplifies the operation of the transitional paradigm. According to Teitel, one of 
the defining features of the rule of law in periods o f political change is that it indeed pre­
serves some degree of continuity in legal forms while it enables normative change. UNMIK’s 
decision to partially re-instate the previous legal order was certainly informed by an under­
standing that a Rechtsstaat must supply normative intersections through which claims that 
arose in the old order can be realised in the new one. An international agent, though pur­
suing a ‘foundational’ moment to institute political change within a polis a t a constitutional 
point zero,845 is obligated to provide retrospective avenues through which the rule of law can 
be rooted in notions of continuity.846 The emergent versions o f constitutionalism and tran­
sitional law-making are thus ambivalent in their direction; under conditions of suspended 
sovereignty, law performs the work o f continuity and separation from the previous regime as 
well as that o f integration with its successor. UNMIK, in a metaphorical rendering, hence 
polices the border between past and future government authority through an import o f legal 
forms.
843 Cf. Hans Kelsen, General Theory o f Law and State (Vol. 1 , 20th Century Legal Philosophy Series: 
New York, 1961), at 213.
844 With reference to German constitutional doctrine, UNMIK Regulations and subsidiary instruments, 
including local Kosovo laws promulgated as such (cf. infra p.219), arguably possess 
Anwendungsvorrang, but not Geltungsvorrang with respect to (S)FRY statutes. For a discussion of 
the legal uncertainty in the specific field of property legislation see von Cariowitz, ‘Crossing the 
Boundary’ , supra note 614. As Brand notes, it is also unclear whether provisions 6f  the 1974 
Kosovo Constitution apply, and whether the body of applicable law includes, e.g., SFRY federal 
and SRS republican constitutional laws, municipal statutes and regulations, workers’ council 
decisions, united labour court procedures, mining and woodcutting licenses and the rules 
governing the socio-economic relations between municipalities and socially owned companies 
(International Administration, supra note 597, at 155).
845 Adapted from Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence. The Role of Law in Political Transforma­
tion’ , 106 Yale LJ 2009 (1996-1997), at 2057.
846 The partial reconstruction of the previous order in an internationalised territory is to some degree 
predicated on the obligations of a trustee to observe the limits that international law places upon 
her. Under the doctrine of acquired rights, rights once vested in accordance with law under a 
previous regime are, subject to certain exceptions, to be accorded full recognition by its 
successor. It is, however, entirely unclear whether an international territorial administration is, e.g., 
bound by Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and the “duty to respect...the existing laws in force". 
Treating UNMIK as belligerent occupant would limit its power to an extent where it may only make 
changes absolutely necessary to meet the basic needs of the indigenous population. Public order 
requirements support the counter-argument, namely, that is the precise task of an international 
peace-building mission to effectuate normative change through the overall reform in all areas of 
law. The reasoning of the Committee that, in 1952, submitted its report on the legal problems 
facing the UN can also be considered here: “the United Nations should not feel bound by all the 
laws of war, but should select such of the laws...as may seem to fit its purposes..., adding such 
others as may be needed, and rejecting those which seem incompatible with its purposes" 
(‘Should the Laws of War Apply to United Nations Enforcement Action?’, 46 Proceedings o f the 
ASIL 216-220 (1952), at 2202). For a discussion of the applicability of international humanitarian 
law to UNMIK see von Cariowitz, ‘UNMIK Lawmaking’, supra note 142, at 372-374 (arguing that 
Article 43 cannot be applied as guideline for all aspects for international lawmaking and policy). 
See also the brief discussion in Chapter V.2.2 (i), supra, note 716.
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Kosovo’s transitional legal order is simultaneously forward-looking in receiving an Ideal 
‘operating system’ -  mechanisms and processes designed to ensure orderly compliance 
with norms. Local courts, created under the international agent’s mandate, rely on inter­
pretations of the rule of law which are transmitted from the international legal order. New 
political institutions and rules of procedures governing, for example, the newly constituted 
legislature are closely modelled after Western conceptions, if not entirely designed by 
foreign experts. International legal advisers funded by various foreign agencies are involved 
in drafting and processing commercial and economic laws within both the local government 
and the legislature. Electoral rules are crafted in favour of those whom international officials 
understand to be advocates of ‘moderate’ politics. The asymmetrical ‘dual-key’ institu­
tional arrangement that divides competencies between international and local institutions is 
devised as a constitution which directly imports existing international standards of human 
rights protection.
( i t )  T h e  C o l l a p s e  o p  D u a u s m  a m d  t h e  P r o m i s e  o f  a  L i b e r a l  F u t u r e
The derogation of the previous legal order by the UN Security Council and the establishment 
of a territorial legal system rooted in an international legal source operationalised a two-fold 
belief: firstly, that ideational standards can be coherently expressed through practices and 
organisations of international life and, secondly, that external pressure can be applied to 
domestic actors in order to effectuate cognitive shifts in the target territory.847 48 On 10 June 
1999, the territory o f Kosovo was directly submitted to international law -  a condition that 
enabled the seamless import of international liberal practices and value schemes. The 
normative environment of a 'perfectly internationalised’ territory resembles, in extremis, a 
monist model, in which municipal and international law form part o f a unitary normative 
system.849 The collapse of the ‘impermeable wall’ between the international and national 
legal orders850 encapsulates a characteristic of a UN-administered territorial unit which, 
though not sovereign, is exclusively subject, without the intervention o f any other state entity, 
to international norms and legislation created by the international organ administering it.
As a result of the collapse of the dualist separation between international and internal legal 
orders, international legal instruments have a ‘direct’ statute-like role in the domestic legal 
order of an internationalised territory. In the area of contract law, for instance, UNMIK simply 
imported the 1980 UN Convention on the international Sale of Goods into municipal law.851 A
847 Cf., for instance, International Crisis Group Discussion Paper, Beyond Ballot Boxes: Municipal 
Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo, 10 September 1997). For further references to the 
OSCE’s 'benign’ electoral engineering in Bosnia, cf. Caplan, International Governance, supra note 
19, at 127-128 and Roland Paris, At War’s End. Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2004), at 104-106. For a far more critical, if not populist, appraisal see Chandler, Bosnia, 
supra note 11 , at 188 et seq.
848 Cf. Sabic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, supra note 4, at 218.
849 Cf. O'Connell, International Law, vol. I, supra, note 43, at 39 et seq. and Cassese, International 
Law, supra note 495, at 215-16.
850 Eric Stein, ‘International Law in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization of Central-Eastern 
European Constitutions?’, 88 AML 427-450 (1994), at 428.
851 UNMIK/REG/2000/68 On Contracts For the Sale of Goods (29 December 2000). As Muharremi et 
al. critically note, this approach introduced common law terminology unknown to local lawyers 
trained in continental civil law (Administration and Governance in Kosovo: Lessons Learned and 






situation in which an international organisation adopts norms which, similar to domestic 
legislation, have binding effect on private persons within the sphere of a territory remains, of 
course, exceptional.852 It means that Kosovo courts as well as other government bodies will 
look to international treaty language itself as a source of law, similar to the way they consider 
instruments of municipal law.853 As a corollary, the local legislature lacks the capacity to 
‘transform’ international law, implying that canons of international treaty interpretation are 
directly imported into the domestic setting without a 'constitutional gesture’ of that local legis­
lature.854
This is o f particular importance where norms of international law purport to confer or 
recognise individual rights, especially in instances where an international legislative organ 
weaves such rights into constitutions, legislation, and instructions regarding administrative 
governance and other institutional settings.855 The unmediated import of international treaty 
law into the municipal context is also exemplified by UNMIK’s commitment to entrench the 
EC HR within Kosovo’s legal order, though the FRY, the nominal sovereign, had not yet 
become a party to the agreement.856 The explicit imposition o f the jus publicum Europaeum 
upon an internationalised territory is, of course, highly symbolic. The reference to a Euro­
pean public order not only imbued the new United Nations governance framework with legiti­
macy. The import of liberal conceptions and practices and the superimposition of foundation- 
nal ideals o f a legal order, particularly in the spheres of constitutional and criminal law, also 
aim at sanctifying the rituals o f political passage and facilitating the normative shift from an 
ancien régime to a liberal future in which political competition is to be constitutionally
852 Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein (eds.), Bowett’s Law o f International Institutions (501 ed., London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), at 285.
853-Cf. John H. Jackson, ‘Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems. A Policy Analysis', 86 AML 
310-340 (1992), at 321.
854 For the transformation doctrine cf. O’Connell, International Law, vol. I, supra note 43, at 49. There 
are sound reasons for a national legal system to avoid the combination of direct application of 
treaties in domestic law. Obviously, the absence of constitutional rules of recognition of 
international treaties represents a problem for democratic legitimacy as the local legislature will 
not be in a position to approve or disapprove of a certain instrument taking effect. Nor can it clarify 
ambiguous treaty provisions to fit them into the municipal legal order (Cf. Jackson, ‘Status of 
Treaties, supra note 853, at 323-4). Further, the absence of a Constitutional Court in intemational- 
lised territories implies that the role of judicial actors in translating international influence into 
constitutional arguments is severely curtailed.
For a critical appraisal o f the ‘transplantation’ metaphor as one of the lead paradigms of 
comparative law, cf. Ftorian F. Hoffmann, Are Human Rights Transplantable? Reflections on a 
Pragmatic Theory o f Human Rights under Conditions of Globalization (Ph.D. thesis, European 
University Institute, 2003), especially at 115 ef seq. It is questionable whether it is appropriate to 
utilise the terminology of 'transplantation' if a vertical transfer is meant. As Orucu suggests, the 
term ‘transposition’, used in music, may be more apt: “[e]ach note (legal institution or rule) is sung 
(introduced and used) at the same place in the scale of the new key (of the recipient) as it did in 
the original key (of the model); the ‘transposition’ occurring to suit the particular voice-range 
(socio-Iegal culture and needs) of the singer (the recipient)’  (Critical Comparative Law: Con­
sidering Paradoxes for Legal Systems in Transition (Deventer: Kluwer Law, 1999). This chapter, 
however, prefers to speak of unmediated ‘imports’ of legal concepts.
856 UNMIK/REG/1999/24, supra note 840, states that ‘ in exercising their functions, all persons 
undertaking public duties or holding public office in Kosovo shall observe internationally 
recognised human rights standards...”, followed by an impressive list of human rights instruments, 
among them the ECHR and the ICCPR (s.1.3). The Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) has 
only ratified the ECHR on 3 March 2004.
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In what seems like a remote promise of a liberal future, the Venice Commission concluded, 
in one of its recent reports, that “[i]t is certainly unwarranted to leave the population of a 
territory in Europe indefinitely without access to the Strasbourg Court."857 58 This is an extra­
ordinarily utopian proclamation. It over-subscribes to Paris’ reformulation of a peace-building 
agenda as mere mission civilisatrice and its testimony to a liberal bias in an international 
mission’s promotion of Western conceptions of human rights.859 Internationalisation reaches 
beyond the conventional means of democracy assistance in cases of less intrusive multi­
lateral operations. Ambitions aimed at the internationalisation of territory seek to actively 
draw the periphery into a wider area of shared standards in order to deal with the 
treacherous issues of group identity in divided societies and the provision of remedies 
necessary to counter mass violations of human rights.860 Institution-building agents aspire to 
nothing less than the temporary yet wholesale import o f foreign constitutional and admini­
strative systems. Democratic regime-building by an international organ can hence be under­
stood as the operationalisation of these aspirations in the context of transnational norm 
entrepreneurship.861
Recognising that we are dealing with ideal types, the transmission of legal standards to the 
periphery of the international system follows the extraordinary paradigm of transformative 
law in that it intends to construct liberalising change.862 This transmission within a monist 
model underscores UNMIK’s commitment to crafting an internationalised polity in the precise 
image of the core. Institution-building agencies indeed seek to “achieve a set of universal
857 Cf., however, PajiC’s claim that the EC HR had been “smuggled into the legal order“ of BiH when it 
was not yet member of the Council of Europe (‘A Critical Appraisal of Human Rights Provisions of 
the Dayton Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 20 HRQ 125-138 (1998), at 131).
858 Opinion, supra note 616, at 17. Another CoE paper specified that the full application of CoE 
treaties to Kosovo “would be perfectly in line with the international community’s concern to 
facilitate the territory's integration into European structures" {Note on the Applicability o f Council o f 
Europe Conventions in Kosovo and in BiH, prepared by DG I, DG II and DGAP for the Meeting 
with the Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (Prishtina, 13 June 2002), at 4). This may be the 
case. However, as the brief discussion at note 888 demonstrates, these promises are not 
accompanied by any remedies through which Kosovars could access the jus publicum 
Europaeum.
859 Cf. 'Mission Civilisatrice', supra note 11, at 639 et seq.
age
Fionnuala Ni Aolain, 'The Fractured Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal Analysis', 19 
Michigan JIL 957-1004 (1997-1998), at 978. The problems that such a utopian proposition 
encounters are best illustrated when examining the ECHR’s criteria for establishing 'jurisdiction’. 
See infra, page 223.
861 The term is borrowed from Harold H. Koh's identification of key agents in the transnational legal 
process ^Bringing Human Rights Law Home', 35 Houston LR 623-681 (1998-1999), at 646-655). 
Cf. also the discussion of the role of 'norm entrepreneurs' for the emergence of norms by 
Finnemore and Sikkink in 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, in Exploration and 
Contestation in the Study o f World Politics 247-277 (ed. by P.J. Katzenstein, et a I., Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), at 256-259. Value transfers are of course not as one-dimensional as our 
brief account suggests. For a case in which the policy in question (namely, regulatory standards 
imposed on broadcast and print media and the (European) understanding of the role of a Public 
Broadcaster) was criticised by the US, cf. Laura Palmer, ‘A Very Clear and Present Danger: Hate 
Speech, Media Reform, and Post-Conflict Democratization in Kosovo’, 26 Yale JIL 179-218 
(2001).
862 Teitel, Transitional Justice, supra note 832, at 213.
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moral...imperatives based on ‘shared values'...and regulative norms”.863 The hardest 
evidence o f the wholesale import and internalisation of internationally shared values lies in 
the practice o f institutions, placed at the intersection of domestic and international law, which 
make the law and render binding interpretations o f i t  The absence of a clear-cut hierarchy of 
norms, discussed in the following section, provides a strong indicator o f the intensity with 
which the organised international community endeavours to affect normative change in a 
temporarily internationalised polity.
6.2.2 T h e  A b s e n c e  o f  H ie r a r c h y  o f  L o c a l  N o r m s
In the case of Kosovo’s temporary internationalisation, such coercive processes o f sociali­
sation were initiated by the Security Council, which displaced the previous legal orders’ 
sphere of applicability. UNMIK came to occupy a unique position in the Kosovo legal system: 
it became part of the domestic constitutional order, and at the same time remains superior to 
it.864 Our observation that sources of law within an internationalised territory are hybrid to the 
extent that ’old’ Yugoslav and Serbian law is considerably interlaced with a new body o f UN 
law confirms Rufferts conclusion that the “conglomeration of UN-regulations and existing 
provisions is the legal order of Kosovo..., though containing international legal elements for 
the sake of guaranteeing their conformity with higher ranking international law”.865
(i) U n if o r m  P r o m u l g a t io n
Law in an internationalised territory under fiduciary administration operates at the inter­
section of municipal and international normative spaces. This insight leads us to grasp how 
an international administration attempts to steer liberalising change by importing not only 
discrete ’packages’ of ideal-type Western legislation but also a tertium comparationis -  a
863 Isa Blumi, ‘One Year of Failure in Kosova: Chances Missed and the Unknown Future’, 1:1 
Southeast European Politics 15-24 (2000), at 17. Again, it must be emphasised that the project of 
international institution-building is characterised here in an ideal-type manner which abstracts 
from social and cognitive aspects of norm-building. International norms must always work their 
influence through the filter of a domestic structure, which can produce important variations in their 
interpretation -  processes ignored by Blumi whose dubious suggestions read, in pertinent parts, 
like a transcript of an imaginary encounter between KLA General Agim Ceku and Michel Foucault 
(“...locals have a strong sense of duty of maintaining order in their lives. Their fight with Belgrade’s 
colonialism represented a dynamic o f communal bonding and self-sacrifice that could have been 
cultivated by UNMIK.” Id., at 19). As Hoffmann reminds us, legal transplants are surrounded by a 
web of local significances, and are subject to manipulation by local actors in a variety of ways. 
Every such manipulation creates repercussions which reconfigure the original transplant, initiating 
a recursive process of adaptations which ads further layers to an emerging transnational prece­
dent. The possibility of ‘transplantation’ hence depends on the particular configuration of a local 
community’s legal culture (Transplantable, supra note 855, at 205 and 227-229). What we mean 
to underscore here is the international institution-building agencies’ intention to increasingly link 
domestic and international norm tables -  a process which Finnemore/Sikkink describe as ‘norm 
cascades’ (supra note 861, at 262-264). For a highly obscure and factually wrong yet original 
approach to UNMIK as a case in which international society reproduces liberal conceptions to 
non-liberal areas through the frame of ‘disaggregated’ sovereignty, cf. David Schleicher, ’Liberal 
International Law Theory and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo: Ideas and Practice’, 14:2 
Tulane JICL (forthcoming in December 2005).
864 This conclusion is inspired by Marcus Cox’s treatment of the OHR in BiH’s constitutional order in 
Bosnian State, supra note 23, at 91.
865 ‘Administration’, supra note 144, at 624. Note the similarities to the situation in East Timor after 
1999 where the sequence of UNTAET Regulations “sidestepped the problem of the relationship 
between Indonesian legal standards and applicable customary international law” (Morrow/White, 
‘East Timor1, supra note 504, at 9)
j .
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standard, or ‘benchmarks', against which the performance of the ‘import* is measured.866 867
The propositions advanced here reach beyond the transitional framework in which law 
mediates between two regimes. They concern the difficulties in determining, in practice, the 
sources and hierarchy of applicable local law. As a point of departure for the following 
analysis, we submit that a specific autological relationship -  a hierarchy between norms of 
‘higher* constitutional quality and ordinary municipal statutes -  does not exist in Kosovo. 
Apart from the Resolution 1244, all applicable law in Kosovo is formally promulgated as 
‘UNMIK Regulation’ (or as subsidiary instrument) or has been declared applicable by such 
an instrument The relationship between the first two normative ‘layers’ of which this 
chapter previously spoke -  UNMIK Regulations and Kosovo 1989 law which has not been 
superseded by the former -  remains, however, entirely unresolved. The absence of formal 
differentiation o f legal norms -  their equal ‘position* within a transitional legal order -  is, 
indeed, the result of a territory’s temporary direct submission to international law, a situation 
in which the international legal order directly interferes with the territory’s constitutional order.
Kosovo’s institution-building framework, presented in section 1 of this chapter, opens the 
investigation into the particularities o f a ‘dual-key’ governance setting in which authority is 
exercised by an international administration that is temporarily vested with virtually un­
checked executive and legislative powers. Along the unfolding institution-building sequence 
as foreseen by Resolution 1244, the international agent is vested with a (decreasing) 
measure of authority to supervise the work of local institutions which, on the other hand, 
gradually assume competencies for a certain range of issues and discharge municipal 
functions according to their autonomous sphere of action.868 As a result of the creation of a 
sui generis, loosely configured political system, the legislative process in the sphere of 
‘reserved’ powers differs from that in the areas of ‘transferred’ powers. In the former, 
Regulations and subsidiary instruments continue to be drafted by the respective UNMIK 
component 'pillars', reviewed by UNMIK’s Legal Adviser as well as the UN’s legal office in 
New York with a view to ensuring that such legislation complies with Resolution 1244.869 On 
the other hand, under the Constitutional Framework’s procedures, the laws adopted by the 
Kosovo Assembly (ligj/zakon) have to be uniformly promulgated by the SRSG, also as
866 Cf. Hoffmann, Transplantable, supra note 855, at 130. The measuring of transplantation progress 
that is to indicate approximation towards a stereotypical ‘normalcy’ can be clearly observed in 
Kosovo. As already noted in the previous Chapter, UNMIK instituted a policy of ‘benchmarking’ 
through which indicators were to be developed in several governance spheres.
867 This includes the Constitutional Framework which contains substantive constitutional rules (supra, 
note 622). The CF shares its ‘rank’ with a ll other UNMIK Regulations. It contains no 'immutability 
clause’ which would protect certain o f its central norms from alteration by UNMIK (Stahn, 
‘Constitution without a State', supra note 607, at 546).
868 The asymmetrical ‘dual-key’ arrangement was established by the CF which divides all spheres of 
governmental authority into powers that are to be ‘transferred’ to the newly created PISG (Chapter 
V of the CF) and 'reserves’ others for the continued exercise by UNMIK (CF Chapter VIII). The 
latter mostly concern *sovereignt/-related matters such as external relations, the administration of 
state and public property and enterprises, control over the civil registry database, railways and 
civil aviation, protection of minority rights, public order and safety, defence, and the appointment 
and removal o f judges and prosecutors.
869 See Stahn, ‘Origins’, supra note 516, at 107. Zygojannis’ suggestion that the Office of Legal Affairs 
assumed functions of 'control' over UNMIK activities (Die Staatengemeinschaft und das Kosovo, 
Berlin: Duncker&H urn blot, 2003), at 223) is, however, open to challenge. In some instances, as 
Brand notes, UN OLA was only consulted after the instrument had already been promulgated 
(Internationa! Administration, supra note 597, at 200),
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UNMIK Regulations.870
(h) ‘Med ia te  U nited  Nations  La w *
Examples from the legislative practice of Kosovo’s local institutions further illustrate the 
impact of a complex ‘dual-key’ power sharing on the hybrid nature of the legal system. The 
indeterminate ‘texture’ of the relevant provisions o f the Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework 
leaves a wide range of ‘grey’ areas which touch upon both ‘transferred’ and ‘reserved’ 
competencies. There, the drafting o f laws resembles a patchwork exercise seeking to stitch 
together inputs from both local Ministries and UNMIK.871 Instead of sending the draft back to 
the Assembly, the SRSG alternatively proceeds by introducing amendments that he deems 
are required by what we term international legal forms. Notably, the SRSG goes forth with 
the promulgation of the relevant law by adding changes to the Assembly version as 
attachment to the Law. Absent procedures indicating the competent institution to incorporate 
UNMIK changes into the published (bilingual) translations o f the law, UNMIK has adopted a 
minimalist position, insisting it publish the authentic version o f the law (in English) on its web­
site, while refusing to guarantee the authenticity of the Albanian or Serbian translations.872
In a strictly formalist sense, it has at times become virtually impossible to decide whether the 
thus amended laws can still be considered as ‘Assembly laws’ or whether they originate from 
a hybrid constitutional source. While the syncretism of sources of normative acts is, as we 
maintain, a defining feature of government activity at the intersection between municipal and 
international law, the uncertainty as to a law’s exact source has troubling implications: while 
laws passed by the Assembly can be subject to constitutional review by the Special
870 Chapter 9.1.45 o f the CF, supra note 618. ‘Resolutions* o f the Assembly remain non-binding 
declarations (Chapter 9.1.26). This im plies that final competence to issue normatively binding acts 
is, in any case, outside the scope o f authority o f local institutions. By way of qualification, it should 
be noted that the 'Zustimmungsvorbehalt’ of UNMIK is reminiscent of the practice o f the Allied 
occupation authorities in Germany. Like in the case o f Kosovo, the passing o f local laws was 
conditioned upon the consent o f the allied administration: “Die Besatzungsmächte machen die 
Gültigkeit eines...Gesetzes von ihrer Zustimmung abhängig...weil sie die deutschen Beschlüsse 
daraufhin überprüfen wollen, ob sie den Absichten der Besatzungspolitik widersprechen“ (Hans 
Schneider, ‘M ittelbares Besatzungsrecht’, 75:4 AdV494-500 (1945), at 497).
871 Cf. Robert Muharremi, ‘Legislative Procedure According to the Constitutional Framework, 4:1 
Kosovo Legal Studies 2-6 (2003). Literature on the Allied administration of Berlin refers to the 
practice o f issuing laws, directives and orders as 'versteckte Besatzungsakte' -  ‘ Maßnahmen, die 
zwar von den deutschen Behörden erlassen werden, die aber so stark von Einflüssen der Be­
satzungsmacht geprägt sind, daß in W ahrheit der W ille der Besatzungsmächte für den Erlaß die­
ser Akte entscheidend ist“ (Joachim Herbst, Gerichtlicher Rechtsschutz gegen Hoheitsakte der 
Alliierten in Berlin (West) (Frankfurt a.M .: Peter Lang, 1991, at 14).
672 Until mid-2005, the absence o f a Law on the Official Gazette through which legal acts (including 
the SRSG's own regulations) were published and disseminated has reinforced the uncertainty as 
to the body o f applicable law. The procedures were puzzling indeed. Responsibility for the 
publication o f Assembly Laws lay with the PISG. The Assembly’s Secretariat made these laws 
available to the Official Gazette Unit w ithin the (UNMIK) Department of Administrative Services 
which subsequently posted them on the UNMIK website. The Kosovo Assembly, however, 
maintained its own website that included a section dedicated to the publication of Assembly laws 
and promulgated regulations. Erroneous postings that include mark-up comments and translation 
errors occurred frequently. That flawed translations of law constitute one of the chief factors that 
contribute to  legal uncertainty in Kosovo has been recognised ever since UNMIK’s deployment 
(Cf. International Crisis Group, Finding the Balance: The Scales o f Justice in Kosovo (Europe 
Report No. 134, 12 September 2002), at 13). The Law on the Official Gazette was adopted by the 
Kosovo Assembly in September 2004 (Law No.2004/47) and promulgated by the SRSG only on 
12 May 2005 (UNMIK/REG 2005/25).
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Chamber of the Supreme Court o f Kosovo,873 a determination that a law's content is 
attributable to UNMIK would remove it from any scrutiny whatsoever.
The practice of instituting ‘mediate UN-law’ -  defined here, with reference to ‘mediate 
occupation law*, as United Nations law by form and local law in terms of material content874 -  
was repeatedly criticised by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission. It suggested that 
this practice would exceed the limits that have been placed by the Constitutional Framework 
upon the structural collaboration between the SRSG and the emerging local institution.875 
The relation between normative acts stemming from an international source and local laws is 
characterised by the sort o f inconsistency we expect under conditions of a tenuous 
partnership between international and local institutions. The absence of a hierarchy among 
normative acts possessing statutory force within the local executive branch entails difficulties 
as it also creates gaps in legal certainty. Addressing the situation within the local executive 
branch, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo has not only noted deficiencies in the issuing of 
subsidiary legislation by local institutions, but has also recommended the adoption of a Law 
on Normative Acts defining the types and hierarchy between normative acts in general, 
including the different categories of subsidiary acts.876
6.2.3 T h e  U n a c c o u n t a b iu t y  o f  a n  In t e r n a t io n a l  A d m in is t r a t io n
The import (and superimposition) o f liberal conceptions of governance, facilitated by the 
assumption of temporary jurisdiction by an international territorial administration, has also 
been met by a critique of the ways through which the administration dispenses its supreme 
authority. Briefly, the argument suggests that progress towards developing democratic 
structures will, through a process of local mimicry, be slow and incomplete if the means 
employed toward that end resemble authoritarian administration. In (continental European) 
constitutional democracies, a hierarchy of norms implies a differentiation between constitu­
tional and ordinary jurisdiction, and between constitutional and ordinary law. The consti­
tutional review of political legislation has developed extensive techniques*to neutralise 
political decisions, fit result-oriented ‘policies’ into legal doctrine in accordance with criteria o f 
consistency, and, in the most serious cases, pronounce legislative acts unconstitutional.877 
Judicial review is, in a state of law, seen to be the corollary of an attribution of powers: its
873 Article 9.4.11(a) of the CF, supra note 618. The Special Chamber, it must be added, is not 
functioning. By mid-2005, the competent UNMIK authorities were no closer to establishing it than 
in 2001.
874 Cf. the reference to ‘mittelbares Besatzungsrecht, infra note 922.
875 Opinion, supra note 616, at §138 (p. 25).
876 Implementation o f Kosovo Assembly Laws by the Executive Branch o f  the Provisional Institutions 
of Self-Government Review Period: Laws Promulgated in 2002-2003 (Prishtina, January 2005), at 
21. UNMIK/REG/2001/19, supra note 600, specifies only two categories of subsidiary acts that 
could be issued by the ministers: decisions and administrative instructions (s.1.3(d)). However, 
many of the laws passed by the Kosovo Assembly within the period 2002-2003 refer not only to 
these two categories of subsidiary acts, but also to ‘rules’, ‘implementing rules’, ’regulations’, 
’directives’, and ‘guidelines’. UNMIK/REG/2003/15 Law on External Trade Activity (12 May 2003), 
for instance, reprises such haphazardly all-inclusive typology when it stipulates that ‘“ normative 
act’ shall mean (i) any law, decree, resolution, normative act, sub-normative act, regulation, 
administrative direction, instruction, rule, ordinance, or other act that is recognised or represented 
as having normative force w ithin the territory o f Kosovo by any public authority, and (ii) any 
international agreement that international law considers binding upon Kosovo" (Chapter I, $.2).
877 Gunther Teubner, ’Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centered Constitutional 
Theory’ (unpublished paper, 2001), at 7.
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use must conform to the law and the action of any government body is subject to the control 
of courts as ultima ratio. Indeed, the rule of law in transitional regimes came to be associa­
ted with rule by courts, and particularly rule by constitutional courts.878
The ‘thin' understanding of democratic constitutionalism in an internationally administered 
territory is, according to its critics, be best demonstrated by pointing at the continuation of a 
practice precluding independent review of the UN’s normative acts that have territorial 
validity. No international territorial administration, so the argument proceeds, has yet pro­
posed that its legislative enactments be brought into conformity with constitutional require­
ments through an institutionalised set of measures to ensure 'horizontal' accountability.879 
This and other deficiencies in the implementation of liberal positions has led one author to 
suggest recently that an international administration “stands outside the normative frame­
work of international society because it is an arrangement o f power rather than one of 
law".880
The last section of this thesis will only partially agree with this proposition. In the first part, we 
will pursue our discussion o f the legal order in order to demonstrate how UNMIK insulated 
itself against demands to submit its acts to judicial review and failed to provide effective 
remedies for human rights violations. The second step w ill offer examples from other 
territories under international tutelage as to how the issue of norm control was broached. 
The third part will build upon, and go beyond, considerations of norm control and judicial 
review to briefly expand upon another dimension of accountability, namely the liability of 
international organisations for wrongful acts. There, the structure of the argument draws on 
the analysis o f the dual functions of an international administration presented in Chapter IV.
(i) A Hum an  R ights V a c u u m ?
The [ECHR] was not designed to be applied throughout the world. ' 881
'As such, KFOR detentions are entirely distinct 
from cases that must be processed throughout the Kosovo judicial system. ' 882
The past six years o f international institution-building in Kosovo have not only exposed the 
frailty of a transitional legal order which seeks to accommodate both backward and forward- 
looking elements. It also exhibited what one commentator termed a contradiction that lies at 
the heart of UN-mandated territorial administration: namely, its inability to take full advantage 
of the entire spectrum of means ensuring vital aspects o f good governance that are regularly 
encountered in liberal constitutions. Kosovo represents a case in which institutions of 
‘constitutional self-restrainf remain absent long into the institution-building sequence. While
878 Cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, 'Constitutional Interpretation after Regimes of Horror1, Public Law and 
Legal Theory Research Paper Series 1-30 (University o f Pennsylvania Law School, 2000), at 24.
879 For the concept of ‘horizontal’ accountability as relationship between government agencies see 
Andreas Schedler, 'Conceptualising Accountability1, in The Self-Restraining State: Power and 
Accountability in the New Democracies (ed. by A. Schedler, L. Diamond, and M.F, Plattner, 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), at 22-25.
Bain, Anarchy, supra note 18, at 153.
881 Bankovid case, supra rote 47, at §80.
882 Letter from SRSG Haskkerup to  OSCE Head of Mission, Amb. Everts (Prishtina, 31 August 2001),
p .2.
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it created rules to govern the functioning of local institutions, the applicable legal framework 
has failed to set limits on the powers of the international territorial administration. This 
practice is seen to be particularly problematic as UNMIK has, into mid-2005, retained 
administrative authority over justice and law enforcement -  areas which are closely entwined 
with human rights guarantees. Even more worryingly, individuals within the territory continue 
to lack the basic protection mechanism that derives from Serbia and Montenegro’s 
increased acceptance of international human rights instruments in the past two years.883
The extent to which Kosovars can rely on the ECHR to bring claims in front of the Stras­
bourg Court is less than clear. The problem can be broken down into three issue areas 
which shall be briefly touched upon. It can be formulated in terms of an instance of extra­
territorial applicability of international human rights instruments in which ECHR signatories 
are 'projecting' their espace juridique beyond their territorial boundaries. The issue gravitates 
around the interpretation of the term ‘jurisdiction’ in Article 1 of the ECHR and the question of 
whether anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a Contracting State -  wherever in 
the world that act may have been committed or its consequences felt -  is thereby brought 
within the jurisdiction of that State.884 In short, the first issue concerns the question whether 
the jurisdiction o f a state follows the exercise of public authority by that state and whether its 
authorised agents (including armed forces) bring other persons ‘within the jurisdiction’ of that 
state when abroad. The Court found that the extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR in 
those special cases is the consequence of the exercise of control by the State party o f an
883 This refers particularly to the right to an effective remedy before a national authority for a human 
rights violation (Art. 13 ECHR) which applies in Kosovo not only by way of its incorporation in the 
Constitutional Framework (supra, note 618). SCG has ratified the ECHR without formulating 
reservations concerning the territorial application of the CoE instruments. With reference to Article 
29 o f the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, there is thus a presumption in favour of 
the ‘application’ o f the CoE treaty to the entire SCG territory, including Kosovo (cf. CoE Note 
Applicability, supra note 858, at 1). It must be added, however, that SCG is prevented from 
(legally) exercising its jurisdiction in the territory of Kosovo due to the presence o f UNMIK and 
KFOR. For Serbian parallel structures and their (illegal) exercise o f effective control see Chapter 
V, supra notes 590 and 591.
884 Bankoviô case, supra note 47, at §75. The case is authoritatively discussed by Georg Ress, 'State 
Responsibility for Extraterritorial Human Rights Violations. The Case o f Bankovic’, ZEuS 73-89 
(2003). For two critical reviews of the case, see Ralph Wilde, T he  “Legal Space" or “Espace 
Juridique" o f the European Convention on Human Rights: Is It Relevant to Extraterritorial State 
Action?’, 2 EHRLR  115-124 (2005), and Gérard Cohen-Johnathan, 'La territorialisation de la 
juridiction de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme', RTDH (2002), at 1069 ef seq. The Court 
concluded that extraterritorial jurisdiction can specifically be recognised in cases where a state 
effectively controls the relevant territory and its inhabitants (whether as a consequence of m ilitary 
occupation or with the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the territorial government) and 
employs at least some of the powers normally exercised by that government (§§67-73). In 
general, it should be evident that in view o f the purposes and objects of human rights treaties, 
there is no a priori reason to limit a state’s obligation to respect human rights to its territory. As 
Meron notes, “narrow territorial interpretation of human rights treaties is anathema to the basic 
idea..., which is to ensure that a state should respect human rights of persons over which it 
exercises jurisdiction". Thus the presumption is that the state's obligation continues where agents 
of the state -  whether military or civilian -  exercise power and authority over persons outside 
national territory (‘The 1994 U.S. Action in Haiti: Extraterritoriality o f Human Rights Treaties’, 89 
AJIL 78-82 (1995), at 80-82). On the margins it may be noted that the debate as to the ECHR’s 
scope of applicability mirrors, to some extent, the dispute as to the applicability of multilateral con­
ventions in ‘non-metropolitan' and occupied territories. Israel’s recalcitrance to submit to the 
supervisory procedures under the ILO Conventions is discussed by Theodor Meron, ‘Applicability 
of Multilateral Conventions to Occupied Territories', 72 AJIL 542-557 (1978), at 544-551; for 
Israel’s denial that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies de jure  to  the OPT, cf. Ardi Imseis, 'On 




area outside its national territory.
Second, the problem may be re-stated as one of imputabiiity. This is clearly more complex 
than the ratione loci issue. As regards the civil administration of territory, it is unlikely that UN 
member states (which are parties to the ECHR) are responsible for the actions of their 
nationals within UNMIK, as they do not exercise any degree of control. Concerning security 
tasks, CoE member states regularly contribute troops to the international security force 
operating in the territory. Prima facie, it may be argued that since national contingents of 
Convention States are exercising governmental authority over a people in an area over 
which they exercise control, there is every reason why they should carry responsibility for 
securing the human rights of these people.85 86
The limitations of the argument are, however, clean NATO (in our case) is an organisation 
with an international legal personality distinct from that of its participating states.887 It is 
therefore doubtful whether its ‘organisational veil’ could be pierced in order to hold individual 
states responsible for the acts of soldiers under KFOR’s command and control. Since NATO 
is not a signatory of the ECHR, the latter’s protection mechanism does not extend to 
individuals under its effective control. Solving the issue of imputabiiity means asking the 
complex question to which extent m ilitary forces are indeed placed at the disposal o f NATO 
and whether there exists a jo in t international authority which cannot be divided into separate 
jurisdictions. Naturally, each case must be examined as to whether the specific act was per­
formed under the operational control of the organisation or the sending state. If control 
remains with the troop-contributing nation, it is critical to inquire whether individual human 
rights violations are committed within a CoE member state's genuine responsibility over a 
'sector' of territory.888 Responsibility could be established even in cases where the contingent
885 As the ECtHR held in the case Loizidou v. Turkey, “the responsibility of Contracting states can be 
involved by acts and omissions o f their authorities which produce effects outside their own 
territory” (No. 40/1993/435/514, Judgment of 18 December 1996, §52). The Court assumed such 
an extraterritorial applicability in the case o f the occupation o f northern Cyprus (Cyprus v. Turkey 
(No. 25781/94, 10 May 2001 (Judgment), §52), and recently in the case of the Russian influence, 
secured by the presence o f Russian m ilitary, over the Moldavian Republic o f Transdniestria (llascu 
a.o. v. Moldova and Russia, Appl. No. 48787/99, 8 July 2004, Judgment, §314). An argument that 
seeks to lim it these findings to territories which “would normally be covered by the Convention* 
(Bankovic, supra note 47, at §80) could not exclude Kosovo since SCG, the holder of the formal 
title  over the territory, has become a Contracting State (supra, note 856).
886 Sarah W illiam s and Sangeeta Shah, ‘Case Analysis. Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and 16 
Other Contracting States', EHRLR  775-781(2002), at 781.
887 As Zwanenburg concludes with reference to Tomuschat and Pellet, application o f the ‘objective’ as 
well as the ‘subjective’ theory o f international legal personality suggests that NATO is, indeed, an 
international legal person vested w ith functions distinct from those of the member states 
(Accountability, supra note 615, at 67).
888 Cf. Heike Krieger, ‘Die Verantwortlichkeit Deutschlands nach der EMRK fur seine Streitkrafte im 
Auslandseinsatz*, 62 ZaoRV  669-702 (2002), at 677-686. In Bankovid, the Court did not decide 
the question whether Member States o f an international organisation could be held responsible for 
the acts of the latter. For the question o f whether France and Britain were bound by the ECHR in 
the Allied occupation of Berlin, cf. Herbst, Rechtsschutz, supra note 871, at 53-64. The ECtHR 
may provide clarification in the case Behram i v. France  which concerns the responsibility of 
French KFOR troops under Article 1 in respect o f an alleged negligent failure to act (No. 71412/01 
[pending], case communicated on 16 September 2003). The Court may look for jurisprudential 
guidance in the Hess decision in which the EComHR found that Spandau prison was established 
on the basis o f a collective decision o f the Kommandatura and that the subject o f the complaint 
was a m atter fo r which the Four Powers were jo in tly responsible. Hess’ application was 
inadmissible because the jo in t authority could not be divided into separate jurisdictions; the 
Commission was without ratione personae (Use Hess v. United Kingdom  [1975], No. 6231/73,
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to which that member belongs is generally under the operational control of the or­
ganisation.889
Third, the problem can be viewed as one of granting an excessive array of privileges and 
immunities to international actors. As widely criticised by international scholars,890 human 
rights NGOs891 and international organisations both within and outside o f Kosovo,892 the 
rights of Kosovars to seek review of, and redress for, alleged violations o f their rights by 
UNMIK and KFOR remain non-existent also due to the UN administration’s functional 
immunity from the jurisdiction of the court system.893 Such ‘human rights vacuum' appeared 
as the UN Security Council instituted UNMIK and KFOR as legitimate authorities and as 
holders of imperium and in effect permitting them to perpetrate violations of the Convention 
in an extraterritorial setting which they could not perpetrate in any of the CoE member states.
The findings can. be summarised as follows: by temporarily derogating from the FRY legal
Decision o f 28 May 1975, 2 DR  9, at 74). The extension of member state’s ‘jurisdiction’ (in the 
meaning o f Article 1 ECHR) to peace-building missions would certainly remove harmful incon­
sistencies in the protection against domestic and external acts of their state organs. However, it 
must be added that the accessibility o f the Strasbourg Court would not dose the human rights gap 
as many troop-contributing countries are not ECHR Contracting States. A discussion of the 
relationship o f the ECHR to other norms of (customary) international human rights law is beyond 
the scope o f this chapter.
889 Zwanenburg considers the (hypothetical) situation that the Dutch contingent in Srebrenica 
received instructions from its government concerning the attitude it must take toward the transfer 
o f the local population by Bosnian Serb forces: "If such were the case, the conduct o f the 
contingent would be attributable to the government, even though the agreement between the 
Netherlands and the UN concerning the participation of Dutch troops in the operation spedfied 
that the UN was in command" (Accountability, supra note 615, a t 111). The presumption that the 
conduct o f troops that are an integral part of a peace support operation is attributable only to the 
international organisation, can be rebutted if it is established that the troops acted on behalf o f a 
troop contributing state (at 132). As Hirsch points out, holding the contributing state responsible 
for acts o f its troops without enabling that state to control the operation may, however, serve as a 
negative incentive to the participation o f some states in international forces (The Responsibility o f 
International Organizations Toward Third Parties: Some Basic Principles (Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 
1995), at 77). On the other hand, he notes that sheltering member states from responsibility for 
acts committed by their forces under the ‘veil’ of an international organisation does not supply an 
incentive to prevent future violations (at 150).
890 For a detailed critique o f the inconsistent and non-transparent articulation o f policy goals by 
UNMIK, its structural tensions with democratic governance and the lack o f jud ida l review o f its 
actions, see Marshall/lnglis, 'Disempowermenf supra note 837, at 106 e tseq . and 144-145.
891 Cf., e.g., Amnesty International, Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (Kosovo): Setting the Standard? 
UNMIK and KFOR's Response to Violence in Mitrovica (Al Index EUR 70/13/2000, March 2000).
892 Cf. the various Reports by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Department of Human Rights and Rule of 
Law and espedally its ‘Remedies Catalogue’. For a critique o f the opaque references to, and 
defective entrenchment of, international human rights law see Ombudsperson in Kosovo, Certain 
Aspects o f UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/59 Amending UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 on the Law  
Applicable in Kosovo (27 October 2000), Spedal Report No. 2 (30 May 2001) as well as the report 
o f the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, Kosovo: The Human Rights Situation and the Fate o f 
Persons D isplaced from their Homes (Strasbourg, 16 October 2002 (CommDH (2002)11), at 48).
893 UNMIK/REG/2000/47 On the Status, Privileges and Immunities o f KFOR and UNMIK and Their 
Personnel in  Kosovo (18 August 2000). Simitar provisions on the immunity of World Bank 
personnel were laid earlier down in UNMIK/REG/2000/44 On the Privileges and Immunities o f the 
World Bank Group and Its Officials in  Kosovo (10 August 2000). The amount o f literature devoted 
to the incompatibility of UN immunity rules with international human rights law is steadily 
increasing. See, e.g., Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not To W aive: Immunity and Accountability 
in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations’, 18 Connecticut JIL 103 (2002), at 124 et seq; Cerone, 'KFOR 
Accountability’, supra note 681; and the Kosovo Ombudsperson Institution’s Special Report No. 1, 
supra note 608.
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order, the Security Council removed from individuals the benefit of the ECHR’s fundamental 
safeguards and their right to call a state to account for violation of their rights in proceedings 
before the Court.894 Not without a sense of sarcasm, the Kosovo’s Ombudsman pointed out 
that the UN has placed a people under its control, “thereby removing them from the 
protection of the international human rights regime that formed the justification for UN 
engagement in Kosovo in the first place".895 896This state o f affairs is even more disturbing 
when mirrored against decisions o f the UN Human Rights Committee which, in the wake of 
massive human rights violations committed in the territory o f the former SFRY, concluded 
that citizens should not be deprived of the benefits deriving from the application o f the inter­
national human rights instruments simply because the State was dissolving. The argument 
can also be fortified from the position of human rights case law, in particular by applying the
oqg
equal protection test devised by the EComHR and further developed by the ECtHR. 
Ironically, the UN Secretary General -  the constitutional “guardian of the principles of the 
Charter"897 -  has, through the actions of his subsidiary organ (the SRSG in Kosovo), 
become notorious for the illegal detention of persons at a time when many of the UN 
member states, and Annan himself, have raised serious concerns about the United States’ 
detention practices at Guantanamo.898
As Knaus and Martin recently noted with regard to the competencies of the OHR, a state-
894 Adapted from Cyprus v. Turkey; supra note 885, at §78. The case is discussed by Frank 
Hofmeister, ‘International Decisions', 96 AJIL 445-452 (2002) and Loukis G. Loucaides, ‘The 
Judgment o f the ECtHR in the Case o f Cyprus v. Turkey, 15 LJIL  225-236 (2002).
895 Second Annual Report 2001-2002 (Prishtina, 2002), at 5.
896 Cf. M. & Co. v. Federal Republic o f  Gemiany [1990], EComHR, 9 February 1990 (Decision), 33 
Yearbook o f  the ECHRAQ (1990), a t 52: “[t]he transfer o f powers to  an international organisation 
is not incompatible with the Convention provided that within that organisation fundamental rights 
w ill receive an equivalent protection". S im ilar Matthews v. United Kingdom [1999], ECtHR, No. 
24833/94, 18 February 1999 (Judgment), 42 Yearbook o f d ie  ECHR  78 (1999), at §32. State 
responsibility could hence derive from the transfer o f command/control over a national contingent 
to the UN or NATO without ensuring that those powers are exercised in conformity with the 
member state's international obligations (Cf. Zwanenburg, Accountability, supra note 615, a t 133).
897 Cf. Javier Perez de Cu6IIar, ‘The Role o f the UN Secretary-General’, in United Nations, Divided 
World: The UN’s Roles in International Relations 125-142 (ed. by A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury, 
2nd. ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), at 126. For an argument tying the UNSG to a ‘sacred 
trust’ to secure within the lim its o f his powers the observance o f UN principles, see Charles H. 
Alexandrowicz, The Secretary-General o f the United Nations’, 11:4 ICLQ 1109-1130 (1962), at 
1127, and, more recently, Ian Johnstone, ‘The Role of the UN Secretary-General: The Power of 
Persuasion Based on Lav/, 9 Global Governance 441-458 (2003), at 444-5. Cf. also the SG’s 
stated intention to ‘mainstream’ human rights -  “integral to the promotion of peace and security’  -  
throughout the UN system (Renewing the United Nations, supra note 513, at §78).
898 Cf. Agence France Presse, 'Guantanamo: Annan Warns of Abuse o f T-Word’ (30 January 2004). 
UNMIK has on several occasions earned out preventive detentions, arguing that an individual 
poses a threat to public safety and order. Furthermore, the SRSG has issued a number of 
Executive Orders extending detention periods without specifying the grounds for the continued de­
tention, and without providing the detainee with an opportunity to challenge the lawfulness o f the 
decision. The Kosovo Ombudsperson found that the absence o f judicial control over deprivations 
o f liberty imposed under those Executive Orders constituted a clear violation o f the ECHR (Special 
Report No. 3: On die Conformity o f  Deprivations o f  Liberty under “Executive Orders”  with 
Recognised International Standards (Prishtina, 29 June 2001)). See also Amnesty International, 
Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (Kosovo): Criminal Justice System Still on Trial (Al Index; 
EUR70/063/2000), 22 November 2000) as well as Elisabeth Abraham, The Sins of the Saviour: 
Holding the United Nations Accountable to International Human Rights Standards for Executive 
Order Detentions in its Mission in Kosovo’, 52 American University LR  1291 (2003). Cf. also the 
OSCE Mission in Kosovo’s thematic Review o f the Criminal Justice System (March 2002), at 43- 
49; its Remedies Catalogue, at 11-12 (both regarding SRSG’s Executive Orders and extra-judicial 
detentions by KFOR) and their discussion by Stahn, ‘Origins', supra note 516, at 152-154.
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building mission that started out with unlimited powers to meet extraordinary circumstances 
may indeed end up as an uncomfortable caricature of a Utilitarian despot.899 The frustration 
with the immunisation of law from democratic politics, the absence of institutions of 
constitutional control, and the concomitant deprivation of the effective protection of human 
rights standards has recently led the CoE Parliamentary Assembly to advance daring 
propositions. It suggested the establishment of a Human Rights Court for Kosovo with 
jurisdiction over complaints alleging violations of ECHR-protected rights by, among others, 
UNMIK, KFOR, and its national contingents. Moreover, it recommended to UNMIK the 
creation of a Special Chamber of Kosovo’s Supreme Court with the jurisdiction to review “all 
Provisional Assembly laws other than those which had been amended in promulgation by 
the SRSG so as to bring them into conformity with international human right standards".900
This proposition is based on a fallacious dichotomy between laws that are promulgated by 
the SRSG in a ‘blanket’ manner and those which are promulgated subsequent to an 
amendment by the SRSG. It creates the assumption that SRSG amendments -  o f any 
nature presumably, even if only to clarify the literal meaning of a particular term used in an 
Assembly ‘law* -  would confer a seal of conformity with human rights instruments. This 
assumption is dubious. Such a Special Chamber would therefore be in a position to 
effectively charge the SRSG with failure to amend Assembly laws before promulgating them. 
While the idea of judicial review of normative acts of a UN territorial administration is nothing 
if not revolutionary, it is entirely unclear why, given the fact that the SRSG has to ensure 
compliance with international human rights standards, the CoE proposal draws a distinction 
between these two scenarios of promulgation.
(it) The Problem  of Norm  C o ntrol: Examples from  Palestine  and B osnia
The SRSG himself, accountable only to the UN Secretary-<5eneral through his Deputy in the 
New York Headquarters’ DPKO in the form of periodic reporting exercises, is not bound by 
the provisions of the Constitutional Framework and can, in theory, revoke the granted 
powers and thus reverse the process of gradual transfer of competences to local institutions 
created under it.901 In order to cement the hierarchy of norm-setting within the territory, the 
Framework vests the SRSG with Kompetenz-Kompetenz. He is, first, empowered to oversee 
the Provisional Institutions o f Self-Government (PISG), its officials and agencies, even as 
they operate in their respective fields of ‘transferred’ powers (autonomer Wirkungsbereich), 
and is, second, authorised to take "appropriate measures" whenever their actions are incon­
sistent with Resolution 1244.902 In practice, it has also not been uncommon for the UNMIK
899 Knaus/Martin, ‘Raj’, supra note 8, at 73.
900 CoE Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1417, Protection o f  Human Rights in Kosovo (25 
January 2005), §4(b) and §5(b) (italics supplied). The proposal is based on the Report o f the 
Venice Commission, Opinion, supra note 616, at 22 e t seq., with reference to the BiH Human 
Rights Chamber.
901 The CF's preamble clearly expresses the retention of the overall decision-making power by the 
SRSG: “[tjhe exercise of the responsibilities of the IPISG] shall not in any way affect or dim inish 
the ultimate authority of the SRSG for the implementation of UNSCR 1244(1999)". According to  an 
O/SRSG working paper, the reversion of competencies to UNMIK remains a punitive option, along 
with the reversal o f a certain decisions, the withholding of funds by UNMIK, and the removal o f 
officials from office, and, as a measure of last resort, their criminal prosecution (O/SRSG W orking 
Document, Types o f Intervention, 17 February 2003, on file  with the author).
902 Chapter 12 of the CF, supra note 618. Cf. also the wide-ranging interpretation by the UNSG o f the 
SRSG’s legislative powers: In exercising the authority vested in UNMIK, the SRSG ‘ may change, 











SRSG to intervene in the legislative process of the PISG and refuse to promulgate laws that, 
upon advice from UNHQ in New York, were deemed to be in violation of Resolution 1244 
and the Constitutional Framework.* 903 He has nullified resolutions of the Kosovo Assembly 
considered to be beyond the scope o f its competencies.904 Moreover, powers of intervention 
were exercised through executive decisions to set aside inter-ministerial agreements with 
other states905 as well as decisions o f municipalities906 and decisions of the local executive 
taken within the scope of their competence.907 The SRSG even held a decision of a local 
court to be null and void as it disregarded applicable law.908
Exercising his unlimited power to review the constitutionality of, and annul, laws adopted by 
the local legislature, the SRSG can be said to act as ‘negative legislator1.909 No other 
institutional checks and balances or extra-organisational normative controls are envisaged. 
Under the current legal framework, the SRSG is neither accountable to the local institutions, 
nor subject to any control exercised by them.910 In particular, legislative acts issued by the 
SRSG -  both Regulations and Administrative Directions as well as other subsidiary instru­
ments issued by one of UNMIK’s four ‘pillar" components -  are exempt from the jurisdiction
where existing laws are incompatible w ith the mandate, aims and purposes of the interim civilian 
administration" (Report o f the Secretary-General (12 July 1999), supra note 600, at §39.
903 E.g., the Law on Higher Education (2002/3), adopted by the Assembly on 25 July 2002. The law 
was not promulgated by the SRSG pursuant to his authority under the Constitutional Framework, 
which provides that “PJaws [passed by the Assembly] shall become effective on the day o f their 
promulgation by the SRSG, unless otherwise specified" (s.9.1.45). During its 3 April 2003 plenary 
session, the Assembly contended that “UNMIK is selectively implementing" a law and took the 
position that all parts of the PISG and the university shall implement the provisions o f the law 
regardless of whether the law has been promulgated by the SRSG (see OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 
Spot Report on the Monitoring o f the Assem bly o f Kosovo (4 April 2003, on file with the author)).
904 E.g., the Assembly ‘Resolution’ on the ‘Values of the Liberation W ar of Kosova’ (15 May 2003). In 
a previous instance, the Assembly had issued a ‘Resolution’ challenging the border agreement 
between the FRY and- the fYRoM (Territo ria l Integrity o f Kosova’, o f 23 May 2002). The SRSG 
declared that this Resolution violated the Constitutional Framework and the UN Security Council 
issued a strong condemnation (‘Security Council Deplores Kosovo Assembly’s Resolution 
Concerning the Province’s Territorial Integrity’, UN/Press Release/SC/7413, of 24 May 2002). For 
the background to this particular incident, cf. the discussion supra  p. 200.
905 E.g., Memorandum of Understanding between the M inistry o f Economy and Finance of Kosovo 
and the Ministry of Economy of Albania (30 May 2002), declared void by SRSG Steiner in a letter 
to the Kosovo’s PM on 25 June 2002.
906 Cf., e.g., UNMIK/ED/2004/8 On Setting Aside Provisions in the Municipal Regulation No. 2000/1 o f 
the Municipal Assembly o f Mitrovice/Mitrovica o f 20 February 2004 (8 April 2004). Based on 
s.47(2) o f UNMIK/REG/2000/45 On Self-Government o f Municipalities in Kosovo (11 August 
2000), the SRSG has the authority to  set aside any decision o f a municipality which he considers 
to be in conflict with S/RES/1244 or the applicable law or which does not take sufficiently into 
account the rights and interests of ‘communities’ (i.e. m inorities).
907 In a case that aroused considerable excitement, the SRSG, in late 2004, cancelled the decision of 
the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (TRA) to select the Slovenian company Mobitel as 
Kosovo’s second cell phone operator after a tender process that it had conducted under the 
authority explicitly delegated to it (cf. UNMIK/ED/2004/25,20 October 2004).
908 On the same issue, UNMIK declared that the subsequent decision of Prishtina Municipal Court 
requiring the TRA to execute the agreement with Mobitel would be without legal basis and "not 
enforceable" as the Court “disregarded the applicable law in Kosovo, as established by Executive 
Decision o f the SRSG" (UNMIK Press Briefing Notes, 23 March 2005).
909 Adapted from Kelsen, Law and State, supra  note 843, a t 268*269.
910 The Constitutional Framework limits the jurisdiction of the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court 
on Constitutional Framework Matters to  the control o f laws adopted by the Kosovo Assembly and 
to disputes among the provisional institutions (Chapter 9.4.11).
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of local or international courts.911 The absence of a Constitutional Court means that no tri­
bunal in Kosovo’s legal system of Kosovo could give an authoritative ruling on, e.g., the 
discriminatory nature of a law or the (non-)compatibility of legislative and executive acts by 
UNMIK organs with higher sources of law. Only the Ombudsperson912 913may examine claims 
concerning an abuse of authority by UNMIK. Crucially, the lack of a Constitutional Court 
implies that there is no independent institution to ensure the coherence of the temporary 
legal order. The gap in mechanisms of independent constitutional guardianship, which 
assumed such centrality in democratic revival elsewhere, means that judicial activism in 
internationalised territories will be slow to enforce constitutional understandings. It can only 
belatedly insinuate itself into the foreground of politics by transforming public policy disputes 
into questions o f constitutional interpretation.914
In order to illustrate the fundamental problématique of the rule of law in an internationalised 
territory -  a territory which is temporarily governed under the ‘sacred trust of civilisation' -  
consider two examples drawn, firstly, from the governance of Palestine under the League of 
Nations Mandate system and, secondly, from Bosnia under international tutelage.
In 1925, the High Commissioner fo r Palestine, acting under the Palestine Order-in-Council 
(1922), enacted an Ordinance authorising the Municipality of Jerusalem to draw water from
911 This can be derived from UNMIK/REG/1/1999/1, supra note 598, which stipulates that UNMIK 
Regulations "shall remain in force until repealed by UNMIK or superseded by such rules as are 
subsequently issued by the institutions established under a political settlement" (s.4). Perritt notes 
that the only concrete mechanism for judicial review of decisions by the 'political trustee’ is the 
Special Chamber of the Kosovo Supreme Court which has jurisdiction to review decisions taken 
by the privatisation agency KTA ('Judicial Review1, supra note 720, at 8. While this observation is 
accurate, it is also incomplete. Some UNMIK Regulations provide for different kinds of appeal. In 
the area o f pharmaceutical products, a decision of the Pharmaceutics Appeals Board (a hybrid 
body composed of international and local members appointed by the SRSG) to refuse, suspend, 
revoke or terminate a license can be appealed to the courts (UNMIK/REG/2000/52 On the Import, 
Manufacture, Sale and Distribution o f  Pharmaceutical Products, Including Narcotic Drugs and  
Psychotropic Substances (2 September 2000), s.13). Similar procedures for administrative review 
are foreseen in UNMIK/REG/2000/20 On Tax Administration and Procedures (12 April 2000) (s.7 
provides for appeal to the Independent Review Board and further appeal to a court); S.9(5) o f 
UNMlK/REG/2003/23 On Excise Taxes on Tobacco Products in  Kosovo (25 June 2003) provides 
for appeal against the decision of, or a penalty imposed by, the Director-General of UNMIK’s 
Customs Service; S.4(4) o f UNMIK/REG/2000/8 On the Provisional Regulation o f Businesses in  
Kosovo (29 February 2000) provides for appeal against a decision on denial of the registration of 
a business. In the field o f electronic media regulation, sanctions imposed by the Temporary Media 
Commissioner or his decision to refuse to issue a broadcast license can be appealed to the Media 
Appeals Board (s.4(3) of UNMIK/REG/2000/36 On the Licensing and Regulation o f the Broadcast 
Media in Kosovo (17 June 2000)), a quasi-judicial body comprised o f two international and a local 
judge.
912 UNMIK/REG/2000/38 On the Establishment o f  the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo (30 June 
2000) authorises the Ombudsperson Institution (Ol) to "receive and investigate complaints from 
any person or entity in Kosovo concerning human rights violations and actions constituting an 
abuse o f authority by the interim civil administration" (s.3.1). It would, however, be mistaken to 
conclude that the Ol exercises a degree of constitutional restraint over the supreme authority o f 
the SRSG; it may adopt decisions in the form of recommendations which do not bind the SRSG. 
The latter also appoints the Ombudsperson and can remove him from office (s.6.2 and 8).
913 For the case o f Estonia see, e.g., Nancy Maveety and Anke Grosskopf, '"Constrained" Consti­
tutional Courts and Conduits for Democratic Consolidation’, 38:3 Law&Society Review  463-488 
(2004), at 469 et seq.
914 Cf. Lee Epstein, Jack Knight and Olga Shvetsova, ‘The Role o f Constitutional Courts in the Esta­
blishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government’, 35 Law&Society Review  117- 
163 (2001). at 123.
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the spring of a neighbouring village (subject to certain rights of compensation) in order to 
increase Jerusalem’s water supply. The village’s inhabitants applied to the Supreme Court of 
Palestine fo r an injunction to restrain the local authorities from taking water. They claimed 
that the Ordinance contradicted Article 2 of the ‘A’ Mandate for Palestine stating that "the 
Mandatory shall be responsible for...safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the 
Inhabitants o f Palestine, irrespective o f race and religion".915 916The Supreme Court held that 
the provisions of the Ordinance concerning the compensation to be paid to villagers were 
indeed contrary to the Mandate and declared the Ordinance ultra vires. On appeal by the 
Government of Palestine, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (competent to hear the 
case under the 1890 Foreign Jurisdiction Act) revised this decision on the grounds that the 
Supreme Court had misconstrued Article 2 of the Mandate. However, it confirmed that the 
Court was competent to consider the compatibility of any Ordinance issued by the Govern­
ment of Palestine with the Mandate, and to declare it null and void if necessary. What 
renders this decision remarkable is not only that the Mandate was held to be enforceable in 
a municipal court915 The judgment also encapsulates what we intend to demonstrate as we 
establish a linkage between the abstract notion of legality and that of judicial scrutiny o f inter­
national legislation with territorial reach.
A decision by the Constitutional Court o f Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) further elucidates 
the issue o f the hybrid sources of law and the interference o f international legal forms with a 
domestic normative order.917 In 2000, the Court, held that the High Representative (HR), as 
“final authority in theatre” and charged with the overall implementation of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement,918 acts both as a national ‘agent’ of BiH and as an organ of the inter-state Peace 
Implementation Council (PIC) when adopting decisions in the form of the national law of BiH. 
In its deliberation on the admissibility o f the case, it referred to the cases of Germany and 
Austria placed under international administration after WWII. The Court suggested that:
foreign authorities acted in these States on behalf o f the international community, substituting 
themselves for the domestic authorities. Acts by such international authorities were often 
passed in the name o f the States under supervision. Such situation amounts to a sort of 
functional duality: an authority o f one legal system intervenes in another legal system, thus 
making its functions dual. The same holds true for the High Representative: he has been 
vested with special powers by the international community and his mandate is o f international 
character. In the present case, the High Representative...intervened in the legal order o f [BiH] 
substituting himself for the national authorities. In this respect, he therefore acted as an
915 Cf. the District Governor Jerusalem-Jaffa District and Another v. Suleiman Murra and Another 
Case (The Urtas Springs case, 3 AD no. 32, 1925-1926). The case is presented in Erades, 
Interactions, supra note 450, at 736.
916 For case law qualifying the scope of application of th is judgment see ibid., at 737-38.
917 The discussion here draws significantly from earlier conclusions reached in connection with the 
‘dual functions’ o f an international administration. In order to recapitulate, a temporary fiduciary 
administration acts both as international organ and as agent of the territory under its tutelage.
918 Supra note 89, Annex 10 Article V. A t the margins it may be added that the BiH Constitution itself 
represents a hybrid instrument as it is  annexed to the GFAP, Annex 4. The Framework Agreement 
is a basket containing a complex amalgam of bi- and trilateral treaties which has, in tum , been en­
dorsed by S/RES/1031 (15 December 1995), UN Doc. S/RES/1031 (1995). For three compelling 
analyses see Dörr, ‘Dayton/Ohio’, supra note PP, at 140 et seq.\ Edin Sarcevic, ’Völkerrechtlicher 
Vertrag als „Gestaltungsinstrument“ der Verfassunggebung: Das Daytoner Verfassungsexperi­
ment m it Präzedenzwirkung?’, 39 A dV  297-339 (2001); and Carsten Stahn, 'Die verfassungs­
rechtliche Pflicht zur Gleichstellung der drei ethnischen Volksgruppen in den bosnischen Teilrepu­
bliken -  Neue Hoffnung fü r das Friedensmodel von Dayton?’, 60 ZaöRV  663 (2000), at 668-674.
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authority o f [BiH] and the law which he enacted is in the nature of national law and must be re­
garded as a law of [BiH].919
In an apparent application of Scelle's doctrine of dédoublement fonctionnel in which national 
organs are seen to function either as national or as international agents,920 the Court further 
concluded that irrespective o f the nature of the powers vested in the HR, the law promul­
gated by him would be local in character if it related to a field falling within the legislative 
competence o f the BiH legislature. Hence, “[t]he competence of the...Court to examine the 
conformity with the Constitution...of the Law...enacted by the High Representative acting as 
an institution o f [BiH] is...based on...the Constitution."921
Several aspects o f this decision are striking. The judgment supports our conclusions put 
forward in Chapter IV, namely concerning an international agent’s ‘split’ identity and its 
performance o f dual functions. Secondly, the judgment helps us to advance the argument 
relating the hybrid nature o f the legal regime under (partial) international administration. 
Initially, the Court appears to have followed the exegesis developed by the Badischer 
Staatsgerichtshof shortly after WWII in which it subscribed to the material distinction 
between state- and occupation law. In a series o f noteworthy judgments, the Court had 
investigated the nature of local administrative law that was, "in reality, occupation law 
disguised the garment of Baden law", ordered to take effect by the Contrôle de la Sûreté.922 
While the Staatsgerichtshof declared itself incompetent to review administrative acts whose 
material content derived from an Allied legal source,923 the Bosnian Constitutional Court
919 Case No. U 9/00 (Request fo r Evaluation o f Constitutionality o f the Law on State Border Service), 
Constitutional Court of BiH (Banja Luka, 3 November 2000), §5 et seq.). For an admirably sen­
sible discussion of the case and its qualification in the light o f the subsequent Biöaköiö case (U 
37/01), see Christian Steiner and Nedim Ademoviö, 'Kompetenzstreitigkeiten im Gefüge von 
Dayton’, in Bosnien-Herzegowina im  Horizont Europas 109-147 (ed. By W. Vitzthum and I. 
Winkelmann, Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 2003), at 120-127. .
920 Cf. Chapter IV, supra p. 124. The case of Allied occupation of Germany and the dual functions 
exercised by the Control Council were discussed in the same chapter (supra p. 131).
921 Case No. 9/00, supra note 919, §§6 and 9.
922 Judgment o f the Badischer Staatsgerichtshof, Freiburg (St.G.H. 2/48, 15 January 1949), synopsis 
reprinted in 75:4 AdV  477 (1945), at 480. In this judgment, the Staatsgerichtshof was called upon 
to pronounce itself on the legality o f a regulation issued by the Ministry of Interior o f Baden 
through which a local administrative body (Landratsamt) had ordered the sequestration o f a car 
that was in itia lly removed by an A llied (French) soldier. The M inistry argued that the regulation 
was based on the order of the m ilitary government which is directly applicable law of occupation 
(unmittelbares und ausschließliches Besatzungsrecht) and as such not susceptible to judicial 
review. Sim ilar were the conclusions reached in its judgment St.G.H. 3/48 (27 November 1948): 
‘ Stellt die Anordnung...ihrer äußeren Form nach badisches Recht, ihrem materiellen Inhalt nach 
aber Recht der französischen Militärregierung dar, so ist sie einer Nachprüfung durch den 
Staatsgerichtshof entzogen.... Die Bad. Verfassung kann....nicht den Maßstab für die Gültigkeit 
von Besatzungsrecht abgeben. Dieses letztere bemißt sich allein nach völkerrechtlichen 
Gesichtspunkten und auf einer völkerrechtlichen Ebene, die dem Staatsgerichtshof verwehrt ist“ 
(ibid., 486). See also the judgments St.G.H 3/49 (31 August 1949), holding that the Court would 
be competent to review an administrative act since its material content was not derived from 
occupation law (ibid., at 487 ef seq., and their critical discussion by Schneider, ‘Mittelbares 
Besatzungsrecht’, supra note 870).
923 St.G.H. 2/48, 15 January 1949, reprinted id., at 479. These judgments are in line with established 
practice of municipal courts during occupation which are ‘ reluctant to inquire whether legislative 
measures which prima facie could be intended to safeguard public order, and thus to satisfy the 
requirements o f Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, were in fact necessary. They have 
considered themselves bound by them’  (Felice Morgenstern, ‘Validity o f the Acts o f the Belligerent 
Occupant’, 28 BYIL 291-322 (1951), at 306, with further references).
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significantly departed from this reasoning.
In the present case it held that acts o f the HR are susceptible to judicial review as acts o f the 
government o f BiH.924 The judgment, which one commentator termed the "Bosnian version 
o f...Marbury v. Madison”,925 essentially suggests that laws imposed by the organ of the inter­
national community that lay within the competence of the local institutions had the same 
constitutional status as ordinary legislation. HR-imposed legislation would, according to the 
Court, be required to comply with the Constitution, at least in so far as it concerned the 
federal distribution of powers, and would be subject to review by the Court. It follows from 
the decision of the Court that such acts of Ersatzvomahme may, like any other national laws, 
be challenged by the organs listed in the BiH Constitution.926
Whatever the merits of the dictum in Case No. U 9/00, the wider point here is that the 
‘legality’ o f a rule is established by showing that it conforms to tests of validity laid down by 
some other rules of a legal order. These tests normally concern the way the rule was 
enacted or laid down by a judicial authority.927 In the formalist understanding adopted here, a 
norm’s legality attaches to its particular institutional configuration, not only with regard to its 
existence (validity) but notably as regards the possibility o f its institutional invalidation. A 
voidable act is thus an act that produces all its effects in spite of any defects by which it is 
vitiated, as long as it is not annulled by the competent organ. Legality hence denotes a rule’s 
relation to a hierarchy of norms and its reference to the modes through which it is validated 
and invalidated. These clarifications are important as they allow us to conclude that legality 
is an intelligible concept only to the extent to which it presupposes concrete avenues for 
challenging laws on grounds of their formal invalidity and incompatibility with higher sources 
of law (systemic validity).928
924 Cf. W ilde, ‘Complex Role’, supra note 813, at 255:
925 Stahn, ‘Origins, supra note 516, at 167.
926 Steiner/Ademovic paraphrase the findings o f the Court in the following way: “W ann der HR 
eingreifen sollte, unterliegt seinem gerichtsfreien Beurteilungsspielraum. Nur: Wenn er handelt, 
muss er sich an die Verfassung halten... Handelt der HR als Gesetzgeber, so bedient e r sich [der 
Kompetenzen der innerstaatlich zuständigen Körperschaften und Organe], muss sich im Ergeb­
nis... dann aber auch an die verfassungsrechtlichen Vorgaben halten... Mit dem Gesetz darf der 
HR...weder Kompetenzvorschriften...noch...materielles Verfassungsrecht verletzen...“ (‘Kompe­
tenzstreitigkeiten’, supra note 919, a t 123-24 and 125). In this case, however, the Court declined 
the competence to review the ‘exercise’ o f the High Representative’s powers, leaving him full dis­
cretion over when and how to intervene in the legislative process. De Wet’s conclusion that the 
“potential for an uncontrolled exercise o f power by the Security Council (through the High 
Representative) is not as acute as in Kosovo or East Timor" is untenable (Chapter VII Powers, 
infra note 931, at 315). The case No. U 25/00 o f 23 March 2001 is also of interest in th is context. 
There, the  applicants suggested that the HR could not amend the Law on Travel Documents 
(zakon o  putnim ispravama) by a decision, since a decision represents an act o f 'weaker1 legal 
force than laws. The BiH Constitutional Court re-stated its conclusions o f the case No. U 9/00, 
namely, tha t its power o f review extended to decisions o f the HR i f  he substituted fo r the BiH 
Parliamentary Assembly: "the laws enacted by him have the character of domestic laws and are to 
be considered the laws o f Bosnia and Herzegovina" (§22, to which §29 refers).
927 Raz, Authority  o f Law, supra note 809, at 150-51.
928 Cf. Osieke who discusses mechanism that international organisations utilise to make some o f their 
decisions reviewable -  i.e., the decisions o f the International C ivil Aviation Organization which are, 
according to Article 84 o f the Chicago Convention, appealable to the ICJ (The Legal Validity of 
Ultra V ires Decisions of International Organizations’, 77 AJiL  239-256 (1983), at 243). For a brief 
comparison o f the review procedures foreseen in the Constitution of the Free City o f Danzig, the 
draft Statutes of the City o f Jerusalem, the Free City o f Trieste, the constitutional arrangements of
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The paucity o f conceptions as to how the powers of an international administration could 
possibly be limited and scrutinised929 implies that references to the notion o f 'legality' in an 
internationalised territory remain tricky. If the Security Council is the authority from which the 
legal order in an internationalised territory emanates, how can a UN organ -  which derives 
its legal position from the delegating institution -  be subject to it? Unless we posit that one of 
the principal organs of the UN can, itself, act in contradiction to international norms,930 its 
subsidiary organ UNMIK is, by definition, vested with the ‘power* of legality. Its actions a re  
actions of the UN Secretary-General and accrue to him. Beyond command and control over 
the Mission on the ground, he exercises a power of authoritative interpretation over the 
competencies delegated to him and is accountable only to the Security Council, the ultimate 
warden of legality in the current international system whose pronouncements, legal or 
otherwise, are not open to independent judicial review.931
Kosovo, East Timor, BiH, the City Municipality of Mostar, and the District o f Brcko see Salamun, j
Democratic Governance, supra note 610, at 189-199.
929 In this regard see, e.g., the rather disappointing chapter by Bothe and Marauhn discussing the 
limitations of Trusteeship administrations: *UN Administration', supra note 601, at 235-239. For 
fresh suggestions as to the introduction of judicial review models to fit into the legal framework
established by a political trustee cf. Perritt, 'Judicial Review1, supra note 720, at 47 et seq. It is, *
however, necessary to stress that it would be very difficult to argue that an international territorial 
administration is under a general legal obligation to accept judicial review o f its acts, even when it j
is in the position analogous to an occupant. Although we may discern a tendency toward admitting 
the review of measures taken by a m ilitary occupant, such a right to control cannot be considered 
as a rule of customary international law, mainly because the evidence for a corresponding opinio \
iuris of the occupying power to consider itself bound by such rule is insufficient (see Herbst, [
Rechtsschutz, supra note 871, at 77). j
930 This question re-positions the problem of the auto-obligation of the state that played a fundamental \
role in German jurisprudence. See Kelsen, Law and State, supra note 843, at 197 ef seq. The far- 1
reaching competences o f the SC have led some scholars to the conclusion that the UN is not eo  j
ipso bound by general international law (custom and general principles) when acting under
Chapter VII (Kelsen, United Nations, 1950, supra note 105, at 294; ‘The purpose o f the ;
enforcement action...is not: to maintain or restore the law, but to  maintain, or restore peace, which
is not necessarily identical with the law”). See also Albert Bleckmann, 'Zur Verbindlichkeit des f
allgemeinen Völkerrechts fü r internationale Organisationen’, 37 ZaöRV  107 (1977), at 120. Since ;
the UN is not a party to human rights treaties, it has no obligations under them. This follows from
Art. 34 o f the 1986 Convention on Treaties between States and International Organizations and
between International Organizations (25 ILM  543 (1986), at 564). Treaties may afreet the conduct
o f the UN, however, as codification o f a general principle of law or declaratory o f state practice in
the formation o f customary international law (see generally Christopher Greenwood, ‘International
Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations', in 1 YIHL 3-34 (1998), w ith j
bibliography, and Marten Zwanenburg, ‘Compromise or Commitment: Human Rights Obligations
and International Humanitarian Law Obligations for UN Peace Forces', 11 U IL  229 (1998), at 234 j;
e t seq.) It is, in any case, now generally accepted that at least UN forces are bound by /
humanitarian law (cf. Brian D. Httemore, ‘Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International :
Humanitarian law to United Nations Peace Operations’, 33 Stanford JIL 61 (1997), at 107, and
Ray Murphy, ‘United Nations Military Operations and International Humanitarian law: What Rules
Apply to Peacekeepers?’, 14 Criminal Law Forum 153 (2003), at 154 e f seq.). The (internally)
binding Bulletin ‘Observance by United Nations Forces o f International Humanitarian Law*, setting
out the applicability of fundamental rules and principles to all forces deployed under the auspices
o f the UN, has not entirely resolved the issue. It only covers forces "when in situations o f armed
conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants...” (s. 1.1, UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 i,
August 1999, reprinted in 38 ILM  1656 (1999)). Institution-building activities are clearly not
covered. On the bulletin in general, cf. Daphna Shraga, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations: )j
Applicability o f International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility fo r Operation-Related Damage’, |
94 AJIL 406 (2000) and Marten Zwanenburg, 'The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Observance by
United Nations Forces o f International Humanitarian Law. Some Preliminary Observations’, 5
International Peacekeeping 133 (1999).
931 For. a comprehensive discussion o f the legal considerations relating to the delegation o f powers 
(based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter) by the SC to the SG to establish UN peace-keeping
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To the extent that there are no institutional mechanisms available to allow for such 
determination, the 'legality’ o f what this chapter terms ‘mediate United Nations law1 is simply 
assumed and remains unverifiable from that position. As a normative acts nullity cannot be 
established, the determination of whether such an act conforms to higher sources o f law is 
beyond the reach of constitutional discourse. It exceeds its concepts of different branches of 
government and the separation o f power and Is hence open to hermeneutic infinity.932 
Assessing the normative content o f Resolution 1244 or acts adopted under it in terms of 
their 'legality' means that we are regularly thrown back into a circular argument that we must 
abruptly terminate as we invoke the last resort o f the Security Council's extensive legal 
competence to interpret threats to international peace legibus soiutus,933
forces as subsidiary UN organs and the lim itations to  their exercise by the SG, cf. Sarooshi, ‘Role 
of the SG’, supra note 514, at 286-289. W hether the Security Council, in exercising its powers 
under the Charter, and particular under Chapter VII, is eo ipso subject to legal constraints 
imposed by general international law is subject to  a lively discussion among scholars which 
cannot be replicated here. Cf., e.g.t Jose E. Alvarez, 'Judging the Security Council’, 90:1 AJIL 1- 
39 (1996) and Dapo Akande, The International Court o f Justice and the Security Council: Is there 
Room for Judicial Control o f Decisions o f the Political Organs of the United Nations?’, 46 ICLQ 
309-343 (1997). For an original approach to the question through the application of the estoppel 
and the implied duties doctrines see August Reinisch, 'Das Jugoslawien-Tribunal der Vereinten 
Nationen und die Verfahrensgarantien des II. VN-Menschenrechtspaktes. Ein Beitag zur Frage 
der Bindung der Vereinten Nationen an nicht-ratifiziertes Vertragsrechf, 47 Austrian JPIL 173 
(1995), at 185 et seq. See also G ill, ‘Lim itations’, supra  note 734, at 72-90 (pro), and Gabriel H. 
Oosthuizen, ‘Playing the Devil’s Advocate: The United Nations Security Council is Unbound by 
Law1, 12 LJIL 549-563 (1999), at 562-563 (contra). For an examination whether, first, analogies 
between the UN Charter and domestic constitutions in relation to judicial review are permissible 
and, second, whether such emergent general principle o f law in municipal orders could be 
transferred to the embryonic international constitutional order, see Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII 
Powers o f  the United Nations Security Council (Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004), 
at 116-127. The lack o f rules governing the accountability o f an organ of an international 
organisation incidentally presents us with the flipside o f a presumption that acts taken in fulfilm ent 
o f a purpose o f the United Nations are intra vires — a presumption that was initially intended to 
protect the functional decision-making autonomy o f an international organisation. As the ICJ 
pointed out in the Certain Expenses opinion, “when an Organisation takes action which warrants 
the assertion that it was appropriate fo r the fu lfilm ent o f one o f the purposes of the United Nations, 
the presumption is that such action is not ultra v ires" (ICJ Reports [1962], supra note 192, at 158). 
The ICJ’s pronouncement gave jud ic ia l expression to  the original intentions of the drafters of the 
UN Charter who "consciously om itted any provision for jud icia l review, and regarded it as 
inevitable that each organ would interpret the provision o f the Charter relating to its own functions" 
(Frederic L. Kirgis, 'Editorial Note: Security Council Governance o f Postconflict Societies: A Plea 
for Good Faith and Informed Decision Making’, 95 AJIL  579-582 (2001), at 580). The intra vires 
presumption, subsequently reaffirmed in broader term s by the ICJ and the ECJ, is deemed to 
apply more generally to institutional acts adopted in accordance with rules of procedure. See 
Bowett’s  Law, supra note 852, at 295, and the discussion in the subsequent section.
For a distinct treatment o f an act’s legal status adopted in excess o f authority, namely according to 
its reviewability or non non-reviewability, see Osieke, ‘Legal Validity', supra note 928. A different 
perspective is held by Crawford who argues that judicial review exists in contentious cases 
because international organisations can affect the rights o f States: "A court with jurisdiction to 
determine the rights o f States w ill necessarily have to assess, for that purpose, the effects of 
decreases o f international organizations, and no further mandate is required to do so" ('Marbury v. 
Madison at the International Level’, 36 George Washington ILR  505-514 (2004), at 512).
933 Cf. Sean Murphy, ‘The Security Council: Legitimacy and Collective Security After the Cold Wari, 32 
Columbia JTL 201 (1994), at 248 e t seq., and, generally, Geoffrey R. Watson, 'Constitutionalism, 
Judicial Review, and the W orld Court’ , 34 Harvard ILJ  1-45 (1993). A judicial review function for 
the ICJ was discussed at the San Francisco Conference (at which the Charter and the ICJ Statute 
were negotiated) and the decision was made not to confer it. For reference to the Security 
Council’s broad discretion and its ‘lim itation’ by bona fide considerations see also Thomas M. 
Franck, Fairness in International Law  and Institutions (Oxford: OUP, 1995), at 220. The SC’s 
absolute power to render such determ inations has been somewhat qualified by the ICJ in its two 
(virtually identical) 1998 judgments on prelim inary objections in the Lockerbie cases (Questions o f
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A local machinery of unaccountability in an internationalised territory which even resisted, 
until 2002, a systematic review o f all draft legislation by human rights law experts,* 934 is, as 
one commentator notes, matched at the international level, as “none of the international 
judicial scrutiny mechanisms can hear complaints brought against the international actors 
involved arising out of their conduct of territorial administration."935 Unless it is meant to 
address infinity, luvenalis' question sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Saturae VI, 347) 
must hence be aborted as it turns on itself and on what Judge Shahabuddeen termed the 
“equilibrium o f forces underpinning the structure of the United Nations within the evolving 
international order".936 Alternatively, it shall be answered with positivist triviality: ‘no one’.
(in) T he ‘W ro ng fulness ’ of an International A d m in istr atio n ’s A ct
It has been claimed that the ‘principle1 of legality certainly applies to international organisa­
tions, irrespective of whether any review or sanction mechanism has actually been created 
or referred to within an organisation.937 This proposition is too general to assist us in the 
formulation of the problem of non-reviewability. With Osieke we suggest that the legal status 
of an act or a decision adopted by an international organisation will depend to a large extent 
on whether there exists, in fact, the possibility for scrutiny.938 Absent such mechanisms, the 
search for alternate modes of accountability prompts us to reach past the validity of norma­
tive acts and to hold the norm-producing body responsible itself. There are two areas in 
which arguments about the putative responsibility of an international territorial administration 
for ‘wrongful’ acts could advance the notion of accountability: (i) the ‘organic’ relationship 
between it and its mother organisation on the one hand, and (ii) the agency relationship it
Interpretation and Application o f the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial inc ident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), ICJ Reports [1998] 115, reprinted in 37 ILM  
587 (1998), at 604-5 (§§39-44)). Cf. Bemd Martenczuk, ‘The Security Council, the'International 
Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?', 10 EJIL 517-547 (1999), at 544-46; 
Schweigman, Security Council, supra note 7, at 244-260; Michael J. Matheson, ’ICJ Review o f 
Security Council Decisions', 36 George Washington ƒ£_/? 615-622 (2004), at 621-622. See also the 
Tadié case in which the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY -  erroneously -  found that its inherent 
‘ incidental’ power to determine the propriety of its own jurisdiction (competence-competence) 
permitted review of the legality o f the Security Council's action in establishing the Tribunal 
(Prosecutor v. Dusko T ad ic , Case No. IT-94-AR72, 2 October 1995, reprinted in 35 /LM (1996), at 
32, §18).
934 The OSCE Mission in Kosovo proposed the creation of a high-level 'Human Rights Oversight 
Committee’ tasked to vet UNMIK legislation in the drafting stages (OSCE Interoffice Memorandum 
to the Legal Adviser to the UNMIK SRSG, of 24 April 2002, on file  with the author). The Committee 
assumed its work in June 2002.
935 Ralph Wilde, 'Accountability and International Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East 
Timor’ , 7 ILSA J . In ti & Comp. L  455-460 (2001), at 456.
936 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States, supra note 933, Request for the Indication of Provisional 
Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ Reports [1992] 114, at 142.
937 See, e.g., Mohammed Bedjaoui, ‘Du contrôle de légalité des actes du Conseil de sécurité', in 
Nouveaux itinéraires en dro it -  Mélanges François Rigaux (Brussels: Bruylant, 1993), at 93; 
Michael Bothe, ‘Internationale Organisationen und das Rechtsstaatsprinzip’, in Das Menschen- 
recht zwischen Feiheit und Verantwortung. Festschrift fü rK ari J. Partsch (ed. by J. Jekewitz et al., 
Berlin, 1989), 493-513, at 498 et seq.; and Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, Principles o f 
Institutional Law o f International Organizations (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), at 166.
938 Osieke, ‘Legal Validity’, supra note 928, at 243 and 248-249 (also discussing the contrary view, 
namely that the attribution o f ultra vires status o f acts and decisions does not depend on a 

















has assumed with regard to the entity under its temporary protection, on the other.939 940
The first area involves an inquiry into whether the organ has acted in accordance with the 
technical rules of its mandate. W hile the formal validity of an institutional act will be relatively 
easy to establish, debates over its substantive legality (breaches of obligations under 
international law or in exes de pouvo irf40 or over lack of competence will be o f a political 
rather than legal character. In the Certain Expenses opinion (1962), Judge Morelli argued 
that ‘illegal’ resolutions of United Nations organs were void ab initio (ex tunc), since 
invalidation did not exist in international law. An act’s serious lack of conformity with a higher 
legal rule may constitute an absolute nullity, operating ipso iure so that the act produces no 
legal effects.941 Deciding whether an agency decision is authorised by law necessitates 
review of statutory competence (and its opposite, ultra vires action), review o f decisional 
rationality, and review of procedural regularity. Were UNMIK to act beyond its authority, 
purporting to bind Kosovo’s institutions with obligations not necessary for implementation of 
its institution-building mandate, UNMIK, and derivatively the UN, may be held responsible.942 
However, since absolute nullity is the only form in which an act of the organisation can be 
invalid, there is, so to speak, no third option available to bridge the chasm between full 
validity and absolute nullity of an act.943 This chasm appears particularly wide as the validity/ 
nullity debate is “not tempered by the intervention of a more 'objective’ actor, such as an 
international tribunal".944
939 This draws upon the analysis of dual functionality undertaken in Chapter IV. It is appropriate at this 
point to  clarify that ‘responsibility’ arises out of conduct which is internationally wrongful, whereas 
'liability' denotes an obligation to compensate for the injurious consequences of conduct which is 
not necessarily wrongful. See Alan E. Boyle, ‘State Responsibility and International Liability for 
Injurious Consequences o f Acts not Prohibited by International Law; A Necessary Distinction?’, 39 
ICLQ 1-26 (1990) and Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘The International Law of State Responsibility: 
Revolution or Evolution?’, 11 Michigan JIL 105-128 (1989-90), at 109-118. The issue o f extending 
the scope of international responsibility to international organisations (and particularly to  those 
that assume temporary governmental powers on the basis o f a Chapter VII authorisation) and to 
adapt the Draft Articles on State Responsibility (2001) in this respect has been repeatedly 
postponed by the ILC. Cf. note 954, infra.
940 A détournement de pouvoir occurs where the grantee of a discretionary power exercises that 
power in the course of public administration, not in breach o f any legislative provision, but for a 
purpose other than that contemplated in the grant (cf. J.E.S. Fawcett, 'Détournement de Pouvoir 
by International Organizations’, 33 BYIL 311-316 (1957), at 311 (drawing a distinction between 
action ultra vires, as action stretching beyond the proper lim its o f the grant and détournement de 
pouvoir as action taken within those lim its but fo r an improper purpose. This distinction, he 
argues, is particularly hard to make in the case of international agency)).
941 Sep. op. Judge Morelli in the Certain Expenses opinion, supra note 303, at 221. See also id., at 
168.
942 This example is drawn from Arsanjani’s discussion o f acts of the UN Council for Namibia in excess 
o f its powers (‘Quis custodiet', supra note 729, at 155-156).
943 Cf. Karl Zemanek, ‘Is the Security Council the Sole Judge o f its Own Legality?’, in Liber Amicomm 
-  Mohammed Bedjaoui 629-645 (ed. by E. Yakpo and T. Boumedra, The Hague: Kluwer Law, 
1999), a t 642. See, on the other hand, Osieke who argues that ICJ jurisprudence and the law and 
practice o f international organisations does not support the conclusion that substantive ultra vires 
acts and decisions are void ab initio, but only cease to give rise to binding legal obligations (‘Legal 
Validity’, supra note 928, at 244). A  discussion o f the distinction between substantive and 
procedural ultra vires acts is beyond the scope of this thesis.
944 Bowett’s Law, supra note 852, 293-294. An interesting idea, advanced by Perritt, involves the 
competence o f the UN Office o f Internal Oversight Services [Perry calls it the 'U.N. Inspector 
General’] to  review the conduct o f UN-established bodies (‘Judicial Review, supra note 720, at 70- 
71). W hether the inspection functions o f its Peacekeeping Audit Service could extend to include 
the review (in the administrative law sense) of decisions taken by a UN subsidiary organ qua
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On the other hand, the legality discourse could be rendered more fecund by undertaking an 
investigation into the agency relationship an international organisation has assumed. In order 
to recapitulate the conclusions reached in Chapter III, we framed the relationship between a 
non-state territorial unit and its fiduciary administration as a relationship of agency and 
presented international agency as the foundation upon which the (limited) legal personality of 
a non-state territorial entity rests. We recognised that agency had been established, either 
by agreement between two subjects of international law, or, more commonly these days in 
the framework of multilateral peace-building missions, through the vertical imposition of 
compulsory agency ex lege by the UN Security Council. Following established rules of 
agency, acts performed by the agent within the limits of its internationally conferred authority 
bind the entity as if  they had been performed by the latter. When acting within its power, the 
agent assumes no responsibility toward either the ‘principal’ or third parties. As a corollary, 
however, the agent’s acts bind the ‘principal’ only in so far as they are within the authority 
conferred. Sim ilar to an international organisation’s constitutive instrument, a mandate given 
to an international administration acting on behalf of a territorial entity delimits its functions 
and powers. Unless it runs the risk of acting ultra vires, an agent representing a non-state 
territorial entity cannot perform functions or exercise powers other than those provided in the 
constituent document, nor convert functional means into purposes.945 In this regard, it is 
assumed that a wrongful act o f an international organisation is attributable to that 
organisation itself when the act is performed by the organs of that organisation or by its 
officials or agents acting in an official capacity.
International authorities may hence be bound to comply with governance standards arising 
from general principles of agency due to the fact that they exercise ultimate authority over a 
territory as a substitute for domestic authorities. The precise consequences of this assertion 
are, however, controversial. As one author already observed in 1950: “Responsibility derives 
from control the United Nations may be expected to assume responsibility for acts of agents 
injurious to others".946 947That raises difficult questions regarding the attribution of wrongful acts 
* committed by the UN in the aftermath of a plenary international administration. W hile a
territorial government is, however, questionable. Ideas that involve the creation o f a UN-wide 
Ombudsman along the lines of the W orld Bank Inspection Panel have recently been advanced by 
Zwanenburg (Accountability, supra note 615, at 317 et seq.) as well as by M6gret and Hoffmann 
(The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United Nations Changing Human 
Rights Responsibilities’, 5 HRQ 314 (2003)).
945 For ultra vires acts of international organisations see, in general, Lauterpacht, ‘Legal Effect’ , supra 
note 668, 88 et seq. and Ueki, 'Responsibility', supra note 668, at 237-249.
946 Clyde Eagleton, ‘International Organisation and the Law of Responsibility1, 76 RCADI385 (1950), 
at 385 and 387. Eagleton introduced the criteria of ‘control’ in his seminal work The Responsibility 
o f States in International Law (New York: NYU Press, 1928), at 26 ef seq. (italics supplied). See 
also the intriguing discussions by Ueki, ‘Responsibility’, supra note 668, at 243; Zwanenburg, 
Accountability, supra note 615, at 135 e f seq.\ and Hirsch, Responsibility, supra note 889, at 64- 
77 (concluding that the principle that international organisations may be held responsible for their 
acts is part o f international customary law).
947 An example of an international organisation’s direction and control in the commission of allegedly 
wrongful acts was envisaged, e.g., by the French Government in its preliminary objections in 
Legality o f Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. France), when it argued in relation to  KFOR 
that “NATO is responsible for the ‘direction’ of KFOR and the United Nations for ‘control’ o f it" 
(Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports [1999], at 33, §45). The UN is clearly capable of being inter­
nationally ’responsible’ for an internationally wrongful act (Manuel sur les organisations Inter­
nationales (Hague Academy of International Law, ed. by. R.-J. Dupuy, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 
1988), at 887). It is however doubtful whether the UN can be held responsible for breaches of 
public international law perpetrated by its administrative authorities as the current legal framework 
lim its the concept of attribution o f wrongful conduct to  States. Cf. Article 4(1) o f the ILC Draft
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substantive discussion of the liability of international organisations for internationally wrongful 
acts is beyond the scope of this thesis,948 it is nevertheless crucial to emphasise one aspect 
that follows from the general rules covering agency in international law. The issue in 
question is whether an agent’s responsibility (and putative liability for tortuous acts) will be 
restricted to the extent that the acts were directly performed by the ‘principal’. In situations of 
co-government, in which the exercise o f public power is shared between the international 
agent and local institutions, differentiating the source of responsibility will be d ifficult The 
provisions of an international institution-building mandate, together with the agent’s internal 
power-sharing agreement with local institutions delineating each sphere of competence that 
reserves to the agent some degree of residual power of control, may be the foundation for 
an international territorial administration’s general liability for tortuous acts committed within 
its jurisdiction.949 To escape this bind, a UN administration could claim a mere ‘functional 
authority’, i.e. one which is not a claim to ultimate authority over all matters within a territory, 
but only as regards the particular functions which fall within its asserted jurisdiction 950
Doctrine has not treated this problem unanimously. In analogy to the ‘control theory’ 
(developed by Ago with respect to the responsibility of a protecting state or a Mandatory 
power), the UN might also be liable for wrongful acts committed by local institutions in so far 
the international agent maintains control over, and could have prevented, their harmful 
legislative and executive acts. Such indirect liability may be ‘objectively constituted’, i.e., re­
gardless of culpa in eligendo or culpa in vigilando-951
Arguments about the ‘wrongfulness’ o f acts o f the international agent -  framed either in an
Articles on Responsibility o f States fo r Internationally Wrongful Acts (UN Doc. A/CN 4/L.602/Rev 1 
(2001), approved by A/RES/56/83, 12 December 2001). For a survey of customary international 
law in the area of attribution of organisation conduct to member states see Zwanenburg, 
Accountability, supra note 615, at 72 et seq.
948 See, in general, Bowett's Law, supra note 852, at 512 et seq. (with literature) and Mathias Hartwig, 
Die Haftung der Mitgliedstaaten für Internationale Organisationen (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1991).
949 Established in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, in which the PCIJ, after having 
noted that the obligations resulting from the engagements o f Great Britain as Mandatory Power 
are obligations which the administration o f Palestine must respect, added: “The Mandatory Power 
is internationally responsible for any breach of them since, under Article 12 of the Mandate, the 
external relations of Palestine are handled by it’  (PCIJ (Ser. A), No. 2 (1924), at 23).
W ith regard to  the European Union’s claim to exclusivity of jurisdiction (as opposed to the claim to 
finality o f authority), this thought is advanced by Neil W alker in his unpublished paper 
'Sovereignty, Global Security and the Regulation o f Armed Conflict: The Possibilities o f Political 
Agency’, forthcoming in The Politics o f Protection (ed. by J. Huysmans, Routledge, 2005).
961 Roberto Ago, ‘La responsabilité indiretta nel diritto intemazionale’ 1 Archivio di Diritto Pubblico 7- 
63 (1936), reprinted in Scritti sulla responsibitità intemazionale degli Stati (vol. I, Université die 
Camerino, 1978), at 10 et seq. and 60. For a similar constitution of ’objective’ liability in cases of 
asymmetrical relationships, see Friedrich Klein, Die mittelbare Haftung im Völkerrecht (Frankfurt, 
1941), at 217 et seq. (protectorates) and 247 et seq. (’A ’-Mandates). Verdroß, on the other hand, 
endeavoured to lim it the ’control theory’ to behaviour with respect to areas in which control is 
effectively exercised (‘Theorie der m ittelbaren Staatenhaftung’, ÖZöR 388 (1946-48)). Under the 
concept of lim ited liability, UN administration’s responsibility for an internationally wrongful act 
could only be established if it was directly committed by one of its organs within its jurisdiction. A 
case in which this question could be contentious is the mixed international-local responsibility for 
the privatisation of ‘state’ owned assets in an internationally administered territory (such as 
Kosovo, supra p.179). Acting within the lim its of the municipal power-sharing agreement with the 
international organ, the local government may engage its own responsibility, neither attributable to 
the international organ, nor to the ‘sovereign’ whose bare title to territory remains in suspension 
pending a final status determination. Given the fluid distribution o f competences in an institution­
building environment, responsibility fo r wrongful acts can be very much seen as a ‘moving target’.
organic relationship that focuses on the lack of supervision by the mother organisation and 
the concomitant lack of accountability of the organ to it or in an agency relationship that 
seeks to impute wrongful acts to the international agent -  are hypothetical as there are no 
precedents for holding an international administration responsible for breaches of inter­
national law.952 The closest an internationally sanctioned fiduciary administration came to 
being held liable in legal terms was the case of post-colonial Nauru.953 At any rate, the above 
analysis did not aim at an exhaustive treatment of the responsibility of international 
organisations (and thus of UN organs administering territories) -  an issue currently under the 
consideration of learned bodies such as the International Law Commission954 and the Inter­
national Law Association.955 We merely attempted to provide an additional perspective on 




952 The only possible scenario in which such a determination could be made would involve a request 
by the General Assembly (or the SC) for an Advisory Opinion in which the ICJ could pronounce 
itself on "any legal question" (Art 96(1) UN Charter) pertaining to "other organs o f the UN and 
specialized agencies", hence also the normative acts o f a UN mission, a subsidiary organ o f the 
UN Secretary-General.
953 Cf. supra p.131. The case was settled by the 1993 'Compact o f Settlement’ under which Australia 
agreed to pay Nauru compensation for the deposits extracted. For trustee responsibility in the 
environmental sphere cf. also Hyun S. Lee, 'Post-Trusteeship Environment Accountability: Case of 
PCB Contamination on the Marshall Islands’, 26:3 Denver JILP 399-435 (1998). It is, however, 
worth highlighting that those claims were based on an alleged breach of the Trusteeship 
Agreement. This prevents us from drawing analogies to a situation in which an international 
administration’s authority to temporarily govern territory is based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
ILC Special Rapporteur Gaja has delivered the First, Second and Third Report on Responsibility o f 
International Organizations (UN Doc. A/CN.4/532, 26 March 2003; UN Doc. A/CN.4/541, 2 April 
2004; and UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.553,13 May 2005 respectively).
955 Cf. Report o f the I LA Berlin Conference (2004), Accountability o f International Organizations, 
printed in 1 International Organizations Law Review 221-293 (2004) (cf. particularly Part II, S.4 of 
the Report (at 251-253) which deals with temporary administration o f territory).
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C o n c lu d in g  A p p r a is a l
At the end of his study on legitimacy, Barker notes that unless an author is “suddenly to do in 
five pages what he has failed to do in two hundred..., the conclusion must be...a necessarily 
didactic summary and an allusive indication of things undone."956 Following these re­
commendations, this appraisal attempts to bring together the strands of a long argument by 
recalling the main themes. At the same time, it offers some concluding thoughts which trans­
cend the preceding discussion.
The research puzzle required the application of four conceptual frames. In the first chapter, 
we viewed the methodology of internationalisation as the result of a transfer of imperium 
from a sovereign power to a protecting entity leaving the former with a claim as a 'bare title'. 
In the positivist framework, suspending sovereignty represents a legal process through 
which the conceptual hallmarks of dominium and imperium are divorced from each other. 
We discussed the processes and methods of transferring effective control and focused on 
territories under international administration as experimental models o f restricted 
sovereignty. International legal sovereignty has increasingly been suspended by the SC by 
its reliance upon Chapter VII. Both UNMIK and UNTAET were created on the basis of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and in both cases an international territorial administration 
assumed exclusive administrative authority over the territories placed under their effective 
control and supervision. Moreover, we established that the special normative quality of 
Resolution 1244 lies in its 'vertical' imposition of the transfer o f effective control. This 
analysis allowed us to make normative statements about the jus nudum o f a sovereign 
whose title had been suspended. Specifically, we likened the retained bare title of the 
sovereign to a state servitude in which the exercise o f sovereign title to territory is voluntarily 
limited in favour of another subject o f international law. In applying ordre public considera­
tions, the internationalisation of territory by the Security Council’s reliance on Chapter VII can 
be viewed as the imposition of a temporary servitude juris gentium necessariae.
The second chapter aimed at supplying a complementary theoretical framework to account 
for instances of suspended sovereignty. It posited that classical rules of international law -  
rooted in concepts of sovereign equality and bilateralism -  were inapplicable once the notion 
of fiduciary administration entered the international system in the wake of the Versailles 
Treaty and once the promise of self-determination was recognised as an international 
entitlement. W e argued that in periods of turbulent transition, international law reached 
beyond its basis and placed itself within a transitional paradigm in which the abstract 
dichotomy between sovereignty and self-determination was temporarily suspended. 
Grounded in principles of equity and morality, and devoted to the furtherance of social goals, 
fiduciary administration represented a new linkage between the instant in which sovereignty 
reposed in abeyance and the opportunities for emergent forms o f legal creativity.
The analysis thus gradually shifted from a positivist ownership-based view to one that 
conceives of the trustee as internally bound in the performance o f his trust -  hence segrega­
ting this obligation from the title in rem. W e further concluded that the revolutionary ICJ ruling 
of 1971 gave affect to a functional understanding of the inherent properties and promises of
956 Politicai Legitimacy, supra note 748, at 195.
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fiduciary administration. The process of internationalisation of a territory through which an 
entity was to be directly administered by a subsidiary organ o f the UN (the case of Namibia) 
necessitated the granting of sui generis legal personality to the territory on whose behalf the 
international organisation acted, thus further widening the gap between the application of 
rules of classical international law and the novel legal responses that the fiduciary 
administration had introduced. We concluded that fiduciary administration created the link 
between the agenda of state-building and the granting of a continuously growing share in the 
territory’s administration under the banner of self-determination, with a policy o f gradual 
detachment that differentiated various levels of development.
The concept of partial legal personality provided a third normative framework within which 
territories administered by the United Nations can be located. Three key argumentative 
steps were essential to determining the status of a non-state territorial entity in public inter­
national law. We proceeded from Rechtsfähigkeit to Handlungsfähigkeit and suggested that 
capacity to act on behalf o f a territory can be vested in an international agent. Secondly, we 
defined agency as the relationship between the territorial agent and an entity that is under its 
temporary protection and established that in the case of UN interim administrations agency 
ex lege is assumed on grounds of necessity. In a tangent to post-structural positions, we 
further argued that personality is constituted through the ‘texture’ spun between the ‘inside’ 
of a non-state territorial entity and the ‘outside’ o f the international legal order. A  different 
ontological status is installed once the performative external acts of an international ad­
ministration are accepted as legally significant in that they bind and commit the non-state 
territorial entity. Thirdly, we proposed that personality is, in the case of fiduciary administra­
tion, limited by the international agent's mandate.
One of the wider-ranging conclusions o f Chapter III was that the quality of being a subject of 
international law can be attributed to any composite entity, in vacuo, thus relating it to other 
subjects as well as to the very legal order that identified its subjectivity and defined its 
characteristics. The performance o f its subjectivity by an agent renders a non-state territory 
an international legal personality with the capacity to pursue its abstract ‘interests’ on the 
international stage. Following the precedent of international organisations, such limited legal 
personality must be defined in relation to the respective functions the subject in question 
fulfils with regard to the needs shared by the international society. Chapter IV suggested 
that, due to the convergence of municipal entitlements and their discharge by ancillary 
subjects of international law, such territories have both an international agent and a local 
government that make and apply law, and whose legal activism leads to an overlap of 
international and municipal normative spaces. The two case studies -  Germany under Allied 
occupation and Namibia under the administration o f its UN Council -  revealed that an 
international administration acts as agent of the territory under its administration. We utilised 
the frame of ‘dual functionality’ as a device to disaggregate the agent and organic functions 
of an international administration, thus complementing the theoretical groundwork for the 
seminal case study of this thesis -  Kosovo under international administration.
Chapter V first applied the framework developed in Chapter I to explain Serbia’s jus nudum 
over the territory. Further, the discussion illustrated the extent to which a UN organ assumes 
agency and represents a territory in external relations, hence applying the core propositions 
of Chapter 111. The case study also illustrated what we have earlier identified as one of the 
chief dilemmata of international law, namely its preference to stay clear of unequivocal
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definitions of the respective units to which the principie of self-determination would apply, or 
the methods of its implementation. In a further step, we investigated certain aspects o f the 
two-faced role of the UN as it administers territory and the inherent systemic constraints it 
encounters due to its open-ended mandate. We argued that the success of a conditionality 
policy is jeopardised when an international organ pursues the 'international public good' as 
well as the ‘domestic interest1 of the territory (as its agent of necessity).
Upon consideration, it is instructive to recapitulate that the firs t authoritative study on the 
topic defined internationalised territories as "populated areas, established for an unlimited 
period as special political entities, whose supreme sovereignty is vested in, and partly (or 
exclusively) exercised by, the supreme organisation of the international community, the 
[UN]."957 958The increasing willingness o f the international community to utilise deep inter­
vention and administration tools has motivated our attempts to sharpen this definition. 
Evidently, there cannot be a singular conclusion to the preceding explorations and the rough 
delineation of the properties of a territory subject to plenary international administration that 
has resulted from them. A more precise definition of the phenomenon of internationalisation 
shall, however, include the following elements:
A. As to the legal status of the administering organ:
1. An internationalised territory is subject to the interim administration o f a subsidiary 
organ of an international organisation. This distinguishes it from a condominium where 
public authority is exercised by more than one state;
2. The international community 'lends' a civil and/or military organ to assume temporary 
administration tasks. In the framework of a Chapter VII authorisation, this subsidiary
QCft
organ substitutes for domestic governmental institutions;
3. The administration itself assumes dual functions: that of an agent appointed ex iege 
and tasked with the representation of the territory, and that of an international ad­
ministrative organ.
B. As to the title to territory:
4. The internationalisation of territory on the basis of a Chapter VII mandate can be 
likened to the imposition of a temporary servitude juris gentium necessariae on the 
holder of the territorial title;
5. The creation of internationalised territories rests on multilateral instruments which may 
indefinitely suspend the exercise of sovereign rights. The UN organ assumes im­
perium over territory while competing municipal legal orders are derogated;
6. In the hiatus of international administration, the concept of indivisible sovereignty is 
inapplicable.959 Dominium remains suspended and is temporarily replaced by the inter­
957 Ydit, Internationalised Territories, supra note 37, at 320. At that tim e o f writing, another m ajor 
study on the issue concluded that the term  'international administration’ of territory had no fixed 
meaning in doctrine, hence “erübrigt sich eine Abgrenzung seines Wesens von dem der als Inter­
nationalisierung bezeichneten Erscheinungen" (Beck, Intemationalisierung, supra note 82, at 76).
958 Similar: de W et, 'Administration’, supra note 629, at 331.
959 Similar already Beck in intemationalisierung, supra note 82, at 93: "Für das Völkerrecht kündigt 
sich in dieser Verteilung der Hoheitsrechte auf lokale Behörden und internationale Organisationen
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national performance of trust.
C. As to the extent/nature of powers assumed by an international administration:
7. The international administration’s authority over territory is comprehensive in terms of 
executive, judicial, and legislative competencies. The legal system thus established is 
hybrid. It is located at the normative intersection between international and municipal 
law. As a result of the collapse of the dualist separation between international and 
internal legal orders, international legal instruments have a 'direct1 statute-like role in 
the domestic legal order of an internationalised territory;
8. Public order considerations support the argument that is the precise task of an inter­
national territorial administration to effectuate normative change through the overall 
reform in all areas of law. It is thus highly doubtful whether it is under an international 
legal obligation to observe the limits to the exercise o f public power set by international 
humanitarian law, especially by A rt 43 of the Hague Regulations;
9. Detached from the context o f decolonisation, an organ of the international community 
performs governmental functions ‘in trust, that is, in the interests of the territory. The 
existence of a singular fiduciary bond between the administrative agent and the 
territory distinguishes the exercise of power from constellations under Mandate and 
Trusteeship Agreements in which the administrating authorities also performed fidu­
ciary functions with respect to the international community as a whole (sacred trust);
10. The international administration exercises fiduciary functions on a temporary basis in 
order to create stable and sustainable political units which shall, at the minimum, be in 
a position to exercise their right of internal self-determination. The primary purpose of 
such a transitional administration consists in the transfer of competencies to local 
actors that are to be established under the institution-building mandate. The legal 
basis o f Chapter VII enables us to distinguish such administrative functions from 
constellations assumed under protectorate agreements.
D. As to the legal status of the territory itself:
11. Independent of the question o f sovereign title, the concept of 'status’ refers to a 
crystallisation of rights and obligations which one international legal person possesses 
towards another person, with respect to a specific territory.960 Such rights and obli­
gations do not stem from contractual obligations undertaken under 'horizontal' agree­
ments. The legal status of an internationalised territory is mediated by an agent ex 
lege;
12. The international legal order reaches the object of its concern directly, through its 
organ, without the constraining mediation of a sovereign state structure. The territorial 
entity is endowed by international law with a set o f entitlements and obligations
und in der dadurch erzeugten gemeinsamen Verwaltung beider für die internationalisierten 
Gebiete eine neue Auffassung von den Beziehungen zwischen einzelstaatlichen Völkerrechtssub­
jekten und Organen der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft an: die Konzeption der unteilbaren Souveräni­
tä t wird, jedenfalls bei internationalisierten Gebieten geopfert, und an ihre Stelle tritt eine 
Verteilung der territorialen Rechte.“
960 Cf. Klein, Statusverträge, supra note 116, at 22, and Rauschning, Status, supra note 437, at 12- 
13.
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(subjectivity) which it effectively discharges through this international agent;
13. International legal practices are constitutive o f an avenue through which such entity 
connects to the international plane. The Security Council thus constitutes the spatio- 
temporal identity of a polis. Its international legal personality is limited by the inter­
national agent’s mandate.
In all, the first five chapters presented a synoptic vision of the notion of internationalisation of 
territory and the extent to which it can be distinguished from projects undertaken under the 
Mandate- and Trusteeship systems. It utilised institutions o f both private law (agency, 
trusteeship, servitude) and public law (wardship, the status of organs) to underscore that the 
dual set of fiduciary obligations undertaken by a state under the UN's Trusteeship system 
collapses into one as a UN subsidiary organ takes over the performance of the fiduciary 
bond towards the people under its administration. In this context, allusions to a supposedly 
novel institution of ‘neo-trusteeship’ do not take account of the major change in legal 
spheres that the increased willingness of the international community to interfere directly with 
the subjects o f its concern, has brought about
This thesis has, in any case, not attempted to provide ideas as to the amendment o f the 
institutional design within which such territories shall be administered in the future -  a task 
reserved to policy and legal advisers. A brief comment is, however, in order. Despite the 
conceptual differences between international and national territorial management projects, it 
has been suggested that the (now defunct) UN Trusteeship Council (TC) be used to ’deal’ 
with ‘failed states’ as a new depository of trust Prima facie, the idea that the states 
responsible fo r their administration should voluntarily place such territories under trusteeship 
-  as provided for in Article 77(1c) o f the Charter -  appears reasonable. However, there are 
obvious legal obstacles that preclude an application of the Trusteeship system to UN 
member states. Such suggestions also fail to account for the Security Council’s lack of 
competence to forcibly place a state under the jurisdiction of the TC.961 Moreover, the mere 
resuscitation o f the TC’s 'dormant powers’ would not meet the challenges identified by this 
thesis. It is, fo r instance, not immediately clear how a transfer o f governance-related peace­
building tasks from the UN Secretariat to the TC would remedy the problems flowing from 
the dual functionality of an administration, or those connected with an international mission’s 
lack of accountability. Some of the most pertinent problems in international territorial 
governance are rooted in the genuine ambiguity of mandate and the institutional culture in 
which an administration mission is embedded. It is a truism to state that the UN’s DPKO has 
experienced problems in planning and seeing through internationalisation projects. Yet this 
does not guarantee that the TC, or another body composed of government representatives 
(such as a standing committee responsible for overseeing UN-authorised civil administra-
961 As Stahn points out, the imposition o f trusteeship status on a state might even go beyond what is 
permitted by Chapter VII, because Article 77 of the Charter makes it clear that territories can only 
be administered under this system when they have been placed there by means o f an individual 
agreement with the UN (’Origins’, supra note 516, at 119). Gordon also finds that "the Council may 
not strip a state o f its statehood, sovereignty or government" (’Some Legal Problems’, supra note 
634, at 326). This conclusion must, however, be qualified. The absolute requirement o f a 
trusteeship agreement with the territorial state cannot be interpreted as a genuine limitation on the 
actions of the Security Council in the context of its reliance on Chapter VII.
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lions), could do a better job.962 Those propositions would effectively reverse the experiment- 
talism with which the competence to manage territorial internationalisation was wrought from 
the ambit o f the General Assembly.
In order to summarise our findings of the final chapter of the thesis, it is not unhelpful to 
borrow a fine metaphor from Schmitter. there are three movements to a dance that frames 
our assumptions about normative change under the transitional administration o f the inter­
national community. The overture, the illiberal, repressive past and the collapse of order 
spurred by conflict; the intermezzo, which is more compressed, consisting in the rapid 
deployment of procedural mechanisms to establish a democratic institutional structure; and 
the finale, often drawn out, in which democratic practices are transformed into democratic 
substance through the reform of state institutions and in which the target society undergoes 
a rapid transition in values.963 In this final stage, the normative foundations laid by an 
international importing agent should provide the conceptual soil for the evolution o f a political 
system in the post-administration phase. Democratic consolidation is regarded as achieved 
when codes of behaviour are enforced as a sanctioned institutional culture.964 965
The final chapter o f the thesis approached the phenomenon of a legal and political order in 
the intermezzo where the international community is engaged in what has been termed an 
“enormous experiment in social engineering", involving the wholesale import o f Western 
models of social, political, and economic organisation into a war-shattered theatre. We 
firstly explored a process in which the transfer of legitimacy in accordance with this 
institution-building mandate is contested. As we have noted, the motivations underlying local 
challenges to the legitimacy of international political authority take different forms and 
shapes. They might adopt the language of the street, as they do when UNMIK’s headquarter 
is besieged by protesters. They might arise in head-on confrontations in the Assembly or 
take the more civilised form of 'exchange of letters'. Challenges to the UN’s political authority 
might also be mounted by seeking alternative political fora than UNMIK to preside over a 
political compromise.966
962 For the suggestion to create such a committee as a subsidiary organ o f the Security Council cf. de 
W et, ‘Adm inistration’, supra note 629, at 339-40. Sweeping claims that the TC would be a “better 
organ to manage the governance tasks o f contemporary peacebuilding’’ abound. Cf., inter alia, 
Saira Mohamed, 'From Keeping Peace to Building Peace: A Proposal for a Revitalized United 
Nations Trusteeship Council', 105 Columbia LR 808-840 (2005), at 823, and Tom Parker, The 
Ultimate Intervention: Revitalising the UN Trusteeship Council for the 21st Century (Norwegian 
School o f Management Report No. 3/2003, 2003), especially at 43 et seq. for suggestions to 
amend the UN Charter. New international institutional arrangements for dealing with collapsed 
states are also pondered by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Neotrusteeship and the 
Problem o f W eak States’, 28:4 International Security 5 (Spring 2004), 33 et seq.
963 Schmitter, ‘Democracy’, supra note 19, at 53. See also Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. 
Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democra­
cies (Baltim ore, Md.: JHU Press, 1986), at 6. A sim ilar sequence is drawn up by Samuel 
Huntington in his seminal The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), at 35 and by Thomas Carothers in 'The End o f the 
Transition Paradigm’, 13:1 Journal o f Democracy 5-21 (2002), at 7.
964 Samuel H. Barnes, The Contribution o f Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies, 95 AJIL 
86-101 (2001), at 92.
965 Paris, ‘Liberal Internationalism’, supra note 24, at 56.
966 This occurred when the Joint Declaration between Kosovo Albanian and Serb leaders concerning 
reconstruction and returns following the outbreak o f communal violence, was signed in July 2004
A successful trustee will be expected to manage the anomalous phenomena of legitimacy, 
rather being forced into undignified retreat when the local population becomes unwilling to 
tolerate its continued supremacy.967 The extraordinary ‘legitimacy cycle’ in Kosovo relates 
back to what we understood to be an inherent weakness of an international mission’s 
mandate: an ‘open-ended’ deployment setting that facilitates the struggle to appropriate 
legitimising capital which, in turn, unsettles the transfer of legitimacy to an extent that the 
implementation of an institution-building mandate might be thrown into jeopardy. As Caron 
observes, perceptions of an international institution’s illegitimacy can arise where there is 
great discrepancy between the expectations generated by its promises and what the 
institutions actually deliver.968 96The underlying paradox of international institution-building at 
the periphery can thus be framed in the following manner as it administers a period of 
political flux into which it wishes to inject normative change, an international territorial 
administration does not submit to liberal constitutional principles -  ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’
Qgq
accountability, transparency and responsibility.
In the second section of the final chapter, we concluded that normative change in an inter­
nationally administered territory is effectuated by the import and the subsequent super- 
imposition of foundational concepts o f an ideal-type ‘Western’ legal order. An institution­
building mandate consists precisely in the creation of conditions under which those concepts 
are absorbed into local sub-cultures -  presumably by a lengthy and gradual process. As 
exemplified by the case of UNMIK in its seventh year of operation, progress in absorption will 
be measured against similarly imported 'benchmarks'. Focusing on aspects of norm-building 
-  which some authors refer to as the third transformation taking place in conjunction with 
developments in political and economic spheres970 971-  we argued that a transitional legal order 
exhibits a number of specific properties.
Firstly, the body of applicable law is subject to immediate contestation within intrusive UN 
governorship operations, especially where the law applied prior to international intervention 
is considered to have been the tool of an oppressive government. Secondly, the operation of 
interlacing legal orders and hybrid sources of law supplied us with a powerful, though 
temporary, exception to the dualist separation of international and domestic law. Upon con­
sideration, processes of internationalisation exhibit the most extreme range in an emerging 
spectrum where state constitutions have been ‘opened’ to the international community in
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general and international law in particular.
in the presence of the US and EU representatives, but without UNMIK. See the Eide Report, supra 
note 513, at 10.
967 Perritt, ‘Final Status’, supra note 797, at 12.
968 David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council’, 87 AJIL 552 
(1993), at 559-61
969 On the general issue of the accountability of UN agencies and organs, see also August Reinisch, 
'Governance W ithout Accountability?’, 44 GYIL 270-306 (2001), at 279 etseq. On ex ante and ex 
post facto conceptualisations of accountability cf. Joy M. Moncieffe, ‘Accountability: Idea, Ideals, 
Constraints’, 8:1 Democratization 26 (2001).
970 See Geoffrey Pridham, The Dynamics o f Democratization. A Comparative Approach (London/New 
York; Continuum, 2000), Chapter VIII.
971 For a discussion of the interaction between post-revolutionary démocratisation and an 'opening* of 
new constitutions to the international legal system, cf. Antonio Cassese, Modem Constitutions and 
International Law, 192 RCADI335-418 (1985-111), at 351-393. A thoughtful analysis o f the extent to
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The sixth chapter began by subscribing to what can be viewed as a stereotypical image of 
the mission civiiisatrice and portrayed an internationally managed transition as a process 
through which a territory with an underdeveloped legal system adheres to a number of inter­
national instruments, thereby opening a whole new conceptual universe for its citizens.972 
Rather than looking at an institution-building mandate as a ‘transmission belt’ for shared 
beliefs held by international actors, we, however, depicted a ‘de-sovereignised’ territory as 
the site which is most receptive to manifestations of solidaristic principles. This is the 
location where we situate the international community's aspirations to emulate liberal- 
democratic principles in its institutional design and hence temporarily re-modef itself in its 
own image. We continued by focusing on some of the difficulties emerging from the 
unmediated import of ‘international standards' that are not tailored to UN-managed political 
transitions and noted that the peculiar ‘curvature’ o f normative space -  the fundamental 
indeterminacy of the body of applicable law, the gaps in statutory instruments and in human 
rights protection -  exposes the frailty o f transitory administration.
These observations also presented us with a paradox in which the machinery o f a fiduciary 
administration, powered by the ideology of liberal internationalism, establishes a legal 
system where the liberal rule o f law is itself subject to exceptions. The absence of a 
hierarchy o f norms within an internationally administered territory means that rules for both 
the auto-production and this auto-review of law are missing.973 We assessed this as having 
a deplorable effect on legal certainty. The incomplete reconstruction of liberal positions thus 
makes an internationalisation project suspect from ‘within’, as it does not import adjoining 
mechanisms to prevent the arbitrary exercise of authority under international tutelage. Prima 
facie, the continuing unsupervised authority of an international executive causes the very 
foundations of liberal notions of the rule of law to quaver. In this Schmittian rendering, a UN 
SRSG eclipses parliamentary law-making and legal adjudication as these avenues would, 
according to the UN’s mode of thinking, be at times too susceptible to ‘illegitimate’ parti­
cularistic interests.
In order to demonstrate the conceptual linkage between the notions of legality and judicial 
review, we made further reference to two exceptional decisions by the Supreme Court of 
Palestine (in 1925), and the Bosnian Constitutional Court (in 2000), in which certain acts of 
an international importing agent were held to be subject to review. Absent comparable 
mechanisms foreseen for 'plenary' internationalisation projects, we suggested that the notion 
of ‘legality’ is particularly unhelpful as a means of specifically circumscribing the concept of 
‘authority’. In its wider significance, these gaps indicate that legal formalism is compromised 
by the operation of liberal internationalism and the foundationalist import o f a rule o f law 
which deviates from ideal conceptions. Remaining in the margins, the debate about the
which Central European constitutions have been 'opened' to facilitate the import of international 
treaty law, customary rules and general principle in the period after 1990 is provided by Stein, 
‘Internal Law*, supra note 850.
972 For a criticism  of such a stylised image being inadequate to grasp the complexity o f the 
‘transplantation’ process, see Hoffmann, Transplantable, supra note 855, at 221-222.
973 Cf. Gunther Teubner’s Legal Autopoiesis and Legal Evolution (EUI Colloquium Papers, Auto- 
poiesis in Law and Society, Doc. IUE 322/85, Florence, December 1985), at 8-15. As opposed to 
an autopoietic normative order which, according to Teubner, provides its unity by specifying its 
boundaries and regulating its own creation, a transitional legal order such as one created by a UN 
territorial administration must remain operationally open (owing to the collapse o f the dualist 
frame) and systemically indeterminate.
'legality’ of normative acts issued by an international territorial administration has certainly 
rejuvenated the human rights critique and has simultaneously substantiated the "otherwise 
curiously eerie debate on the applicability of human rights standards to the United 
Nations".974 However, we proposed that this debate raises more questions than it set out to 
answer. In a reformulation of Derrida’s cautioning against deconstructive ‘models’ of the 
political, warnings about the absence o f ‘legality* in the international system and hence in an 
internationalised territory resemble:
searchlights without a coast, they sweep the dark sky, shut down or disappear at regular inter­
vals and harbour the invisible in their very light. One no longer even knows against what rocks 
or abysses they forewarn us. One no longer even knows whether these watchmen guide us 
toward another destination, nor even if a destination remains promised or determinable.975
A question we have not yet attempted to answer -  and which projects some of the con­
clusions reached in section 2 against those of section 1 of the final chapter -  is the following: 
does such unaccountability create gaps in an international administration’s ‘domestic’ and 
‘international’ legitimacy? Constitutionalism comes as a ready answer to those challenging 
the legitimacy of an international territorial administration. The notion appears to promise 
more than just the ultra vires doctrine and the notion of conferred powers, or checks and 
balances -  “it promises all of these together, in a comprehensive package“.976 According to 
this liberal orthodoxy, only constitutional regimes can bestow legitimacy on a political system 
in search of that very commodity. This thesis finds itself in disagreement with some of these 
sweeping propositions. As a matter of observation, only a few manifestations of local dis­
content concern themselves with the functional immunity of international officials or an 
administrative machinery which screens itself from domestic complaint procedures and 
which is not subject to independent judicial control.
The construction of a legal order which has a temporarily limited sphere of validity under an 
international institution-building arrangement is, as we have concluded, a task that has to 
reconcile interlocking normative systems stemming from discrete constitutional sources. 
Given the problems in ‘translating’ concepts of accountability and the separation of powers 
into the context of an internationalised territory, the current critique -  launched from the 
heights of Western constitutionalism — of the UN and its incarnations as territorial ad­
ministrators of Kosovo and East Timor does not fully do justice to the political imagination 
inspiring an internationalisation project. The use of international authority to temporarily 
substitute for ‘authentic’ constitutional orders represents a radical experiment with new tools 
of the international order within the domestic sphere. By delegating legislative powers to an 
international territorial administration, the international community has acquired the capacity 
to work directly at the level of norms and institutions.977 It thus lends practical expression to 
the concept o f international concern fo r what was once called ‘dependent peoples’ through 
which “all members of the organisation are jointly and severally responsible for the fulfilment
974 Mégret/Hoffmann, 'Violator*, supra note 944, at 333.
975 Jacques Derrida, Politics o f Friendship (New York: Verso, trans. by G. Collins, 1997), at 301.
976 Jan Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism Lite’, 1 International Organizations LR 31-58 (2004), at 45 (adop­
ting an admirably ironic perspective on the issue of constitutionalism facing international organisa­
tions).
977 Cox, Bosnian State, supra note 23, at 112.
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of the sacred trust".978 Limitations to international territorial government might set overly strict 
standards which -  given the extensive mandate to steer normative change -  transitional 
administrations cannot live up to.
Mirrored against versions of constitutionalism familiar to Western lawyers, these deficiencies 
undoubtedly raise grave unease as to the propriety of international legislative acts and, 
probably more worryingly, concerning the level of human rights protection in an inter­
nationalised territory. In a post-authoritarian society, however, the import of such notions is 
only gradually absorbed and fails to give rise to organised dissent in the domestic arena. It 
may therefore be argued that the elaboration of democratic rules and their diffusion is 
integral to the transition itself. Imported versions of the rule o f law cannot create a moral 
community because for its proper functioning it requires the existence of such.979 For it to 
receive meaning, the rule of law depends on the existence of an institutional and political 
culture -  the point of departure for every UN transitional administration, in the parenthesis of 
an international administration project, institutional and legal arrangements always entail a 
loss of certainty and liberty. As Bain notes, a ward must be coerced, just as parents coerce 
their children, towards some good for the sake of his own happiness.980 The issue in 
Kosovo, it must be stressed, is not dissatisfaction with the clash between the coercive model 
of institution-building and conceptions of freedom but whether such perceived paternalism is, 
in the eyes of those subject to tutelage, the most expedient means to make the population fit 
to face the 'strenuous conditions o f the modem world’.
To state it provocatively, much of the conventional unease voiced in recent international 
peace-building literature concerning the opening of a protection gap in which an international 
territorial administration would be operating appears moot when viewed through the lens of 
an international administration’s domestic legitimacy. The immunisation of law from demo­
cratic politics only marginally affects the perceived quality o f its exercise of power.981 This is 
especially the case in a setting in which derogations from the participatory model of ad­
ministration can be justified by reliance on emergency powers. The core questions here 
concern the issue of whether the paternalistic impulse (which runs deep in an inter­
nationalisation project) is based on an imperative o f 'strategic liberalisation' and whether it is 
justifiable in terms of the prevalent beliefs and values held in the target society. As 
evidenced by the case of Kosovo under UNMIK rule, justifiability is certainly enhanced when 
an international administration is seen to act in consistency with, and perform, what we have 
termed the territorial interests of the entity under its tutelage. Simply put, when an inter­
national administration behaves as ordinary government.
Moreover, we noted that international political scrutiny of an international organ operating in 
an internationalised territory aims at nothing less than ensuring, through political rather than 
legal means, that its practice complies with a particular system of good governance, forcing
978 Judge Bustamante, ICJ Reports 1962, supra note 192, at 355.
979 Adapted from Koskenniemi, 'Legitimacy’, supra note 827, at 367.
980 'Tw ilight', supra note 771, at 51.
981 This challenges the opinion of commentators who believe that the absence of mechanisms to 
review UNMiK acts undercuts the internal legitimacy of political trusteeship (e.g., Perritt, ‘Judicial 
Review1, supra note 720, at 2). I am regrettably unable to provide empirical data to support this 
hypothesis. I have drawn these conclusions from observations in the course of four years of pro­
fessional experience in BiH and Kosovo.
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it to employ strategies of justification and legitimisation towards the international community. 
The absence of constitutional limits to the exercise of international political power can also 
spill into the international domain and mobilise serious discontent among the global political 
and diplomatic constituency. Failure to justify its coercive measures arguably presents a far 
more serious challenge to an international territorial administration’s legitimacy than that 
presented by local stakeholders. Consider a Report by the Council of Europe's Parliamen­
tary Assembly which, regarding the continuation of international authority in BiH, concluded 
that the OHR constitutes
the supreme institution vested with power in Bosnia... In this connection, the Assembly 
considers it irreconcilable with democratic principles that the OHR should be able to take 
enforceable decisions without being accountable to them or obliged to justify their validity and 
without there being a legal recourse.
It remains conventional wisdom that international administrations cannot be expected to 
"possess the qualities of a democratically elected legislative branch."982 83 Acceptance of the 
collapse of key categories of constitutionalism such as legal certainty, the protection of 
fundamental rights, and the separation of powers would however make our analysis 
vulnerable to implications that we acquiesce in decisionism. We did not intend to insinuate 
this. Advocates of executive detention orders and opponents of judicial review of other 
normative acts should certainly not be given the benefit of the doubt History, as Alvarez 
points out with regard to national legal orders, does not demonstrate that systems 
characterised by heterogeneity cannot have a functioning judiciary capable of some consti­
tutional review.984 It is hard to make the case for constitutional reform in, say, Russia and yet 
refrain from applying similar standards to a subsidiary organ of the UN Secretary-General.
Against this background, the question of the review of international administration measures 
is one that should be explicitly dealt with in the respective Security Council Resolution 
establishing such a temporary regime. Whether this power should be accorded to domestic 
courts within the internationalised territory or whether international administrations should 
create mixed review bodies for this purpose is a discussion which lies outside the purview of 
this thesis.985 By way of conclusion we may note that in the face of increasingly intrusive 
international power, arguments in favour of the partial re-construction of dualism are steadily 
gaining plausibility. Building on the dicta of the BiH Constitutional Court in the cases U 9/00 
and U 25/00,986 acts of international administrations should be reviewable in instances in 
which they replace the functionally competent local organs -  where they act, according to the
982 Article 13 o f Resolution 1384 of the Council o f Europe Parliamentary Assembly (20th Sitting, 23 
June 2004). The Resolution asks the Venice Commission “to determine how fa r [the OHR’s] 
practice complies with the Council o f Europe's basic principles, and in particular with the [ECHR].* 
For a relatively comprehensive, though outdated, enumeration o f OHR-imposed legislation, cf. 
Agata Dziewulska, Peace-Building in Bosnia: Putting Theory into Practice (Ph.D. thesis, on file 
with the EUI Florence, 2004), 203-244. The CoE PA has also a tradition o f urging UNMIK to apply 
and to promote relevant CoE legal instruments. See, e.g., CoE PA Resolution 1375 (14th Sitting, 
29 April 2004), §5.
983 Marshall/Inglis, ‘Disempowerment’, supra note 837, at 117.
984 'Security Council’, supra note 931, at 37.
985 For proposals delineating powers o f judicial review which could be incorporated into the legal 
framework o f ongoing political trusteeships, see Perritt, 'Judicial Review1, supra note 720, at 68 et 
seq.
986 Supra notes 919 and 926.
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terminology adopted in this thesis, as territorial agents. According to this dualist under­
standing, measures of substantive substitution (materielle Ersatzvomahme) -  i.e., instances 
in which the international administration acts within the sphere of a competent national organ 
-  could be nullified by a Constitutional Court if they are not in line with the distribution of 
powers laid down in the local constitution or if they are in breach with other substantive 
provisions.987 The partial review of the powers of an international organ would thus lim it its 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the field of normative action. International authority would have to 
respect the legal limitations which are equivalent to those competent national organs are 
constitutionally required to honour.
Recent institution-building mandates are founded on evolutionary models o f democratic self- 
government. We have argued that concepts of démocratisation and institutional reform are 
embedded in a mandate o f promoting normative change through various techniques of 
‘norm-building’. The associations used to characterise such internationalisation projects -  
'benign imperialism', 'autocracy1, 'dictatorship of virtue’988-  are unable to capture its essential 
characteristics. They misrepresent the extent to which the international community has 
undertaken to perform thick moral obligations, towards itse lf and the people under its 
temporary administration. The picture that emerges from this thesis is therefore neither 
simple nor unidirectional. If anything, it points at an international territorial administration’s 
uncomfortable and paradoxical SelbstverstSndnis as it adopts what has been termed ‘con­
stitutionalism lite’.989 International importing agents are profoundly aware that their ambitious 
goals cannot be fully realised within the ambit of liberalism’s strong critique of un­
challengeable political authority. Their exercise o f power is, very much to the chagrin of 
constitutionalists, markedly distrustful of democratic politics and remains vulnerable to 
strands of exceptionalism and domination in the pursuit o f a modernising -  and indeed 
liberalising -  agenda.
987 This presupposes that the respective compétence d'octroyer (say, the power to issue a directive to 
dismiss a local official) is actually foreseen in the body of local law. Cf. Steiner/AdemoviC, ‘Kom- 
petenzstreitigkeiten', supra note 919, a t 125-26, with reference to  the infamous Biôakciô case.
988 Cf. the introduction to this thesis, p. 13.
909 Supra note 976.
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